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May 30, 2007 
 
 
The Honorable ROBERT BYRD 
President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Washington, D.C. 20510 
The Honorable NANCY PELOSI 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. 20515 
 
DEAR SENATOR BYRD AND SPEAKER PELOSI: 
 
We are pleased to transmit the record of our March 29-30, 2007 hearing on 
“China's Military Modernization and Its Impact on the United States and the Asia-
Pacific.”  The Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act (amended by Pub. L. 
No. 109-108, sect. 635(a)) provides the basis for our hearing, as it requires the 
Commission to study China’s military modernization.  During the hearing, the 
Commission heard from Representatives Dana Rohrabacher, Madeleine Bordallo, and 
Tim Ryan, and received a written statement from Representative Duncan Hunter.  The 
Commission also heard the views of senior defense and intelligence officials, including 
the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, General James Cartwright, and DIA 
Senior Intelligence Analyst Mark Cozad.  An array of notable experts from outside the 
U.S. government also participated in the hearing.1
 
The hearing was timely, coming only three months after a successful direct-ascent anti-
satellite test by China that destroyed one of its own aging weather satellites in low-earth 
orbit. This test was only the third of its kind by any nation in history and served as a 
useful reference point during the hearing to illustrate not only China’s advances in 
military capabilities, but also the extent to which China’s decision making process is still 
very much opaque.  This incident raises questions about Chinese intentions in space.  The 
Commission will address these questions as it continues to monitor developments. 
 
The Commission took a novel approach to this hearing on China’s military 
modernization, its first on this topic in 2007. Using the threat scenarios outlined in the 
Department of Defense’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) as its analytical 
framework, the Commission examined China’s capacity to threaten the United States and 
its allies in the domains of irregular warfare, traditional warfare, and disruptive warfare. 
This approach generated testimony that illuminated many important aspects of China’s 
military strategy and modernization programs, including the heavy emphasis China has 
placed on asymmetric strategies and capabilities.  
 
 
                                                 
1 An electronic copy of the full hearing record is posted to the Commission’s web site: 
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/hearingarchive.php#hearings2007    
 
 China’s Capacity for Irregular Warfare 
 
Several experts testified that if China were to find itself in an armed conflict with the 
United States and its allies such as that resulting from a Taiwan dispute, China is likely to 
employ an array of irregular warfare strategies against its adversaries. According to 
Michael Vickers, Senior Vice President for Strategic Studies at the Center for Strategic 
and Budgetary Assessments, a Chinese attack on Taiwan could entail special operations 
and cyber attacks on U.S. regional bases in Japan and South Korea, and might even 
include cyber attacks on the U.S. homeland that target the U.S. financial, economic, 
energy, and communications infrastructure.  
 
China’s search for asymmetric capabilities to leverage against U.S. vulnerabilities 
represents a serious form of irregular warfare preparation. China is convinced that, 
financially and technologically, it cannot defeat the United States in a traditional force-
on-force match up. However, as Chairman of the Defense Science Board Dr. William 
Schneider highlighted, if it can acquire niche weapons systems that are relatively 
inexpensive and that can exploit U.S. vulnerabilities, it stands a chance of deterring or 
defeating the United States in a limited engagement. This strategy explains China’s 
emphasis on acquiring sophisticated ballistic and cruise missiles, submarines, mines, and 
information and electronic warfare capabilities.  
 
According to Dr. Derek Reveron, Professor at the U.S. Naval War College, Beijing also 
engages in a much softer form of irregular warfare through its perception management 
operations, both in times of tranquil relations and in times of crisis. Perception 
management is not unique to China – all nations have similar international perception 
goals.  However, because the Chinese Communist Party maintains tight political and 
media controls, Chinese perception management campaigns are more tightly coordinated 
with diplomacy.  
 
China has worked diligently over the last two decades, as Dr. Reveron stated, “to 
promote a non-aggressive image of itself through a policy of non-interference, outreach 
to foreign publics and governments through public works projects, participation in the 
international system, and comparisons to the United States, which it characterizes as a 
hegemon on the offensive.”  This is in keeping with an internal and foreign policy 
statement made in 1991 by Party Chairman Deng Xiaoping when he put forward that 
China should, “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our 
capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; never claim 
leadership.” 
 
Similarly, Dr. Reveron noted that in times of crisis China has sought to manipulate 
information in order to cast itself in a positive light or as the victim of U.S. aggression. 
He illustrated his point by recounting China’s response to the crisis that ensued when a 
Chinese fighter collided with a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft in international airspace 
in April 2001.  The damaged EP-3 was forced to land on China’s Hainan Island. By 
holding the crew in isolation for the first three days and monopolizing information, by 
characterizing the EP-3 as a spy plane, and by charging that the U.S. had violated China’s 
sovereignty by landing the aircraft on Hainan Island, Chinese leaders were able to portray 
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 the United States as the aggressor in the crisis and elicit a statement of regret for the loss 
of the Chinese pilot.     
 
China’s Traditional Warfare Capabilities 
 
Western literature on Chinese military modernization, as well as Chinese national defense 
white papers, acknowledges that China is presently in the midst of a lengthy round of 
holistic military modernization begun in 1992 with the aim of creating a professional, 
high-technology fighting force equal to those of the world’s best militaries. To this end it 
has raised its defense budget 10 percent or more each year over the last 11 years. This 
March, Beijing announced that its 2007 defense budget would rise by 17.8 percent to 
total $44.94 billion. The Pentagon believes this figure is significantly understated and that 
China’s actual defense budget is closer to two or three times this amount, or $90-$135 
billion.  Because of the opacity of Beijing’s expenditures, particularly those that are 
military-related, it is difficult for analysts to agree on precise amounts.  Nonetheless, the 
increasingly sophisticated capabilities purchased with such expenditures are readily 
demonstrated.  In his testimony, Defense Science Board Chairman Schneider illustrated 
the benefit of looking at capabilities rather than budgets by saying, “I think looking at it 
from an output perspective may in some ways be more informative than trying to 
calculate how the inputs are measured.” Therefore, while larger defense budgets do not 
necessarily reflect an increase in capabilities, in the case of Beijing’s funding of the PLA 
there is a strong correlation in this regard.   
 
According to the testimony of LTC (Ret.) Cortez Cooper of Science Applications 
International Corporation, China’s weapons acquisitions and training are guided by an 
overall strategy of preparation to win “informationized wars” – or wars that are heavily 
reliant on computers and information systems. He also noted that Beijing’s strategists 
believe that, in the future, conflicts that involve China will be limited in geographical 
scope, duration, and political objectives, and will be highly dependent upon command, 
control, communications, and computer (C4) systems. 
 
As China surveys scenarios of potential future conflict, one of the most likely is a conflict 
over Taiwan in which the United States and/or Japan might intervene. This understanding 
has guided China’s financial investment in the military over the last 15 years, during 
which the majority of the resources for weapons acquisition has gone to the Navy and Air 
Force rather than the land forces.  Nonetheless, the pattern of military modernization and 
acquisition by China suggests the possibility it is consciously preparing for other types of 
and locations for armed conflict (or efforts to deter conflict with shows of force). 
 
Navy 
 
The PLA continues to modernize its Navy with an emphasis on those platforms that are 
best suited for littoral or “green water” operations. China has completed the acquisition of 
its fleet of a dozen Kilo-class submarines from Russia along with a complement of 
advanced SS-N-27 “Sizzler” supersonic anti-ship missiles.  These low altitude sea-
skimming missiles were specifically designed for attacking U.S. aircraft carriers by 
defeating the Aegis anti-missile system.  Simultaneously, it is launching ever-larger 
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 numbers of indigenously developed Song and Yuan-class submarines, the latter of which 
may be equipped with an air-independent propulsion system for improved endurance. 
 
The PLA Navy surface fleet has also made substantial progress in raising its air defense 
and surface warfare capabilities. Its three newest classes of surface combatants, the 
Luyang II and Luzhou-class destroyers and Jiangkai II-class frigate, are all equipped with 
sophisticated air search and missile guidance radars and long-range, vertical launch, 
surface-to-air missiles. However, the anti-submarine warfare capabilities of these vessels 
are weak – as was the case with their predecessors.  
 
In the assessment of Dr. Andrew Erickson, Professor at the U.S. Naval War College, 
naval power projection remains lower on the PLA Navy’s list of priorities than littoral 
operations in the near term. Despite their latent production capacity, China’s shipyards 
have not engaged in the serial production of replenishment-at-sea ships, considered 
essential for the re-supply of surface action groups engaged in blue water operations. 
Similarly, even though China has benefited from close to two decades of aircraft carrier 
design study, it still has not produced a single operational carrier platform. However, 
there are indications that the PLA Navy soon may refurbish the Russian carrier Varyag 
that it acquired from Ukraine and place it in an operational state. 
 
If China launches ten of its new nuclear-powered Shang-class submarines by the end of 
2008, as posited by Mr. Cooper, this would reflect a new emphasis on blue water naval 
capabilities on the part of Chinese strategists. In fact, so substantial have been Chinese 
advancements in naval modernization that they are leading some to begin to consider 
China as a partner, along with the U.S. Navy, in protecting freedom of navigation and 
maritime security on the high seas.  During the hearing, RADM (Retired) Eric McVadon, 
former U.S. Defense Attaché in Beijing, suggested that, “[i]t is reasonable to envision the 
PLA Navy as part of our thousand ship navy concept, described by the U.S. Chief of 
Naval Operations as an international fleet of like-minded nations participating in security 
operations around the world.  U.S. policies can foster, if not ensure, a favorable 
outcome.”  There may be problems in building such a partnership with China, however.  
Among those is the fact that, according to section 1203 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, the U. S. Navy likely would not be permitted to 
engage in the forms of operational information sharing with the PLA that would be 
required for such military-to-military collaboration. 
 
Air Force 
 
China has always considered air superiority over the Strait as a necessary precondition to 
successful invasion and to this end has funded the PLA Air Force heavily over the last 15 
years. In the early 1990s, China abandoned its hope of building an advanced fleet of 
fighter aircraft through only indigenous means and instituted a two track system of 
acquiring advanced types from abroad while continuing to pursue parallel domestic 
programs. Today, the PLA Air Force possesses close to 300 of the Russian Sukhoi family 
of aircraft, including fourth generation, imported Su-27 and Su-30s, and licensed, co-
produced Su-27s, designated the “J-11.” It is also manufacturing its first indigenous, 
light-weight, fourth-generation fighter, the J-10, in increasing numbers.  
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 China continues to rely primarily on foreign purchases to fulfill its requirements for 
strategic lift and aerial refueling. The IL-78 still serves as the mainstay for PLA Air Force 
aerial refueling, though it has been supplemented by H-6 bombers reconfigured for this 
purpose. According to Mr. Cooper, China recently agreed on a deal to purchase 
additional IL-76 transport aircraft that would increase its lift capacity for airborne forces 
by as much as 150 percent.   
 
As evidenced by its modernization trends, the PLA Air Force understands the importance 
of developing a fleet with information systems that can be integrated into a theater-wide 
command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR) system. It has sought to install data links in all its advanced 
fighter aircraft and to build or acquire airborne early warning aircraft. China’s handful of 
Y-8 and KJ-2000 aircraft fulfill this latter requirement to a limited degree. The second of 
these is China’s answer to the United States blocking the $1 billion deal for China to 
purchase Israel’s “Phalcon” system in 2000. The KJ-2000 system is based on the Russian 
A-50 airframe and uses an indigenous phased array radar.  
 
Army 
 
Despite the fact that China’s defense budget has favored the Navy and Air Force over the 
last decade and a half, the modernization of China’s ground forces continues to constitute 
an important component of the overall development of China’s armed forces. The Army 
continues to train in combined arms warfare and to focus on improving the quality of its 
infantry, armor, and artillery operations. It also conducts joint operations with the Navy 
and Air Force to train in the types of air mobile and amphibious assault operations that it 
would be called upon to undertake in a potential conflict over Taiwan. According to Mr. 
Cooper, about a quarter of the PLA’s maneuver divisions and brigades focus on training 
for amphibious operations at four or more major amphibious training bases.     
 
Even though training across the Army continues to lag behind that of the Navy and Air 
Force, in recent years the U.S. Defense Department has witnessed significant efforts 
dedicated to improving the professionalism and effectiveness of all PLA services. These 
efforts include developing a professional non-commissioned officer corps, improving the 
professional military education programs for officers, reforming and improving the 
quality of training, raising the pay of enlisted personnel, and emphasizing integration of 
information technology in daily operations.  
 
Second Artillery 
 
Development continues on both the nuclear and conventional components of China’s 
strategic missile forces, otherwise known as the Second Artillery. Presently, China’s 
land-based, solid-fueled, road-mobile DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile constitutes 
its sole means of nuclear deterrence. However, with the introduction of the DF-31’s naval 
counterpart, the JL-2, on the Jin-class submarine, China will possess an even more 
survivable nuclear deterrent.  
 
China’s conventional force, consisting of medium and short-range ballistic missiles, 
constitutes a crucial component of the deterrent force arrayed against Taiwan and is 
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 expected to fulfill an important theater-level precision strike role for China if armed 
conflict should arise. Presently, the Second Artillery’s arsenal of 850 short-range ballistic 
missiles is being augmented at a rate of roughly 100 missiles per year. Additionally, the 
lethality of these missiles has increased through the development of more sophisticated 
warheads.  
 
One other development in China’s conventional missile force is noteworthy. The Second 
Artillery is designing a variant of the DF-21 intermediate-range ballistic missile with a 
maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV). This weapon will be very difficult to defend 
against due to its extremely high terminal speed.  According to Mr. McVadon, if this 
capability is achieved, U.S. carrier groups responding to a Taiwan crisis may need to 
operate much further from China’s coast, increasing the difficulty of air operations over 
the Strait.  
 
The Taiwan Strait 
 
Contingencies involving Taiwan remain the focus of Chinese planning and force 
acquisitions in the near term. The goals of PLA strategists are to deter Taiwan from 
declaring independence and to deter or delay the arrival of intervening third party forces, 
such as those of the United States or Japan. According to Dr. Bernard Cole, professor at 
the National War College, while Taiwan’s armed forces are arguably better trained than 
their mainland counterparts, they also are under-armed in every service. Cole emphasized 
the importance of this by noting that if armed conflict were to break out between the two, 
it is unlikely that Taiwan could withstand the pressure from the mainland for more than a 
few weeks. He also remarked that, even with the addition of the defense systems that 
would be funded by the Special Budget that has been held up in the Legislative Yuan for 
more than five years, Taiwan’s armed forces still would face a significant challenge 
defending the island. Indeed, it has become the consistent criticism of the United States 
government over the past decade that Taiwan is not preparing sufficiently for its own 
defense and is too reliant on the potential intervention of U.S. forces. 
 
Chinese strategists are well-aware of the historical precedent of U.S. armed intervention 
on behalf of Taiwan and are developing strategies and capabilities to deter or delay the 
arrival of such forces in the theater. Chinese doctrine in this area stresses the use of pre-
emptive, decisive strikes on forward bases and staging areas, such as Guam and Okinawa, 
and employment of a variety of platforms to deny the operational use of the waters in the 
Chinese littoral. Presently, the PLA possesses the capabilities to maintain sea denial 
operations out to 400 miles from China’s coastline for a period of days. By 2010 China is 
expected to be able to sustain such operations for a period of weeks.    
 
China’s Capabilities to Execute Disruptive Warfare 
 
Disruptive warfare is a form of non-traditional warfare with the aim of undermining the 
qualitative advantages of an opponent. Usually, fielding these asymmetric capabilities 
does not involve as much research and development or fiscal investment as traditional 
capabilities. Thus, developing disruptive capabilities is a strategic choice for a nation 
with a nascent military force preparing for conflict with a comparatively advanced 
adversary. 
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As evidenced by the trajectory of its military modernization, Chinese defense planners 
are seeking to accomplish the goal of undermining the U.S. military’s technological edge 
through a variety of disruptive means.  Among these is cyber warfare. USSTRATCOM 
Commander General Cartwright testified before the Commission that China is actively 
engaging in cyber reconnaissance by probing the computer networks of U.S. government 
agencies as well as private companies. The data collected from these computer 
reconnaissance campaigns can be used for myriad purposes, including identifying weak 
points in the networks, understanding how leaders in the United States think, discovering 
the communication patterns of American government agencies and private companies, 
and attaining valuable information stored throughout the networks. General Cartwright 
testified that this information is akin to that which in times past had to be gathered by 
human intelligence over a much longer period of time. He went on to say that in today’s 
information environment, the exfiltration that once took years can be accomplished in a 
matter of minutes in one download session. 
 
Speaking of the magnitude of the damage cyber attacks could cause, General Cartwright 
said, “I think that we should start to consider that regret factors associated with a cyber 
attack could, in fact, be in the magnitude of a weapon of mass destruction.” Here, by 
“regret factors,” General Cartwright was referring to the psychological effects that would 
be generated by the sense of disruption and chaos caused by a cyber attack. 
 
One subsequent panelist posited a mitigating analysis. James Lewis from the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies testified that asymmetric attacks, including cyber 
attacks, are more likely to solidify the resistance of the targeted population than to cause 
real damage. Speaking about the practical outcomes of asymmetric attacks, Lewis said, 
“The effect is usually to solidify resistance, to encourage people to continue the fight, and 
if you haven't actually badly damaged their abilities to continue to fight, all you've done 
is annoy them, and what many of us call cyber attacks [are] not weapons of mass 
destruction but weapons of mass annoyance.” Despite the different estimates of potential 
damage from cyber attacks, all the panelists agreed that developing asymmetric 
capabilities is a primary focus of the PLA’s military modernization endeavor. 
 
This modernization also includes efforts to build competitive space and counter-space 
capabilities, the latter demonstrated by the January 2007 anti-satellite test. According to 
Hudson Institute Research Fellow Mary FitzGerald, Chinese military strategists and 
aerospace scientists have been “quietly designing a blueprint for achieving space 
dominance” for more than a decade. 
 
Recommendations 
 
Based on the information presented at the hearing, we offer the following four 
preliminary recommendations to the Congress:   
 
1) In order to minimize the possibility of miscalculation and conflict, the 
Commission recommends that Congress urge the Administration to press 
Beijing to engage in a series of measures that would provide more information 
 7
 about its strategic intentions and the ultimate purpose of its increasing military 
expenditures. 
 
2) To further facilitate mutual understanding and avoid conflict resulting from 
inaccurate perceptions of interests or values by either nation, and to establish 
relationships that could prove critical for de-escalation of crises, the 
Commission recommends that Congress call on the Defense Department to 
develop a strategic dialogue whereby the senior military staff from the United 
States and China can discuss potentially contentious issues of the day such as 
non-interference in other nations’ satellite activity and protocol for the use of 
nuclear weapons. 
 
3) The Commission recommends that Congress ensure the adequate funding of 
military and intelligence agency programs that monitor and protect critical 
American computer networks and sensitive information. 
 
4) The Commission recommends that Congress give high priority to the support 
of American space programs that ensure continued freedom of access to space 
and the safety of space-based commercial and defense-related assets.  This 
would include hardening satellites, maintaining quick-launch replacement 
satellites, and other defensive measures called for by the Operational 
Responsive Space framework. 
 
The transcript, witness statements, and supporting documents for this hearing can be 
found on the Commission’s website at www.uscc.gov. We hope these will be helpful as 
the Congress continues its assessment of China’s military modernization.  
 
 Sincerely yours, 
 
 
        Carolyn Bartholomew                                                  Daniel Blumenthal 
                Chairman                                                                Vice Chairman 
 
 
cc:  Members of Congress and Congressional staff 
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 May 30, 2007 
 
The Honorable ROBERT C. BYRD 
President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Washington, D.C. 20510 
The Honorable NANCY PELOSI 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. 20515 
 
DEAR SENATOR BYRD AND SPEAKER PELOSI: 
 
We are pleased to transmit the record of our February 1-2, 2007 public hearing on 
“The U.S.-China Relationship: Economics and Security in Perspective.”  The Floyd D. 
Spence National Defense Authorization Act (amended by Pub. L. No. 109-108, section 
635(a)) provides the basis for this hearing, as it requires the Commission to submit an 
advisory report to the U.S. Congress on “the national security implications and impact of 
the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People’s 
Republic of China.”  In this hearing, the Commission reviewed the overall status of the 
U.S.-China relationship, and evaluated both the progress that has been made since 
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and the emerging 
challenges still facing U.S.-China relations. 
 
The testimony offered at the hearing highlighted views that the United States 
needs to develop a coherent, coordinated policy toward the People’s Republic of China 
that integrates economic, security, diplomatic, and human rights concerns.  Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Richard Lawless testified, 
“China’s rapid emergence is an important element of today’s strategic environment, of 
course, one that has significant implications for the United States, the Asia Pacific region, 
and the world.  The uncertainty surrounding China’s rise underscores the importance of 
the Commission’s charter to identify approaches that best serve U.S. interests in 
managing the way forward.”  Development of a more coordinated framework for 
approaching China would strengthen the ability of the United States to communicate its 
interests to China and how it believes China must act to assume a place on the world 
stage as a mature, responsible world power.   
 
Developing a more coordinated approach will require reexamining the 
expectations fundamental to the U.S.-China relationship and encouraging a public 
dialogue among U.S. commercial, security, and diplomatic interests intended to identify 
conflicts in American behavior toward China, and identification of policy solutions that 
best serve the economic and security interests of the United States and our people. James 
Mann, FPI Author-in-Residence at the School for Advanced International Studies at 
Johns Hopkins University, testified that “[U.S.] policy and public discourse about China 
are often affected by ideas, assumptions, rationalizations, and phrases that we fail to 
examine.” 
 
 In addition to the economic benefits of expanded trade, the granting of Permanent 
Normal Trading Relationship (PNTR) status for China six years ago was linked to the 
social and political belief that economic liberalization inevitably would lead China 
toward democratic political reforms.  However, as Mr. Mann argued, the United States 
 
 has not considered fully the possibility that China may not undergo dramatic political 
change as a result of its economic development and that leadership by the Chinese 
Communist Party may remain intact. As December 2006 marked the completion of the 
fifth year after China’s accession into the WTO, the United States should review its 
economic relationship with China and assess the extent to which all the Congress’s 
expectations when it approved PNTR status for China have or have not been realized.    
 
The U.S-China Economic and Trade Relationship 
 
 China’s policies of market liberalization have resulted in rapid export-led 
economic growth prompting increased foreign investment; development of China’s 
manufacturing capabilities; and integration into the global supply chain.  China’s 
abundant and inexpensive labor supply has made that country an obvious place for 
multinational companies to expand their production.  However, as Dr. Peter Navarro, 
Professor of Business at the University of California, Irvine, observed in his testimony, 
five of eight factors identified as major drivers of China’s comparative advantage—i.e., 
its ability to undercut the prices of global competitors—are considered unfair trading 
practices.  These include its undervalued currency, counterfeiting and piracy, export 
industry subsidies, and lax health, safety, and environmental regulations.  These practices 
violate China’s WTO commitments, especially regarding workers’ rights, market access, 
currency manipulation, subsidies, and the protection of intellectual property rights.  These 
violations and unfair practices also contribute to a growing U.S. trade deficit with China, 
one that U.S. Census Bureau statistics confirm increased 177 percent in the past six years 
from $83.8 billion in 2000 to $232.5 billion in 2006. 
 
Former Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Grant Aldonas 
argued that, as a result of changes in technology, transportation costs, and 
communication, China is no longer a low-cost producer, but the country maintains its 
attractiveness as a location for foreign direct investment because of the massive 
distortions produced by Beijing’s economic policies.  These distortions diminish the 
competitiveness of American workers, benefits, and wages, and as Ms. Thea Lee, Policy 
Director of the AFL-CIO, testified, even the prospect that American workers will be able 
to participate in effective collective bargaining as members of unions.  Manufacturers 
increasingly are looking to China for its lower labor costs, and one significant factor is 
that the Chinese government prevents workers from organizing and negotiating for their 
wages, benefits, and rights.  Dr. Navarro argued that as more American companies 
offshore their production to China, the American business community will lose its 
political will to lobby the government against unfair trading practices.  It will be 
increasingly in the interest of businesses operating in China to maintain status quo 
distortions in order to protect their investments, but, as Mr. Aldonas stated, this is not 
necessarily in the interest of the United States. 
 
All witnesses agreed that currency reform alone is not the solution to rebalancing 
the U.S.-China relationship because the deficit and disadvantages are compounded by 
China’s other unfair trading practices.  Dr. Navarro noted that revaluation would not 
produce a one-for-one improvement in the ability of the United States to compete with 
  
 the China Price.1  Rather, coordinated actions in the WTO against unfair industrial 
subsidies and restrictions on workers’ rights are required to produce a comprehensive 
reshaping of the U.S.-China trade balance and to induce China’s greater compliance with 
its WTO obligations. 
 
The U.S.-China Military and Security Relationship 
 
On January 11, 2007 China fired an anti-satellite weapon at one of its own 
weather satellites, destroying the satellite and littering space with debris.  Deputy Under 
Secretary Lawless stated that this test and other actions by the Chinese in the past six 
years illustrate a “more confident and increasingly assertive posture than when the U.S.-
China Commission was established in 2000.”  China increasingly is investing in 
capabilities designed to thwart U.S. access to the region.  Of concern, China’s ultimate 
objectives for its military modernization and assertiveness remain unclear. 
 
Dr. Thomas Ehrhard, Senior Analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments, testified that the U.S. must actively maintain the existing military balance 
in Asia.  Improvement of China’s capabilities requires a combined U.S. strategy of 
creating a flexible base structure, maintaining long-range forces, and supporting stealthy 
submarine and aircraft systems. Dr. Ehrhard stated, “Many key measures in the military 
balance vis-à-vis China are moving in a negative direction from a U.S. point of view, 
especially in the Taiwan Strait, and that movement is occurring at a pace that may expose 
this nation and our allies to more destabilizing Chinese actions in the future, generate 
capacity for coercion by PRC leaders, and present increasing risk of miscalculation 
owing to an erosion of deterrence.”  Deputy Under Secretary Lawless concluded that in 
the absence of improved transparency and broader trust between the two countries, the 
risk of miscalculating the development of China’s military capabilities would increase.  .   
 
Mr. Kenneth Allen, Senior Analyst at the CNA Corporation, testified that the 
issue of transparency in the U.S.-China relationship should be viewed with a 25-year 
perspective, and that U.S.-China military-to-military exchanges would benefit from 
formal agreements pledging prior notification of meeting time and place and topics of 
discussion. Army Col. Charles Hooper, Senior Lecturer at the School of International 
Graduate Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School, argued that China does not engage in 
military-to-military exchanges for the purpose of increasing transparency or reducing 
threat nor does China share information out of a sense of obligation or reciprocity.  Thus, 
it is unlikely the U.S. military will be able to obtain increased access to and conduct 
meaningful conversation with the PLA’s leadership regardless of its investments in 
military-to-military exchanges.  However, all witnesses underscored the importance of 
continuing to seek dialogue with the Chinese and monitoring the progress of interactions.  
Moreover, several witnesses highlighted the need to refocus the education and training of 
                                                 
1 According to Dr. Navarro, “The China Price refers to the fact that Chinese manufacturers can undercut 
significantly the prices offered by foreign competitors over a mind-bogglingly wide range of products and 
services.  Today, as a result of the China Price, China produces more than 70% of the worlds DVDs and 
toys; more than half of its bikes, cameras, shoes, and telephones; and more than a third of its air 
conditioners, color TVs, computer monitors, luggage and microwave ovens.”  The Coming China Wars, 
New York: FT Press, 2007), p. 2. 
  
 U.S. military personnel to incorporate more study of China because of the possibility it 
may choose a course that will make it an adversary of the United States. 
 
Additionally, creating a new framework for military-to-military exchanges—such 
as engaging our allies in the region and throughout the world on the subject of the PLA’s 
modernization or engaging the PLA in security dialogues about third parties or on issues 
of humanitarian assistance and disaster response—could produce new insight into PLA 
strategic thought and intention.    
 
The U.S.-China Political and Diplomatic Relationship
 
Since China’s accession to the WTO, U.S.-China relations have grown 
increasingly complex as the United States has sought to balance trade promotion with 
concerns over China’s behavior regarding proliferation, support of rogue governments, 
and military developments, especially regarding the Taiwan Strait.  Acting Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs John Norris testified, “Our 
vision is a China that is more open, transparent, and democratic, and a China that will 
join us in actions that strengthen and support a global system that has provided peace, 
security, and prosperity to America, China, and the rest of the world.  Encouraging China 
to move in that direction continues to be the foundation of our policy; the question…is 
how we can most effectively do that.”  He noted that while it is encouraging China to 
choose the path of a mature, responsible stakeholder in the global system, the United 
States is aware of the possibility that China will not choose this course. 
 
To facilitate the expression of U.S. interests and policy to China, the United States 
and China have instituted structural mechanisms for diplomatic engagement, such as the 
Senior Dialogue and the Strategic Economic Dialogue.  However, while witnesses agreed 
that engagement, dialogue, and cooperation with China are needed to improve issues of 
transparency and governance, Dr. Edward Friedman, Hawkins Chair Professor of 
Political Science at the University of Wisconsin and Dr. Alan Wachman, Professor of 
International Politics at The Fletcher School at Tufts University, underscoring James 
Mann’s point, both highlighted the need to reevaluate how that engagement occurs and 
whether U.S. expectations and assumptions are, in fact, correct that economic growth in 
China will lead to political reform.     
 
Witnesses noted throughout the hearing that energy holds immense potential for 
improved U.S.-China cooperation.  Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy for 
International Energy Cooperation David Pumphrey testified, “As the two largest energy 
consumers in the world, the United States and China have a common interest in working 
together both bilaterally and multilaterally to promote global energy security and a 
cleaner energy future.”  The Department of Energy has actively engaged China on a 
range of energy issues, including fossil energy, energy efficiency, renewable energy, 
nuclear energy, and nonproliferation.  Moreover, it has worked to incorporate China in 
dialogue and association with the International Energy Agency, especially as China 
continues to develop its strategic petroleum reserve. 
 
  
 To improve the depth of U.S.-China cooperation and to improve regional security, 
given the close relationships the United States maintains in East Asia, Dr. Friedman 
argued that China must change its diplomatic policies regarding three key regional issues:  
territorial disputes in the South China Sea and China’s relationship with Southeast Asia; 
territorial disputes in the East China Sea and China’s relationship with Japan; and 
policies toward the people of Taiwan.  Moreover, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State Norris acknowledged the importance of involving the diplomatic community in 
addressing China’s recent ASAT test, and suggested the possibility of initiating a 
dialogue between the Department of State and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
about the importance of verification in testing of space objects and fair warning, as 
prescribed by the Outer Space Treaty to which China has acceded but which it has not 
ratified.  Resolution of these issues not only will foster China’s reputation as a 
responsible regional partner, but also will strengthen U.S.-China dialogue by lessening 
tensions with U.S. allies and allowing engagement to focus on issues of mutual interest. 
 
Despite the areas of potential conflict in U.S.-China diplomacy, Acting Deputy 
Assistant Secretary Norris and Dr. Shiping Hua, Senior Fellow at the McConnell Center 
and Professor at the University of Louisville, both agreed that it is in China’s interest to 
play a constructive role in the East Asian region and even globally.  Dr. Hua testified that 
Chinese leaders recognize this and, after three decades of engagement between the 
United States and China, they realize that constructive engagement with the United States 
is in China’s interest.  Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary Norris said, “We must continue 
to build on the foundations of cooperation that we have established, broadening them and 
deepening them, while engaging China in a frank and direct manner about those areas in 
which we believe China’s policy or behavior is undercutting our common objectives of 
peace, security, and prosperity in the region and the world.”  As expressed by witnesses 
throughout the hearing, these undercutting policies occur in both the economic and 
security realm, and  the United States needs to design its diplomatic approaches to China 
so that it pursues American interests in a coordinated way in all three realms of 
interaction:  economic, security, and political.     
 
Recommendations 
 
1. Because understanding China’s strategic intentions—both in the economic and 
security realms—is essential to formulating a responsible and proactive policy 
toward China that addresses the complexity of U.S. interests and avoids 
miscalculation and potential conflict, the Commission recommends that Congress 
take all possible opportunities in parliamentary exchange settings to urge officials 
of the People’s Republic of China to be as forthcoming as possible with the 
United States and other nations in clearly describing its strategic intent and 
objectives, and to make prior announcement of significant and possibly 
controversial actions such as the recent anti-satellite test in order to reduce the 
potential for miscalculation and prevent the development of anxieties that swell 
into adversarial inclinations. 
 
  
 2. The Commission recommends that Congress instruct the Administration to 
reevaluate its assessment of China’s currency policies in the Department of 
Treasury’s Annual Report to Congress. 
 
3. The Commission recommends that Congress both applaud the recent actions 
taken by the Administration to employ WTO mechanisms to seek relief from 
China’s unfair trading practices, and urge the Administration to act more rapidly 
to employ those mechanisms in future circumstances where China fails to rectify 
other unfair trading practices. 
 
4. The Commission recommends that Congress direct the Administration to 
determine the nature of past military-to-military exchanges with China that appear 
to have produced the greatest enhancement in the U.S.-China relationship and 
benefits for the United States, to seek agreement from China to expand the 
frequency and number of exchanges determined to be mutually productive; and to 
seek a formal agreement from China providing that there will be an exchange of 
the specific details, agenda, list of participants, and topics for discussion for each 
military-to-military exchange circulated to all participants at least several weeks 
in advance of the exchanges. 
 
5. The Commission recommends that Congress urge the Department of Defense to 
expand its dialogue with the militaries of other nations in the Asia Pacific region 
about the effects of China’s military modernization, actions, and objectives on the 
regional balance of power, with the purpose of strengthening U.S. partnerships in 
the region. 
 
6. The Commission recommends that Congress instruct the Administration to create 
an interagency committee on China to coordinate the formulation and execution 
of U.S.-China policy, and to facilitate development of a comprehensive U.S. 
Government policy toward China that incorporates economic, security, and 
diplomatic considerations and objectives. 
 
The transcript, witness statements, and supporting documents for this hearing can be 
found on the Commission’s website at www.uscc.gov.   We hope these will be helpful as 
the Congress continues its assessment of U.S.-China relations.  
 
Sincerely yours, 
 
 
        Carolyn Bartholomew                                                  Daniel Blumenthal 
                Chairman                                                                Vice Chairman 
              
cc: Members of Congress and Congressional Staff 
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 CHINA'S MILITARY MODERNIZATION 
 
 AND ITS IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES AND 
 
 THE ASIA-PACIFIC 
 
_________ 
 
 
 THURSDAY, MARCH 29,  2007 
 
U.S. -CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION 
 Washington,  D.C.   
 
     The Commiss ion met  in  Room 562,   Dirksen Senate  Off ice  
Bui ld ing,  Washington,  D.C.  a t  9 :00 a .m. ,  Chairman Carolyn 
Bar tholomew,  Vice  Chairman Danie l  Blumenthal ,  and Commiss ioners  
Wil l iam A.  Reinsch and Larry  M. Wortzel  (Hear ing Cochairs) ,  
pres iding.  
 
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CAROLYN 
BARTHOLOMEW 
  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Good morning.   We ' re  going to  
go ahead and get  s tar ted  wi th  our  opening s ta tements ,  and then we ' l l  
break i f  we ' re  going on when Congresswoman Bordal lo  comes.   I  am 
pleased to  welcome everyone to  the  second hear ing of  the  U.S. -China 
Economic and Secur i ty  Review Commiss ion 's  2007 repor t ing cycle .  
We 're  very  p leased that  you could  jo in  us  today.  
 I  am thr i l led  to  welcome our  two newest  commiss ioners ,  Dennis  
Shea and Mark Esper ,  who jo ined us  las t  week and the  week before ,  
respect ively .   We 're  very pleased to  have them on board.  We 're  looking 
forward to  thei r  par t ic ipat ion,  and we real ly  are  expect ing great  
contr ibut ions  f rom them to  the  work of  the  Commiss ion.  
 At  today 's  hear ing,  we wi l l  be  explor ing the  rapid  modernizat ion 
of  the  Chinese  mi l i tary ,  the  People 's  Libera t ion  Army.   We wi l l  be  
assessing the impl ica t ions  of  the  mi l i ta ry  bui ldup and the  impact  tha t  i t  
i s  having on the  secur i ty  of  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  and the  s tabi l i ty  of  the  
Asia-Pacif ic  region.   
 The cochairs  of  our  hear ing wi l l  be  Commiss ioners  Larry  
Wortzel  and Bi l l  Reinsch.   We are  very p leased to  hear  th is  morning 
f rom severa l  members  of  Congress .   We 've  got  a  few s ta tements  tha t  
 are  going to  be  submit ted  for  the  record  by several  senators .   Al l  of  
these  wi l l  ass is t  the  Commiss ion in  unders tanding the  perspect ive  of  
members  of  Congress  on these  issues  and a lso  on a  considera t ion of  the  
pr ior i t ies  of  the  110th  Congress  in  address ing U.S. -China  re la t ions .  
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 Later  today and tomorrow,  we wi l l  hear  f rom key off ic ia ls  f rom 
execut ive  branch agencies .   And I 'm very  honored that  Genera l  James  
Car twr ight  who serves  as  the  Commander  of  the  U.S.  St ra tegic  
Command wi l l  be  jo ining us .   He 's  commander  of  one of  our  mi l i tary 's  
four  funct ional  Combatant  Commands.  
 We wi l l  a lso  receive  tes t imony f rom Mark Cozad,  a  Senior  
In te l l igence Analys t  a t  the  Defense  Inte l l igence  Agency,  and tes t imony 
f rom exper ts  f rom the  pr ivate  sector  and academia  who wi l l  contr ibute  
thei r  v iews and ins ights  regarding the  issues  to  be  addressed.  
 I  would  now l ike  to  turn  the  microphone over  to  the  
Commiss ion 's  Vice  Chairman Dan Blumenthal  for  his  opening remarks .  
 
OPENING STATEMENT OF VICE CHAIRMAN DANIEL 
BLUMENTHAL 
 
 VICE CHAIRMAN BLUMENTHAL:  Thank you very  much,  
Chairwoman Bar tholomew.   And I 'd  l ike  to  second your  comments  and 
acknowledge our  newest  commiss ioners,  Dennis  and Mark.   We're  very ,  
very  happy to  have you on board and very  much look forward to  the  
contr ibut ions  you wi l l  undoubtedly  make.  
 As  the  chai rman ment ioned,  today our  focus  is  on China 's  
mi l i tary  moderniza t ion  and speci f ica l ly  i t s  increasing capaci ty  to  wage 
both  i r regular  and t radi t ional  forms of  warfare  and ef fec ts  of  this  
modernizat ion on the  mi l i tary  balance  across  the Taiwan St ra i t .  
 In  our  2006 repor t  we found that  China 's  extensive  mi l i tary 
modernizat ion program includes  acquir ing equipment  that  wi l l  a l low i t  
to  project  force  fur ther  into  the  Paci f ic  Ocean as  wel l  as  into the 
Indian Ocean,  and to  confront  U.S.  and a l l ied  forces  in  the  region i f  i t  
concludes  i t s  in teres ts  require  such confronta t ion.  
 Today,  we ' l l  hear  f rom a  var ie ty  of  exper ts  about  these  three  
facets  of  the  modernizat ion program and how the  resul t ing capabi l i t ies  
are  present ly  being employed or  could  potent ia l ly  be  employed in  the  
future .  
 I  want  to  recognize  Commiss ioner  Larry Wortze l ,  who was  our  
chai rman las t  year  and is  one  of  the  cochairs ,  and Commiss ioner  Bi l l  
Reinsch,  and thank them very  much for  assembl ing th is  very  good and 
informat ive  hear ing.  
 The wi tness  l i s t  i s  extensive  and impress ive  and I 'm conf ident  
that  the  Commiss ion 's  abi l i ty  to  advise  Congress on these  mat ters  in  
the  hear ing wi l l  be  substant ia l ly  enhanced by what  we learn  here  today 
 and tomorrow.  
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 So,  I ’ l l  now turn  i t  over  to  Commiss ioner  Wortzel .  
 
OPENING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER LARRY M.  
WORTZEL, HEARING COCHAIR  
 
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Thank you,  Madam Chairman,  
Mr.  Vice  Chairman.   Good morning and welcome.   I t ' s  a lways  a  
p leasure  to  work wi th  Commiss ioner  Reinsch on issues ,  and we  
couldn ' t  have done th is  wi thout  h is  help  and the  excel lent  suppor t  of  
our  s taf f .  
 The  purpose  of  today 's  hear ing i s  to  examine China 's  mi l i tary 
modernizat ion.   As  we do that ,  we ' re  us ing the  Depar tment  of  
Defense 's  2006 Quadrennia l  Defense  Review,  or  QDR as  i t ' s  known,  as  
a  f ramework.  
 The QDR highl ights  four  vectors  or  potent ia l  types  of  war  
scenar ios  tha t  the  Depar tment  of  Defense  envis ions  as  i t s  f ramework:  
i r regular  warfare ,  ca tas t rophic  warfare ,  t radi t ional  warfare ,  and 
disrupt ive  warfare .  
 And of  those  four  vectors ,  or  areas ,  China  fa l l s  into  three  of  
them.   China  a l ready employs  a  number  of  the  sof ter  forms of  i r regular  
warfare .   I t  leverages  internat ional  law to const ra in U.S.  act ions  
in ternat ional ly ;  I t  conducts  percept ion management  operat ions  here  in  
the  Uni ted  States  in  order  to  manipulate  American and internat ional  
opinion and to  s t rengthen i t s  posi t ion vis-à-vis  the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  and 
i t  probes  the  cyber  defenses  of  important  mi l i tary and economic  
centers  for  thei r  vulnerabi l i t ies .  
 In  the  area  of  t radi t ional  warfare ,  China  has  received perhaps  the  
greates t  a t tent ion by scholars  and the  media .   China 's  broad-sweeping 
modernizat ion program begun in  1993 cont inues  to  enhance China’s  
capabi l i t ies  for  power  project ion,  for  jo in t  opera t ions ,  for  sea  and a i r  
control  and for  denia l .  
 China  recognizes  that  Taiwan wi l l  only  be  able  to  wi ths tand a  
Chinese  blockade or  invasion i f  i t ' s  ass is ted  by the  Uni ted  States  and 
i t s  a l l ies .   Any s t ra tegy must  a lso  account  for  China 's  heavy 
inves tment  in  submarines ,  ba l l i s t ic  and cruise  miss i les ,  naval  s t r ike  
a i rcraf t ,  and other  sys tems that  not  only  can be  used agains t  Taiwan 
but  can deter  or  delay the  arr ival  of  an  in tervening force .  
 I f  China  can keep in tervening forces  a t  a  d is tance  or  render  them 
ineffec t ive  for  a  per iod of  weeks ,  tha t  may be  suff ic ient  for  i t  to  
achieve i t s  a ims.    
 Those  cover  some of  the  panels  we ' l l  do  today.   Tomorrow,  
Commiss ioner  Reinsch wi l l  chai r  two panels  that  wi l l  address  China 's  
 capaci ty  for  d isrupt ing American command and control  networks  and 
computer  sys tems and China 's  ambi t ions  in  space .  
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 Today,  we ' l l  have three  congress ional  wi tnesses ,  Congresswoman 
Madele ine  Bordal lo ,  a  Delegate  f rom Guam; Congressman Tim Ryan 
f rom the  17th  Dis t r ic t  in  Ohio;  and Congressman Dana Rohrabacher  
f rom the  46th  Dis t r ic t  in  Cal i fornia .  
 With  tha t ,  I ' l l  c lose ,  and we ' l l  wai t  for  Congresswoman Bordal lo .   
Thank you very  much.  
 
 [Whereupon,  a  shor t  recess  was  taken. ]  
 
PANEL I:   CONGRESSIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Congressman Tim Ryan,  a  
Democrat  f rom the  17th  Dis t r ic t  of  Ohio,  wi l l  provide  his  perspect ive  
th is  morning.   He 's  serving his  th i rd  term in  off ice .   He has  ac t ively  
sought  to  hal t  China 's  currency manipula t ion,  and cosponsored the  
China  Currency Act  of  2005 and again  in  2007 wi th  Congressman 
Duncan Hunter .   Congressman Hunter  i s  not  able  to  be  here ,  but  has  
provided a  wri t ten  s ta tement .  
 Congressman Ryan was  asked to  serve  on the  Democrat ic  
Steer ing and Pol icy  Commit tee  by House Speaker  Nancy Pelos i ,  and he  
serves  on the  Appropr ia t ions  Commit tee  Subcommit tee  on Labor ,  
Heal th ,  Human Services ,  Educat ion and Rela ted Agencies ,  and i t s  
Subcommit tee  on Energy and Water  Development  and Related 
Agencies .  
 Congressman,  thank you very  much for  the  work you 've  done.   
P lease  begin .  
 
STATEMENT OF TIM RYAN 
A U.S.  REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE STATE OF OHIO 
 
 MR.  RYAN:  Thank you very  much.   I t ' s  a lways  a  p leasure  to  be  
wi th  you,  and I  can ' t  even begin  to  express  on behalf  of  mysel f  and 
members  of  my s taf f  what  a  resource  tha t  your  body is  to  us .   The level  
of  de ta i l ,  the  level  of  research that  goes  into  your  work,  i t  provides  a  
grea t  service  to  not  only me and my s taf f ,  but  I  th ink to  the  whole  
Congress  and to  the  pol i t ica l  sys tem.   So I  want  to  thank you very  
much for  that  and a lso  welcome my favor i te  governor ,  Ms.  Bordal lo .  
 I  want  to  thank you for  a l l  of  your  work here  a t  the  U.S. -China 
Economic and Secur i ty  Review Commiss ion.   One of  the  key issues  
that  we ' re  fac ing in  the country i s  our  deal ings wi th  and our  
re la t ionship  to  China .   This  morning,  as  the  Commiss ion begins  to  
explore  China 's  mi l i tary  modernizat ion and discuss  the  impl ica t ions  for  
 tha t  region and the  world ,  I  don ' t  th ink there  i s  any quest ion to  any of  
us  who have been involved in  publ ic  l i fe  that  the  People 's  Republ ic  of  
China  has  a  mi l i tary  that  i s  growing in  i t s  capabi l i ty  seeking to  become 
the  dominant  force  in  the  region.   I  don ' t  th ink there 's  any doubt  tha t  
China  is  us ing Uni ted  Sta tes  dol lars  to  f inance th is  expansion and 
modernizat ion,  and the  currency misa l ignment  I  be l ieve  is  to  b lame.  
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 I t  i s  my hope that  th is  Congress  wi l l  take  act ion on legis la t ion to 
address  th is  i ssue  and s low China 's  unsustainable  pol ic ies  and 
quest ionable  mi l i tary  expansion.    
 Let  me be  c lear :   I  be l ieve  that  a  f ree  and fa i r  t rade  re la t ionship  
wi th  the  People 's  Republ ic  of  China  would  be  great ly  benef ic ia l  to  the  
c i t izens  of  both  countr ies .   However ,  we are  not  deal ing wi th  an  open 
and fa i r  t rading par tner  in  China .  
 The Chinese  government  provides  i ts  indust r ies  wi th  a  ser ies  of  
subsidies  that  p laces  U.S.  companies  a t  an  insurmountable  
d isadvantage.   Among the  most  damaging of  China 's  predatory  t rade  
pract ices  i s  currency misal ignment .   As  the Commiss ion is  aware ,  
China 's  currency misal ignment  ac ts  as  a  subsidy on goods ,  expor ted to  
the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  to  the  tune  of  about  40 percent .   Here 's  how i t  
works:  
 When buying Chinese  goods ,  U.S.  impor ters  pay Chinese  
expor ters  in  U.S.  dol lars .   Then the  Chinese  se l lers  must  t rade  in  thei r  
surplus  dol lars  a t  roughly  7 .8  yuan for  each U.S.  dol lar  to  the  Chinese  
government .  
 Because  of  the  enormous t rade  def ic i t  and fore ign di rec t  
inves tment ,  there  i s  an  excess  supply  of  yuan.   Without  China 's  
currency peg,  the  yuan would  r i se  in va lue  agains t  the  dol lar  because  
of  i t s  formidable  demand and the  rapid  development  of  the  Chinese  
economy over  the  las t  ten  years .   I f  the  yuan apprecia ted  in  a  market -
dr iven manner ,  i t  i s  es t imated tha t  the  va lue  re la t ive  to  the  dol lar  
would  r ise  by approximately  40 percent .  
 Because  the  Chinese  do not  a l low this  to  happen,  i t  amounts  to  a  
40  percent  subs idy.   With  this  apprecia t ion of  the  yuan,  the  pr ice  of  
Chinese  products  would r ise ,  Chinese  expor ts  would drop,  and expor ts  
to  China  from domest ic  American  companies  would  then increase .  
 However ,  China  does  not  a l low this  to  happen because  i t  would  
r isk  disrupt ing i t s  main  s t ra tegy of  mainta in ing ar t i f ic ia l ly  h igh 
economic growth through expor t -dr iven development  and investment  in  
fore ign reserves .   As  a  resul t  of  these  manipulat ive  s t ra tegies ,  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes  and China  share  the  most  imbalanced bi la tera l  t rade 
re la t ionship  in  the  ent i re  wor ld a t  s igni f icant  cos t  to  U.S.  workers  and 
manufacturers .  
 Al l  to ta led ,  China  a lone accounts  for  near ly  $200 bi l l ion or  27 
percent  of  the  Uni ted Sta tes '  near ly  $730 bi l l ion t rade  defic i t .  
  To br ing th is  home,  le t  me te l l  you about  a  local  company cal led 
Wheel ing PITT in  Warren,  Ohio .   (They a lso  have some operat ions  in  
western  Pennsylvania . )   They make tubing,  and the  compet ing f inal  
product  tubing arr iv ing from China cos ts  the  same as  Wheel ing’s  raw 
mater ia ls .   That ' s  the  k ind of  advantage that  the  products  have coming 
in  f rom China,  and that ' s  the  k ind of  d isadvantage  that  a  lot  of  these  
local  companies  who employ local  workers  in  the  Uni ted Sta tes ,  who 
are  family-run businesses ,  have to  compete  against .  
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 I t  wasn ' t  a  surpr ise  to  many of  us  that  about  three  weeks  ago,  
Wheel ing PITT cut  the i r  whi te  col lar  s taf f .   They 've  been cut t ing the  
blue  col lar  s taf f ,  and now have to  cut  thei r  whi te  col lar  s taff  by  about  
30  percent .   So  this  i s  the  k ind of  d isadvantage that  our  companies  are  
faced wi th .  
 The Chinese  conduct  th is  i l legal  currency misa l ignment  by  
s imply pr in t ing money and s ter i l iz ing about  hal f  of  thei r  currency 
oversupply  by issuing bonds  and giving subsidies  to  s ta te-owned 
companies .   To mainta in  i t s  peg,  amid a  huge inf low of  fore ign capi ta l ,  
the  Chinese  government  has  amassed over  $600 bi l l ion in  fore ign 
exchange reserves .  
 Al lowing China  to  col lec t  massive  currency reserves  i s  not  only 
a  concern for  the  U.S.  economy,  but  I  th ink a lso  for  our  nat ional  
secur i ty ,  and th is  i s  something my par tner  in  th is ,  Duncan Hunter ,  has  
been very ar t icula te  and pass ionate  about .   As  Duncan has  sa id ,  "China 
i s  arming i t se l f  wi th  weapons  i t  purchased wi th the  dol lars  earned from 
i ts  mass ive  t rade  surplus  wi th the  Uni ted  Sta tes ."  
 Fur ther ,  according to  an  ar t ic le  dated  March 23,  2007,  in  The 
Washington Times,  China  has  announced double  d igi t  mi l i tary 
spending increases  each year  for  the  pas t  two decades .   The new and 
advanced weapons  sys tems being purchased by the  Chinese  mi l i tary are  
being f inanced by the  mass ive  reserve  in  U.S.  dol lars  owned by the  
Chinese  government ,  mainly as  a  resul t  of  the i r  currency misa l ignment .  
 To address  these  threats  to  both  our  economy and our  nat ional  
secur i ty ,  Congressman Hunter  and I  in t roduced the  Fai r  Currency Act  
of  2007,  or  as  i t  has  been commonly been referred to ,  the  Ryan-Hunter  
b i l l .   S ince  Congressman Hunter 's  pres ident ia l  announcement ,  i t ' s  now 
the  Hunter-Ryan bi l l ,  a t  leas t  in  Iowa,  Nevada,  New Hampshire  and 
South  Carol ina .  
 In  summary,  th is  b i l l  would  a l low U.S.  indust ry to  use  the  ant i -
subsidy,  or  countervai l ing duty  law,  to  seek re l ief  f rom the  in jury  
caused by impor ts  tha t  benefi t  f rom a  subs idy in  the  form of  a  foreign 
exchange ra te  misa l ignment .   I t  def ines  exchange ra te  misa l ignment  as  
a  fore ign government 's  maintenance of  an  undervalued currency by 
means  of  prot rac ted  large-scale  intervent ion in  currency markets  
regardless  of  the  intent  of  the  fore ign government .  
  The bi l l  c lar i f ies  tha t  exchange ra te  misa l ignment  meets  a l l  three 
WTO tes ts  for  a  prohibi ted  expor t  subsidy:  governmental  f inancia l  
contr ibut ion,  d i rec t  benef i t  and speci f ic i ty .  
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 Ryan-Hunter  g ives  guidance to  the  Commerce Depar tment  on 
how to  determine whether  a  countervai lable  subsidy due to  exchange 
ra te  misal ignment  exis ts  and the  level  of  i t s  magni tude.  The bi l l  
implements  the  WTO's  agreements  on  subsid ies  in  U.S.  domest ic  law in  
two ways:  
 F i rs t ,  by  expl ic i t ly  adding exchange ra te  misal ignment  as  a  
countervai lable  subs idy under  U.S.  law;  
 And second,  by c lar i fy ing that  the  U.S.  countervai l ing duty  law 
appl ies  fu l ly  and equal ly  to  subsidies  in  both  market  and non-market  
economies  such as  China’s .   
 Ryan-Hunter  a lso amends  the  China-speci f ic  safeguard 
mechanism that  wi l l  remain  in  ef fec t  unt i l  December  13 as  par t  of  
China 's  te rms of  access ion to  the  WTO.  The safeguard provides  for  
poss ib le  re l ief  f rom import  surges  f rom China that  are  found to  d isrupt  
the  U.S.  market .   Ryan-Hunter  ins tructs  the  U.S.  In ternat ional  Trade  
Commiss ion ( ITC) to  evaluate  whether  exchange ra te misa l ignment  
exis ts  in  determining i f  market  d isrupt ion is  present  in  such cases .  
 I f  market  d isrupt ion is  found,  the  pres ident  may procla im 
increased dut ies  or  o ther  impor t  res t r ic t ions  wi th China  for  such per iod 
as  the  pres ident  considers  necessary to  prevent  or  remedy the  market  
d isrupt ion.   We want  to  s imply give  the  pres ident  the  tools  that  he  or  
she  may need in  the  fu ture  to  deal  wi th  th is  new re la t ionship .  
 Ryan-Hunter  a lso  conta ins  a  nat ional  secur i ty  provis ion requir ing 
the  Secretary  of  Defense  to  inform the  ITC whether  the  injured U.S.  
producers  make components  that  are  cr i t ica l  to  the  U.S.  defense  
indust r ia l  base ,  and i f  so ,  i f  those  components  are  compet i t ive  wi th  the  
imports  from China  that  are  found to  be  in jur ing the  U.S.  producers .   
The Secre tary of  Defense  wi l l  be  prohibi ted  f rom procur ing those  
defense  products  f rom China unless  the  pres ident  waives  th is  provis ion 
based on the  nat ional  secur i ty  interes ts  of  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .  
 Ti t le  I I  of  Ryan-Hunter  amends the  Exchange Rates  and 
Internat ional  Economic Pol icy  Coordinat ion Act  of  1988,  which 
requires  the  Secre tary  of  Treasury  to  submit  to  the  Congress  semi-
annual  repor ts  regarding U.S.  t rading par tners '  exchange ra te  and 
economic pol ic ies .  
 Under  the  ac t ,  consis tent  wi th  the  In ternat ional  Monetary  Fund 's  
Art ic les  of  Agreement ,  i f  a  t rading par tner  i s  found to be  manipula t ing 
i t s  exchange ra te  for  the  purposes  of  prevent ing ef fec t ive  balance  of  
payments  adjus tments  or  gaining an unfa i r  compet i t ive  advantage in  
in ternat ional  t rade ,  the  Secre tary i s  ins t ructed to  engage in  
negot ia t ions ,  e i ther  b i la teral ly  or  in  the  IMF,  to  correct  the  problems 
 unless  the  Secretary  determines  and informs the  Congress  tha t  such 
negot ia t ions  would have  a  ser ious  de t r imental  impact  on  v i ta l  U.S.  
economic and secur i ty  in teres ts .  
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 Ti t le  I I  of  Ryan-Hunter  a lso  enhances  exis t ing law by 
es tabl ishing that  the  Secre tary 's  semi-annual  repor ts  to  Congress  a lso  
shal l  evaluate  whether  any other  country  engages  in  fundamental  
misa l ignment  of  i t s  currency.   This  i s  def ined as  a  form of  exchange 
ra te  manipulat ion tha t  exis ts  when there  i s  a  mater ia l  susta ined 
dispar i ty  between the  observed levels  of  an  effec t ive  exchange ra te  for  
a  currency and the  corresponding levels  of  an  ef fec t ive  exchange ra te  
for  that  currency that  would  be  consis tent  wi th  fundamental  
macroeconomic condi t ions  based upon a  genera l ly  accepted economic  
ra t ionale .  
 I f  the  Secre tary  f inds  manipula t ion or  fundamental  misal ignment  
that  causes  or  contr ibutes  to  mater ia l  adverse  impact  on  the U.S.  
economy,  the  Uni ted  Sta tes shal l  oppose  a  proposed change in  any 
in ternat ional  f inancial  ins t i tut ion 's  governance arrangement  that  would 
benef i t  the  country  involved for  as  long as  i t  cont inued to  engage in  
the  manipula t ion or  fundamental  misal ignment .  
 I  want  to  be  c lear :   This  legis la t ion seeks  sole ly  to  ensure  a  
heal thy and fa i r  t rade  re la t ionship  wi th  China .   I t  i s  bel ieved that  i f  
China  and other  Asian countr ies  would  phase  out  currency market  
in tervent ion,  the  U.S.  t rade  def ic i t  would  be  cut  by  about  hal f .  
 U.S.  GDP would increase  by as  much as  $500 bi l l ion ,  and 
employment  would  expand by as  many as  f ive  mi l l ion new jobs .   In  
addi t ion,  solving those  misal ignments  would  a lso  benefi t  China .   Yuan 
revaluat ion  would  ra ise  incomes and l iv ing s tandards  immediate ly  and 
permit  the  Chinese  government  to  spend more  on much-needed socia l  
inves tments .   I  be l ieve  we 're  beginning to  see  some of  that  lack of  
inves tment  come home to  roos t  in  some of  thei r  socia l  problems that  
are  emerging.    
 Longer- term,  more  balanced t rade  and a  more  rapidly  growing 
U.S.  economy would create  a  more  secure  and rapidly  growing market  
for  which Chinese  expor ts  would  be  welcome in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .   
 Again ,  I  want  to  thank th is  Commiss ion and the  commiss ioners  
for  holding th is  hear ing today and for  a l l  your  ef for ts  to  provide  
Congress  wi th  the  informat ion that  we need to  develop a  
comprehensive  s t ra tegy wi th regard  to  China .   I  be l ieve  tha t  this  wi l l  
ensure  a  safe  and prosperous  Chinese  t rading par tner  and provide  
domest ic  manufacturers  wi th  a  market  to  expor t  the i r  products  and 
grow the  U.S.  economy.  
 One thing is  c lear ,  the  Chinese  have a  c lear  plan  for  deal ing and 
t rading wi th  the  Uni ted Sta tes  and for  becoming an economic  
superpower .   I t  i s  up  to  the  Congress  of  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  and the  
 President  of  the  Uni ted  States  to  work together  to  do the same for  the  
c i t izens  of  th is  country .  
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 I t  i s  long past  the  t ime for  act ion on this  topic  as  th is  
Commiss ion has  s ta ted  many t imes .   The House  of  Representa t ives  
must  pass  the  Ryan-Hunter  b i l l  and begin  the  process  of  providing for  
a  fa i r  t rade  envi ronment .   
 I  would  jus t  l ike  to  say,  as  this  ends ,  I  have a  t remendous  respect  
for  the  Chinese  cul ture .  In  many ways  I ’m infatuated wi th  i t  and love 
reading about  i t ,  and the  extent  and the  t ime that  they have been on 
th is  planet  as  a  c ivi l ized socie ty and somet imes not-so-c ivi l ized.   This  
i s  not  in  any way a  dismissa l  of  the  kind of  contr ibut ion that  the i r  
socie ty  has  made to  our  p lanet .  
 But  th is  i s  c lear ly  jus t  asking them to  play  by the  rules  that  
everyone e lse  i s  p laying by.   This  i s  asking them to  l ive  up to  the  
commitments  tha t  they made when they jo ined the  WTO.  So,  again ,  I  
thank you.   I  apologize  for  holding up Congresswoman Bordal lo ,  who 's  
a  good fr iend.     Thank you again  very  much.  
[The s ta tement  fo l lows: ]  
 
Prepared Statement  of  Tim Ryan 
A U.S.  Representat ive  from the State  of  Ohio 
 
Good Morning. First, I would like to thank Commissioner Wortzel, Commissioner Reinsch, and the rest of 
the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission for all of your hard work on these important 
issues. Each year the Commission fulfills its congressionally mandated duty with professionalism and 
accuracy, and your annual reports provide a sobering look at our current trade crisis, and the national 
security implications of record trade deficits with the People’s Republic of China. This morning, the 
Commission will explore China’s military modernization and discuss the implications for the region and 
the World. There is no question that the PRC has a military that is growing in capability, and seeking to 
become the dominant force in the region. There is no doubt that China is using U.S. dollars to finance this 
expansion and modernization, and currency misalignment is to blame. It is my hope that this Congress will 
take action on legislation to address this issue and slow China’s unsustainable policies, and questionable 
military expansion.  
 
Let me be clear. I believe that a free and fair trade relationship with the PRC would be greatly beneficial to 
the citizens of both countries. However, we are not dealing with an open or fair trading partner in China. 
The Chinese government provides its industries with a series of subsidies that places U.S. companies at an 
insurmountable disadvantage. Among the most damaging of China’s predatory trade practices is currency 
misalignment.  As the Commission is aware, China’s currency misalignment acts as a subsidy on goods 
exported to the United States to the tune of about 40 percent. Here is how it works. When buying Chinese 
goods, U.S. importers pay Chinese exporters in U.S. dollars.  Then the Chinese sellers must trade in their 
surplus dollars at roughly 7.8 yuan for each U.S. dollar to the Chinese government.  Because of the 
enormous trade deficit and foreign direct investment (FDI), there is an excess supply of yuan.  Without 
China’s currency peg, the yuan would rise in value against the dollar because of its formidable demand, and 
the rapid development of the Chinese economy over the last 10 years.  If the yuan appreciated in a market-
driven manner, it is estimated that the value relative to the dollar would rise by approximately 40 percent. 
Since the Chinese do not allow this to happen, it amounts to a 40 percent subsidy.  With this appreciation of 
the yuan, the price of Chinese products would rise, Chinese exports would drop, and exports to China from 
domestic American companies would increase.  However, China does not allow this to happen because it 
 would risk disrupting its strategy of maintaining artificially high economic growth through export driven 
development and investment in foreign reserves. As a result of these manipulative strategies, the United 
States and China share the most imbalanced bilateral trade relationship in the world, at significant cost to 
our workers and manufacturers. All totaled, China alone accounts for nearly $200 billion or 27% of the 
United States’ nearly $730 billion trade deficit. 
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The Chinese conduct this illegal currency misalignment by simply printing money and sterilizing about half 
of their currency oversupply by issuing bonds and giving subsidies to state owned companies.  To maintain 
its peg, amid a huge inflow of foreign capital, the Chinese government has amassed over $600 billion in 
foreign exchange reserves. 
Allowing China to collect massive currency reserves is not only a concern for the U.S. economy, but also 
for our national security. As my friend and colleague Duncan Hunter Ranking Member on the House 
Armed Services Committee “China is arming itself with weapons it purchased with the dollars earned from 
its massive trade surplus with the United States.” Further, according to an article dated March 23, 2007 in 
the Washington Times, China has announced double-digit military spending increases each year for the 
past two decades. The new and advanced weapon systems being purchased by the Chinese military are 
being financed by the massive reserve in U.S. dollars owned by the Chinese government mainly as a result 
of their currency misalignment.  
To address these threats to both our economy and our national security, Congressman Duncan Hunter and I 
introduced the Fair Currency Act of 2007 or, as it has commonly been referred to, the Ryan-Hunter bill. In 
summary, this bill will allow a U.S. industry to use the anti-subsidy (countervailing duty) law to seek relief 
from the injury caused by imports that benefit from a subsidy in the form of foreign exchange-rate 
misalignment.  It defines "exchange-rate misalignment" as a foreign government’s maintenance of an 
undervalued currency by means of protracted large-scale intervention in currency markets, regardless of the 
intent of the foreign government.  The bill clarifies that exchange-rate misalignment meets all three WTO 
tests for a prohibited export subsidy:  governmental financial contribution; benefit; and specificity.  Ryan-
Hunter gives guidance to the Commerce Department on how to determine whether a countervailable 
subsidy due to exchange-rate misalignment exists, and the level of its magnitude.  The bill implements the 
WTO’s agreements on subsidies in U.S. domestic law in two ways:  (1) by explicitly adding exchange-rate 
misalignment as a countervailable subsidy under U.S. law; and (2) by clarifying that the U.S. 
countervailing duty law applies fully and equally to subsidies in both market and non-market economies, 
such as China. 
  
Ryan-Hunter also amends the China-specific safeguard mechanism that will remain in effect until 
December 2013 as part of China’s terms of accession to the WTO.  The safeguard provides for possible 
relief from import surges from China that are found to disrupt the U.S. market.   Ryan-Hunter instructs the 
U.S. International Trade Commission to evaluate whether exchange-rate misalignment exists 
in determining if market disruption is present in such cases.  If market disruption is found, the President 
may "proclaim increased duties or other import restrictions" with China "for such period as the President 
considers necessary to prevent or remedy the market disruption."   
 
Ryan-Hunter also contains a national security provision requiring the Secretary of Defense to inform the 
ITC whether the injured U.S. producers make components that are critical to the U.S. defense industrial 
base.  If so, and if those components are like or directly competitive with the imports from China found to 
be injuring the U.S. producers, the Secretary of Defense will be prohibited from procuring those defense 
products from China unless the President waives this provision based on the national security interests of 
the United States.  
  
Title II of Ryan-Hunter amends the Exchange Rates and International Economic Policy Coordination 
(IEPC) Act of 1988, which requires the Secretary of the Treasury to submit to the Congress semi-annual 
reports regarding U.S. trading partners’ exchange-rate and economic policies.  Under the act, consistent 
 with the International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement, if a trading partner is found to be 
“manipulating” its exchange-rate for purposes of preventing effective balance of payments adjustments or 
gaining an unfair competitive advantage in international trade, the Secretary is instructed to engage in 
negotiations, either bilaterally or in the International Monetary Fund, to correct the problem unless the 
Secretary determines and informs the Congress that such negotiations would have a serious detrimental 
impact on vital U.S. economic and security interests. 
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Title II of Ryan-Hunter also enhances existing law by establishing that the Secretary’s semi-annual reports 
to Congress also shall evaluate whether any other country engages in “fundamental misalignment” of its 
currency, defined as a form of exchange-rate manipulation that exists when there is a material, sustained 
disparity between the observed levels of an effective exchange-rate for a currency and the corresponding 
levels of an effective exchange-rate for that currency that would be consistent with fundamental 
macroeconomic conditions based upon a generally accepted economic rationale.  If the Secretary finds 
manipulation or “fundamental misalignment” that causes or contributes to a material adverse impact on the 
U.S. economy, the United States shall oppose a proposed change in any international financial institution’s 
governance arrangement that would benefit the country involved for as long as it continued to engage in the 
manipulation or “fundamental misalignment.” 
 
I want to be clear; this legislation seeks solely to ensure a healthy and fair trade relationship with China. It 
is believed that if China and other Asian countries were to phase out currency market intervention, the U.S. 
trade deficit would be cut by about half. U.S. GDP would increase by as much as $500 billion, and 
employment would expand by as many as 5 million new jobs. In addition, solving these misalignments 
would also benefit China. Yuan revaluation would raise incomes and living standards immediately, and 
permit the Chinese government to spend more on much needed social investments. Longer-term, more 
balanced trade and a more rapidly growing U.S. economy would create a more secure and rapidly growing 
market for Chinese exports in the United States. 
 
Again, I want to thank the Commissioners for holding this hearing today, and for all their efforts to provide 
the Congress with the information that we need to develop a comprehensive strategy with regard to China. 
This will ensure a safe and prosperous Chinese trading partner, and provide domestic manufacturers with a 
market to export their products and grow the U.S. economy. One thing is clear; the Chinese have a clear 
plan as to how to deal and trade with the United States, and how to become an economic superpower. It is 
up to the Congress and the President to work together to do the same for the citizens of this country.  It is 
long past the time for action on this topic; the House of Representatives must pass the Ryan-Hunter bill and 
begin the process of providing for a fair trade environment. 
  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:   Thank you.  Congressman 
Ryan.    
 Congresswoman Bordal lo ,  we a l l  know about  the  impor tant  ro le  
that  the  mi l i tary  fac i l i t ies  on Guam play in  the  U.S.  defense  s t ructure ,  
so  i t ' s  a  dis t inc t  p leasure  to  have you here .  
 Congresswoman Bordal lo  i s  the  Delegate  f rom Guam and is  
present ly  serving her  thi rd  te rm in  the  House .   She  is  the  f i rs t  woman 
to  represent  Guam in  tha t  capaci ty .   She 's  the  new Democrat ic  cochair  
wi th  Congressman Forbes  on the  Congress ional  China  Caucus  and 
serves  on the  Armed Services  Commit tee’s  Subcommit tee  on Readiness  
and i t s  Subcommit tee  on Seapower  and Expedi t ionary  Forces .  
 She  a lso serves  on the Natural  Resources  Commit tee’s  
Subcommit tee  on Fisher ies ,  Wildl i fe  and Oceans  and i t s  Subcommit tee  
on Insular  Affa i rs .   I t  rea l ly  i s  a  p leasure  to  have you here .    
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STATEMENT OF MADELEINE BORDALLO 
A U.S.  REPRESENTATIVE FROM GUAM  
 
 MS.  BORDALLO:  Thank you very  much.   I  too  want  to  thank 
Congressman Ryan,  a  very  good f r iend of  mine,  and fe l low member  of  
the  Armed Services  Commit tee  a t  one t ime.  
 Cochai rmen Wortze l  and Reinsch and Chairman Bar tholomew and 
commiss ioners ,  thank you for  af fording me the  oppor tuni ty  today to  
appear  before  the  Commiss ion and to  provide  tes t imony on behalf  of  
the  people  of  Guam and members  of  the  Congress ional  China  Caucus .   
 I  great ly  apprecia te  th is  oppor tuni ty  to  provide  br ief  tes t imony 
on the  cont inued importance  of  evaluat ing the  impact  tha t  China 's  
ongoing effor ts  to  improve and modernize  i t s  mi l i tary  capabi l i t ies  has  
on the  nat ional  secur i ty  of  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  and especia l ly  on the  
Asia-Pacif ic  region.  
 Before  I  begin ,  I  would  l ike  to  thank my col league Congressman 
Ike  Skel ton,  who is  now the  chai rman of  the  House  of  Representa t ives  
Commit tee  on Armed Services ,  for  h is  recommendat ion that  I  become 
cochair  of  the  Congress ional  China  Caucus .   I  a lso  want  to  thank my 
col league,  Congressman Randy Forbes  of  Virginia ,  for  h is  suppor t  of  
my becoming the  cochai r  as  wel l .   
 My col leagues '  support  for  my serving in  this  capaci ty  i s  much 
apprecia ted  and humbl ing.   Of  course,  I  a lso  want  to  thank the  people  
of  Guam who e lected me to  serve  for  a  thi rd  te rm as  thei r  
representa t ive  in  Congress .  
 Guam is  the  par t  of  the  Uni ted  States  tha t  i s  nearest  to  China .   I  
a lways  l ike  to  say  that  when I  address  any of  our  neighbor ing 
countr ies .   We are  your  c loses t  American neighbor .   And Guam,  due  to  
i t s  geographical  locat ion,  i s  a  s t ra tegic  resource  for  the  Uni ted Sta tes  
and is  uniquely  impacted by U.S.-China pol icy  and the  Asia-Paci f ic  
regional  secur i ty  s i tuat ion in  general .   I  can’ t  emphasize  that  enough.  
 The recent  announcement  tha t  the  Depar tment  of  Defense  p lans 
to  s ta t ion more  U.S.  mi l i tary  personnel  and assets  on Guam,  when 
combined wi th  the decis ion to  re locate  to  Guam a  s igni f icant  number  
of  Uni ted Sta tes  Marines  current ly  s ta t ioned in  Okinawa,  Japan,  i s  
indicat ive of  the  enhanced role  that  Guam wil l  p lay  in  the  years  to  
come toward ensur ing tha t  U.S.  nat ional  secur i ty  interests  in  the  Asia-
Paci f ic  region and those  of  our  a l l ies  are  defended.  
 As  you know,  U.S.  nat ional  secur i ty  in teres ts  in  the  Asia-Paci f ic  
region are  d iverse  and very  chal lenging.   As  you know,  the  
formulat ion,  adopt ion and implementa t ion of  pol ic ies  that  wi l l  he lp  our  
country  successful ly  and peaceful ly  meet  these  d iverse  chal lenges ,  
whi le  s imul taneously adapt ing to  account  for  the  shi f t s  in  or  
 development  of  in tent ions ,  capabi l i t ies  and pol ic ies  of  cer ta in  
countr ies  in  the  region wi l l  a long wi th  events  in  the  Middle  East  be 
one  of  the  pr incipal  tes ts  by which future  generat ions  of  Americans  
wi l l  measure  the  qual i ty  of  th is  generat ion of  American s ta tecraf t .  
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 We must  succeed in  this  ef for t  and we must  do so  in  a  manner  
that  es tabl ishes  a  las t ing  peace  for  the  region.   We must  a lso  do so  in  a  
manner  that  bui lds  upon,  s t rengthens ,  and divers i f ies  the  t rus t  tha t  our  
current  a l l ies  have in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .  
 We fur ther  must  endeavor  to  convince  the  people  and the  
government  of  potent ia l  compet i tor  s ta tes  of  the  benefi ts  of  
const ruct ive ,  t ransparent  and continued engagement  across  the  wide  
range of  pol i t ica l ,  economic,  secur i ty  and cul tura l  areas .  
 Our  success  in  accompl ishing these  objec t ives  wi l l  def ine  the  
legacy of  peace ,  s tabi l i ty  and communicat ion wi th  the  Asia-Paci f ic  
region that  those  of  fu ture  genera t ions  of  Americans  wi l l  inher i t  and 
a lso  be  able  to  fur ther  improve.  
 The Congress ional  China  Caucus  bel ieves  that  few chal lenges  
wi th  respect  to  U.S. -China  pol icy and the U.S.  in terest  in  the  
maintenance  of  a  s table  Asia-Paci f ic  region are  greater  than the  U.S.  
response  to  the  r i se  of  Chinese  mi l i tary power  dur ing this  century.  
 The Congress ional  China  Caucus  suppor ts  th is  round of  hear ings  
to  review the  extent  to  which the  People 's  Republ ic  of  China  in tends  
to ,  i s  capable  of ,  and may adopt  pol ic ies  that  would  advocate  for  
conduct  of  i r regular  forms of  warfare ,  conduct  of  t radi t ional  forms of  
warfare ,  and inf luence  of  mi l i tary  balance  to  the  det r iment  of  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes .  
 These  are  impor tant  i ssues  for  our  government  to  s tudy.   The 
f indings  of  th is  hear ing should  be  considered for  inclusion in  the 
d ia logue between the  Uni ted Sta tes  and China ,  and i t  i s  my hope that  
the  Congressional  China  Caucus  can help in  this  regard.  
 The Congress ional  China  Caucus respect ful ly  requests  tha t  the  
Commiss ion take  into  considerat ion four  i tems dur ing the  course  of  the  
hear ing sess ions  today and tomorrow.   These  i ssues  are  of  pr imary 
importance  to  the  Congress ional  China  Caucus ,  and I  am conf ident  that  
the  Commiss ion wi l l  agree  tha t  these  are  important  fac tors  and i ssues  
to  consider .  
 F i rs t ,  the  need for  the  government  of  the  People 's  Republ ic  of  
China  to  work to  increase  the  t ransparency of  i t s  fore ign pol icy and 
mi l i tary  decis ion-making processes ,  i t s  current  and planned mi l i tary  
capabi l i t ies ,  and the  t rue  and the  accurate  amount  of  i t s  defense  and 
nat ional  secur i ty  budgets  among other  i ssues  i s  paramount .  
 I  th ink we can a l l  agree  that  greater  t ransparency is  essent ia l  to  
the  es tabl ishment  and the  maintenance  of  t rus t  be tween the  Uni ted  
Sta tes ,  our  a l l ies  in  the  region,  and the  People 's  Republ ic  of  China .  
  Second,  the  need for  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  to  commit  i t se l f  to  
es tabl ishing a  greater  degree  of  in teragency coordinat ion wi th  respect  
to  the  U.S. -China  pol icy  and posture  i s  a lso  paramount .  
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 The Uni ted Sta tes’  re la t ionship  wi th  China  i s  broad and vibrant  
and can be  more  so .   But  th is  dynamic  engagement  wi th  China  must  be  
bet ter  coordinated in  order  to  be  as  ef fec t ive  as  poss ible  and to  
promote  U.S.  in teres ts  and suppor t  those  of  our  a l l ies .  
 The in teragency process  wi th  respect  wi th  the  U.S. -China  pol icy 
must  be  improved,  and soon.   Coordinat ion is  d i f f icul t  and thankless  
work.   But ,  ladies  and gent lemen,  i t  must  be  done.  
 Third ,  obviously ,  China  is  not  the  only  country  wi th  hard  and 
sof t  power  wi thin  i t s  region.  Establ ished regional  powers  such as  
Aust ra l ia ,  Japan and South Korea are  force  mul t ipl iers  for  U.S.  pol icy  
in  the  region.   The Uni ted  Sta tes  has  long-s tanding secur i ty  
commitments  based on economic and pol i t ical  pr ior i t ies  i t  shares  wi th 
these  a l l ies .  
 Also ,  the  mul t i faceted  re la t ionship the Uni ted  Sta tes  enjoys  wi th  
India  i s  s t rong and product ive .   Las t ly ,  o ther  countr ies  in  the  region 
are  f i rmly commit ted to  helping combat  ter ror is ts  and pi ra te  
organizat ions  ac t ive  in  the  Asia-Pacif ic  region,  and thus  help  us  
achieve our  nat ional  secur i ty  objec t ives  there .  
 So by no means  should  observers  v iew the  r i se  in  Chinese  
mi l i tary  capabi l i t ies  wi th  respect  to the  Uni ted  Sta tes  as  a  b ipolar  
ar rangement .  
 In  fac t ,  the  s i tuat ion is  much more  d iverse  and dynamic  and as  a  
resul t  more  compl ica ted .   This  leads  me to  the four th  i tem that  I  wish  
to  note :   the  extent  to  which knowingly  provocat ive  s ta tements  or  
ac t ions  on the  par t  of  our  a l l ies  in  the  region or  e lsewhere  compl ica te  
fur ther  the  vi ta l  task  of  es tabl ishing and maintaining peace  in  the  
region wi th  respect  to  the  growth and moderniza t ion  of  China 's  
mi l i tary .  
 As  you know,  his tory  can provide  examples  of  smal l  a l tercat ions  
resul t ing  in  big  confl ic ts .   Therefore ,  I  urge  the  Commiss ion to  adopt  a  
hol i s t ic  perspect ive  and to  review the  views,  pol ic ies ,  ac t ions ,  and the  
ac tors  themselves  of  our  a l l ies  and other  countr ies  in  the  Asia-Paci f ic  
region.  
 Once again ,  I  thank you for  af fording me the  oppor tuni ty  to  
represent  the  people  of  Guam and more  impor tant ly  the  members  of  the  
Congress ional  China Caucus  before  the  Commission today.   Thank you.  
[The s ta tement  fo l lows:] 1
 
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Thank you very  much,  We ' l l  
be  jo ined in  a  few minutes  by Congressman Dana Rohrabacher ,  and 
 
1
 Click here to read the prepared statement of U.S. Representative Madeleine Bordallo  
 unt i l  he  ar r ives ,  we ' l l  take  a  short  break.   [Whereupon,  a  shor t  recess  
was  taken. ]  
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PANEL II:   BEIJING’S DOCTRINE ON THE CONDUCT OF 
“IRREGULAR FORMS OF WARFARE”   
 
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Our  second panel  i s  present .   
We 're  going to  seat  tha t  panel  and s tar t  tha t  sec t ion of  tha t  hear ing.   
When Congressman Rohrabacher  comes,  we ' l l  break for  a  few minutes  
for  h im to  speak and move back to  i t .    This  panel  wi l l  address  
China 's  capaci ty  for  i r regular  warfare   as  def ined in  that  Quadrennial  
Defense  Review of  2006.   The Commiss ion hopes  that  the  panel is ts  
wi l l  be  able  to  offer  answers  to  severa l  key quest ions  including what  
Chinese  mi l i ta ry  wri t ings  say  about  forms of  economic  warfare  such as  
des t roying enemy supply  chains  or  manufactur ing,  mobi l iz ing an 
adversary 's  populace  in  China 's  favor ,  managing publ ic  percept ions  
about  China  in  a  potent ia l ly  hos t i le  nat ion,  and us ing internat ional  law 
to  l imi t  the  act ions  of  an  opponent .  
 The f i rs t  to  speak wi l l  be  Mr.  Michael  Vickers  who is  Senior  
Vice  President  for  St ra tegic  Studies  a t  the  Center  for  St ra tegic  and 
Budgetary  Assessments  here  in  Washington.   He was  a  Senior  Advisor  
to  the  Secre tary  of  Defense  for  the  QDR dur ing 2005-2006 and is  a  
former  Army Specia l  Forces  Off icer  and CIA Operat ions  Off icer .  
 Second wi l l  be  Dr .  Wil l iam Schneider .   He 's  the  Chairman of  the  
Defense  Science  Board here  in  Washington.   He a lso concurrent ly  
serves  as  the  Pres ident  of  Internat ional  Planning Services  which is  an  
in ternat ional  t rade  and f inance  advisory  f i rm,  and is  an  Adjunct  Fel low 
of  the  Hudson Ins t i tu te .  
 Dr .  Derek Reveron is  Associa te  Professor  of  Nat ional  Securi ty  
Affa i rs  a t  the  Naval  War  Col lege .   He received his  M.A.  in  pol i t ica l  
sc ience  and Ph.D.  in  publ ic  pol icy  a t  the  Univers i ty  of  I l l inois .   He s i t s  
on the  edi tor ia l  boards  of  the  Defense  Inte l l igence Journal  and the  
Naval  War  Col lege  Review.  
 Dr .  Rober t  Bunker  i s  the  CEO of  Counter-OPFOR Corporat ion in  
Claremont ,  Cal i fornia .  He 's  been a  member  of  the  Los  Angeles  County  
Terror ism and Ear ly  Warning Group s ince  1996 and has  
counter ter ror ism operat ional  t ra in ing exper ience .  
 He 's  a lso a  former  Adjunct  Professor  of  Nat ional  Secur i ty  
Studies  a t  Cal i fornia  Sta te ,  San Diego,  and is  a  fe l low at  the  Ins t i tu te  
of  Land Warfare .    
 Thank you very  much.   Jus t  to  remind you a l l ,  we ' re  hoping for  
seven minutes  of  ora l  tes t imony f rom each wi tness  fo l lowed by a  round 
of  quest ions ,  and your  wri t ten  tes t imony wi l l  go in to  the  record .   Mr.  
Vickers ,  p lease  begin .  
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STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL G.  VICKERS 
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES,  CENTER 
FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS 
 
 MR.  VICKERS:   Thank you,  Chairman Wortzel ,  and members  of  
the  Commiss ion for  the  oppor tuni ty  to  par t ic ipate  in  th is  publ ic  
hear ing of  the  U.S. -China  Economic and Secur i ty  Review Commiss ion.   
 I  wish  to  make four  br ief  points  in  my opening s ta tement .   The 
People 's  Republ ic  of  China  could  pose  a  number  of  major  secur i ty  
chal lenges  for  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  in the  decades ahead.   The scope of  
potent ia l  chal lenges  could  range f rom more  in tense  s t ra tegic  
compet i t ion  on a  g lobal  scale  to  armed conf l ic t .   The secur i ty  
chal lenges  which a  more  powerful  and asser t ive  China  could  pose  
could  extend wel l  beyond any potent ia l  confl ic t  over  Taiwan.  
 Managing the  r i se  of  China  so  that  i t  does  not  become a  host i le  
compet i tor  of  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  i s  and should  remain  a  cent ra l  a im of  
U.S.  pol icy .  
 Given the  s t rong emphasis  on asymmetr ic  warfare  in  Chinese 
s t ra tegic  doctr ine ,  one  should  expect  China  to  employ i r regular  forms 
of  a t tack  in  any confl ic t .   A Chinese  a t tack on Taiwan,  for  example ,  
would  l ikely  include specia l  operat ions  and cyber  a t tacks  not  only  
agains t  Taiwan proper ,  but  a lso  potent ia l ly  agains t  U.S.  bases  and 
forces  in  the  region.  
 Cyber  warfare  might  even be  employed agains t  targets  wi th in  the  
U.S.  i t se l f .   Such unrest r ic ted  warfare  could  include,  but  not  be  l imi ted  
to ,  a t tacks  on f inancia l ,  economic,  energy and communicat ions  
infras t ructure .   Purer  forms of  i r regular  warfare ,  such as  use  of  
surrogates ,  could  a lso  be  employed in  a  China-Taiwan confl ic t .  
 Should  China  a t  some point  choose  to  become a  s t ra tegic  
compet i tor  of  the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  i t  could  a lso  f ind  i t  in  i t s  interes ts  to  
engage in  proxy wars  to  increase  i t s  g lobal  inf luence  and weaken that  
of  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .  
 The emergence  of  d is rupt ive  capabi l i t ies ,  par t icular ly  those 
s temming f rom advances  in  nanotechnology and bioscience and 
technology,  could  great ly  fac i l i ta te  new forms  of  c landest ine  and 
cover t  s t ra tegic  a t tack.  
 Some of  these  capabi l i t ies- - for  example ,   advances in  the  
cogni t ive  sc iences--could  a lso  be  used for  counter- i r regular  warfare .    
 F inal ly ,  a  g lobal  secur i ty  compet i t ion  could  a lso  emerge  in  the 
decades  ahead in  which the  Uni ted  Sta tes  and China compete  to  
provide  order  to  s ta tes  threa tened from ei ther  external  or  internal  
ac tors .  
 Now,  I  wish  to  s t rongly  emphasize  that  none of  th is  i s  inevi table ,  
 but  i t  i s  poss ib le .   We should  do everything in  our  power  to  dissuade 
these  compet i t ions  and deter  confl ic t ,  but  i t ' s  essent ia l  that  we a lso  
hedge agains t  these  poss ibi l i t ies .  
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 I  would  be  honored to  address  any quest ions  you may have  
dur ing the  ques t ion and answer  sess ion.  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Thank you.   Dr .  Schneider .  
 
STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, JR.  
ADJUNCT FELLOW, THE HUDSON INSTITUTE 
WASHINGTON, D.C.  
 
 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  Thank you,  Mr.  Chairman.   I t ' s  a  pr ivi lege  to  
once again  have an oppor tuni ty  to  appear  before  th is  Commission.   
China 's  mi l i tary  modernizat ion has  been underway for  more  than two 
decades  and in  recent  years  has  evolved in  a  manner  that  has  wi tnessed 
China 's  t ransi t ion  from a  nat ion that  was  preoccupied wi th  regional  and 
local  secur i ty  concerns  to  becoming a  g lobal  mi l i tary  power .  
 Whi le  the  Maois t  concept  of  "People 's  War"  remains  an  endur ing 
express ion of  China 's  demographic  mass  and geographic  depth ,  i t s  
moderniza t ion  themes  ref lec t  a  decis ive  shi f t  away f rom the  approach 
embodied in  Maois t  theor ies  in  the  '50s  and '60s  in  favor  of  a  much 
more  technology-centered effor t .  
 This  technology-dr iven effor t  suppor ts  the  global  reach of  
China 's  d iplomacy and internat ional  in terest  that  have  paral le led  
China 's  profound economic t ransformat ion.  
 Whi le  some aspects  of  China 's  moderniza t ion  are  s imi lar  to  the 
path  taken by other  modern indust r ia l  socie t ies ,  o ther  aspects  of  
China 's  program dif fer  s ignif icant ly ,  and these  observat ions  can be  
suppor ted by a  few i l lus t ra t ions .  
 China  is  acquir ing modern capabi l i t ies  that  mimic  those  found in  
o ther  contemporary  defense  es tabl ishments .   China  i s  modernizing i t s  
long-range nuclear  weapons  del ivery sys tems in  both  qual i ta t ive  and 
quant i ta t ive  terms.   The mobi le  land-based in tercont inenta l  DF-31 
ser ies- - i t s  upgraded land-based ICBMs--and the  JL-1 submarine  
launched bal l i s t ic  miss i le  are  counterpar ts  to  sys tems deployed by 
other  major  powers ,  though a t  present  on a  smal ler  sca le .  
 The mil i tary  and s t ra tegic  s ignif icance of  these  pla t forms wi l l  be  
magnif ied i f  they are  equipped wi th mul t ip le  independent ly  targeted  
re-ent ry vehic les .  
 The genera l  purpose  forces ,  especia l ly  those  sui table  for  
expedi t ionary  campaigns  and combined ground-ai r  operat ions ,  are  a lso  
being recapi ta l ized and modernized.   Two a i rcraf t  car r iers  are  be ing 
acqui red  as  are  the  current  generat ion of  Russ ian  combat  a i rcraf t ,  
d iese l -e lec t r ic  submarines ,  surface  naval  combatants ,  s t ra tegic  a i r l i f t ,  
 ai rborne  warning and control  sys tems,  and aer ia l  tankers .  
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 More  advanced indigenous  a i rcraf t  wi l l  soon be  deployed that  
lever  the  PRC's  access  to  advanced dual -use  technologies  f rom the  
Uni ted Sta tes ,  Europe and Japan.  
 The advanced s ta te  of  China 's  c ivi l  sec tor  te lecommunicat ions  
infras t ructure  impl ies  that  i t s  modernizat ion program is  wel l  suppor ted 
by contemporary  command-control -and-communicat ions  technologies  
as  wel l .  
 Whi le  some of  these  capabi l i t ies  have been acquired  f rom Russ ia ,  
China 's  access  to  advanced technology f rom the  g lobal  market  has  
enabled China  to  create  mi l i tary  capabi l i t ies  that  are  inves ted in  
indigenous  developments  as  wel l .  
 China 's  acquis i t ion  of  mi l i tary technologies  f rom Russ ia  and 
modern c iv i l  technologies  from elsewhere  in  the  world  is  supplemented 
by a  very  aggress ive  commercia l  and c landest ine  defense  indust r ia l  
espionage effor t  as  wel l .  
 The scope,  though not  yet  the  scale ,  of  these  investments  i s  
consis tent  wi th  global  aspi ra t ions ,  but  by most  assessments  i s  
excessive in  re la t ion  to  China 's  regional  secur i ty  needs .  
 However ,  China  has  been s i lent  on the  doctr inal  and pol icy  bas is  
that  i s  dr iv ing the  unique character  of  i t s  modernizat ion and 
recapi ta l iza t ion effor t ,  and moreover  China 's  inves tment  cont inues  to  
grow s ignif icant ly .  
 Concern about  China 's  s i lence  on the  ra t ionale  for  i t s  
modernizat ion program has  prompted the  U.S.  government  to  appeal  on 
numerous occasions  for  greater  t ransparency about  the  a ims of  i t s  
modernizat ion and recapi ta l izat ion effor t .   More recent ly ,  the  
Chairman of  the  U.S.  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staf f ,  Genera l  Peter  Pace ,  
re i tera ted this  request  on  his  recent  vis i t  to  China .  
 Apar t  f rom embryonic  confidence-bui ld ing measures ,  China  has  
not  responded to  requests  for  grea ter  t ransparency leaving China 's  
defense  modernizat ion open to  many a l ternat ive  in terpretat ions .  
 In  looking at  the i r  inves tment  in  asymmetr ic  mi l i tary  
capabi l i t ies ,  a  few points  come to  mind.   F i rs t ,  whi le  some aspects  of  
China 's  defense  modernizat ion and recapi ta l iza t ion effor ts  have readi ly  
unders tood para l le ls  to  those  of  o ther  indust r ia l  na t ions ,  some aspects  
of  thei r  defense  program are  unique in  scale  and thei r  comprehensive  
character .  
 Inves tments  in  technologies  that  in  turn  have created capabi l i t ies  
for  what  the  Commiss ion has  descr ibed as  i r regular  means  and methods  
to  prosecute  war  serve  to  deepen the  enigma about  China 's  defense  
modernizat ion.  
 Investment  in  these  i r regular  capabi l i t ies  by any nat ion can be  
descr ibed as  being consis tent  wi th  an  ant i -access  s t ra tegy,  a  d imension 
 of  an  asymmetr ic  approach to  defense  inves tment .  
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 The under ly ing concept  ref lec ts  a  recogni t ion that  inves tment  in  
t radi t ional  mi l i ta ry technologies ,  especial ly  against  the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  
would be  unl ikely  to  offer  any benef i t  in  the  form of  suppor t ing 
coerc ive  d iplomacy or  mi l i tary  advantage .  
 However ,  a  much lower  level  of  inves tment  in  wel l -chosen 
asymmetr ic  capabi l i t ies  could  in  some c i rcumstances  l imi t  the  abi l i ty  
of  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  to  achieve  i t s  mi l i tary  a ims.   In  sui table  
c i rcumstances ,  the  abi l i ty  of  the  U.S.  to  employ mi l i tary  power  could  
be  af fec ted by a  wel l -executed pat tern  of  asymmetr ic  inves tments  by 
e i ther  s igni f icant ly  ra is ing the  cos ts  of  U.S.  mi l i ta ry  operat ions  or  by 
augment ing the  capabi l i t ies  of  a  more  l imi ted  t radi t ional ly-equipped 
mi l i ta ry  force  to  provide  suppor t  for  coerc ive  d iplomacy or  increased 
mi l i tary  effec t iveness  in  t ime of  war .  
 A decade or  so  ago,  the  Defense  Science  Board engaged in  some 
speculat ive  act iv i ty  that  was not  associated  wi th  any speci f ic  country  
about  oppor tuni t ies  presented by the  abundance of  very  effect ive  but  
low cost  technologies  widely  avai lable  in  the  c ivi l  sec tor  to  create  a  
h ighly  effect ive  ant i -access  sui te  of  mi l i tary  technologies .  
 The s tudy concluded that  such an approach was  pract ica l  because  
of  the  impact  of  modern informat ion and te lecommunicat ions  
technology on mi l i tary  capabi l i t ies .   By focusing the  appl ica t ion of  
these  technologies  on asymmetr ic  or  ant i -access  capabi l i t ies  such as  
informat ion opera t ions  and e lec t ronic  warfare ,  mine warfare ,  a i r  
defense ,  cruise  miss i les ,  ant i -sa te l l i te  opera t ions  and s imi lar  ac t iv i t ies ,  
which lever  widely  avai lable  c iv i l  sec tor  or  dual -use  enabl ing 
technologies ,  such capabi l i t ies  are  a imed a t  speci f ic  U.S.  mi l i tary  
advantages .  
 I  th ink the  message is  tha t  the  sc ience  and technology bas is  i s  
adequate  to  suppor t  a  very  robust  i r regular  warfare  capabi l i ty  and the  
profess ional  l i te ra ture  in  China  is  abundant  about  specula t ion about  the  
use  of  i r regular  capabi l i t ies .   What  i s  miss ing is  any author i ta t ive  
insight  f rom the  PRC as  to  the  a ims of  th is  investment  and how i t  t ies  
in  wi th  our  fore ign pol icy,  and I  think that ' s  the  problem of  China 's  
opaci ty  that  the  U.S.  government  i s  current ly  s t ruggl ing wi th .  
 So I ' l l  br ing my remarks  to  a  hal t ,  Mr.  Chairman.   Thank you.  
[The s ta tement  fo l lows:] 2
 
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Thank you,  s i r .  Dr .  Reveron.  
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MAKING DEPARTMENT, U.S.  NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, 
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND 
  
 DR.  REVERON:  Good morning and thank you for  invi t ing me 
down here  today to  ta lk .   Before  I  begin ,  I  must  note  that  my wri t ten  
s ta tement  and  remarks  today are  my own exclus ively  and don ' t  
represent  the  Depar tment  of  Defense  or  the  Naval  War  Col lege .  
 Las t  year ,  when Chinese  President  Hu came to  the  Uni ted Sta tes ,  
I  was  s t ruck by two very  di f ferent  recept ions  he  received in  
Washington,  D.C.  and Washington Sta te .   On the  tarmac in  Evere t t ,  
Washington,  he  was  greeted  by smil ing chi ldren and r ibbon-waving 
dancers .   Microsoft  Chairman Bi l l  Gates  hosted  him at  h is  home a t  
what  could  only  be  descr ibed as  a  s ta te  d inner ,  and Boeing rol led  out  
the  red carpet  in  ce lebra t ion of  China 's  recent  a i rcraf t  purchases .  
 The same cannot  be  sa id  for  Pres ident  Hu 's  v is i t  to  Washington,  
D.C.   China  ca l led the  t r ip  a  s ta te  vis i t  whi le  the  Uni ted Sta tes  ca l led  
i t  jus t  a  vis i t .   Ins tead of  a  s ta te  dinner ,  Pres ident  Bush hosted a  socia l  
lunch.   Ins tead of  ce lebra t ing recent  bi l l ion  dol lar  t rade  deals ,  the  U.S.  
confronted China 's  currency pol icy .   Ins tead of  ce lebra t ions ,  there 
were  gaffes .   Before  i ts  nat ional  anthem was  played,  the  announcer  
misspoke the  off ic ia l  name of  China  referr ing to  i t  as  the  Republ ic  of  
China ,  Taiwan 's  off ic ia l  name.   And la ter ,  dur ing the  press  conference,  
President  Hu was heckled.   Many in  the  Dis t r ic t  fe l t  the  summit  was  
nothing to  ce lebra te .  
 The  two di f ferent  recept ions  Hu exper ienced are  useful  for  
unders tanding China 's  re la t ionship  to the  Uni ted Sta tes .   Depending on 
one 's  perspect ive ,  China  e i ther  appears  as  a  g iant  smil ing panda or  a  
f i re-breathing dragon.   The chosen image is  important  and of ten f rames  
America 's  unders tanding of  China .   To be  sure ,  the  image China  wants  
to  project  i s  important ,  too .  
 China ,  wi th  i t s  s t ra tegy of  peaceful  r i se ,  pursues  pol ic ies  to  
bols ter  the  panda image because  i t  fears  tha t  other  countr ies  wi l l  
a t tempt  to  res t ra in  i t s  growth.   To counter  percept ions  of  the  f i re-
breathing dragon,  Bei j ing has  long placed s igni f icant  emphasis  on 
monopol iz ing informat ion and us ing propaganda.  
 S ince  the  Chinese  government  la rgely  controls  the  media ,  i t  
eas i ly  speaks  wi th  a  s ingle  voice  or  conveys  c lear  pol icy  preferences  
through i t s  var ious  s ta te- run media  out le ts  l ike  Xinhua.  
 I  don ' t  see  this  as  a  consequence of  communism.   I  tend to  
subscr ibe to  Tom Barnet t ' s  v iew that  the  Chinese  Communis t  Par ty  i s  
30 percent  communis t  and 70 percent  Soprano.   Rather  th is  i s  s imple 
pure  power  pol i t ics .   This  i s  more  Huey Long than Chairman Mao.   
There  i s  one-par ty rule  in  China  and i t  uses  i t s  s ta te  resources  to 
mainta in  i t .  
  Xinhua is  one tool  the  Par ty  uses  to  convey i t s  message.   My 
analys is  of  the  2001 EP-3/F-8 col l i s ion suggests  China  did  use  
percept ion management .   However ,  I  cannot  say that  these  f indings are  
genera l izable .   I t ' s  unusual  in  the  g lobal  media  age  that  one  s ide  can 
monopol ize  informat ion and the  l ikel ihood of  th is  occurr ing again  is  
low.  
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 Outs ide  of  speci f ic  cases ,  though,  I  would  l ike  to  h ighl ight  that  
s ta te-control led media  out le ts  can be used to  inf luence in ternat ional  
percept ions .   My remarks  wi l l  focus  on why China  seeks  to  manage i t s  
percept ion.   In  shor t ,  i t s  reputat ion  determines  how other  s ta tes  judge 
i t s  internat ional  character  and interpre t  i t s  intent ions .  
 China  therefore  seeks a  reputa t ion that  i s  benign,  i f  not  
benevolent .   At  leas t  s ince  1992,  China  has  worked to  avoid  being 
labeled the  new evi l  empire  through a  combinat ion of  d iplomacy and 
s t ra tegic  communicat ions .  
 China  mainly  wants  i t s  image to  be  the smi l ing panda and not  the  
f i re-breathing dragon.   Whi le  I  think Stephen Colber t ' s  " f renemy"  
const ruct  i s  more  useful  to  unders tand China ,  Bei j ing downplays  i t s  
defense  spending,  cas ts  i t se l f  in  a  posi t ive  l ight  re la t ive  to  the  Uni ted  
Sta tes ,  and provides  wel l - targeted fore ign ass is tance .  
 Recent ly ,  the  Car ibbean has  become a  focal  point  for  China  
because  i t  conta ins  four  s ta tes  tha t  s t i l l  recognize  Taiwan as  an  
independent  country .   In  2004,  China successful ly  induced the  
countr ies  of  Dominica  and Grenada to  wi thdraw diplomat ic  recogni t ion 
of  Taiwan.   In  re turn ,  Bei j ing provided Dominica  $117 mi l l ion  in  a id  
and Grenada $100 mil l ion of  a id ,  including a  new cr icket  s tadium.   The 
a id  was  wel l - t imed coming in  the  af termath  of  the  devas ta t ing 2004 
Hurr icane Ivan.  
 To win hear ts  and minds ,  China  act ive ly  reaches  out  to  fore ign 
publ ics  through major  infras t ructure  projects  l ike  s tadiums.   For  
example ,  Cr icket  World  Cup is  current ly  be ing played in  n ine  
Car ibbean s ta tes .   Of  the  12 s tadiums bui l t  or  refurbished in  the  las t  
two years ,  the  Chinese  government  funded three .   In teres t ingly ,  Taiwan 
has  a lso used the  cr icket  tournament  to  maintain  re la t ions  wi th  
Car ibbean countr ies  by funding cr icket  fac i l i t ies  in  two countr ies .  
 S imilar  sovereignty  bat t les  p lay  out  in  Cent ra l  America  and 
Afr ica .   Both  China  and Taiwan bui ld  s tadiums,  par l iament  bui ld ings ,  
palaces ,  and t ranspor ta t ion  infrast ruc ture ,  wi th  the  in tent  to  i l lus t ra te  
the  generos i ty  of  thei r  ass is tance  to  thei r  ta rgeted popula t ions .  
 Some countr ies  have  learned tha t  i t ' s  easier  to  accept  Chinese  
ass is tance  ins tead of  American because  the  Chinese  have  fewer  
demands and ask fewer  quest ions .   General  Jones ,  former  U.S.  
European Commander ,  tes t i f ied in  2005 on th is  problem.   He sa id ,  to  
paraphrase  a  s ta tement  made to  me by [an]  Afr ican leader  about  the  
 growing China  re la t ionship in  Afr ica .   ”We love  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .   
You above a l l  e lse  te l l  exact ly  what  we need,  and then China  turns  
around and gives  i t  to  us .”  
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 This ,  however ,  might  be  changing.   There  are  emerging s igns  that  
some countr ies  are  res i s t ing what  they see  as  China 's  exploi ta t ive  
pol ic ies ,  the  dumping of  Chinese  goods ,  and the  use  of  Chinese  labor  
to  bui ld  infrast ruc ture  projects .  
 In  th is  br ief  tes t imony,  I  t r ied  to  h ighl ight  that  China  act ively  
promotes  a  pos i t ive  image of  i t se l f  as  a  react ion to  the  "China  threat  
theory"  and secure  natura l  resources  to  promote  i t s  economic  
development .   China  act ively  promotes  a  non-aggressive  image of  
i t se l f  through a  pol icy  of  non- in ter ference ,  out reach to  fore ign publ ics  
and governments  through publ ic  works  projects ,  par t ic ipat ion in  the  
in ternat ional  system and compar isons to  the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  which i t  
character izes  as  a  hegemon on the  offens ive .  
 World  opinion suggests  i t s  message is  working.   Br i t i sh ,  French,  
German,  Spanish ,  Dutch and Russ ian publ ics  hold  more  favorable  
v iews of  China than the  Uni ted  States ,  according to  a  2005 Pew Center  
pol l .   The low U.S.  favorabi l i ty  ra t ings  are  based on how publ ics  
perceive  U.S.  fore ign pol icy  act ions .   In  the  event  of  a  cr is is  between 
the  Uni ted Sta tes  and China ,  how the  cr is i s  i s  framed wi l l  be  cr i t ica l .  
 China 's  control  of  i t s  media  out le ts  and good rela t ions  wi th 
developing countr ies  g ive  i t  an  advantage  over  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .   With  
that  sa id ,  China  does  not  want  to  confront  the  Uni ted Sta tes  or  be  
perceived as  a  threat ,  peer  compet i tor ,  or  a  r ival .   China  needs  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes  to  cont inue i t s  economic  growth to  meet  the  needs  of  i t s  
popula t ion.   To counteract  both  rea l  and imagined dangers  of  i t se l f ,  
China refutes  threat  c la ims and bui lds  coal i t ions  with  the  developing 
world  to  suppor t  i t .  
 I  expect  th is  behavior  to  cont inue and only  be  effect ively  
countered by local  react ion to  China 's  pol ic ies  or  China 's  hard-edged 
commercia l  d iplomacy.   The answer  l ies  not  in  a  more  aggress ive  U.S.  
fore ign pol icy  but  in  a l lowing China 's  aggressiveness  to  a l ienate  those 
countr ies  i t  hopes  to  cour t .   
 With  that ,  I ' l l  look forward to  your  quest ions .  
[The s ta tement  fo l lows: ]  
 
Prepared Statement  of  Dr.  Derek S.  Reveron 
Associate  Professor,  National  Security  Decis ion Making 
Department ,  U.S.  Naval  War Col lege ,  Newport ,  Rhode Is land 
 
The Commission is particularly interested in exploring Chinese military doctrine about: 
1. Forms of economic warfare such as destroying or interrupting supply chains or manufacturing 
2. Attacking an enemy’s infrastructure 
3. Mobilizing the enemy’s populace in China’s favor 
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4. Managing public perceptions about China in a potentially hostile nation 
5. Using international law to the limit the actions of an opponent 
6. Using cyber-warfare, especially cyber-terrorism, against an opponent 
7. Employing special operations attacks against an opponent’s infrastructure 
 
It is an honor to be invited to address the Commission to better understand the important security questions 
you are addressing during this hearing on China’s military modernization. Before I begin my remarks, I 
must note that my testimony and subsequent comments are entirely my own and do not reflect the views of 
the Department of Defense, the Department of the Navy, or the Naval War College.  
 
Last year when Chinese President Hu came to the United States, I was struck by two very different 
receptions he received. In Washington State, President Hu received a very positive reception. On the 
tarmac in Everett, he was greeted by smiling children and ribbon-waving dancers. Microsoft Chairman Bill 
Gates hosted him at his home with what could only be described as a state dinner. And Boeing rolled out 
the red carpet in celebration of China’s recent aircraft purchases. By most accounts, the two-day visit was 
successful. President Hu called Washington State “a pioneer in the U.S. trading alliance with China” and 
noted that the state is “closer to China than any other place on [the] mainland United States.” 
 
The same cannot be said for President Hu’s visit to Washington, D.C.  
 
China called the trip a “state visit,” while the United States called it just a “visit.” Instead of a state dinner, 
President Bush hosted a “social lunch.” Instead of celebrating recent billion dollar trade deals, the U.S. 
confronted China’s currency policy and voiced concerns about the $200 billion annual trade deficit. Instead 
of celebrations, there were gaffes. Before its national anthem was played on the south lawn of the White 
House, the announcer misspoke the official name of China referring to it as The Republic of China—
Taiwan’s official name. And later during the press conference, President Hu was heckled. Many in the 
District felt the summit was nothing to celebrate. 
 
In spite of the less-than-spectacular U.S.-China summit, the current administration has emphasized areas of 
cooperation between the United States and China. For example, the 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) 
notes: “China shares our exposure to the challenges of globalization and other transnational concerns. 
Mutual interests can guide our cooperation on issues such as terrorism, proliferation, and energy security. 
We will work to increase our cooperation to combat disease pandemics and reverse environmental 
degradation.” China emphasizes a similar message.  
 
While, the NSS is optimistic about China, the two different receptions Hu experienced are useful for 
understanding China’s relationship to the United States. Depending on one’s perspective, China either 
appears as a giant smiling panda or a fire-breathing dragon. The chosen image is important and often 
frames Americans’ understanding of China. To be sure, the image China wants to project is important too; 
China with its strategy of “peaceful rise” pursues policies to bolster the panda image because it fears that 
other countries will attempt to restrain its growth. China is not unusual in this regard. States do manage 
perceptions and other states rely on perception to infer intentions, which will be the subject of my 
testimony. 
 
Of the seven questions provided to me in advance, my remarks are focused on answering questions three 
and four to provide you the depth you expect. To combine them, I am essentially answering the question, 
“what is China doing to shape a positive image for itself?” I intend to provide evidence of the successful 
use of perception management, but also provide the overall context to make sense of China’s strategic 
communications activities.   
 
But first, I think it is important to understand how and why countries manage their international image.  
 
In my Newport classroom, I continue to be impressed with students’ observations that military power alone 
 cannot guarantee national security. Instead, students understand the importance of all elements of national 
power framed as the acronym DIME to encompass diplomacy, information, military, and economic forms 
of power. From an organizational standpoint, it is easy to identify the corresponding federal departments-- 
State for diplomacy (though the military plays a substantial role in diplomacy through shaping), Defense 
for military power (though State has a significant military capability through its counter narcotics 
activities), and Treasury, Commerce, or USTR for economic power (though this is primarily in the private 
sector). When thinking about information power, there is no good correlate to the other instruments of 
power. The Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy comes close to filling this role, but Karen 
Hughes’ office is too small, the US government is too big, and opinion on policy is too diverse for the 
United States to communicate with a single voice, a single message, or a single face. 
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My students, who are problem-solvers by nature, get preoccupied with this anomaly and consider it when 
thinking about the future of America’s grand strategy. They brainstorm new organizations to provide a 
single voice for US policy. Or they revive and upgrade the old US Information Agency. Or they reshape the 
interagency process through a “Goldwater-Nichols II” to produce a single message for the US government. 
Inevitably, they fail. They fail not for lack of good ideas, but delayed recognition that information cannot 
be monopolized in a free society like the United States where political leaders (past and present) or pundits 
have more access to the media than the government. 
 
While this is becoming increasingly less so, the same is not true in China. 
 
Beijing has long placed significant emphasis on monopolizing information, using propaganda, or 
manipulating information made available to the public. Since the Chinese government largely controls the 
media, it easily speaks with a single voice or conveys clear policy preferences through its various state-run 
media outlets to include Xinhua News Agency. I don’t see this as a consequence of communism; I tend to 
subscribe to Tom Barnett’s view that the Chinese Communist Party is 30 percent Communist and 70 
percent Soprano. Rather, this is simple, pure political power politics. This is more Huey Long than 
Chairman Mao. There is one-party rule in China and it uses state resources to maintain its rule. Xinhua is 
one tool the Chinese Communist Party uses to promote Chinese nationalism and preserve its monopoly of 
political power. 
 
It’s important to note that the primary target of Xinhua is the domestic Chinese audience, which accepts its 
stories with a grain of salt. But in the global media environment, Xinhua reporting is available to anyone 
with access to the worldwide web; and Xinhua feeds other news outlets like AP or Reuters.  
 
China is also expanding its media reach. State-run China Radio International in January 2006 launched an 
FM station in Kenya, which will compete with BBC, VOA, and other local stations.  Like all media outlets, 
Xinhua and China Radio International exhibit a particular bias in its coverage, but because of its control by 
the Chinese government it can be used to disseminate official policy or shape opinion favorable to the 
Chinese government.  
 
Perception Management 
 
My research of China’s reaction to the 2001 collision between a US Navy EP-3 and a Chinese F-8 fighter 
provides a ready example of how China used Xinhua to manage perceptions.   
 
Perception management is generally used during peacetime and does not have to employ deceitful 
information. Its purpose is to influence the opinions of another country’s public or leadership with the goal 
of improving a country’s international image or deterring conflict. Considered more complex than 
deception (measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence 
to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests), perception management results in the target 
misinterpreting data over time and being an unknowing participant in the process. 
 
 Perception management is an effective tool against perceived adversaries. As we study in US war colleges, 
Sun Tzu sees “all warfare is based upon deception.” Countries use such practices in order to protect 
strategic interests while deterring conflict. It is widely accepted by China’s military elite that it is better to 
subdue the enemy without engaging it in battle. As a result, heavy reliance is placed upon manipulating an 
adversary’s cognitive process. In conducting such efforts, the Chinese place great merit on perceptions 
and/or misperceptions, embracing their full potential. This concept of strategy goes beyond attempts merely 
to outwit the opponent by conveying false intentions; it involves the more sophisticated task of directly 
manipulating a perception of reality, and in particular, producing perceptions that directly benefit China.   
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For perception management to be successful the goal cannot be too disconnected from reality; plausibility 
matters. For example, during the initial phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom as US commanders announced 
the arrival of coalition forces in Baghdad, the Iraqi spokesperson dubbed “Baghdad Bob” responded with 
“They have started to commit suicide under the walls of Baghdad. We will encourage them to commit more 
suicides quickly." Baghdad Bob’s comments were rejected by western audiences and were subjected to 
ridicule. Nonetheless, some audiences accepted Bob’s version of events, but this has more to say about 
Arab society than it does about Iraq’s credibility. The main point, however, is that Western audiences had 
more than Baghdad Bob’s account to judge whether his statements were accurate. 
 
The same cannot be said for coverage of the 2001 EP-3/F-8 collision as I detailed in “China’s Use of 
Perception Management.” The Chinese government through Xinhua cultivated a preexisting belief in many 
quarters that the United States is an uncontrollable hegemon and that the South China Sea is China’s sphere 
of influence. China bolstered its position by characterizing the EP-3 as a spy plane and charging that the 
United States violated its sovereignty by landing the disabled aircraft at Hainan Island. Further, by placing 
the F-8 pilot’s widow on television, China hoped to elicit sympathy for the accident and clearly place 
blame on the United States. By holding the US aircrew in isolation for the first three days and not releasing 
the aircrew until 11 days (after the United States expressed regret), China monopolized the information that 
led to the accident. In general, “the facts” about the collision were controlled by China. Ultimately, the 
United States apologized for the incident, regretted the loss of the Chinese pilot, and agreed to dismantle 
the aircraft.  
 
My analysis of the EP-3/F-8 collision suggests China did use perception management. However, I cannot 
say these findings are generalizable. It is unusual in the global media age that one side can monopolize 
information and the likelihood of this occurring again is rare. Outside of specific cases, though, I would 
like to highlight that state-controlled media outlets can be used to influence international perceptions. My 
remarks will conclude with why China seeks to manage its perception. In short, its reputation determines 
how other states judge its international character and interpret its intentions. China therefore seeks a 
reputation that is benign, if not benevolent. 
 
Smiling Giant Panda or Fire-Breathing Dragon 
 
At least since 1992, China has worked to avoid being labeled the new “evil empire.” But unlike the Soviet 
Union, China does not ideologically compete with the Western-sponsored international economic system, 
but has embraced it. Likewise, the United States does not economically isolate China, but actively trades 
with it. China does not promote revolutionary movements around the world, but provides UN peacekeepers 
in post-conflict zones. China is also viewed by the United States as indispensable to northeast Asian 
security, not destabilizing. Chinese military forces are postured for operations in north Asia, not poised on 
the border of western Europe like the Soviets were. Overall, China has embraced the current international 
system in ways the Soviets could never have imagined.  
 
In spite of this, China is often identified as the next rival of the United States.  
Political scientists like John Mearsheimer, who are theoretically predisposed to identify a future balancing 
power, have identified China as the country to replace the Soviet Union in a bipolar world. Sam 
Huntington’s clash of civilization hypothesis also privileges China as a “Confucianist civilization” that 
 would clash with the West. These hypotheses about future conflict are reflected in the Chicago Council on 
Global Affairs 2006 survey that identified 50 percent of Americans believing that it is very likely that the 
growth of China’s military power will lead to war. The view within Asia is even starker with 93 percent of 
Japanese, 76 percent of Russians, and 63 percent of Indians believing that China’s growing military power 
is bad, according to the Pew Global Attitudes Project. 
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However, as China scholar Yong Deng notes, China believes that certain countries like Japan, India, 
Taiwan, and the United States have “fabricated the idea of a China threat to bolster a hostile containment 
policy toward China, to justify interferences in China’s domestic affairs, including Taiwan, to maintain 
their hegemonic security structure in the Asia-Pacific, and to increase their own military expenditures and 
enhance their overall defense capabilities.” While China’s growing military power is viewed as threatening 
in the region, it is not seen by publics as replacing U.S. military power during the next 50 years, according 
to the Pew Global Attitudes Project. Tom Barnett places the China Threat Theory squarely into American 
distributive politics when he wrote, “the proponents of Big War (that cold-war gift that keeps on giving), 
found overwhelmingly in the Air Force and Navy, will go to any length to demonize China in their quest to 
justify high-tech weaponry (space wars for the flyboys) and super- expensive platforms (submarines and 
ships for the admirals, and bomber jets for both) in the budget struggles triggered by our costly wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.” 
 
I am not here to evaluate whether or not China poses a military threat to the United States; I find the 
“panda” or “dragon” label too simplistic. Instead, I would simply say that I find Stephen Colbert’s 
“frenemy” construct helpful in this regard. Instead, I am here to say that China does actively counter the 
idea of a “China Threat” and works to defuse this through a combination of diplomacy and strategic 
communications. For example, earlier this month, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang refuted 
the China threat, saying anyone who can understand and recognize China's foreign policy would “never 
regard China as a threat.” Its message is reinforced when China explicitly contrasts its non-interventionist 
foreign policy with United States’ foreign policy activism, which has elicited negative world opinion.  
 
China mainly wants its image to be a giant, smiling panda and not a fire-breathing dragon. It does so by 
cultivating its own legitimacy, downplaying its defense spending, casting itself in a positive light relative to 
the United States, and providing foreign assistance. China’s 2004 Defense White Paper noted that one of its 
five goals included “shaping the international environment favorably in China’s interest.” Through its 
activities, Chinese strategic communications emphasizes five inviolable national interests: one China that 
includes Taiwan, domestic stability, economic globalization, a manageable international security 
environment, and international status.  
 
An essential part of China not appearing threatening is minimizing negative perceptions of its military. 
While Chinese military spending growth has been steadily increasing, China pegs its spending at just $45 
billion. Even if this amount is underestimated, high estimates of $120 billion are contrasted by China with 
US defense spending exceeding $700 billion. However, if one takes into account the differences in costs 
between the United States and China and used purchasing power parity (PPP) to measure defense spending, 
then the Chinese military budget is closer to $450 billion or ten times what it publicly acknowledges. But 
by using the non-PPP values, China presents itself as a small military, which is not very accurate. It is 
much better to estimate military strength not by how much it costs, but by what it is capable of in combat. 
 
In addition to downplaying its military spending, China also emphasizes its participation in international 
institutions. To illustrate its commitment to international peace and security (not conquest), China currently 
provides 1,800 peacekeepers (the largest contribution from a UNSC permanent member). China also is an 
active participant in international trade organizations like the WTO and ASEAN.  
 
Stadium Diplomacy and Rogue Aid 
 
Relative to the United States, European Union, and Japan, China’s assistance programs are modest. 
 However, China’s programs are well-coordinated to advance its interests, and it regards commercial 
diplomacy as an effective tool to advance political goals. Beijing has also taken advantage of US missteps 
to engage with countries it might otherwise not. For example, US requests for article 98 exemptions from 
the International Criminal Court resulted in US aid being suspended to dozens of countries under the 
American Service Member’s Protection Act until recently. With international military education and 
training programs cut-off, China seized the opportunity to train foreign military officers in China and 
provide military assistance to fill the void. While leading US Southern Command, General Bantz Craddock 
testified before the House Armed Services Committee in 2006 saying, “The PRC has been making 
headway into the region by using economic measures, employing diplomacy, building infrastructure, 
negotiating trade deals, and offering resources to cash-strapped militaries and security forces with no 
strings attached.” I must emphasize the “no strings attached” point since it is an advantage China 
leverages. Up until last fall, the Article 98 requirement restricted SOUTHCOM from engaging with nearly 
one-third of the countries in the Western Hemisphere. And while the United States funds international 
officers to attend programs in the United States, China also provides funding for the officers families. But 
having had an international officer as a student who attended programs in the U.S. and in China, I can 
reassure you that the Chinese cannot compete with American professional military educational institutions 
like the Naval War College.   
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Recently, the Caribbean has become a focal point for China because it contains four of the 24 states that 
still recognize Taiwan as an independent country. In 2004, China successfully induced the countries of 
Dominica and Grenada to withdraw diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. In return, Beijing provided 
Dominica $117 million of aid over six years and Grenada $100 million of aid, including a new cricket 
stadium. The aid was well-timed coming in the aftermath of the devastating 2004 hurricane Ivan.  
 
China actively reaches out to foreign publics through major infrastructure projects like stadiums. For 
example, Cricket World Cup is currently being played in nine Caribbean countries. Of the twelve stadiums 
built or refurbished in the last two years, the Chinese government funded three (Antigua, Jamaica, and 
Grenada). Interestingly, Taiwan has also used the cricket tournament to maintain relations with Caribbean 
countries by funding cricket facilities in St. Kitts & Nevis and in St. Vincent & the Grenadines. Similar 
sovereignty battles play out in Central America and Africa. Both China and Taiwan build stadiums, 
parliament buildings, palaces, and transportation infrastructure with the intent to illustrate the generosity of 
their assistance to the targeted populations. 
 
In addition to providing public works, Beijing also promotes Chinese culture through Confucius Institutes, 
Chinese language schools, and international broadcasting. The Confucius Institutes facilitate Beijing’s 
relationship with Chinese populations living throughout the world and are centers for China to reach out to 
local populations.  
 
China also influences foreign audiences about US intentions. For example, last month after the Defense 
Department announced its intention to create a single military command for Africa, the PLA Daily 
promoted an instrumental explanation for the decision. The PLA Daily saw the US move as inevitable “to 
step up its [US] control over Africa.” This interpretation overemphasizes the importance of West African 
oil because the change is more about smoothing existing bureaucratic lines and focusing US assistance. The 
Defense Department sees that Africa Command will “integrate US interagency efforts and assist diplomacy 
and development efforts.” Yet the Chinese explanation is more believable given the increased use of the US 
military during the last five years.  
 
Moisés Naím has characterized some Chinese foreign assistance as “rogue aid.” Specifically, China’s $2 
billion loan to Angola undermined the International Monetary Fund’s efforts to force Angola to improve 
oversight and reduce corruption. Or, China’s investments in the Sudanese energy sector are viewed as 
preventing decisive action in Darfur. Or China’s support of environmentally unfriendly programs in the 
Philippines preempted the Asian Development Bank’s efforts to encourage environmental protection.  
 
 In the cases I listed above, China used its foreign assistance to ensure access to raw materials and curry 
favor with the local populations. These motives are consistent with a country pursuing its national interests, 
but this behavior can have detrimental effects on its international reputation. By going around international 
institutions, comprehensive efforts to facilitate development and improve governance can be undermined.  
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Yet, some countries have learned that it is easier to accept Chinese assistance instead of American because 
the Chinese have fewer demands and ask fewer questions. General Jones, former US European 
Commander, testified in 2005 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on this problem. He said, 
“To paraphrase a statement made to me by an African leader about the growing China relationship in 
Africa, he says, ‘we love the United States. You, above all else, tell us exactly what we need and then 
China turns around and gives it to us.’”  
 
This, however, might be changing. Earlier this month, Angola’s state oil company, announced it would 
discontinue talks with China’s Sinopec on building a joint refinery. Angola was not willing to back a 
refinery that would only serve China’s interests. There are also emerging signs that other countries are 
resisting what they see as China’s exploitative policies, the dumping of Chinese goods, and the use of 
Chinese labor to build infrastructure projects. Sometimes, the Chinese populations in these countries 
become targets of violence. For example, in Zambia last year, the presidential election was marred with 
some violence directed at the 30,000 Chinese there. It appears that developing countries can and will resist 
any trade deal that is not mutually beneficial, so the honeymoon China is experiencing in the developing 
world may be undermined by its own behavior.  
 
I must note that China is also learning that its commercial diplomacy comes at a political cost that 
sometimes does not serve its broader national interests. Its association with rogue regimes tarnishes its 
international image and its hard-edge business practices often undermine the goodwill its investments have 
generated. For example, China’s support of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe has been waning and several 
Chinese firms recently withdrew from projects because Zimbabwe could not live up to its contractual 
obligations. While the relationship has historical depth, it could not withstand the realities of 21st century 
commerce. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this brief testimony, I tried to highlight that China actively promotes a positive image of itself as a 
reaction to the “China threat theory” and secure natural resources to promote its economic development. 
The war on terrorism has helped deflate the China threat as relations have improved with the United States, 
but China continues to actively promote a non-aggressive image of itself through a policy of non-
interference, outreach to foreign publics and governments through public works projects, participation in 
the international system, and comparisons to the United States. Relative to its past, China has made great 
efforts to abate fears about China’s economic growth and military power. Through its strategy of peaceful 
rise, the message is simple and exemplified by Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang who said, “China 
adheres to peaceful development and advocates a harmonious society of lasting peace and common 
prosperity. That's what has allowed China to win trust, cooperation and friends in the world.” This message 
is also accompanied with statements that characterize the United States as a hegemon on the offensive. 
 
World opinion suggests its message is working. British, French, German, Spanish, Dutch, and Russian 
publics hold more favorable views of China than the United States, according to a 2005 Pew Center poll. 
The low US favorability ratings are based on how publics perceive US foreign policy actions. In the event 
of a crisis between the United States and China, how the crisis is framed will be critical. China’s control of 
its media outlets and good relations with developing countries give it an advantage over the United States.  
 
With that said, China does not want to confront the United States or be perceived as a threat, peer 
competitor, or rival of the United States. China needs the United States to continue its economic growth to 
meet the needs of its population. To counteract both real and imagined dangers of itself, China refutes 
 threat claims and builds coalitions within the developing world to support it. I expect this behavior to 
continue and only to be effectively countered by local reactions to China’s policies. The answer lies not in a 
more aggressive US foreign policy, but in allowing China’s aggressiveness to alienate those countries it 
hopes to court.  
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With that, I look forward to your questions. 
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PANEL I:   CONGRESSIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Thank you very  much.   Dr .  
Bunker ,  I 'm going to  delay you,  i f  I  may,  and ask Congressman Dana 
Rohrabacher  to  speak.    Congressman Rohrabacher  i s  a  
Republ ican f rom the  46th  Dis t r ic t  in  Cal i fornia .   He was e lected to  the  
House  of  Representa t ives  in  1988 and he 's  present ly  serving his  n in th  
term in  off ice .   He 's  the  former  chai rman of  the  Science Subcommit tee  
on Space  and Aeronaut ics .    
 He 's  a lso  former  chai rman and ranking member  of  the  
Subcommit tee  on Internat ional  Organizat ions ,  Human Rights  and 
Oversight ,  and a  member  of  i t s  Subcommit tee  on Asia  and the  Paci f ic  
and the  Global  Environment .  
 In  these  posi t ions ,  he 's  been a  forceful  advocate  of  America 's  
in ternat ional  t rade  compet i t iveness  and he  promotes  a  s t rong role  for  
nat ional  secur i ty  and U.S.  fore ign pol icy .    
 Thank you for  being here ,  Congressman Rohrabacher .   We 're  
very  pleased to  have you.  
  
STATEMENT OF DANA ROHRABACHER 
A U.S.  REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 MR.  ROHRABACHER:  I  want  to  thank you for  invi t ing me 
today,  and I  th ink we ' l l  jus t  go  r ight  in to  i t ,  the  fac t  that  I  be l ieve  that  
i t  i s  apparent  that  the  Chinese  government  has  embarked on a  very well  
orchest ra ted  campaign to  put  China  on the  path  to  g lobal  dominat ion.   
That ,  I  be l ieve ,  i s  the i r  goal .   We are  fee l ing the  resul ts  of  th is  
successful  effor t  as  we run into  roadblocks  around the  wor ld--
roadblocks  to  American foreign pol icy  in  I ran ,  Sudan,  Venezuela ,  
Nor th  Korea ,  Kazakhstan,  Burma and e lsewhere .  
 The Overs ight  and Inves t igat ion Subcommit tee ,  which I  chai red 
las t  year ,  he ld hear ings  on China 's  inf luence  on U.S.  fore ign pol icy 
through U.S.  educat ional  and mul t i la tera l  organizat ions  and corporate  
America .  
 I  bel ieve that  the  s ingle- largest  long- term threa t  to  the  Uni ted 
Sta tes  of  America  to  our  secur i ty  and to  our  wel l -being is  the  a t tempt  
by the  Chinese  Communis t  Par ty  to  regain  what  i t  be l ieves  to  be  
China 's  los t  s ta tus  as  the  most  powerful  mi l i tary  and economic power  
in  the  world .  
 I t  i s  successful ly  accompl ishing i t s  mission through successful  
percept ion management .   Under  the  leadership  of  the  Chinese 
Communis t  Par ty ,  one  bi l l ion people  or  more  are  being educated dai ly  
 to  ha te  America  because  we are ,  they bel ieve ,  s topping them from 
achieving thei r  r ightful  posi t ion of  inf luence and power .  
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 Unfor tunate ly ,  when Western  academics  or  pol icymakers  warn of  
the  impending danger  of  China ,  they are  r id iculed and isola ted  by 
American business ,  by  media ,  as  wel l  as  by educat ional  ins t i tu t ions .  
 Not  only  i s  the  potent ia l  threa t  of  having th is  mass ive  power  in  
the  world  being dominated by,  f rankly ,  a  c l ique of  gangsters ,  which are  
commit t ing  ghoul ish  cr imes  against  the i r  own people ,  but  we end up 
having a  s i tuat ion when people  are  t ry ing to  warn the  publ ic  about  th is ,  
i t ' s  not  being looked a t  ser iously .   That ' s  why I 'm very ,  very  pleased 
today to  be  here  to  tes t i fy  to  you and to  take  some of  these  th ings  very  
ser iously  and to  have a  respect ful  analys is  of  th is  potent ia l  threat .  
 This  Commiss ion is  fu l ly  aware  of  China 's  mi l i tary  bui ldup,  i t s  
bruta l  repress ion of  re l ig ious  pract i t ioners ,  i t s  thef t  of  our  most  deadly  
mi l i tary  technology and our  economic  technology,  i t s  f launt ing of  
basic  inte l lectual  proper ty  r ights  and i t s  f r iendly  re la t ions  wi th  other  
d ic ta torships  and groups  of  nefar ious  characters  around the  world .    
Whether  they ' re  in  Nor th  Korea ,  I ran ,  Sudan,  Burma or ,  as  I  say ,  any 
other  rogue regimes that  are  around,  you wi l l  f ind China  somewhere  in  
the  background.  
 The Commission is  a l so  aware  of  China 's  spread of  nuclear  
weapons  technology to  Pakis tan  and to  North  Korea .   So we have that  
type of  prol i fera t ion,  which is ,  of  course ,  an  enormous threat ,  not  only  
in  terms of  prol i fera t ion,  but  the  nuclear  program is  a  speci f ic  threa t  to  
Japan and Taiwan.   And,  of  course ,  wi th  the  bui ldup of  i t s  nuclear  
capabi l i t ies ,  we a lso  have des tabi l iz ing ter r i tor ia l  c la ims agains t  
democracies  such as  India  and the  Phi l ippines ,  not  to  ment ion Russia ,  
which of  course  may or  may not  be  on a  path  to  democracy.   But  you 
have incredible  land c la ims being pushed now by the  Communis t  
Chinese  regime.  
 Couple  tha t  wi th  the i r  mi l i tary  expansion and thei r  ac t ivi t ies  to  
gain  inf luence  throughout  the  world ,  and th is  makes  those  ter r i tor ia l  
c la ims and the  c la ims to  South China Sea,  e t  ce tera ,  a  huge threat  to  
the  peace  of  the  wor ld.  
 You a lso  know about  China 's  d is turbing method,  of  course ,  of  
purchas ing oi l  a round the  world ,  outbidding our  pr ivate  companies ,  and 
then control l ing  the  o i l  and the  energy sources  of  the  country  a t  the  
wel lhead.   But  the  American people  and th is  Commiss ion have heard  
l i t t le  about  th is  threat .  
 Much less  has  there  been any type of  chal lenge to  this  what  I  
consider  to  be  a  real  display of  arrogance and power  on the  par t  of  the  
Communis t  Par ty  of  China .   So why is  i t  that  our  nat ion  keeps  ignor ing 
these  hard  cold  fac ts?   Why is  i t  tha t   there  i s  a  very  rea l  threa t  and 
something tha t  i s  demonst rably  evi l  forming jus t  r ight  over  the  
 horizon,  why is  i t  be ing ignored?  
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 The quest ion is  no longer  whether  or  not  the  People 's  Republ ic  of  
China  is  undergoing a  mi l i tary  bui ldup and whether  i t s  economic 
growth is  threatening to  the  wor ld .   I t ' s  c lear  that  th is  massive  increase  
and inf luence  in  power  in  the  mainland of  China  i s  going to  a l ter  the  
world  we l ive  in .  
 The rea l  ques t ion is ,  ”How do we ident i fy  those  mechanisms by 
which the  Communis t  Par ty  has  been operat ing i t s  successful  campaign 
of  percept ion management  a  campaign a imed a t  prevent ing us  f rom 
real iz ing what  a  threat  i s  developing,  as  I  say ,  jus t  over  the  hor izon?” 
 We must  ask  ourselves ,  why are  our  th ink tanks ,  newspapers  and 
in te l l igence communi ty  keeping the  l id  on  th is?  Is  i t  because  there 's  
some sor t  of  inf i l t ra t ion?   I s  i t  jus t  wishful  thinking?   Why is  i t  tha t  i f  
there  i s  a  huge threat  tha t ' s  developing that  could  be  ten  years  down 
the  road,  (we ignored the  fasc is t  development  in  the  1920s  and '30s  
unt i l  there  was  an  invas ion of  Poland)  that  we ' re  ignor ing the  
development  of  a  huge threat  to  the  world  unt i l  i t  becomes  
unmanageable  and dest roys  the  wor ld  we l ive  in?  
 Before  Constant ine  Menges ,  a  very  c lose  f r iend who worked wi th  
me in  the  White  House  for  seven years ,  he  d ied ,  he  wrote  a  book 
ent i t led  China:  The Gather ing Threat .  In  i t ,  he  predic ted  global  
dominat ion by the  People 's  Republ ic  of  China  unless  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  
recognized the  threat  and quickly  we began to  respond to  i t .  
 Let  me note ,  though,  when I  came in to  the  White  House ,  the  
Sovie t  Union was  a  huge global  threat  to  anybody who bel ieved in  
democracy and bel ieved in  those  values  that  we hold  dear  as  a  nat ion.   
Constant ine  Menges  was  one of  those  people  who helped us  des t roy 
and el iminate  tha t  threat  to  the  wor ld and to  a l l  of  our  generat ions .   
And Constant ine  saw very  c lear ly  that  China  was  developing as  tha t  
same type of  threat  in  the  fu ture .  
 As  our  nat ion wages  war  on radical  I s lamic  terror ,  the  threa t  that  
we face  from the  People 's  Republ ic  of  China  goes  unrecognized and 
unchecked.  Simul taneously ,  NATO is  now dis in tegra t ing and i t  cannot  
be  re l ied  upon to  help  us  counter  the  rapidly  expanding threat  of  
tyranny and the  g lobal  power  of  China.  
 A new al l iance  i s  needed to  secure  the  peace  and f reedom of  the  
world  in  the  decades  ahead.   The Uni ted  Sta tes  Congress  can and 
should  play a  leading role  in  explor ing the  potent ia l  for  cooperat ion 
wi th  l ike-minded par l iamentar ians  f rom India ,  Japan,  and Russia .  
 I t  i s  f i t t ing  that  the  ta lks  about  the  fu ture  secur i ty  of  our  country 
be  t ied  to  an  a l l iance  that  begins  wi th  legis la t ive  bodies .   These  are  the  
nat ions  whose  legis la t ive  bodies  we could  put  together  because  they 
are  the  nat ions  that  confront  th is  power  more  than other  nat ions .  
 I  propose  that  a  conference  be  chaired by your  Commiss ion and 
 perhaps  pres ided over  by Speaker  Pelos i  to  be held  in  the  Capi tol  of  
the  Uni ted  Sta tes .   The symbol ism would be  an inspi r ing  addi t ion  to  
Ms.  Pelosi ' s  leadership on the  China  i ssue ,  and I 've  worked wi th the  
new Speaker  of  the  House  on numerous  occas ions  in  the  past  deal ing 
wi th  jus t  these  types  of  human r ights  i ssues  deal ing wi th  China .  
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 So I  be l ieve  that  i t  would  be  very  f i t t ing  to  have her  p lay  a  
leading role  and for  the  Congress  and the  legis la t ive  branch to  get  
together  and to  discuss  the  potent ia l  threa t  and to  perhaps  lead the  way 
in  developing a  p lan of  how we would counter  tha t  threat .  
 Constant ine  Menges '  ins ights ,  as  I  say ,  he lped end the  Cold  War  
and his  concern  about  the  "gather ing s torm in  China"  cannot  be  
unders ta ted .   Poor  Constant ine  Menges  d ied ,  as  we know,  of  cancer .   I t  
was  a  grea t  loss  to  a l l  of  us .   I t ' s  up  to  us  then to  s tep  forward to  t ry  to  
f ind some col lec t ive  wisdom now that  we 've  lost  Constant ine ' s  
d i rec t ion,  but  le t ' s  have some col lec t ive  wisdom.   And I  would  hope 
that  the  wisdom and author i ty  of  th is  Commiss ion can ac tual ly  be  put  
to  use  to  s tar t  a  process  of  d iscuss ion wi th  Russia ,  India  and Japan that  
would  help  us  create  the  new al l iance ,  l ike  NATO was in  the  pas t .   
Such a l l iance  wi l l  he lp  preserve  the  peace  and f reedom of  the  world  so  
that  our  chi ldren can l ive  in  a  more  prosperous  and peaceful  wor ld .  
 Thank you very  much.  
[The s ta tement  fo l lows:]  
 
Prepared Statement  of  Dana Rohrabacher 
A U.S.  Representat ive  from the State  of  Cal i fornia  
          
            Thank you for inviting me here today to address the commission regarding China's Military 
Modernization and its Impact on the United States and the Asia-Pacific. I believe that the Chinese 
government has embarked on a well orchestrated campaign to put China on the path to global domination.  
We are feeling the results of this successful effort as we run into road blocks to U.S. foreign policy in Iran, 
Sudan, Venezuela, North Korea, Kazakhstan, Burma and elsewhere.  
            I held a hearing last Congress on China's influence on U.S. foreign policy through U.S. educational 
institutions, multilateral organizations and corporate America.  I believe that the single largest long term 
threat to the United States is the attempt by the Chinese Communist Party to regain what it believes to be 
China's lost status as the most powerful military and economic country in the world.  It is successfully 
accomplishing this goal through a successful perception management campaign. 
            Under the leadership of the CCP China's billion people have been educated to hate America and 
because we are they believe stopping them from achieving their rightful power and influence.  
Unfortunately when western academics or policy makers warn of the impending danger they are ridiculed 
and isolated by American business, media and educational institutions.     
            This commission is fully aware of China's military buildup, its brutal repression of religious 
practitioners, its theft of some of our most deadly military technology, its flaunting violation of intellectual 
property rights, and its friendly relations with North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Burma and other rouge regimes.  
The commission is also aware of China's spread of nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan and North 
Korea, its threats against democratic Japan, and Taiwan and its destabilizing territorial claims against  
democracies such as India and the Philippines not to mention Russia which may or may not be on the road 
to democracy. You also know about China's disturbing method of purchasing oil around the world by 
outbidding private companies and then by controlling the oil at the wellhead. But the American people and 
 this commission have heard little about why these threatening displays of arrogance and power are going 
unchallenged.  Why is it that our nation keeps ignoring the hard cold fact that China's dictators have some 
very real evil and devious goals?  
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            The question is no longer whether or not the PRC's military buildup and economic growth is 
threatening to the free world. The real question is how do we identify the mechanisms by which the CCP 
has been operating its successful perception management campaign which facilitates its goal to gather more 
and more power and neutralize it enemies?  We must ask how have our think tanks, newspapers and 
intelligence community been infiltrated and 'turned?'  
            Before Constantine Menges died he wrote a book titled, China: The Gathering Threat. In it he 
predicted global domination by the People's Republic of China unless the United States recognized the 
threat and quickly began to respond to it.  
            As our nation wages war on Islamic terror the threat that we face from the PRC goes unrecognized 
and unchecked. Simultaneously, NATO is disintegrating and cannot be relied upon to help us counter the 
rapidly expanding threat of a tyrannical and globally powerful China.   
            A new alliance needs to be forged to secure the peace and freedom of the world in the decades 
ahead.  The U.S. Congress can and should play a leading role by exploring the potential for cooperation 
with like-minded parliamentarians in India, Japan and Russia. It is fitting that talk about a future security 
alliance begins in the legislative bodies of these nations.             
            I propose that a conference chaired by your Commission and perhaps presided over by Speaker 
Pelosi be held here in the Capitol. 
            The symbolism would be an inspiring addition to her leadership on the China issue underscoring the 
need to develop a strategy to deal with a powerful and aggressive China, and the severe implications if this 
responsibility is not met. 
            Constantine's insights helped end the Cold War. His concern about "the gathering threat of China" 
cannot be understated. Now it's up to us and the collective wisdom and authority of this Commission can 
get the process started.              
            Thank you for permitting me testify today. 
 
 
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Thank you,  s i r .  Do you have 
t ime for  a  quest ion?  
 MR.  ROHRABACHER:  I  have t ime for  a  couple  of  ques t ions .  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  The whole  idea  of  Chinese  
percept ion management  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  i s  one  that  I 've  confronted.   
On February  6 ,  in  th is  room,  I  had agreed to  be  on a  panel  run by the  
Carnegie  Endowment .   The Carnegie  s taf f  asked for  a  b iography,  and I  
sent  them one that  sa id  I  was in  China  dur ing the  Tiananmen massacre .   
A member  of  Carnegie’s  s taff  changed the  biography to  dele te  the  
words  "Tiananmen massacre ."   Instead,  the  Carnegie  s taf f  member  
changed i t  to  read  "Tiananmen s tudent  demonstra t ion."  
 Over  a  ser ies  of  emai ls  tha t  went  to  Carnegie  managers ,  I  repl ied 
that  there  were  3 ,000 people  or  so  ki l led  there .   I  noted that  in  the  U.S.  
we can ta lk  about  the  My Lai  massacre ,  and asked why we can ' t  ta lk  
about  the  Tiananmen Massacre?   Eventual ly  I  sa id  I  wi l l  s imply not  
appear  unless  my biography appears  as  I  wrote  i t .   Eventual ly ,  a  
Carnegie  manager  d i rec ted i t  appear  that  way,  but  wi th a  discla imer  
that  I  had wri t ten  i t  tha t  way,  not  Carnegie .  
 I  la ter  real ized tha t ,  of  course ,  Carnegie 's  new program is  to  put  
an  off ice  in  China  and to  have a  Web s i te  in  Chinese .   And because  of  
 the  coopera t ion of  U.S.  companies  l ike  Google ,  no Chinese  could  
access  thei r  Web s i te  i f  they had the  phrase  "Tiananmen massacre"  on 
i t  associa ted  wi th  that  hear ing.   So i t  s t r ikes  me that  th is  percept ion 
management  i s  even extending in to  the  hal ls  of  Congress .  
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 MR.  ROHRABACHER:  Yes ,  indeed.  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  So  how do we respond to  that ,  
s i r?  
 MR.  ROHRABACHER:  Let ' s  note that  we have a  democrat ic  
sys tem here  and our  democrat ic  process  i s  af fec ted by people  who are  
ac t ive  wi th in  our  sys tem.   The people who are  af ra id  to  be  ac t ive  are  
not  ac t ive ,  and there  are  a  lo t  of  p layers  who are  ac t ive  wi thin  the  
democrat ic  process  of  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  who have very  parochia l  
in terests .   — 
A lot  of  th ings  that  are  dominat ing these  d iscuss ions  today on China  
are  dominated by people  who have an in teres t  in  making a  fas t  buck in  
China .  
 Businessmen who want  to  make a  25 percent  prof i t  deal ing wi th 
th is  d ic ta torship  ra ther  than keeping thei r  companies  here  in  the  Uni ted 
Sta tes  and making a  s ix  or  seven percent  profi t .   Also  i t ' s  a  lot  eas ier .   
You only  have to  pay off  one group of  people  over  there .   Here  you 
have got  to  deal  wi th a l l  sor ts  of  things  wi thin the democrat ic  process  
l ike  coasta l  commiss ions  and envi ronmenta l  res t r ic t ions  and a l l  sor t s  
of  regula t ions  that  are  es tabl ished by the  democracy that  we l ive  in .  
 So you have businessmen now looking for  a  fas t  buck,  not  car ing 
i f  i t ' s  a  b loody dic ta torship  or  even i f  i t  poses  a  threat  to  the  Uni ted  
States  in  the long run,  and they are  f looding our  system wi th  the 
resources  needed to  t ry  to  manage the  percept ion of  th is  potent ia l  
threat .   To businessmen,  what  i s  a  potent ia l  threat  to  America  in  the  
long run is  a  source  of  enormous prof i t  to  them in  the  shor t  run.  
 I 've  seen th is  in  th ink tanks  around the  c i ty ,  and i t ' s  
embarrass ing.   I  see  i t  in  both  pol i t ica l  par t ies .   I  cer ta in ly  have seen i t  
in  the  Republ ican Par ty  where  you have these  b ig  corporat ions  who say 
they have to  do business  in  China  because  thei r  re la t ionship  wi l l  he lp  
China  evolve  into a  more  democrat ic  socie ty .   In  fac t ,  not  one  
businessman who has  ever  come to  me to  ta lk  about  China  has  ever  
spoken to  any of  the  local  of f ic ia ls  about  democracy and about  the  
human r ights  i ssues  that  we ' re  ta lk ing about .  
 I  have asked repeatedly  and not  once  has  there  been a  
businessman in  my off ice  advocat ing most  favored na t ion s ta tus  for  
China ,  and a lso  able  to  say that  they 've  had meet ings  concerning 
f reedom of  re l ig ion or  the  repress ion of  some local  person 's  r ight  to  do 
th ings  that  we take  for  granted here  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .  
 So these  businessmen,  unfor tunate ly ,  are  having a  huge impact .   
They are ,  wi th  their  involvement  wi th China ,  af fec t ing  us .   They have 
 become China 's  publ ic  re la t ions  proponents  here  wi thin  our  democrat ic  
sys tem,  and i t ' s  very  sad because  th is  i s  the  same th ing that  happened 
wi th  Nevi l le  Chamber la in .  
 
 
 
 
  
41
 
 When he  got  of f  tha t  plane  saying “peace  in  our  t imes ,”  people  
don ' t  know that  he  had been in  Germany before .   Remember  that .   He  
had been in  Germany wi th  I  th ink $1.5  bi l l ion worth  of  investment  
f rom England in to  Germany af ter  Hi t ler  took over th inking that ,  “wel l ,  
i f  we inves t  in  Germany,  they won ' t  dare  do th ings  that  wi l l  threaten 
that  inves tment .”  
 Wel l ,  that  d idn ' t  work.   Al l  they did  was  rebui ld  the German 
economy so  that  they had the  resources  necessary to  bui ld  the  weapons  
that  led  to  war .   Without  l ibera l izat ion in  China ,  i t ' s  the  same th ing.   
We 're  permi t t ing them to  have  the  resources  necessary to  bui ld  the ir  
economy.   I f  there  i s  no  pol i t ica l  reform that  goes  wi th  that ,  i t  wi l l  
des t roy the  world  we l ive  in .  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:   Thank you,  s i r .  
 VICE CHAIRMAN BLUMENTHAL:  Thank you very  much,  
Congressman.   Your  proposal  of  the  legis la t ive  body in  the  Uni ted  
States  together  wi th  other  legis la t ive gather ing together  and perhaps 
taking the  lead in  counter ing a  percept ion management  campaign and 
expla in ing to  the  American people  the  nature  of  the  threat  that  we 
face-- I 'm wonder ing i f  tha t ' s  s t i l l  poss ible ,  given what  you 've  sa id  
about  influence and percept ion management  campaigns  wi thin  our  own 
Congress?   I 'm wonder ing i f  you ' re  seeing growing inf luence 
campaigns  and percept ion management  campaigns  a imed a t  the  
Congress?  
 MR.  ROHRABACHER:  Sure ,  the  fac t  i s  wi th  b ig  corporat ions ,  
the  Chinese  have  got  our  number .   They know where  thei r  leverage is :   
shor t - term prof i t .   Boeing is  the  biggest  employer  in  my dis t r ic t  and 
Boeing is  se t t ing  up an  avia t ion manufactur ing opera t ion in  China  now.   
Wel l ,  then what 's  going to  happen?  
 We 're  going to  bui ld  an  aerospace  indust ry  for  China  that  ten  
years  f rom now wi l l  put  our  own aerospace  people  out  of  work.   Wel l ,  
the  people  a t  Boeing are  going to  make two or  three  years  of  rea l ly  
good profi t  on  that  par t icular  opera t ion,  I 'm sure .   The guys  who are 
making the  decis ion,  they know they ' re  not  even going to  be  around ten  
years  f rom now when that  wi l l  become a  horror- -not  only  a  mi l i tary 
threat ,  but  a lso  an  economic threat  to  the  wel l -being of  our  country .  
 And companies ,  not  jus t  Boeing,  g ive  a  lo t  of  campaign 
donat ions  to  people .   They give  donat ions  to  a  lo t  of  people  and look 
what  happens?   Ten years  ago,  Hughes  Aircraf t  in  my dis t r ic t  broke the  
law and t ransfer red  rocket  technology to  the  Communist  Chinese.   
 I  d id  a  lo t  of  invest igat ing in to  that  and,  qui te  f rankly ,  I 'm the  
guy who uncovered i t .   I  d id  a  lo t  of  invest igat ing before  I  turned i t  
 over  to  the  powers  that  be  and they had an off ic ia l  inves t igat ion over  
in  the  House .   But  now we see  China ,  wi th  the  help  of  Russ ia ,  of  
course ,  t ry ing to  buy off  the  a l l iga tor  before  i t  ea ts  them,  us ing rocket  
technology,  probably  our  guidance systems,  in  order  to  knock a  
sa te l l i te  out  of  the  a i r .  
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 That  i s  an  enormous threat  to  our  country  even r ight  now.   The  
Chinese  were  te l l ing  us  by knocking that  sa te l l i te  out  that  they can 
bl ind  us  and that  they can neuter  a  grea t  deal  of  our  mi l i ta ry  s t rength 
because  a lmost  a l l  of  our  opera t ions  now are  based on space-based 
assets .   And,  of  course ,  when they knocked that  sa te l l i te  out  of  the  a i r ,  
they created a  debr is  f ie ld  which is  caus ing grea t  danger  to  a l l  of  the  
wor ld .  
 Now,  a l l  of  these  companies--Loral  and Hughes--who went  over  
there .   They ' re  not  t ra i tors .   They ' re  jus t  not  th inking th ings  through 
and they ' re  not  wi l l ing  to  make a  shor t - term sacr i f ice  of  prof i t  i f  i t  
means  the  long- term secur i ty  interes ts  of  the i r  country .  
 But  i t ' s  up  to  us  in  the  government ,  whether  i t ' s  the  legis la t ive  
branch or  the  execut ive  branch,  to  lead the  way.   We can ' t  expect  the  
pr ivate  sector  to  do i t .   We 're  going to  have the courage  to  te l l  our  
pr ivate  sector  leaders  I 'm sorry ,  you 're  going to  have to  forego shor t -
term prof i t  because  th is  i s  not  in  the  in teres t  of  our  country  in  the  long 
term.  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Thank you very  much for  your  
tes t imony.  
  
 
PANEL II  (continued):   BEIJING’S DOCTRINE ON THE 
CONDUCT OF “IRREGULAR FORMS OF WARFARE”  
 
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Dr .  Bunker ,  I  apprecia te  you 
wai t ing pat ient ly  through the  break,  but  I  th ink th is  whole  discuss ion 
in  the  end is  an  excel lent  lead- in  to  some of  the  ideas  that  you have 
there .   P lease  go r ight  ahead.  
 
STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT J.  BUNKER 
CEO, COUNTER-OPFOR CORPORATION, CLAREMONT, 
CALIFORNIA 
 
 DR.  BUNKER:  Thank you for  asking me to  a t tend,  s i r .   Some of  
the  main  points  of  my tes t imony are  as  fo l lows:    
 When Unres t r ic ted  Warfare  i s  combined wi th  one  ear l ier  Chinese  
c lass ic  on warfare ,  speci f ica l ly  Sun Tzu 's  The Art  of  War ,  Bei j ing has  
now been wel l  posi t ioned a t  least  in te l lectual ly  to  f lour ish  in  i t s  
pursui t  of  i r regular  and post -modern forms of  warfare .   The s ta tement  
 “the  f i rs t  ru le  of  unres t r ic ted  warfare  i s  that  there  are  no  rules  wi th 
nothing forbidden” has  caused immense det r imenta l  ef fec ts  on U.S.  
v iews and analyses  of  Bei j ing 's  fore ign ac t ivi t ies .  
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 Every  t ime Bei j ing engages  in  economic,  pol i t ica l ,  cul tura l ,  
bus iness ,  media  or  any other  form of  fore ign act iv i ty ,  we have now 
been forced to  ask  ourse lves  i f  th is  i s  a  component  of  unres t r ic ted  
warfare .   Regardless  of  the  intent ional i ty  involved,  we now f ind 
ourselves  in  a  d isrupt ive  target ing s i tuat ion,  much l ike  a  deer  in  the  
headl ights  of  an  oncoming car .   We need to  respond or  create  some 
form of  countermeasure  to  the  perceptual  t rauma th is  ambigui ty  i s  
causing us  in  our  s t ra tegic  analys is  of  Bei j ing 's  fore ign act ivi t ies .  
 I t  would  be  Bei j ing 's  bes t  s t ra tegy to  task  special  di rectora tes  
and pol i t ica l  groups  with  ac t ively  es tabl ishing non-mil i tary  
warf ight ing doct r ines ,  but  to  use  every  form of  decept ion a t  i t s  
d isposal  to  keep the  exis tence  of  such groups  hidden.  
 This  i s  where  a  secre t ive ,  methodical  and s t ra tegic  opponent ,  i f  
Bei j ing is  indeed one,  would nur ture  and grow a  t rue  unrest r ic ted 
warfare  capabi l i ty .   Whether  th is  g ives  Bei j ing 's  o ld  pol i t ica l  guard  too 
much credi t  i s  a  quest ion for  the  o ther  panel is ts  wi th  more  exper t i se  in  
that  par t icular  area .  
 The Commiss ion should  be  chief ly  concerned wi th  Bei j ing 
s tanding up specia l  governmental  or  quas i -governmental  d i rec tora tes  
that  combine  outsourced ta lent  into unrest r ic ted  warfare  teams or  
working groups .   The hi r ing of  th is  outs ide  ta lent  may be  di f f icul t  as  
much of  i t  i s  current ly  loyal  to  the  U.S.  and our  a l l ies .   But  a t  the  
point  the  Chinese  are  able  to  secure  i t ,  any of  the  what- i f  scenar ios  
posed could  then be  s tudied,  p lanned,  and implemented in  concer t  wi th  
o ther  mi l i ta ry and non-mil i ta ry ac t iv i t ies  as  par t  of  the  greater  
s t ra tegic  p lan.  
 I  would  suggest  a  bet ter  way of  v iewing the  2006 QDR threat  
ca tegor ies  i s  through a  modif ied  diagram which factors  in  each 
category-- i r regular ,  ca tas t rophic ,  d isrupt ive  and t radi t ional  chal lenges-
- f rom the perspect ive  of  threat  level  and t ime.   In  the  back of  my 
wri t ten  tes t imony,  I  have a  p ic ture  of  the  QRD four-square  box,  and 
then I 've  inc luded this  one wi th  the  threa t  and t ime to  give  you a  
perspect ive  on how that  could  be  done.  
 When a lso  viewing Bei j ing 's  threa t  potent ia ls ,  whi le  i t  i s  
unders tood that  a  sequence of  chal lenges  wi l l  dominate  over  t ime-- f i rs t  
t radi t ional ,  the  pas t ;  second,  i r regular ,  the  present ;  and th i rd ,  
d isrupt ive,  the  fu ture ,  wi th each modif ied  by ca tas t rophic  chal lenges as  
an  addi t ive  threat .   This  would  not  l imi t  Bei j ing  to  ut i l iz ing each 
category in  a  separa te  and discre te  manner .  
 Rather ,  in  the  cockta i l  mixes  advocated in  Unres t r ic ted  Warfare ,  
these  chal lenges  would  be  blended and matched in  such a  way as  to  
 ta i lor  them to  the  speci f ic  s i tua t ions .   And that ' s  why in  Figure  2  I  
have the  Bei j ing cockta i ls ,  where  you can mix and match those  
di f ferent  ways  of  doing business .  
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 The other  note  on the  diagram that  I  have  there  i s  tha t  I  be l ieve  
we 're  in  th is  t ransi t ion  from the  modern to  the  post -modern,  and 
his tor ica l ly  these  t ransi t ions  have been about  300 years ,  especia l ly  the 
ear l ier  ones .   This  one is  going to  be  much shor ter  in  t ime because  of  
h is tor ica l  compress ion wi th  technology.   I  th ink we 're  probably  
looking a t  a  t rans i t ion here .   I 'm guess ing a t  th is  point  how long.   I t  
could  be  50 years ,  100 years ,  but  u l t imate ly  i t ' s  going to  be  in  the  near  
term that  the  i r regular  threa ts  are  going to  be  the  top  chal lenge .   But  a t  
some point  i t ' s  going to  be  the  h igh  technology disrupt ive  threats  wi th  
the  new s ta te  forms that  are  going to  cause  us  i ssues .   
 Thank you,  gent lemen.  
[The s ta tement  fo l lows:] 3
 
Panel  II:   Discuss ion,  Quest ions  and Answers  
  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Thank you,  s i r .   I 'm glad you 
ment ioned Unres t r ic ted  Warfare  as  a  book.   A lo t  of  China academics  
have dismissed i t  because  i t  was  wr i t ten  by two colonels ,  senior  
colonels ,  in  the  Genera l  Pol i t ical  Depar tment ,  but  those  fe l lows have 
been re- in terviewed severa l  t imes  s ince  the  book came out  by the  
Chinese  press ,  by J iefangjun Bao,  the  mi l i tary  newspaper ,  and i t  i s  
th inking that  absolutely  informs mil i tary  doctr ine  in  China .  
 We have a  number  of  commiss ioners  that  have quest ions  for  you.   
Vice  Chairman Blumenthal  i s  the  f i rs t  of  those .  
 VICE CHAIRMAN BLUMENTHAL:  Thank you.   I  have two 
quest ions  for  everyone,  but  I  th ink more  speci f ica l ly  for  Dr .  Schneider  
and Mr.  Vickers .   Dr .  Schneider  descr ibed in  a  very  detai led  fashion 
the ant i -access  technologies  and ant i -access  inves tments  tha t  are  be ing 
made.   I  th ink there  i s  a  growing consensus  that  over  the  las t  two 
decades ,  China  has  made great  advances  in  th is  area ,  and f rom that ,  we  
infer  tha t  the  goal  i s  to ,  as  you sa id ,  l imi t ,  res t r ic t ,  const ra in  U.S.  
capabi l i t ies  to  cont inue providing for  the  secur i ty  of  the  region.  
 Now,  about  a  decade ago,  we didn ' t  ta lk  about  these  threats  as  
much.   We ta lked about  China 's  hol low mil i ta ry  and how i t  couldn ' t  
take  Taiwan.   Obviously,  the  conversa t ion has  changed.   The debate  
has  shi f ted  qui te  a  b i t .  
 Now,  we ' re  s tar t ing to  fo l low Chinese  debates  about  secur ing 
supply  l ines  and energy secur i ty ,  and that ' s  what  we th ink the  Chinese  
mi l i ta ry  i s  most  concerned about .   But  what  are  the  capabi l i ty  
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 indicators  we should  be  looking for?   Mr.  Vickers ,  you ment ioned some 
of  the  technologies  nanotechnology and cogni t ive  sc iences  and so  for th 
wi th  which they ' re  exper iment ing.  
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 What  are  the  indicators  we are  to  look for  tha t  would  give  us  the 
possib i l i ty  to  infer  that  China  is  making a  larger  play in  the  region in  
terms of  going f rom t ry ing to  res t r ic t  U.S.  operat ions  and U.S.  abi l i ty  
to  provide  secur i ty  to  actual ly  shi f t ing  towards the  Chinese  providing 
secur i ty .   In  o ther  words ,  indicators  of  the  Chinese  ac tual ly  being a  
power  capable  of  project ing force ,  engaging in  coerc ive  d iplomacy?  
Because ,  i f  t rue ,  tha t  rea l ly  would  be the  s ine  qua non for  displacing 
the  Uni ted  Sta tes .   So what  indicators  and when do we know that  might  
be  happening?  
 MR.  VICKERS:   Mil i tary  capabi l i t ies  are  rare ly  pure ly  defensive  
or  offensive .   They can be  used in  d i f ferent  ways .   Some of  the  
capabi l i t ies  that  we descr ibe  as  ant i -access ,  some of  them have very 
speci f ic  purposes ,  for  example ,  to  a t tack  surface  ships  in  the  l i t tora l .   
But  o thers  could  be  used to  both a t tack an a i r  base to  deny an  
opponent ,  the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  for  example ,  f rom intervening in  a  
conf l ic t ,  a lso  can be  used to  subdue another  opponent  through s t ra tegic  
a t tack by large-scale  miss i le  barrages .  
 A miss i le  force  can a lso  be  used for  pol i t ica l  and economic 
coerc ion or  peacet ime compet i t ion  to  convince  s ta tes  not  to  g ive  base  
access  to  an  a l ly .   How these  emerging capabi l i t ies  would be  used over  
t ime and for  what  inf luence remains  to  be  seen.  
 In  my readings  of  the  Chinese  l i te ra ture ,  they ( the  Chinese  
mi l i tary)  are  very ,  very  concerned about  energy vulnerabi l i ty .   Rather  
than expect ing them to  bui ld ,  for  example ,  a  t radi t ional  navy and 
t ry ing to  contes t  g lobal  naval  supremacy wi th the  Uni ted Sta tes- - they 
may go about  that  in  d i f fe rent  ways ,  much as  previous  countr ies  have.  
 Sea  denia l  could  become a  preferred Chinese  s t ra tegy.   I f  you get  
in to  a  conf l ic t ,  you might  in terdic t  energy suppl ies  for  everybody e lse  
and put  the  problem on us  of  how do we secure  the  energy l ines  of  
Japan or  o thers  as  a  means  of  t ry ing to  br ing a  conf l ic t  to  an  end.  
 Another  means-- I  th ink i t  was  a l luded to  ear l ier - -would be ,  again  
in  a  sor t  of  peacet ime compet i t ion ,  to  t ry  to  curry  favor  wi th  var ious  
s ta tes  by becoming the  secur i ty  and economic par tner  of  choice .   Then 
that  i s  a  s tep ,  potent ia l ly ,  to  the  deployment  of  forces  in  some of  these  
areas ,  and there  are  some very  unpleasant  thoughts  one can imagine ,  
s imi lar  to  things  we did  in  the  Cold  War  when we were very  worr ied 
about  a  convent ional  balance .   We extended nuclear  deterrence  to  
a l l ies  around the  world  and sa id  that  i f  the  Sovie ts  d id  anything,  they 
might  t r igger  a  response  they wouldn ' t  l ike .   Wel l ,  poss ibly  some day 
the  Chinese  might  do that ,  and then what  do you do?  
 Even i f  you have an overwhelming convent ional  capabi l i ty  in  the  
 Middle  East  or  g lobal  naval  super ior i ty ,  i t  may not  t rans la te  in  the 
same way that  you th ink.   And so  one cer ta in ly  hopes  that  we do not  
have  a  s t ra tegic  compet i t ion  and confl ic t  wi th  China  in  the  decades 
ahead,  but  one th ing I  th ink one can say is  that  i t  wi l l  look very ,  very  
d i f ferent  f rom the  Cold  War  in  terms  of  geography,  in  terms of  the  
tools  tha t  could  emerge,  and how one might  move between sor t  of  
in i t ia l ly  defensive mi l i tary capabi l i t ies  to  us ing them more  for  
offensive  purposes .  
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 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  In  terms of  indicators ,  moni tor ing mi l i tary 
exerc ises  i s  of ten  a  const ruct ive  way to  unders tand how some of  these  
capabi l i t ies  might  be  used,  and in  moni tor ing the  exerc ises  to  see  i f  
they integra te  some of  these  i r regular  capabi l i t ies  l ike  a t tacks  on the 
e lec t r ic i ty  gr id  of  a  hypothet ica l  a l ly  or  s imi lar  k inds  of  th ings  done in 
conjunct ion wi th  more  convent ional  mi l i tary  operat ions .   These  wi l l  
indicate  tha t  China  i s  t ry ing to  leverage i t s  inves tment  in  regular  
mi l i tary  capabi l i t ies  wi th  the  use  of  these  unconvent ional  or  i r regular  
means ,  and I  th ink that  wi l l  be  construct ive .  
 VICE CHAIRMAN BLUMENTHAL:  Thank you.  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Commiss ioner  Reinsch,  
Cochairman Reinsch.  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thank you.    F i rs t ,  le t  me 
thank,  in  par t icular ,  Dr .  Schneider  for  appear ing.   We 've  worked 
together  on some occas ions  in  the  pas t ,  and I  th ink he 's  been a  wise  
and thoughtful  voice  in  mul t iple  adminis t ra t ions ,  both  ins ide  and 
outs ide  the  government ,  in  he lping the  government  to  do wise  things,  
but  probably  more  impor tant  in  he lp ing i t  to  avoid  doing s tupid  things ,  
and we thank you for  your  tes t imony and for  coming.   You 've  been a  
great  publ ic  servant  and we owe you a  debt .  
 That  sa id ,  I  do  have a  ques t ion for  you and,  i f  there 's  t ime,  
another  one .   You 've  made a  good case ,  as  d id  severa l  of  the  wi tnesses ,  
for  China’s  rapid  development  of  asymmetr ic  capabi l i t ies  in  a  number  
of  areas ,  and I  commend to  commissioners  the  par t  of  your  tes t imony 
you didn ' t  have t ime to  del iver  because  i t  goes  in to  some addi t ional  
areas  that  you didn ' t  ment ion.  
 The obvious  quest ion is ,  g iven al l  tha t ,  and assuming that  you ' re  
correc t  about  i t ,  what 's  the  appropr ia te  U.S.  response?  
 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  The t ransformat ion process  that  U.S.  forces  
have undergone in  the  pas t  decade has  been a imed a t  deal ing wi th  the  
fac t  that  in  the  21s t  century ,  i t ' s  not  going to  be  poss ible  to  opt imize  a  
force  agains t  an  adversary  that  has  speci f ic  and known threat  
character is t ics .  
 So what  we need to  do is  to  create  a  new kind of  mi l i tary  force 
that ' s  able  to  adapt  to  a  much wider  range of  potent ia l  adversar ies .   
This  need to  adapt  i s  real ly  a  decis ive  dimension of  what  has  been 
 f ie lded over  the  pas t  severa l  years ,  especia l ly  s ince  9 /11,  tha t  wi l l  g ive 
our  mi l i ta ry  forces  the  abi l i ty  to  adapt  to  these  kind of  threats ,  for  
example ,  cyber  a t tacks  on infras t ructure ,  normal ly  not  thought  of  as  
par t  of  the  reper to i re  of  an  armed force .   But  i t ' s  qui te  poss ible  to  
imagine  fu ture  adversar ies  using these  kind of  a t tacks .  
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 So the  process  that ' s  put  in  p lace  now is ,  I  th ink,  headed in  the  
r ight  di rec t ion  to  deal  wi th  th is  problem.   I 'd  refer  you to  a  recent ly  
publ ished s tudy that  the  Defense  Science  Board did  on an assessment  
of  t ransformat ion which engaged some of  these  i ssues ,  which I  won ' t  
t ry  to  conduct  here ,  but  i t ' s  on  the  Defense  Science  Board Web s i te  in  
the  Depar tment  of  Defense .  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thank you.   We ' l l  ge t  tha t ,  I  
hope. 4  I f  we go down that  road,  how wi l l  that  a l ter  the  re la t ionship 
between the  Depar tment  of  Defense  and the  h igh tech business  
communi ty?  
 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  I t  should  help  develop a  more  const ruct ive  
re la t ionship .   One of  the  l imi ta t ions  on the  modernizat ion of  the  
defense  es tabl ishment  i s  tha t  the  sources  of  technology are  shi f t ing 
f rom technologies  developed ins ide  the  defense  sector  to  enabl ing 
technologies  tha t  are  largely developed outs ide  of  the  defense  sector ,  
and coping wi th  these  kind of  threats .   I t ' s  not  China speci f ic .   
 These  are  threats  that  are  der ived f rom capabi l i t ies  that  are  
ext rac ted  f rom the  c iv i l  technology base ,  but  put  together  in  a  way that  
they can create  a  powerful  asymmetr ic  or  even a  mi l i tary  threat .   The 
defense  es tabl ishment  wi l l  need a  much c loser  and more  cordia l  
re la t ionship  wi th  the  h igh tech sector  to  be  able  to  br ing some of  these  
technologies  in  for  the  benef i t  of  the  nat ional  secur i ty  of  the  Uni ted 
Sta tes  and i t s  a l l ies .  
 So  I 'm opt imist ic  that  this  wi l l  put  us  on a  path  to  a  more 
harmonious  re la t ionship  between the  high tech sector  and the  defense  
es tabl ishment .  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Have you found the  h igh tech 
indust ry  cooperat ive  thus  far?  
 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  The way in  which the  defense  indust ry  has  
been organized gradual ly  over  the  pas t  ten  or  so  years  i s :    the  major  
p layers  in  the  defense  indust ry  focus  on sys tems engineer ing and 
in tegrat ion and are  increas ingly  acquir ing technology from civi l  sec tor  
h igh tech companies  and creat ing speci f ic  mi l i tary  appl icat ions .  
 This  process  i s  moving a long very  rapidly  in  the  informat ion 
technology sec tor ,  and I  th ink we can expect  th is  to  be repl icated in  
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 nanotech and biotech and so  for th .   So I  th ink there 's  a  process  in  
mot ion,  but  i t ' s  not  fu l ly  evolved yet .   One of  the  th ings  that  needs  to  
be  done is  the  defense  indust r ia l  base  that  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  depends  on 
needs  to  be  managed in  a  d i f ferent  way in  order  to  e l ic i t  the  
technology that  i s  now in  the  c ivi l  sec tor  so  tha t  i t  wi l l  more  rout inely 
and eff ic ient ly  be  able  to  be  t ransferred to  the  defense  sector .  
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 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Wel l ,  that  begs  the  ques t ion of  
how,  but  my t ime is  up so  we ' l l  maybe come back to  that .  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  I  saw Dr.  Bunker  nodding his  
head.   To a l l  the  panel is ts ,  i f  you want  to  ge t  involved and respond on 
some of  these  i ssues ,  p lease  le t  me know that  or  le t  the  quest ioner  
know that  and go ahead,  but  p lease ,  Dr .  Bunker .  
 DR.  BUNKER:  Thank you,  s i r .   I t ' s  a  double-edged sword a lso  
in  terms of  our  response as  we increas ingly  pr ivat ize ,  outsource ,  use  
pr ivate  secur i ty  f i rms,  and ul t imately  mercenary  f i rms for  a  lo t  of  our  
capabi l i t ies .   I 'm not  concerned about  those  groups  in  the  shor t  te rm,  
but  over  the  course  of  decades  when we have a  Blackwater  legion out  
there  or  something s imi lar ,  the  folks  tha t  are  manning that  group are  
no longer  drawn from our  mil i tary  and law enforcement  services ,  the  
bond is  going to  be  broken wi th  our  s ta te .   Ul t imate ly ,  as  seen in  the  
course  of  h is tory ,  mercenar ies  wi l l  turn  on you i f  they ' re  not  wel l  paid ,  
they ' re  not  doing the  job as  sworn agents  of  the  s ta te .  
 As  we th ink about  some of  these  responses ,  we need to  make sure  
that  we get  a  good handle  on where  th is  may go.   Thank you.  
 DR.  REVERON:  Maybe a  quick pragmat ic  solut ion of  what  do 
on issue  of  sa te l l i tes  i s  to  in ternat ional ize  them.   The U.S.  mi l i tary  i s  
more  re l iant  on commercia l  sa te l l i tes  today than I  th ink sa te l l i tes  we 
opera te  ourse lves ,  and so  we might  look a t  how do you protect  asse ts  
you do not  own agains t  an  a t tack.   
 One way to  do i t  would  be  to  harden in  some way,  agains t  some 
sor t  of  e lec t ronic  a t tack.   The other  way is  to  t ry  to  change the  
ca lculus  a  b i t .   I  mean as  I  th ink i t  was  a l luded to  throughout ,  China ,  i s  
a  moderniz ing country  and wi l l  develop these  same vulnerabi l i t ies  as  
the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  and i t  wi l l  l ike ly  become re l iant  on commercia l  
asse ts  as  wel l .   So i f  you create  a lmost  a  common commercia l  sys tem,  
that  i t  jus t  wouldn ' t  be  subjec t  to  an  a t tack in  tha t  case .   This  requires  
a  lot  of  imaginat ion,  I  rea l ize ,  but  i t  works  wi th  o ther  countr ies .  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:   Commiss ioner  Brookes .  
 COMMISSIONER BROOKES:   Thank you,  Mr.  Chairman.   Thank 
you a l l  for  tes t i fy ing today.   We ' l l  ta lk  a  l i t t le  b i t  more  about  th is  
tomorrow,  but  s ince  we have th is  august  panel  here ,  I  thought  I  would  
ask  th is  ques t ion.   I t  goes  a  l i t t le  b i t  beyond the  s t ra tegic  level  to  the  
tact ical  level .   I  d i rec t  th is  to  Dr .  Reveron,  but  i f  o thers  have  ins ights ,  
I 'd  be  very  in teres ted  in  them.  
  Beyond Chinese  off ic ia l  media  and diplomacy,  can you give  us 
any examples  or  are  you aware  of  act ive  measures  that  the  Chinese  are 
us ing to  shaping in ternat ional  publ ic  opinion?  
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 DR.  REVERON:  I  th ink in  general  they tend to  off ic ia l ly  put  
the i r  behavior  in  context  as  not  being U.S. ,  and I  th ink one of  the  
k inds  of  inviolable  ideas  behind Chinese  nat ional  in teres t  i s  respect  for  
sovere ignty .   So i f  China is  deal ing wi th  a  country  l ike  Sudan,  for  
ins tance ,  where  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  has  ca l led  Darfur  genocide ,  China  
wi l l  defer  a l l  d iscuss ion of  that ,  and cer ta inly  pose  the i r  ideas  in  
opposi t ion to  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .  
 Another  example ,  for  ins tance ,  i s  jus t  having regular  
commenta tors .   The media  i s  largely  control led  by the  government ,  but  
I  th ink jus t  because  of  technology you have independent  individuals  
and groups  emerging.   In  my prepared remarks ,  I  gave  the  example  in  
re la t ionship  to  when the  Uni ted  Sta tes  announced the  creat ion of  
Afr ica  Command las t  month  and there  were  several  commenta tors  that  
were  quoted in  the  PLA Dai ly ,  for  ins tance ,  and have been put t ing out  
th is  message.   And real ly  the  creat ion of  Afr ica  Command,  according 
to  these  commentators ,  was a l l  about  the  Uni ted  States  t ry ing to  
dominate  Afr ica ,  which I  think is  jus t  s i l ly ,  and I  th ink i f  you look a t  
why the  announcement  was  made,  i t  had more  to  do wi th  I  th ink 
smoothing bureaucra t ic  l ines  and focusing U.S.  ass is tance  there .  
 COMMISSIONER BROOKES:   That ' s  s t i l l  Chinese  off ic ia l  
media .   I 'm asking for  th ings  that  are  outs ide  of  d ip lomacy or  outs ide  
of- -and you may not  know.   That ' s  f ine--but  ac t ive  measures :  
informat ion opera t ions ,  d is informat ion opera t ions ,  mis informat ion 
operat ions ,  by the  Chinese ,  overseas  to  advance Chinese  in teres ts?  
 DR.  REVERON:  I  could  jus t  point  to  s ta te  examples .  
 COMMISSIONER BROOKES:   Anybody e lse  have any? 
 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  Jus t  one point ,  tha t  the  Chinese  campaigns  
for  inf luence  abroad are  very para l le l  to  the  kind of  exper ience  that  we 
had in  the  la t ter  par t  of  the  Sovie t  per iod in  what  i s  now Russia  wi th  
very  sophis t ica ted  campaigns  us ing combinat ions  of  access  to  pr ivate  
sec tor  media  that  are  heavi ly  inf luenced by e i ther  remunerat ive  
incent ives  or  o ther  techniques  to  gain  inf luence or  the  more  aggress ive  
use  of  forged documents ,  fa lse  documents ,  and that  sor t  of  th ing.  
 I  th ink i f  you s tudy some of  the  documents  f rom the  manner  in  
which the  former  Sovie t  Union deal t  wi th  the  KAL 007 shoot ing and 
how they were  able  to  persuade a  substant ia l  f rac t ion of  the  people  in  
the  in ternat ional  communi ty  that  KAL 007 was  on a  U.S.  in te l l igence 
miss ion shows that  these  techniques  are  very  effec t ive  and they do gain  
some considerable  credibi l i ty .   I  think the  methods  are  very  para l le l .  
 COMMISSIONER BROOKES:   Actual ly  you 're  saying we ' re  
seeing th is?  
  DR.  SCHNEIDER:  Yes .  
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 COMMISSIONER BROOKES:  Mr .  Vickers ,  do  you have 
something to  add to  that  or?  
 MR.  VICKERS:   No,  I  would  jus t  underscore  that  one would 
expect  to  see  more  of  tha t  over  t ime,  g iven,  you know,  expansion of  
weal th  and the  t rends  we see  underway of  us ing mul t ip le  channels ,  
some of  which can be  done cover t ly .   And i t ' s  fa i r ly  benign cover t  
ac t ion,  but  i t  can have a  fa i r ly  large  effect .   
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  Dr .  Schneider ,  the  news recent ly ,  
ac tual ly  yes terday,  I  be l ieve ,  on ITT and the  n ight  v is ion technology 
that  was  apparent ly  knowingly  t ransferr ing for  the  purposes  of  cheaper  
product ion,  f i rs t  to  Singapore  and then ul t imately  to  China ,  would 
s t r ike  me as  damaging.   Clear ly ,  they had $100 mil l ion f ine .    
 Have you any idea  or  would  you venture  any es t imate  about  how 
damaging that  was  to  the  secur i ty  of  our  individual  soldiers?  
 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  I  have only  fo l lowed the  case  in  the  
newspaper ,  but  having previously served in  the  Depar tment  of  Sta te  
where  I  had some responsibi l i ty  for  the  arms t ransfer  funct ion,  I  am 
famil iar  in  general  wi th  the  problem,  and the  very  large  f ine  associa ted  
wi th  th is  suggests  that  the  concern  was  regarded by the  U.S.  
government  as  a  grave problem because  i t ' s  a  very  large  f ine  in  
re la t ion to  what  i s  typical ly  done.   I  a lso  noted that  the  d imension of  
the  scale  of  the  f ine  i s  re la ted  to  ef fec t ively  compensatory  research 
and development  inves tment  to  offse t  some of  these  problems.  
 But  i t ' s  not  l ike ly  to  ent i re ly  mi t igate  the  problem because  the 
under ly ing theme of  American modernizat ion is  speed,  s tea l th  and 
precis ion,  speed being the  speed of  the  t ransact ion,  which means  that  
the  U.S.  forces  are  des igned to  operate  24/7 ,  day/night ,  a l l  weather .   I f  
the  abi l i ty  of  the  U.S.  forces  to  operate  in  an unrest r ic ted  manner  a t  
n ight  i s  compromised by e i ther  espionage or  c landest ine  d isc losures ,  i t  
s lows down the  U.S.  opera t ing tempo,  exposes  U.S.  forces  to  being 
more  readi ly  detec ted  and hence  becoming targets .   So I  th ink that  may 
ref lec t  why such a  large  f ine  was  meted out  in  th is  par t icular  case .  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  Let  me just  fo l low up wi th  that .   
I 'm given to  unders tand that  we haven ' t  f ixed the  problem that  was  
created by the  t ransfer  of  the  technology and that  we ' re  asking ITT to  
help  us  f ix  the  problem they crea ted?  
 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  There  are  l imi ts  to  what  can be  done because  
the  funct ional i ty  of  n ight  v is ion,  once es tabl ished,  g ives  a  substant ia l  
advantage to  the  individuals  having i t .   There  was  a  case  dur ing the  
Vietnam War where  a  soldier  basica l ly  I  be l ieve  los t  h is  l i fe  in  an 
ef for t  to  protec t  what  was  then a  f i r s t  generat ion night  v is ion 
equipment  because  i t  was seen as  such a  precious  asset  to  the  secur i ty  
of  the  forces  and thei r  abi l i ty  to  carry  out  thei r  miss ion.  
  So  there  i s  no  doubt  i t ' s  a  grave  problem and can ' t  s imply  be  
recreated by having bet ter  n ight  v is ion equipment .  
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 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:   An Army second l ieutenant  of  
the  28th  Infantry  was  actual ly  awarded a  Medal  of  Honor  for  that  ac t .  
 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  Thank you,  Mr.  Chairman.  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  I  recal l  that  as  a  Vie tnam veteran 
mysel f .   Do we have any informat ion that  the  technology was  passed by 
the  Chinese  to  anyone e lse?  
 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  No.   At  leas t  nothing was  shown there ,  but  
China  has  a  very  high propensi ty  to  export  these  things ,  not  
speci f ica l ly  n ight  v is ion,  but  dozens  of  Chinese  companies  have been 
sanct ioned for  nuclear  and miss i le  technology t ransfers  to  I ran .   They 
provided Pakis tan  wi th  a  fu l l  design of  a  nuclear  device  that  has  
u l t imately been par t  of  the  A.Q.  Khan 's  network that  has  gone in to  
o ther  countr ies .  
 So I  th ink the  poss ibi l i ty  that  this  technology wi l l  wind up in  the  
Chinese  expor t  por t fo l io  i s  h igh.  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  So just  one  f ina l  speci f ic  quest ion.   
How long wi l l  i t  take  us ,  do you f igure ,  to  f ix  th is  so  tha t  our  t roops  
are  a t  the  advantage again?  
 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  I  don ' t  th ink i t  can be  f ixed s imply by bet ter  
n ight  v is ion equipment .   You have to  change the  concepts  of  opera t ion 
to  reduce your  vulnerabi l i ty  to  an adversary  having effect ive  night  
v is ion equipment  and perhaps  accept  some loss  in  mi l i tary  
effec t iveness  in  order  to  maintain the  safety of  the  t roops  whi le  
conduct ing mil i tary opera t ions .   So i t  poses  a  s igni f icant  chal lenge.  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  So the damage here  i s  not  jus t  the  
cos t  of  what  i t  i s  to  develop new technology but  i s  an  opera t ional  cos t  
on a  day- to-day bas is  unt i l  we regain  the  advantage?  
 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  Right .  
 MR.  VICKERS:   Jus t  to  add to  that ,  tha t ' s  t rue  in  a  number  of  
cr i t ica l  mi l i tary  technology areas .   S teal th ,  for  example ,  that  Dr .  
Schneider  ment ioned.   One doesn ' t  need to  have equivalent  s tea l th  and 
then you go to  the  next  generat ion to  pose  an opera t ional  chal lenge for  
an  adversary .   I f  you jus t  have good-enough s tea l th ,  tha t  can change a  
balance .  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  In  th is  case ,  i t ' s  an  ant i -access  
quest ion,  too.   Right?   As I  unders tand i t ,  they now know how to  
counter  our  n ight  v is ion.   I t ' s  not  tha t  they can see  bet ter  than we do;  
they can jus t  b l ind us .  
 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  Yes ,  that ' s  r ight .  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Thank you very  much.   
Commiss ioner  Esper?  
 COMMISSIONER ESPER:  Thank you,  and I  want  to  thank each 
 of  the  wi tnesses  here  for  coming today and for  your  tes t imonies .   I  
have a  speci f ic  quest ion for  Dr .  Schneider .   In  your  tes t imony,  you 
ta lked about  the  PRC's  mi l i tary  moderniza t ion ,  speci f ica l ly  i t s  
acquis i t ion  plans .   Because  of  the  opaqueness  of  the i r  sys tem i t ' s  not  
c lear ,  a t  least  pol i t ica l ly  and mi l i tar i ly ,  where  they ' re  going.   So what  
do the  acquis i t ion  plans  of  the  PLA tel l  you about  thei r  s t ra tegy or  
a ims?  
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 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  We don ' t  have much informat ion about  thei r  
p lans ,  and so  we have to  base  i t  on  what  we see  or  what  we otherwise  
learn  about ,  and the  fact  that  what  they ' re  ac tual ly  buying creates  so 
many a l ternat ive  in terpre ta t ions  of  what  the i r  a ims are ,  tha t  the  U.S.  
government  has  focused i t s  appeal  to China  to  expla in  what  i t ' s  doing 
wi th  this .  
 They 've  publ ished severa l  whi te  papers  on defense ,  but  they have 
genera l ly  concealed more  than they reveal  about  China 's  defense  
aspi ra t ions .  So I  th ink as  th is  mat ter  expands  over  t ime,  because  
they ' re  substant ia l ly  increas ing thei r  defense  inves tment ,  over  15 
percent  per  annum,  that  the  response  to  th is  quest ion of  opaci ty  i s  
going to  ar ise  evermore  urgent ly .   Absent  some c lar i ty  in  th is  area ,  the  
U.S.  and other  countr ies  in  the  region that  are  concerned about  th is  
mat ter  wi l l  need to  take  compensat ing measures  to  mi t igate  the  r i sk  
posed because  of  the  lack of  t ransparency in  the i r  modernizat ion.  
 COMMISSIONER ESPER:  Do any of  the  o ther  panel is ts  have 
any views on what  these  acquis i t ions  may mean in  terms of  s t ra tegy? 
 Let  me ask a  second quest ion then because  you jus t  ment ioned,  
Dr .  Schneider ,  about  compensatory  act ions  on the  Uni ted Sta tes '  par t ,  
and Mr.  Vickers ,  you ment ioned in  your  tes t imony,  how we need to  
manage the  r i se  of  China .   So I  ask  th is  ques t ion:  how do you manage 
the  r i se  of  China?   The Uni ted  Sta tes  and others  can obviously  take  
ac t ions  on thei r  own par t ,  but  how do we manage that  because  
countr ies  modernize ,  they have plans  and ambi t ions  and goals ,  they 
manage thei r  own percept ions  as  wel l .   How do we manage another  
country?  
 What  would  each of  you recommend?  
 MR.  VICKERS:   I  bel ieve  the  r ise  of  China i s  going to  be  the 
momentous  event  of  the  21st  century and i t  i s  going  to  reshape the  
world .   The ques t ion is  how and what  can we do about  tha t?   And 
somet imes  when people  ta lk  about  shaping behavior ,  they get  very  
giddy as  i f  you can control  another  country 's  r i se  and you have to  be  
more  modest  than that .   But  as  Dr .  Schneider  a l luded to ,  over  the  
course  of  the  Cold  War  we developed some s t ra tegies  for  long- term 
compet i t ion  or  in teract ion,  i f  you prefer  that  word,  tha t  may t ranscend 
the  l imi ta t ions  wi thin  the  narrow context  of  the  Cold  War .  
 And that  could  impact  on deterrence  of  confl ic t  or  dissuading 
 compet i t ions  in  cer ta in  area  or  a  range of  th ings .   So,  for  example ,  
your  inves tment  posture  versus  another  s ide 's  inves tment  posture  can 
create  vulnerabi l i t ies  that  can be  exploi ted .    
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 Fai l ing to  take  the proper  ac t ions can a lso  heighten the  r i sk of   
conf l ic t .  
 I f  your  posture ,  for  example ,  cedes  sanctuary  to  an  adversary--
that ' s  important  when countr ies  possess  grea t  s t ra tegic  depth-- this  
could  increase  s t ra tegic  r i sk .   You 'd  expect  ra t ional  ac tors  to  exploi t  
tha t  in  some way.  
 So th inking about  our  investments ,  as  ac tors  do,  and the  way that  
th is  af fects  behavior ,  does  th is  g ive them the  oppor tuni ty  to  jus t  inves t  
in  offens ive  sys tems ra ther  than having to  worry  about  defensive ,  or  
deal  wi th  mul t i faceted  chal lenges  and therefore  deter  confl ic t ,  or  ways 
one can shape behavior?  
 Some of  these  disrupt ive  capabi l i t ies  would  l ike ly  be  c losely  
guarded secre ts  and so i t  p laces  a  premium on inte l l igence  to  t ry  to  
unders tand what  may be  being developed.   In  cyber  war ,  I  a l luded 
ear l ier  to  nanotechnology and advances  in  b iotechnology that  could  
have s ignif icant  impacts  down the  road,  but  you ' re  only  l ikely  to  
d iscover  some of  those  th ings  i f  you have a  pre t ty  good in te l l igence 
sys tem.  
 COMMISSIONER ESPER:  Any other  thoughts?  
 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  Jus t  one  footnote  to  Mr.  Vickers '  remarks.   I  
th ink i f  you compare  the  case  of  China  and Russ ia ,  Russ ia  has  much 
more  threatening capabi l i t ies  to  the  U.S.  than does  China a t  th is  s tage .   
But  however  f lawed,  Russ ia  has  democrat ic  ins t i tu t ions  and democrat ic  
order ,  and a  somewhat  t ransparent  process  of  exposing thei r  defense  
capabi l i t ies  and thei r  p lanning.  
 And as  a  consequence,  we don ' t  regard  Russ ia  as  a  threat ;  where ,  
as  the  Chinese  inves tment ,  whi le  not  yet  a  threat  in  that  sense ,  i t  ra ises  
these  ambigui t ies  about  i t s  a ims because  of  the  lack of  t ransparency.   
So despi te  these  very  di f ferent  s izes  of  capabi l i t ies ,  China  is  the  one 
about  which quest ions  are  raised ra ther  than Russ ia .  
 DR.  REVERON:  I  th ink,  in  addi t ion,  one might  s imply wai t  i t  
out .   I  th ink much of  what  expla ins  China’s  behavior  has  nothing to  do 
wi th  the  in ternat ional  system or  the  Uni ted  States ,  but  maintain ing 
domest ic  order  wi th in  China.   Whether  China  wi l l  s tay  intact ,  i f  tha t ' s  
the  r ight  way to  put  i t ,  I  th ink is  s t i l l  a  very  open quest ion.   But  
obviously  as  they grow,  we 're  a lso  concerned about  countr ies  tha t  want  
to  have the  pres t ige  of  having a  world-c lass  mi l i tary ,  much l ike  we do.  
 Another  th ing that  i s  being done,  I  would  say,  i s  co-opt ing 
China .   I t ' s  probably  too soon to  say the  Six  Par ty  Talks  were  
successful ,  depending on how you measure  success ,  but  th is  idea  that  
we hold  China  to  some sor t  of  accountabi l i ty .   They ' re  a  par t  of  the  
 in ternat ional  system,  they ' re  a  permanent  member  of  the  U.N. ,  so  hold  
them accountable  to  those  s tandards ,  as  I  th ink th is  Commiss ion has  
ment ioned,  cer ta in ly  wi th  WTO as  wel l  as  U.N.   
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 From a  peacekeeping perspect ive ,  I  would  say re ly  on them more  
and get  China  out  there  doing more  peacekeeping.   As  a  permanent  
member ,  they a l ready contr ibute  more than the  Uni ted  Sta tes  s imply  
because  we don ' t  wear  the  blue  bere t  very  of ten;  they contr ibute  1 ,800 
peacekeepers  around the  world  today.   They have a  very  large  s tanding 
army.   There  i s  much demand for  peacekeeping and post -conf l ic t  
reconst ruct ion around the  world .   Get  them more  engaged in  the  
in ternat ional  sys tem,  and I  th ink the i r  interes ts  wi l l  become more  
obvious .  
 F inal ly ,  I  would  say the  obviously  increased dia logue.   I  would  
cer ta in ly  l ike  to  see  more  Chinese .   We don ' t  have any Chinese  
mi l i tary  off icers  in  the  Naval  War  Col lege;  we have one from Taiwan.   
In  ta lk ing wi th  a  number  of  people  f rom Paci f ic  Command,  and I  know 
they do th ings  that  involve  China,  but  increase  in terac t ions  so  we have 
a  bet ter  unders tanding of  what  the i r  s t ra tegy is  a l l  about ,  what  the i r  
capabi l i t ies  are ,  and they can a lso  unders tand what  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  i s  
about  too.  
 COMMISSIONER ESPER:  Thank you,  Mr.  Chairman.  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Thank you.   Commiss ioner  
Shea .  
 COMMISSIONER SHEA:  Thank you,  Mr.  Chairman,  and I  jus t  
want  to  echo everyone 's  comments ,  thanking you for  par t ic ipat ing  in  
th is  hear ing th is  morning.    
 My quest ion is  for  Dr .  Reveron.   You did  not  ment ion th is  in  
your  ora l  tes t imony,  I  don ' t  be l ieve ,  but  the  crack Commiss ion s taf f  
gave us  an  ar t ic le  that  you co-wrote  on percept ion management  and you 
c i te  your  research analyzing New York Times '  coverage of  the  EP-3 
incident  in  2001 and how i t  was  af fec ted ,  you c la im,  by s tor ies  coming 
out  of  the  Xinhua s ta te  news agency in  China .   You a l lege  that  the  New 
York Times coverage of  the  incident  was  ini t ia l ly  pro-U.S.  and then 
once  the  Chinese  s ta te  news agency s tar ted  put t ing out  i t s  s tor ies ,  the  
New York Times coverage shi f ted  to  being ant i -U.S.  and pro-PRC.  
 Quest ion number  one:  has  the  New York Times ever  responded to  
the  conclus ions  drawn in  your  paper?   I 'd  be  cur ious  to  hear  tha t .  
 DR.  REVERON:  No.  
 COMMISSIONER SHEA:  Secondly,  could  you go in to  that  a  
l i t t le  b i t  and give  us  a  sense  of  the  l inkage between the two?   Was the  
New York Times jus t  an  unwit t ing recipient  of ,  in  your  v iew,  of  
Chinese  propaganda?  
 DR.  REVERON:  No.   Thank you for  ra is ing the  quest ion.   Seven 
minutes  i s  very  di f f icul t  to  provide  any substance,  and I  d id  send an 
 elec t ronic  vers ion of  the  ar t ic le  to  the  Commiss ion that  has  the  data  in  
i t ,  but  essent ia l ly  what  we set  out  to  do was  to  say,   ”Does  China  use  
percept ion management  and what  would  that  ac tual ly  look l ike?”  
Unfor tunate ly ,  there  was  a  perfec t  case  to  tes t  th is  idea ,  the  col l i s ion 
between the  EP-3 and a  Chinese  f ighter  in  2001.  
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 I t ' s  a  perfect  case .  The New York Times and other  media  out le ts  
were  s imply unwit t ing par t ic ipants  in  the  process  because  Xinhua was  
the  only  press  agency that  had any informat ion.   One of  the  points  that  
we t ry  to  make in  the  ar t ic le  i s  s imply that  for  percept ion management  
to  work perfect ly  wel l ,  what  they ' re  t rying to  inf luence can ' t  be  too 
divorced f rom real i ty .  
 I  don ' t  know i f  you read my Baghdad Bob s tory  in  the  tes t imony,  
but  i f  you remember  back to  2003 in  Operat ion I raqi  Freedom,  you had 
the  I raqi  spokesperson saying “Yes ,  the  Americans are  here  in  
Baghdad,  but  they ' re  commit t ing mass  suic ide .”   We could  eas i ly  re jec t  
that  because  we had an a l ternat ive  news source ,  but  in  the  2001 case ,  
there  was  no a l ternat ive  coverage.  
 I t  was  perfect  again  f rom China 's  perspect ive  because  i t  was  a  
very  isola ted  par t  of  China .   There  were  no Western  media  repor ters  
there .   Even U.S.  access  was  very  res t r ic ted  for  the  f i rs t  three  days .   
And so  China ,  I  th ink,  very  effect ively  control led  what  the  fac ts  were  
and they shi f ted  f rom what  was  c lear ly  an  accident  l ike ly  caused by 
aggress ive  behavior  by a  f ighter  p i lot ,  re la t ive  to  the  EP-3,  but  they 
very  quickly  changed what  was  an  error  accident  in to  a  v io la t ion of  
Chinese  sovere ignty .   They raised al l  the  other  i ssues  in  terms of  why 
is  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  even conduct ing reconnaissance f l ights  in  
in ternat ional  a i rspace ,  and they very effect ively  control led the  s tory.  
 I  would  say in  the  g lobal  media  age,  an  out le t  l ike  Xinhua is  
readi ly  readable  and read s imply  because  people  re ly  on th ings  l ike  
Google  news service  and so  on,  and i t ' s  a lmost  l ike  a  wire  service  in  
that  sense .  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Dr .  Reveron,  i s  that  ar t ic le  
avai lable  e lec t ronical ly?   Or  anywhere?   Because  we wi l l  make sure  
that  in  our  record of  your  tes t imony,  we include a  l ink to  that  ar t ic le .  
 DR.  REVERON:  I 'm not  complete ly  sure  of  the  copyr ight  ru les .  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Wel l ,  i s  tha t  on the  network 
a t  the  Navy War  Col lege.     
 DR.  REVERON:  I t  was  publ ished in  the  In ternat ional  Journal  of  
In te l l igence and Counter in te l l igence . 5
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  COMMISSIONER SHEA:  Thank you very  much,  Dr .  Reveron.  
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 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Anybody e lse?    
Commiss ioner  Videnieks .   
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   This  fo l lows up on 
Commiss ioner  Esper 's  ques t ion.   About  the  modernizat ion and re la t ive  
s izes  of  the  budgets ,  there 's  been var ious  es t imates .   An interes t ing  
th ing I  saw in  one of  the  prepared tes t imonies  was  use  of  purchasing 
power  par i ty  of  450 bi l l ion (USD).   Does  that  amount  include 
acquis i t ion of  weapons  f rom fore igners  l ike  Russia  or  not ,  because  
acquis i t ions  on open market  are  not  subject  to  PPP in  my opinion?  
 DR.  REVERON:  I t  was  my tes t imony.   I  can ' t  answer  that .   The 
point  I  was  t ry ing to  make was  when the  U.S.  buys  weapons,  we pay 
U.S.  wages .  In  a  s imple  example ,  we buy an assaul t  r i f le  for  about  
$1,000.   The Chinese  buy an assaul t  r i f le ,  i t ' s  about  $10,  equal ly  
ef fec t ive .   In  terms of  looking a t  overa l l  numbers ,  our  budget  looks  ten 
t imes  grea ter ,  but  effec t ive ly they might  be  s imi lar .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Right .   But  what  propor t ion of  
the  PRC mil i tary  budget  i s  acquis i t ion of  technology,  which f requent ly  
they have to  get  overseas ,  I  mean on the  open market ,  and what  
propor t ion would  be  domest ic  product ion and expenses ,  which could  be  
t rans la ted  in to  PPP?  That 's  my under ly ing quest ion.  
 And then how does the  PRC mil i tary  budget  compare  wi th  o ther  
countr ies '  budgets?   Are  they the  top f ive  or  not?   And by service?  
 DR.  REVERON:  I  can ' t  answer  on the  R&D quest ion.   I f  you 
look a t  the  budget  by PPP,  they ' re  number  two.  
 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  Also ,  one  way to  th ink of  th is  i s  ra ther  than 
get  too focused on inputs ,  which is  what  budgets  are ,  i s  to  look a t  
outputs ,  what  the  budget  buys .   However  you measure  i t ,  the  scope of  
the  Chinese  modernizat ion when looked a t  f rom an output  perspect ive  
is  very  extensive  and is  engaged over  a  broad f ront .   They are  
s imul taneously  acquir ing new mobi le  ICBMs,  new sea  launched 
ICBMs,  new nuclear  weapon des igns,  whi le  they are  s imul taneously 
recapi ta l iz ing thei r  p la t forms for  the i r  general  purpose  forces  and 
increas ing the  inves tment  in  human capi ta l  in  the  PLA.  
 So I  th ink looking a t  i t  f rom an output  perspect ive  may in  some 
ways  be  more  informat ive  than t ry ing to  calculate  how the  inputs  are  
measured.  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Thank you,  s i r .   Any other  
opinions?    
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Chairman Bar tholomew.  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Thank you very  much,  
Commiss ioner  Wortzel .   Gent lemen,  thank you very  much for  your  
tes t imony today.   I 'm very  sorry  that  I  couldn ' t  be  here  to  hear  i t .   I  
had to  be  over  a t  the  House Appropr ia t ions  Commit tee  so  I  only  have 
 one quest ion,  but  I  very  wel l  might  come back to  you wi th  quest ions  
af ter  I 've  had a  chance  to  real ly  review in-depth .  
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 Dr .  Schneider ,  i t ' s  a lways  a  p leasure  to  have you appear  before  
us .   You are  a  mi l i tary  exper t .   You are  an  economist .   I  asked you las t  
t ime you were  here  what  you th ink the  re la t ionship  between the  
economic  s t rength  of  a  country  is  and thei r  mi l i tary  s t rength .   We are  
obviously  hear ing more  and more  about  how China  is  bui ld ing i t s  
mi l i ta ry s t rength  on the  backs  of  i t s  economic  growth,  much of  which 
is  coming f rom the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  so  I  th ink I 'm going to  ask  you the  
quest ion again:   what  i s  the  re la t ionship  between a  country 's  economic  
s t rength  and i t s  mi l i ta ry  s t rength ,  and is  i t  poss ible  for  a  country that  
might  be  having economic problems or  potent ia l  economic problems to 
s tay  s t rong mi l i ta r i ly?  
 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  One of  the  interes t ing consequences  of  the  
way technology appl ied  to  mi l i tary  purposes  i s  moving is  tha t  the  cos ts  
of  these  technologies  i s  decl in ing.   As  a  consequence,  we see  some of  
the  poores t  countr ies  on ear th  are  acqui r ing some of  the  most  
des t ruct ive  technologies  s imply because  i t ' s  becoming much cheaper  to  
do so .   Witness  Pakis tan  and North  Korea .  
 North  Korea  is  one of  the  few countr ies  in  the  world  that  can 
develop and produce thei r  own submarines ,  long-range bal l i s t ic  
miss i les ,  space- launched pla t forms,  e t  ce tera .   So whi le  the  
re la t ionship  between the  pr iva te  economic development  of  socie ty  and 
i t s  mi l i tary  powers  doesn ' t  have to  be  highly  corre la ted,  there  i s  no 
doubt  tha t  economic  development  provides  many more  oppor tuni t ies  
for  the  development  of  mi l i tary  power .  
 In  the  case  of  China ,  there 's  no doubt  i t s  profound economic 
t ransformat ion has  contr ibuted di rec t ly  to  i t s  abi l i ty  to  mainta in  th is  
pace  of  modernizat ion across  a  broad f ront  of  mi l i tary  d isc ip l ines  in  
such an  effec t ive  manner .   I  th ink the  rea l  d i fference  in  the  impact  of  
economic prosper i ty  and mi l i tary  modernizat ion is  one of  scope or  
sca le  ra ther  than,  say ,  cherry-picking a  few capabi l i t ies  that  you want  
to  have.   Then i f  tha t ' s  the  case ,  then even very  poor  countr ies  can 
manage to  acqui re  a  few specia l ized capabi l i t ies  i f  i t  su i ts  the i r  
purposes .  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Mr.  Vickers ,  you look l ike  you 
want  to  say something too? 
 MR.  VICKERS:   I  would .   This  i ssue  of  a  re la t ionship  between 
weal th  and power  and the  s ize  of  potent ia l  compet i tors  i s  something 
that  one  can draw some lessons  f rom his tory and some impl icat ions  
f rom looking forward,  but  the  range is  pre t ty  wide.  
 So,  for  example ,  in  the  20th  century ,  Japan posed a  s ignif icant  
mi l i tary  chal lenge to  us ,  that  we would descr ibe  in  terms tha t  i t  was,  in  
mi l i tary  terms,  a t  least ,  something approaching a  near  pure  compet i tor ,  
 an asymmetr ic  compet i tor .   I t  had 15 percent  of  the  GDP of  the  Uni ted 
Sta tes ,  and yet  i t  was  able  to  pose  this  chal lenge.  
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 Those  long- term t rends  are  making i t  eas ier  to  be  disrupt ive  a t  a  
decreas ing f ract ion of  GDP.   The 20th century  was  a  di ff icul t  century  
for  us .   We never  faced a  compet i tor  wi th  more  than 50 percent  of  our  
GDP,  inc luding  Nazi  Germany or  the  Sovie t  Union in  the  bes t  of  i t s  
days .    
 I f  you look a t  some of  the  economic forecas ts  going out ,  the  r i se  
of  China  and India  i s  expected to  remake the  wor ld  economical ly .   I f  
you look a t  World  Bank forecas ts  or  o thers—China,  India  and the  U.S.  
wi l l  be  the  three  great  economic  powers  of  the  world  looking out  30 
years  or  so .   I f  we face  another  country ,  whether  they ' re  a  compet i tor  
or  not ,  tha t  has  grea ter  GDP than the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  and then some of  
that  can be  t rans la ted  in to  broad capabi l i t ies ,  i t  wi l l  be a  very  di f ferent  
s i tua t ion f rom what  we faced in  the  20th  century .   So that ’s  jus t  
something to  bear  in  mind.  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  One thing I  a lways  l ike  to  
remind people  i s  as  we look a t  the  r i se  of  China  and the  r i se  of  India  i s  
tha t  one  of  the  reasons  that  we are  concerned about  the  r i se  of  China  is  
the  nature  of  China 's  government ,  of  course .   I f  i t  were  a  democracy,  
th is  would  be  a  complete ly  d i f ferent  k ind of  debate  and a  di f ferent  se t  
of  concerns .  
 I  have ten  seconds  lef t .   I  want  to  put  one other  i ssue  on the  
table .   I  th ink i t ' s  very  in teres t ing when you ta lked about  how cheap i t  
i s  essent ia l ly  for  the  Chinese  to  produce assaul t  weapons .   I f  we have 
an oppor tuni ty  to  revis i t  this  or  comments  for  the  record ,  I  would 
apprecia te  i t .  What  do you th ink the  impact  of  low-cost  Chinese  
product ion of  defense  equipment  i s  going to  mean for  potent ia l  a rms 
races  e lsewhere  in  the  world?  
 I f  they can produce a i rplanes ,  f ighter  p lanes ,  much cheaper  than 
we can--  
 DR.  REVERON:  Then I  th ink they ' l l  be  exported.   I  had a  
s tudent  f rom Pakis tan  this  las t  term,  and when he  ta lked about  the  
Pakis tan  Navy buying their  next  generat ion,  or  actual ly  next  surface 
ships ,  they took two approaches .   One was  to  ask  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  and 
we had offered them old  ships  for  not  a  very  good deal ,  and then they 
went  to  China  and then got  the  la tes t  and greates t  technology that  they 
could  offer  for  a  good pr ice .   So I  th ink there  i s  every  expecta t ion that  
China  would  cont inue to  expor t  weapons .  
 DR.  BUNKER:  That ' s  an  excel lent  quest ion.  I t ' s  out  of  my ski l l  
se t ,  but  I  would th ink maybe there  are  s tudies  done,  i f  not ,  or  maybe 
you should  commiss ion a  s tudy looking a t  the  U.S.  and China  in to  the  
fu ture  regarding the  cos t  bas is  of  our  f ie lding a  force  and the  cost  
bas is  of  the i r  f ie ld ing a  force .  Because  as  you sa id ,  i t ' s  the  outputs  not  
 the  inputs .    
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 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  That ' s  a  rea l ly  good idea .   
Thank you,  Dr .  Bunker .  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:   Commiss ioner  Wessel .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Thank you for  being here  and,  Dr .  
Schneider ,  good to  see  you again .   I t ' s  a lways  great  to  have you here .   I  
want  to  fo l low up on a  couple  of  quest ions  and comments  that  were  
made and,  Dr .  Schneider ,  you ta lked about  the  need to  manage our  
defense  indust r ia l  base  in  a  d i f ferent  way.   I 'd  be  in teres ted  in  your  
thoughts  about  what  d i f ferences  we should  implement .   How would  we 
approach that  in  the  fu ture?  
 Also ,  and I  am not  an  export  cont rol  exper t ,  but  my 
unders tanding is  we are  soon moving beyond deemed expor t  controls  as  
a  resul t  of  R&D faci l i t ies  being created by Microsof t ,  In te l  and others .   
The inves tments  by U.S.  companies  in  indigenous  R&D in  China ,  
again ,  are  going to  be  uncontrol led  because  we are  going to  be  
inves t ing there ,  not  t ransferr ing the  technology,  but  bui ld ing thei r  
capabi l i t ies .  
 Looking a t  In te l  and a t  a  number  of  our  leading-edge f i rms,  and 
thei r  R&D capabi l i t ies ,  where  do you think that  leads  us  in  terms of  
developing China 's  capabi l i t ies  v is-à-vis  our  own?   And again ,  how 
might  we look a t  th is  v i s-à-vis  our  own defense  indust r ia l  base?   What  
chal lenges  might  there  be  and how should  we manage that  d i f ferent ly?  
 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  Thank you for  your  generous  comments  as  
wel l  as  your  ques t ion.   The quest ion is  very  per t inent .   In  fact ,  the  
Defense  Science  Board  that  I  have the  pr ivi lege  to  chai r  has  two 
s tudies .   One,  ac tual ly  both  of  them have just  recent ly  been f inished.   
One is  on t rus ted  foundr ies  to  f ind out  how we are  going to  be  able  to  
mainta in  access  to  microprocessors  and other  e lec t ronic  components  in  
an  envi ronment  where  the  commercial  incent ives  are  dr iving th is  
technology offshore ,  and we have a  para l le l  s tudy that  i s  now 
completed on t rus ted sof tware  because there ' s  a  s imi lar  problem there .  
 We 've  a l ready made a  decis ion wi th  respect  to  radia t ion  hardened 
devices  that  we have to  bas ica l ly  have  a  subsidized market  segment  in  
order  to  meet  government  demands .   So th is  i s  a  sor t  of  a  c lear  and 
present  problem for  the  Depar tment  of  Defense  as  more  and more  areas  
of  technology have th is  character ,  tha t  they become global ized and the  
economic incent ives  tend  to  move i t  of fshore .  
 This  has  s t imulated a  demand for  another  s tudy that  i s  now 
underway,  led  by former  Under  Secre tary  of  Defense  Gansler  on the  
appropr ia te  indust r ia l  s t ructure  for  t ransformat ion.   The way in  which 
our  forces  are  being t ransformed  means  that  we need to  do something 
di f ferent  about  the  way we manage the  defense  indust r ia l  base .  
 Al l  of  the  defense  technologies  are  not  produced ins ide  tha t  
 defense  indust r ia l  base .   Yet ,  the  way in  which the  indust ry  has  been 
organized has  created  very  high barr iers  to  ent ry  in to the  defense 
market  for  companies  that  are  not  a l ready in  i t .   Chai rman Reinsch had 
ear l ier  ra ised a  ques t ion about  how this  would be  accompl ished,  and 
th is  i s  the  point  of  the  s tudy because  the  Defense  Depar tment  c lear ly  
recognizes  that  there  are  a l ready having th is  problem in  informat ion 
technology,  they ' re  l ikely  to  have i t  in  nano and biotechnologies ,  and 
other  emerging technologies .  
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 So some template  needs  to  be  created.   I  don ' t  pre tend to  have an 
answer .   So folks  smar ter  than I  am are  working on the  problem.  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   But  jus t  before  o thers  may comment  
as  wel l ,  as  i t  re la tes  to  R&D investments  by some of  our  cut t ing-edge 
companies  in  China  which again  may not  be  control led  by deemed 
expor t  or  o ther  ru les ,  how do you view that  a t  th is  point?  
 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  This  i s ,  as  fa r  as  defense  being able  to  get  
the  technology i t  needs,  we ' re  t rying to  see  i f  there 's  an  answer  to  
having a  specia l ized market  segment  tha t ' s  suppor ted  in  some way in  
the  Uni ted Sta tes ,  that  assures  that  we can get  these  products  in  a  way 
that  meets  our  secur i ty  needs.  
 So I  th ink that  there  are  a t  leas t  some concepts  that  have  been 
subjected to  the  varying degrees  of  s tudy that  can meet  the  DoD needs,  
but  i t  does  underscore  the  fac t  that  the  indust r ia l  bas is  on which 
defense  develops  and produces  the  products  i t  needs  i s  c lear ly  in  the  
process  of  evolut ion.   We need to  be  a ler t  to  ways  which can help  us ,  
and the  Congress  i s  u l t imate ly  going to  be  a  key player  in  determining 
how this  spins  out .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Mr.  Vickers?   Any other  wi tnesses?  
 MR.  VICKERS:   Yes ,  jus t  a  couple  ampl i fying comments  on that .   
The depar tment  has  been wrest l ing  wi th th is  problem,  to  my 
knowledge,  for  over  a  decade about  how to  deal  wi th  the  sor t  of  
s t ra tegic  expor t  problem in  a  per iod of  fundamental  economic and 
mi l i tary  change.   For  ins tance ,  whether  we al low mergers  of  companies  
across  the  At lant ic  or  inves tments  here  or  expor t  th is  defense  
technology or  not  versus  bas ic  enabl ing technologies .  
 Deputy  Secre tary  Hamre a t  the  t ime in  the  la te  1990s posed a  
quest ion:   should  I  worry more  about  a  chip p lant  that ' s  be ing bui l t  in  
China  today or  the  sale  of  th is  technology that ' s  going or  th is  merger  
of  the  company?   Which one should  I  spend my t ime on?   And there  
was  qui te  a  debate  about  i t ,  but  there  are  a  lo t  of  people  who are  more  
concerned about  the  chip  p lant  and what  i t  might  por tend down the  
road than current  technology.  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  We have t ime for  a  second 
round,  and Vice  Chairman Blumenthal ,  you are  number  one on that  l i s t .  
 VICE CHAIRMAN BLUMENTHAL:  OK.   I 've  learned how to  
 play th is  game.   Mr.  Vickers ,  one  of  your  comments  was  very  
in t r iguing in  terms of  how we developed-- in  response  to  Commiss ioner  
Esper 's  ques t ion about  managing and shaping and so  for th--and you 
ment ioned that  we developed cer ta in  in teract ions ,  compet i t ions  in  our  
in teract ions  wi th  the  Sovie ts  that  obviously  were  to  our  advantage  and 
prevai led ,  whether  i t  was  dissuading or  de terr ing,  cer ta in  compet i t ions ,  
mi l i tary  compet i t ions  and so  for th .  
 
 
 
 
  
61
 
 I  th ink one of  the  problems is - -and i t ' s  ref lec ted on th is  panel  
and any panel  ever  d iscuss ing China-- is  we cer ta in ly  don ' t  have a  
consensus in  even the  s t ra tegic  communi ty  about  whether  or  not  we 're  
in  a  compet i t ion  with  China  or  whether  China  i s  a  threa t .   In  the  Soviet  
case ,  obviously  by the  la te  40 's ,  we decided i t  was  a  threa t ,  and we had 
an NSD 68 and you had a  number  of  very  smar t  people  working on how 
to  prevai l  in  those  compet i t ions .  
 So we 're  fac ing a  very  di f ferent  se t  of  c i rcumstances  here  where  
we 've  heard  a  range of  tes t imony even today about  s t rategies  of  co-
opt ion versus  prepar ing the  ground for  compet i t ion .  
 So I  wonder  when and how do we know that  we ' re  in  a  secur i ty  
compet i t ion  wi th  China?   When and how do we know that  China  is  a  
threat?   Wil l  this  country ever  come to  tha t  consensus?   That ' s  
specula t ion,  obviously ,  but  your  own opinion f i rs t  and then others  as  
wel l .  
 MR.  VICKERS:   Sure .   I f  you look a t  the  broad grand s t ra tegic  
choices  that  we have vis-à-vis  China  and by grand s t ra tegy,  I  mean the  
in tegrat ion of  economic pol icy  and s tra tegy and secur i ty  and others  i t  
poses  a  very  d i f ferent  chal lenge from the  Cold  War .   I f  you say,  
“China  wi l l  never  be  a  threat  to  us ,  and so  therefore  my aim,  my 
pol i t ica l  and economic s t ra tegy,  i s  jus t  to  ensure  th is  peaceful  r i se ,  but  
I 'm not  going to  hedge in  any secur i ty d imension in  any way,”   i t  could  
be  r ight  and we hope i t ' s  r ight .   But  you ' re  rea l ly  taking some 
potent ia l ly  h igh r isk  there  i f  one  looks  a t  h is tory  for  that  s t ra tegy to  
work.  
 By the  same token,  the  f l ip  s ide  of  that ,  i f  you sa id  “No,  I  th ink 
I 'm very  worr ied  about  them,  and so  I 'm going to  t ry  to  br ing my 
economics  in to  l ine  wi th  my secur i ty  s t ra tegy and adopt  some form of  
conta inment  or  e lsewhere”  that  may be  to ta l ly  impract ica l  and i t  may 
create  a  resul t  tha t  you don ' t  want .   And so  rea l ly  the  essence  of  
s t ra tegic  debate  today is ,  how do you have a  secur i ty  s t ra tegy in  th is  
g lobal ized open world  that  we ' re  a l l  par t ic ipat ing in ,  but  where  you 
s t i l l  have to  hedge in  var ious  ways?   And i t  c reates  some oppor tuni t ies  
as  wel l  as  r i sks .  
 The oppor tuni t ies  come f rom openness .   You know i t  wasn ' t  jus t  
a  cakewalk  to  t ry  to  penet ra te  the  Sovie t  Union and do var ious  th ings  
tha t  the  conta inment  and the  economic s t ra tegy brought  about ,  and 
 occas ional ly  detente  ac tual ly  worked to  our  advantage  in  that  regard  in  
terms of  learning more  about  them.  
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 Now,  again ,  Dr .  Reveron referred to  th is  ear l ier  about  what  path  
are  we on r ight  now.   U.S.  s t ra tegy is  to  engage China .   I t ' s  been for  a  
long t ime.   Congressman Rohrabacher  ta lked about  the  business  v iew 
of  inves t ing and everything e lse .   Al l  that  i s  t rue .  
 The Chinese  view,  I  th ink,  was  summarized very,  very  wel l ,  
which is  “we don ' t  want  conf l ic t  r ight  now;  we want  to  become 
s t ronger  and r ise .”   And now again  whatever  in terpreta t ion you put  on 
that  and the  poss ibi l i t ies  that  could  occur  20 or  30 years  down the  
road,  those  are  the  sor t  of  the  two courses  that  we ' re  on.   
 Now,  the problem is :   what  i f  one  s ide  i s  wrong?  China  i s ,  I  
agree ,  concerned about  domest ic  order  and other  i ssues ,  and i t ' s  not  a  
done deal  tha t  they ' l l  be  able  to  hold  that  together .   By the  same token,  
i t ' s  not  a  done deal  tha t  the  r i se  wi l l  be  peaceful  and so  how you 
manage that  whi le  s t i l l  hedging and shaping behavior  to  the  extent  you 
can,  I  th ink,  i s  cr i t ica l .   Again  there  wi l l  be  oppor tuni t ies  for  us  to  do 
th ings  by our  own inves tments  but  a lso in  this  s t ra tegic  interact ion  that  
we f ind ourselves  in .  
 VICE CHAIRMAN BLUMENTHAL:  So you don ' t  see  a  moment  
that  we ' l l  of  a  sudden say th is  i s  a  threa t  or  not?   I t ' s  not  going to  be  
l ike  the  Soviet  compet i t ion?  
 MR.  VICKERS:   You could ,  but  one of  the  real iza t ions  I  th ink of  
the  pas t  couple  years  or  so  was  the  dangers  in  the  prot racted Rip Van 
Winkle  scenar io  where  you don ' t  have th is  crys ta l l iz ing moment  that  
occurs  fa i r ly  ear ly  and you adjus t  your  course ,  but  ra ther  you see  your  
posi t ion  eroded over  t ime and the  balance  has  shi f ted  because  of  your  
own act ions  and thei rs- -wi thout  th is  crysta l l izing moment .   Therefore  
how do you hedge?  That ' s  where  you th ink you 're  succeeding,  but  how 
do you hedge to  make sure tha t  the  compet i t ion doesn ' t  turn  in  a  darker  
d i rec t ion 25 years  or  so?   So you may not  get  tha t  great  rea l iza t ion.  
 DR.  BUNKER:  You might  a lso be heading into the equivalent  of  
a  19th  century  power  balance  world  wi th ,  you know,  Russia  and India  
coming in to  p lay  here  as  another  e lement  that  you 're  going to  have to  
sor t  out  when you look a t  these  re la t ions .  
 DR.  REVERON:  I  don’ t  mean to  be  g l ib ,  but  the  easy answer  
would  be  Taiwan declares  independence,  China  launches  a  miss i le  
s t r ike  agains t  Taiwan,  then you would know you 're  in  a  war  
potent ia l ly .   What  does  i t  look l ike  before  that?   I  would  add--I  don ' t  
know who to  a t t r ibute  i t  to- -but  the  s t ra tegy r ight  now is  hug them and 
hedge;  hug them in  the  sense  of  economic  coopera t ion and diplomat ic  
and so  on,  hedge on these  technologies ,  unders tand what  thei r  
technology t rends  are  and ensure  tha t  we s tay  ahead of  those .   There  i s  
no consensus  on th is  quest ion of  compet i t ion.  
  HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:   Commiss ioner  Reinsch.  
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 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thank you.   Dr .  Reveron,  in  
your  ora l  tes t imony and in  your  wri t ten  s ta tement ,  you ta lked about  
Chinese  act iv i t ies  to  ga in  favor ,  i f  you wi l l ,  in  o ther  par ts  of  the  
world ,  the  Car ibbean and Afr ica ,  and you a l luded to  Zimbabwe as  an  
example  of  concerns  about  what  the ir  suppor t  of  d ic ta tor ia l  regimes  or  
o ther  unsat is fac tory  regimes  for  any reason is  doing to  thei r  
in ternat ional  reputat ion .  
 Can you say a  word or  two about  the i r  pol icy  in  Sudan and 
whether  you see  any change there  because  of  tha t?  
 DR.  REVERON:  No.    
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Okay.   Fai r  enough.  
 Let  me ask you a  second quest ion then.    
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  No to  thei r  pol icy  or  you can ' t  
answer?  
 DR.  REVERON:  No,  I  can ' t  answer  on Darfur  in  par t icular .   I  
would  say they haven ' t  been as  obstruct ionis t  in  the  U.N.  Secur i ty  
Counci l  as  I 've  seen i t  p layed in  the  pas t .  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  As they used to  be .  
 DR.  REVERON:  As they used to  be .   I  don ' t  know i f  tha t ' s  
because  of  an  agreement  wi th  Sudan that  under  U.N.  Char ter  they can 
refuse  a  peacekeeping presence  or  not ,  but  thei r  reputa t ion is  hur t  by 
ac t ions  l ike  th is  as  wel l .   In  the  tes t imony I  do  a l lude  in  the  Zimbabwe 
case  that  China  is  very d i f ferent  f rom the  Sovie t  Union.   They ' re  not  
out  promot ing ideology;  they ' re  engaged in  some pre t ty  tough business  
pract ices .  
 In  the  case  of  Zimbabwe,  Mugabe 's  government  couldn ' t  l ive  up 
to  the i r  end of  the  bargain  and so  the  Chinese  companies  just  cut  i t  off .   
So i t ' s  a  very  di f ferent  sor t  of  mind se t .  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Le t  me swi tch  gears  then i f  I  
may in  the  remaining t ime and go back to  something you sa id  in  one  of  
your  answers  to  somebody 's  previous  quest ion when you were  ta lk ing 
about  sa te l l i tes  and th inking out  of  the  box.   Suggest ing that  the  
Chinese  might  end up developing industry  that  would  be  re l iant  on the  
commercia l  sec tor .   And my f i rs t  thought  was  that  was  rea l ly  br i l l iant  
and then I  began to  th ink about  i t  some more ,  and now I 'm not  so sure .   
So I  want  to  ask you a  ques t ion about  i t .  
 I t  i s  sor t  of  suggest ing that  perhaps  i t ' s  in  our  interes t  to  
encourage them to  develop the  same vulnerabi l i t ies  tha t  we have,  
which is  a  good idea ,  I  th ink,  in  the  abs t rac t .   I  guess  the  quest ion is ,  
i s  the i r  economy s t ructured in  a  way to  rea l ly  make that  l ike ly?  
 DR.  REVERON:  I  th ink so .   One s tory  I  remember  f rom the  Cold 
War  is  a t  some point  we s ignaled to  the  Sovie ts ,  put  your  miss i les  
underground because  by hardening your  miss i les ,  tha t  makes  deterrence  
 more s table ,  and i t  c rea tes  s table  re la t ions .   What  I  had in  mind a long 
those  l ines  i s  ins tead of  becoming worr ied  about  independent  Chinese  
capabi l i ty  for  GPS or  communicat ion sa te l l i tes ,  you co-opt  i t  in  a  sense  
and you do jo int  projects  in  a  way that  you become equal ly  vulnerable  
in  a  sense .  
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 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  I  see .   I  th ink I  d idn ' t  
unders tand ful ly .   Do you th ink they ' re  l ikely  to  b i te  on that  one?  
 DR.  REVERON:  I  suppose  i t  depends  how good the  deal  i s .   I  
mean they need bandwidth  as  much as  we need bandwidth ,  and so  the  
commercia l  sec tor  i s  able  to  produce bandwidth  a t  a  much bet ter  ra te  
than governments  can.  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  I  see .   So maybe i t ' s  sec tor  
speci f ic .   Mr.  Vickers ,  you want  to  comment?  
 MR.  VICKERS:   Yes .   When you look at  s t ra tegic  interact ions ,  
symmetr ies  and asymmetr ies  p lay  a  very  important  ro le--geography,  
concepts ,  goals ,  a  range of  th ings .   Wel l ,  one  of  them is  in  the  
informat ion area  and i t ' s  dr iven by cer ta in  technological  fac ts  and that  
i s  bandwidth  is  a  good th ing;  i t ' s  very  important .   I t ' s  very  useful  for  
lo ts  of  reasons .  
 But  in  the  compet i t ion  between space-based bandwidth  sys tems 
and ter res t r ia l -based,  r ight  now ter res t r ia l  has  won that  rea l ly  hands  
down.   I f  one  posi ts  potent ia l  conf l ic t ,  i t ' s  more  l ikely  a t  least  the  
locus  of  i t  i s  going to  be  in  the  Eas t  Asian  l i t tora l  for  awhi le  and the  
Uni ted  Sta tes  would f ind i t se l f  having to  t ry  to  br ing i t s  bandwidth  
wi th  i t  where  essent ia l ly  informat ion inter ior  l ines  because of  they ' l l  
use  f iber .  
 The Chinese ,  I  might  add,  have a lso  been expor t ing f iber  to  some 
other  not  so  he lpful  countr ies  as  wel l ,  making our  problem more  
di f f icul t  around the  world .   So that  bas ic  technological  i ssue  shapes  
the  behavior  in  var ious  ways  and therefore  would  shape compet i t ion 
and potent ia l  conf l ic t .  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thank you.   Anybody e lse?   
Dr .  Schneider .  
 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  Jus t  on the  quest ion of  sate l l i tes  and sa te l l i te  
vulnerabi l i ty ,  f rom the  perspect ive  of  in terest  tha t  the  Chinese may 
have in  disrupt ing U.S.  communicat ion in  t ime of  conf l ic t .   I t ' s  
unl ikely  that  the  most  eff ic ient  way to  do tha t  would be  to  a t tack 
communicat ion sa te l l i tes  in  geosynchronous  orbi t .   There  are  more  
ef fect ive  ways  to  a t tack communicat ion,  and so  I  th ink i t ' s  poss ib le  
that  they,  for  a  var ie ty  of  reasons ,  may want  to  invest  in  commercial  
sa te l l i tes  for  te lecommunicat ions  purposes ,  but  I  don ' t  think that  wi l l  
have  much impact  on the  mil i tary  compet i t ion.  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thank you.  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  We wi l l  not  make i t  a l l  the  
 way through a  second round,  but  we do have t ime for  the  las t  quest ion 
f rom Commiss ioner  Brookes .  
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 COMMISSIONER BROOKES:   Thank you,  Mr.  Chairman.   Dr .  
Schneider ,  I  guess  I 'm asking for  a  c lar i f ica t ion and a  quick 
e laborat ion.   Did you say that  you bel ieve  that  the  Chinese  were  
involved in  the  development  or  bui ld ing of  two a i rcraf t  car r iers  in  your  
s ta tement?  
 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  They ' re  going  to  buy a i rcraf t  carr iers ,  and 
eventual ly  they wi l l  develop them,  but  in  the  DoD review this  year ,  
they took account  of  the  fac t  tha t  China i s  going to  acquire  a i rcraf t  
carr iers .  
 COMMISSIONER BROOKES:  And where  are  these  carr iers  
coming f rom? 
 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  Russ ia .  
 COMMISSIONER BROOKES:  Russia?  
 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  Yes .  
 COMMISSIONER BROOKES:  Okay.   And then they ' re  going to  
develop them from that?  
 DR.  SCHNEIDER:  Right .  
 COMMISSIONER BROOKES:  Thank you.  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Gent lemen,  I  want  to  thank 
a l l  of  you for  your  t ime,  for  your  very  thoughtful  tes t imony and 
comments ,  and real ly  for  your  contr ibut ions  to  the  Uni ted  States  and 
nat ional  secur i ty .   I t ' s  been a  very  r ich  and robust  panel .   Thank you.  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  And I  would  just  l ike  to  join  
Commiss ioner  Wortzel  in  thanking you ac tual ly  for  the  many years  of  
service  that  you have a l l  combined given to  this  country  and we look 
forward to  many more  discuss ions  wi th  you.   Thank you very  much.  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  We ' re  going to  have to  c lear  
the  room now.   The Commiss ion is  going to  have a  business  meet ing 
and lunch and the  next  panel  wi l l  be  a t  1 :15 p .m.  [Whereupon,  a t  
12:00 noon,  the  hear ing recessed,  to  reconvene a t  1 :15 p .m. ,  th is  same 
day. ]  
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A F T E R N O O N   S  E S S I  O N
[1:15 p .m.]  
  
 
PANEL III:   PLA MODERNIZATION IN TRADITIONAL 
WARFARE CAPABILITIES:  FORCE INTEGRATION AND FORCE 
PROJECTION 
  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  This  af ternoon 's  panel  i s  
going to  examine China 's  capabi l i t ies  in  the  domain of  t radi t ional  
warfare  genera l ly .   The Commiss ion hopes  that  the  panel is ts  wi l l  be  
able  to  offer  answers  to  a  number  of  key quest ions .  How capable  is  the  
PLA of  carrying out  integrated  or  jo in t  mi l i ta ry  operat ions?   They ca l l  
them integrated;  we cal l  them joint .  
 How is  the  PLA improving i t s  power  project ion capabi l i t ies  on a  
g lobal  bas is?   Are  they capable  of  conduct ing access  denia l  or  a i r  and 
sea  control  opera t ions  around China  and fur ther  out  in to  the  Western  
Paci f ic  such as  the  South  China  Sea and down to  the  Malacca  St ra i t?  
 And f inal ly ,  what  bal l i s t ic  and cruise  miss i le  advances  have been 
made by the  People 's  Libera t ion Army,  and how do they chal lenge the  
Uni ted  Sta tes?   
 F i rs t ,  we ' re  honored to  have General  James Car twright ,  
Commander  of  the  Uni ted  States  St ra tegic  Command Headquar ters  a t  
Offut t  Air  Force  Base ,  Nebraska,  wi th  us  here  today.  
 Genera l  Car twr ight  i s  a  former  Marine  avia tor  wi th  35 years  in  
the  Marine  Corps .   He was  Deputy  Commanding General  of  Marine  
Forces  At lant ic ,  Commanding General  of  Fi rs t  Marine Aircraf t  Wing,  
Director  for  Force St ructure  Resources  and Assessments  of  the  Joint  
Staff .   We're  very  pleased to  have you here  today.   Your  command was  
jus t  great  wi th  us  when we were  out  there  as  a  Commiss ion.  
 We ' l l  a lso  hear  f rom Dr.  Andrew Erickson,  Assis tant  Professor  of  
St ra tegic  Studies  a t  the  Naval  War  Col lege  in  Rhode Is land.   His  Ph.D.  
f rom Pr inceton Univers i ty  was  on Chinese  aerospace  development .   
He 's  worked for  Science  Appl icat ions  In ternat ional  Corpora t ion  and a t  
the  American Embassy in  Bei j ing  and the  U.S.  Consula te  in  Hong 
Kong.  
 The th i rd  panel is t  i s  Cor tez  Cooper  who is  the  Director  of  East  
Asian Studies  a t  Hicks  and Associa tes  in  Virginia .   He has  a  20-year  
mi l i tary  career  and was  a  Branch Chief  in  the China  Divis ion of  the  
Defense  In te l l igence  Agency.   He was  the  China i ssue manager  for  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes  Paci f ic  Command and served in  the  Navy Execut ive  
Service  as  a  senior  analyst  a t  JICPAC,  Joint  Inte l l igence  Center  
Paci f ic .  
 He 's  received an M.A.  in  Asian Studies  f rom the Univers i ty  of  
 Hawai i ,  and has  gone to  the  Armed Forces  Staff  Col lege  and the  
Defense  Language Ins t i tu te .    So I  want  to  thank you again ,  a l l  of  you,  
very  much for  being here .   We look forward to  your  remarks .   General  
Car twr ight .  
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STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES E.  CARTWRIGHT, 
COMMANDER, U.S.  STRAGETIC COMMAND, OFFUTT AIR 
FORCE BASE,  NEBRASKA 
 
 GENERAL CARTWRIGHT:  Given that  the  panel  has  been out  a t  
STRATCOM, I ' l l  go  pre t ty  l ight  on  the  organiza t ion.   But  the  miss ion 
breadth i s  re la t ively  s igni f icant  a t  the  Command,  in  tha t  we have what  
i s  ca l led  Global  St r ike  which is  the  g lobal  convent ional  nonkinet ic  and 
nuclear  capabi l i t ies  for  the  nat ion.  
 In  addi t ion,  we have in tegrated miss i le  defense .   The bulk  of  that  
d iscuss ion general ly  s tar ts  to  center  around Homeland miss i le  defense  
and the  ground-based in terceptors  that  we ' re  working on f ie ld ing.   But  
i t  a lso  goes  out  to  the  regions  and s tar ts  to  get  a t  some of  the  i ssues  
that  we ' re  very  worr ied  about ,  which is  the  prol i fera t ion of  shor t  and 
medium-range bal l i s t ic  miss i les  and the  inevi table  t ime a t  which 
people  wi l l  mate  weapons  of  mass  des t ruct ion to  those  weapons  
because  they ac t  so quickly  and are  so  hard  to  detect  and then react  to .   
The t ime l ines  and the  warning are  very  shor t .  
 We a lso  have in te l l igence survei l lance  and reconnaissance as  a  
miss ion space ,  and we work very  c losely  wi th  the  Director  of  Nat ional  
In te l l igence  to  take  a  g lobal  perspect ive  on our  ISR capabi l i t ies .  
 We have the  miss ion of  combat ing weapons  of  mass  des t ruct ion,  
which is  code for  what  we have cal led  nonprol i fera t ion,  counter  
prol i fera t ion and consequence management .    
 I  probably  lef t  something out  in  there .   I 'm sure  I  did .   IO--
informat ion opera t ions  in  the  cyber  arena .   And the  a t tack,  the  
operat ional  preparat ion of  the  environment ,  OPE,  and defense  in  those  
areas ,  both  layered and internal  to  the  Uni ted  States  where  i t  i s  
appl icable  to  the  Depar tment  of  Defense .    
 Given that  breadth  of  miss ion space ,  we tend to  work wi th  the 
regional  combatant  commanders- - in  par t icular  wi th  PACOM--to  
provide  to  them global  capabi l i t ies  tha t  he lp  them do the  day- to-day 
in teract ion  wi th the  countr ies  in  thei r  region.  
 We have had a  couple  of  s ignif icant  chal lenges  and act ivi t ies  
over  the  past  year  in  the  Paci f ic  area  that  involves  interact ion  wi th 
China ,  and so  the  Four th  of  July  was  a  very  s ignif icant  day.   In  
addi t ion to  being a  hol iday in  the  Uni ted Sta tes ,  the  North  Koreans  
launched severa l  shor t - range miss i les  and a t tempted to  launch a  long-
range,  potent ia l ly  in tercont inenta l ,  bal l i s t ic  miss i le .   That  was  real ly  
 for  us  the  f i rs t  operat ional  manifes ta t ion  of  in tegrated  miss i le  defense 
for  the  country .  
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 Whi le  we can ta lk  about  Nor th  Korea ,  i t  d id  not  go unnot iced by 
the  region,  and that  now has  turned into  a  discuss ion.   On the  one 
hand,  what  we have is  the  emergence of  credibi l i ty  of  miss i le  defense  
being par t  of  our  21st  deterrent  capabi l i ty .   That ' s  manifes ted  in  both 
the  acknowledgement  by the  Chinese  and the  South  Koreans  in  the  
region and a lso  the  Aust ra l ians  that  maybe th is  i s  something they want  
to  be  par t  of ,  both  wi th  indigenous  capabi l i t ies  and in tegra t ing in to  the  
larger  capabi l i ty  that  we are  providing and developing.  
 The other  s ide  of  that  d iscuss ion was what  does  that  mean for  
China?   What  does  tha t  mean for  China 's  bal l i s t ic  miss i les  and the  
development  of  bal l i s t ic  miss i les  on the  par t  of  China?   What  are  the  
impl ica t ions  and how should  they look a t  tha t?   I s  th is  an  arms race?   
Do they respond wi th  more  offens ive  capabi l i ty?   Do they s tar t  to  th ink 
about  a  defensive  capabi l i ty?   How does  this  affec t  thei r  percept ion of  
the  balance  in  the  region?  
 That  tens ion was  rea l ly  brought  to  a  f ine  point  by the  events  of  4  
July  las t  year ,  and I  th ink the  panel  and the  Commiss ion ought  to  th ink 
about  the  impl ica t ions  there  because i t  wi l l  dr ive  how we now t ry  to  
rees tabl ish  a  balance  out  in  the  Pacif ic ,  given the  act ions  of  Nor th 
Korea .   And jus t  when you th ink you 've  thought  i t  through and you 've  
f igured i t  out ,  somebody changes  thei r  mind.   And so  I  don ' t  know 
where  the  Six  Par ty Talks  are  going to  take  us  now.  
 But  there  i s  a  shuff le  going on in  the  Paci f ic .   The potent ia l  for  
the  Japanese to  have a  credible  missi le  defense  i s  s igni f icant  to  thei r  
neighbors ,  but  i s  l ike ly  to  be  perceived as  a  bet ter  a l ternat ive  than an 
offensive  capabi l i ty .    
 The l ikel ihood that  the  South Koreans  would s tar t  to  inves t  in  a  
shor t - range miss i le  defense  capabi l i ty ,  par t icular ly  something that  
could  s tar t  to  protect  thei r  c i t ies ,  has  an  ef fect  on the  offens ive  
capabi l i t ies  of  thei r  neighbors  and what wi l l  that  be  manifes ted as .   
 Those  are  a l l  quest ions  to  the  region.   In  addi t ion,  we had a  tes t  
of  a  poss ible  nuclear  weapon by the  Nor th  Koreans  la ter  in  the  year ,  
and that  a lso  sent  a  warning s ignal  in  the  region.   And everybody in  
that  region is  t rying to  unders tand how 21st  century deter rence  wi l l  
manifes t  i t se l f .   What  wi l l  be  credible?   What  wi l l  have value?  
 Is  i t  a  nuclear  weapon?  Is  i t  an  offens ive  capabi l i ty?   I s  i t  a  
defensive  capabi l i ty?   What 's  the  r ight  balance?   And how do you s tar t  
to  s t r ike  that  balance  and keep i t  suff ic ient ly  agi le  so  that  you don ' t  
end up playing nine-year-old  soccer  where  every  t ime the  bal l  moves ,  
everybody moves  to  the  bal l  and you leave large  voids  where  there  
ought  to  be  defenders .  
 Because  our  adversar ies  today are  so agi le ,  coming up wi th an 
 appropr ia te  balance  for  deterrence  is  a  chal lenge,  and being able  to  
ta i lor  that  ba lance  as  the  world  changes i s  cr i t ical  in  the  a t t r ibutes  tha t  
we want  to  have as  a  deterrent  capabi l i ty .  
 
 
 
 
  
69
 
 The addi t ion  of  the  nuclear  problem with  the  tes t  in  Nor th Korea  
c lear ly  br ings  to  point  tha t  the  potent ia l  for  countr ies  to  have what  we  
are  now cal l ing ,  and forgive  the  label ,  but  rogue s ta tes ,  causes  tens ion 
and react ion between the  Uni ted  Sta tes  and China .   In  some cases ,  we 
can work together  to  make the  region safer .   In  some cases ,  we have 
di f ferent  in teres ts  that  cause  us  to  not  necessar i ly  be  on the  same sheet  
of  music ,  and how do we handle  this  in  that  region?  
 The las t  piece  of  s igni f icant  ac t ivi ty  over  the  pas t  year  would be  
the ant i -sa te l l i te  (ASAT) tes t .   I t  wasn ' t  a  surpr ise;  i t  was  the  thi rd  in a  
ser ies .   I t  wasn ' t  l ike  i t  was  a  shot  in  the dark .   But  I  wi l l  te l l  you as  a  
mi l i tary  person tha t  the  adjustments  they made through those  three 
tes ts  to  have  a  successful  thi rd  tes t  were  good in  terms of  sc ience,  
manufactur ing and R&D.  They were  s igni f icant  and we should  take  
note  of  that .  
 They got  there  very  quickly .   Now,  in  '85  we and the  Russ ians  
were  doing these  k inds  of  tes ts .   We,  I ' l l  speak for  us ,  not  for  the  
Russ ians ,  came to  the  conclus ion that  d i rec t -ascent  ASATs were  not  a  
ter r ibly  effec t ive  way to  opera te ,  and I  bel ieve  that  my Russ ian 
counterpar t  k ind of  came to  the  same conclus ion.  
 I t  would  be  my sense  that  we could  have  said  tha t  to  the  Chinese 
and i t  wouldn ' t  have changed thei r  ac t ion.   (a)  They needed to  f ind th is  
out  on thei r  own and (b)  the  technologies  associated  wi th  th is  tes t  
reach far  beyond ASAT.   This  was  a  par t  of  a  s tep  in  a  d i rec t ion,  but  i t  
a lso  was  done in  the  guise  of  an  offens ive  capabi l i ty  in  space ,  and i t  
had col la tera l  damage effects  that  I  would  say maybe the  Chinese  
underes t imated,  both  in  the  debr is  s ide  of  the  equat ion and in  the  
in ternat ional  react ion  to  the  ac t ivi ty .  
 But  i t  has  been done.   The damage that  has  been done in  the  
environment  i s  damage that  we ' l l  have to  deal  wi th  over  the  next  a t  
leas t  20  to  30 years ,  as  that  debr is  migra tes  down through the  Long 
Ear th  Orbi t  Bel t  (LEO) and then eventual ly  burns  up in  the  a tmosphere  
when i t  reenters .  
 We in  1985 conducted our  las t  ASAT tes t .   The di f ference 
between the  two tes ts  dur ing the  tes t  there  were  a  lo t  less  assets  in  
space ,  but  our  tes ts  were  a t  the  bot tom of  the  a tmosphere  and were  
done on a  descending t ra jec tory  ra ther  than an ascending t ra jec tory .   
So the  debr is  bas ical ly  went  back down to  the  a tmosphere .  
 Having sa id  that ,  we shouldn ' t  k id  ourselves  here .   I t  took 20 
years  even a t  the  lower  end of  the  bel t  for  our  debr is  to  deorbi t .   So 
whenever  you ' re  ta lk ing about  your  adversary  make sure  you carry  a  
mirror .   We have been here .   We have done much of  the  same,  but  i t  
 was impress ive  how quickly  they got  to  the  capabi l i ty .  
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 I t  should  be  a  wake-up cal l  to  o thers  tha t  they are  bui ld ing what  
I  would  ca l l  a  cont inuum of  capabi l i ty  in  space ,  a l l  the  way f rom low 
end temporary  and revers ib le  ef fec ts  through kinet ic  ef fec ts  through 
potent ia l ly  nuclear  capabi l i t ies .    What  i s  of  note  here  i s  a t  the  low 
end,  they are  not  jus t  looking a t  these  and developing them,  they have 
f ie lded a  broad range of  jamming ant i -sa te l l i te  type  capabi l i t ies ,  
pos i t ion navigat ion and t iming,  and a lso  ISR type capabi l i t ies ,  and 
they have prol i ferated them out  in  thei r  forces  to  be  rout in ized in  thei r  
t ra in ing and doctr ine .  
 The las t  p iece  that  I ' l l  touch is  the  cyber  s ide  of  the  equat ion.   
F i rs t ,  f rom our  s tandpoint  as  a  command,  STRATCOM, the  in i t ia l  
chal lenge here  was  to  unders tand how to  think about  th is  medium of  
cyber ,  how to  br ing i t  in to-- for  the  mi l i tary--a  mi l i tary  const ruct .   
What  we tend to  do on the  negat ive  s ide  of tent imes  i s  when we have 
something new,  space ,  cyber ,  we put  a  group together ,  we 
compar tmenta l ize  them,  we give  i t  a  whole  new vocabulary  so  that  i t  
looks  impor tant .   And what  we 've  done is  make sure  that  we cannot  
th ink about  i t  in  the  context  of  the  whole  here .  
 Par t  of  the  chal lenge has  been to  br ing th is  cyber  environment  
and the  In ternet  and these  types  of  informat ion age  technologies  into  a  
const ruct  that  i s  more  l ike  how we th ink about  mi l i tary  ac t iv i t ies .  
 So in tegra t ing and having uni ty  of  command between defense ,  
the  exploi ta t ion  s ide of  the  equat ion and offense ,  was  cr i t ica l  but  was  
not  by any s t re tch  of  the  imaginat ion easy.   None of  these  people  real ly  
wanted to  ta lk  to  each other .   We have  over  the  las t  year  been able  to  
make great  progress  in  that  area .  
 In  doing so ,  wi thout  adding resources ,  we real ized s igni f icant  
benef i t .   I 'm a  Marine .   I f  you have a  defensive  per imeter  and you have 
a t tackers  and you send your  reconnaissance out  to  see  what 's  out  there  
and they come back and don ' t  ta lk  to  e i ther   a t tack or  defense  arms.   
Once you get  them to  ta lk  to  each other ,  now you can s tar t  to  rea l ize ,  
okay,  something is  coming our  way,  le t ' s  prepare  ourselves .   This  i s  a  
mi l l i second world .   I t ' s  300 and some odd mil l i seconds  f rom Baghdad 
to  Seat t le ,  and that ' s  going to  out  to  geosynchronous  orbi t  and back.  
 This  i s  not  a  “ le t 's  have  a  negot ia t ion” world  g iven those  t ime 
l ines ,  but  you don ' t  want  to  so  d i f ferent ia te  th is  unders tanding that  you 
cannot  apply  i t  in  the  broader  sense  of  deterrence and defense .   So we 
are  working very  hard .   
 This  area  a lso  is  not  l ike  the  Planning Programming and 
Budget ing System (PPBS) or  indust r ia l  const ructs  where  we bui ld  
something for  about  e ight  or  n ine  years ,  f ie ld  i t ,  and cal l  i t  legacy 
before  i t  ge ts  to  the  f leet .   The act ivi t ies  here--a  weapon or  a  v i rus--
are  changed by a  mere  s lash .   I t s  character  can be  changed.   This  i s  a  
 very fas t  and dynamic  environment  and unders tanding how i t  works  
and bui ld ing a  defense  that  senses  something on the  other  s ide  of  the  
ear th ,  races  i t  a t  the  speed of  l ight  back to  home,  reconf igures  to  be  in  
the  appropr ia te  conf igura t ion to  defend,  i s  a  very  di f ferent  k ind of  
command and control .   And s tar t ing to  organize  for  that  and s tar t ing to  
unders tand i t  and the  k ind of  people  that  the  services  need to  recrui t  
and t ra in  i s  s igni f icant .  
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 I  say  that  for  what  STRATCOM and DoD are  doing and the  
nat ion is  doing.   Other  countr ies  are  doing the  same th ing,  and there  
are  other  smar t  people  in  the  wor ld ,  and they are  working these  same 
problems,  and to  the  bes t  of  our  knowledge,  they are  having some of  
the  same s t ruggles  that  we ' re  having f rom a  cul tura l  s tandpoint .   
They ' re  having many of  the  technical  problems,  but  over  the  pas t  three  
years  for  STRATCOM, what  we have learned is  what  I  would  have sa id  
when I  s tar ted  th is ,  tha t  i f  you asked me to  go out  and f ind a  good 
cyber  person,  I 'd  probably  be  looking for  someone young,  l ike ly  they 
would have a  ponytai l  and gender  i s  not  the  common indeterminate ,  
mathemat ic ian ,  wel l  educated.  
 The teams that  we have been able  to  put  together  don ' t  
necessar i ly  fo l low that  descr ip t ion.   We genera l ly  f ind our  threats  in  
three  areas :  hackers ,  unsophis t ica ted,  jus t  genera l ly  out  there  t ry ing to  
f igure  out  how to  do something.   They have a  lo t  of  spare  t ime;  
indust r ia l ,  where  they ' re  looking to  s tea l  in  par t icular  in te l lec tual  
capi ta l  and somet imes  cr iminal  ac t ivi t ies  in  the  network;  and then a  
long dis tance  between those  two to  nat ion s ta te  capabi l i t ies .  
 The di f ferent ia t ion is  the  amount  of  resource  that ' s  avai lable  to  
educate  and organize  the  individuals .   When you get  to  the  nat ion s ta te  
level ,  i t  i s  not  general ly  broken down by age .   That  doesn ' t  seem to  be  
a  large  discr iminator  a l though I  would  te l l  you a t  my age,  many t imes  
being comfor table  in  four  or  f ive  rooms chat  rooms s imul taneously  i s  a  
b i t  of  a  chal lenge.  
 But  that  does  not  real ly  seem to  be  a  d iscr iminator  in  those  that  
you t ra in  to  opera te  in  the  cyber  environment .   And we see  them al l  the  
way f rom,  l imi ted  formal  educat ion a  graduate  degree  involved,  but  
then af ter  that ,  i t  tends  to  cover  the  whole  waterf ront .   And i t ' s  very  
in teres t ing to  see  these  groups  and how they in teract .   We have bui l t  
teams,  and that  i s  one  th ing that  we have found as  we bui ld  
in terdisc ipl inary  teams to  work in  th is  environment .  
 The Chinese  are  put t ing  a  lo t  of  resources  in to  th is  ac t ivi ty .   
They are  organiz ing themselves .   I t  i s c lear .   They do tha t  in  thei r  open 
press  and thei r  open wri t ings .   I f  you jus t  apply  what  we 've  learned to  
the  potent ia l  of  what  you can see  in  thei r  ac t iv i ty ,  they 've  appl ied 
resource ,  they 've appl ied educat ion,  they are  going a t  th is  in  a  
d isc ipl ined way.   They have a  long- term view,  not  a  shor t - term view,  
 in  this  act ivi ty  and i t  wi l l  pay off  wi th  pers is tence  i f  they s t ick  wi th 
th is .  
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 We should  take  note  of  that  and be  ready to  unders tand the  
impl icat ions  of  tha t  type of  ac t iv i ty .   I  wi l l  leave  i t  a t  tha t .   I 'm open 
to  your  ques t ions ,  and we can go in  any di rec t ion that  you want  when 
we get  to  the  Q&A par t .  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Thank you,  General ,  and I  
take  i t  you ' re  to  s tay  for  a  b i t  through the  Q&A? 
 GENERAL CARTWRIGHT:  I  wi l l  s tay  wi th  you as  long as  you 
want .  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  That ' s  great .   Thank you very  
much.   Dr .  Er ickson.  
 
STATEMENT OF DR. ANDREW S.  ERICKSON 
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, CHINA MARITIME STUDIES 
INSTITUTE, STRATEGIC RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, U.S.  
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND 
  
 DR.  ERICKSON:  Chairman Bar tholomew,  Vice  Chairman 
Blumenthal ,  Commiss ioners  Reinsch and Wortze l ,  thank you very  much 
for  th is  oppor tuni ty  to  d iscuss  wi th  you today the  very  important  topic  
of  China 's  mi l i tary modernizat ion.  
 I  must  g ive  substant ia l  credi t  to my fe l low scholars  a t  the  Naval  
War  Col lege 's  China  Mari t ime Studies  Inst i tute ,  CMSI,  especia l ly  
Director  Lyle  Golds te in  and Professor  Wil l iam Murray.   With your  
permiss ion,  I  would  l ike  to  submit  for  the  record  a  smal l  amount  of  our  
col laborat ive  research concerning China 's  naval  moderniza t ion,  which 
draws extens ively  on Chinese  language sources .  
 F inal ly ,  le t  me emphasize  that  everything I 'm about  to  say,  as  
you wel l  know,  represents  my personal  opinion as  a  scholar  and should  
be  in  no way const rued to  represent  the  pol icy  or  es t imates  of  the  U.S.  
Naval  War  Col lege ,  the  U.S.  Navy or  any other  e lement  of  the  U.S.  
government .  
 You asked me to  comment  on China 's  abi l i ty  to  conduct  jo int  
warfare .   There  i s  l i t t le  doubt  that  the  People 's  Libera t ion Army 
real izes  that  conduct ing jo int  warfare  i s  a  cr i t ica l  e lement  of  
conduct ing l imi ted  local  wars  under  h igh tech condi t ions .  
 The PLA has  observed the  U.S.  c losely ,  par t icular ly  in  
Operat ions  Deser t  Storm/Deser t  Shie ld  and Operat ion I raqi  Freedom,  
and recognizes  the  need to  improve i t s  join t  capabi l i t ies .   The ques t ion 
of  how good the  PLA is  a t  conduct ing jo int  warfare  however  i s  
d i f f icul t  to  answer .   We see  some indicat ions  that  PLA exercises  are  
moving towards  join tness ,  but  our  research has  not  yet  revealed how 
successful  the  PLA has  been in  ac tual ly  accompl ishing these  goals .  
  There  i s  a lso  no doubt  tha t  the  PLA is  fu l ly  commit ted  to  being 
able  to  dominate  the  bat t le  space  of  the  l i t tora ls  around China wi th  an 
in tense  focus  on the  waters  and area  around Taiwan.  Everything the  
PLA is  developing,  wi th  the  except ion of  i t s  ICBM force ,  bal l i s t ic  
miss i le  submarines ,  and perhaps  i ts  nuclear  powered submarines  and 
landing pla t form dock,  seems to  be devoted to  this  cause  in  our  
es t imat ion.  
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 Some of  the  PLA's  more  modern ships  and a i rcraf t  wi l l  a l low i t  
to  extend i t s  combat  power  s l ight ly  fur ther  into  the  South  China  Sea 
and,  to  a  l imi ted  extent ,  in to  par ts  of  the  Western  Paci f ic .  
 As  you know,  the  PLA Navy is  a lso  capable  of  sending some 
l imi ted  number  of  warships  on occas ional  t r ips  across  oceans .   These  
deployments ,  however ,  are  severely  l imi ted  by the  l imi ted  number  of  
replenishment  vesse ls .   Whi le  China 's  sh ipyards  are  fu l ly  capable  of  
bui ld ing vessels  tha t  could  perform those  replenishment  opera t ions ,  
such ships  apparent ly  are  not  current ly  being bui l t .  
 This  sugges ts  to  us  that  a t  leas t  for  the  t ime being,  China  i s  
l imi t ing  i t s  mi l i ta ry ,  par t icular ly  i t s  naval ,  focus  to  mat ters  c loser  to  
home.  
 Thus ,  China 's  power  project ion capabi l i t ies  seem to  be  focused 
on the  Taiwan cont ingency.   There  i s  l i t t le  evidence  to  show that  the  
PLAN is  developing the capabi l i t ies  necessary to  extend i t s  abi l i ty  to  
project  power ,  a t  leas t  as  the  U.S.  would  conceive  of  i t ,  much beyond 
China 's  c la imed terr i tor ia l  waters  and those  environs .  
 Granted,  i t ' s  impor tant  to  emphasize  that  PLAN (PLA Navy)  
ships  carry  sophis t ica ted long-range ant i -ship  cruise  miss i les ,  and 
some of  thei r  a i rcraf t  can carry  land a t tack cruise  miss i les  as  wel l .   
Their  newest  SSNs might  be  s imi lar ly  equipped.   But  the  PLAN does  
not  have the  capabi l i ty ,  in  our  v iew,  a t  present  to  deploy to  d is tant  
areas  and es tabl ish  a  sanctuary  on the  ocean f rom which i t  can  conduct  
mi l i tary  s t r ikes  against  opposing navies  or  ta rgets  on  shore .  
 The PLA has  recognized th is  overa l l  naval  weakness  in  a i r  
defense  and surface  warfare  and has  taken impress ive  s teps  to  
overcome these problems.  China 's  three  most  recent  c lasses  of  surface  
combatants  a l l  have  sophis t ica ted  a i r  search and missi le  guidance 
radars  and a lso  are  sa id  to  have the  advanced long-range surface- to-a i r  
miss i les  to  af ford  these  ships  a  respectable  area  a i r  defense  capabi l i ty .  
 Thus ,  the  Luyang I I  des t royers ,  hul ls  170 and 171,  carry  the  
HHQ-9 SAM, the  two Luzhou-class  des t royers  have a  mar inized SA-20 
SAM, and now the  f ive  J iangkai  I I  f r igates  have  ver t ica l  launch cel ls  
and phased array and guidance  radars  tha t  s t rongly  suggest  a  s imi lar  
capabi l i ty  to  us .  
 China  cont inues  to  devote  substant ia l  e ffor t s  to  i t s  submarine  
force .   Our  book,  China 's  Future  Nuclear  Submarine  Force ,  i f  you ' l l  
 forgive  me-- jus t  publ ished by Naval  Ins t i tu te  Press  offers  deta i led  
informat ion on th is .   China  does  not  appear  to  have made s ignif icant  
progress  in  correc t ing i t s  weakness  in  ant i -submarine  warfare ,  
however .   Al though i t s  newer  large  surface  combatants  can cer ta in ly  
carry  hel icopters  and might ,  in  fac t ,  carry  ASW hel icopters ,  none 
appear  to  have modern hul l -mounted or  towed sonars .   There  is  a lso  
l i t t le  evidence tha t  China  i s  devot ing much effor t  to  developing planes  
equivalent  to  the  U.S.  P-3  mari t ime pat rol  a i rcraf t .  
 
 
 
 
  
74
 
 We have recent ly  completed  a  two-year- long s tudy of  over  1 ,000 
Chinese  language ar t ic les  concerning naval  mine warfare .   With  the  
help  of  the  Commiss ion i t ' s  been dis t r ibuted outs ide ,  and I 'd  be  happy 
to  furnish  more  copies  as  wel l  as  updates  as  we cont inue th is  research.  
 Our  three  most  impor tant  f indings thus  far  a re :  
 (1)  China  has  a  large  inventory  of  naval  mines ,  many of  which 
are  obsole te  but  s t i l l  deadly ,  and somewhat  more  l imi ted  numbers  of  
sophis t ica ted  modern mines ,  some of  which are  opt imized to  des t roy 
enemy submarines;  
 (2)  We th ink tha t  China  would  re ly  on offens ive  mining in  any 
Taiwan scenar io;  
 (3)  I f  China  were  able  to  employ these  mines ,  and we th ink that  
they could ,  i t  would  grea t ly  h inder  opera t ions  for  an  extended t ime in  
waters  where  the  mines  were  thought  to  have been la id .   The obvious  
means  of  employing mines  are  through submarines  and surface  ships .   
We bel ieve  that  the  use  of  c iv i l ian  asse ts  should  not  be  discounted,  but  
we a lso  see  s igns  of  Chinese  recogni t ion of  the  fact  that  a i rcraf t  offer  
the  bes t  means  of  quickly  laying mines  in  s ignif icant  quant i ty .  
 These  a i rcraf t  would  be  useless ,  however ,  wi thout  a i r  
super ior i ty .   China 's  increas ingly  impress ive  convent ional  bal l i s t ic  
miss i le  force and inventory of  SAMs and advanced tact ical  a i rcraf t ,  in  
our  v iew,  cas t  rea l  doubts  on Taiwan 's  abi l i ty  to  mainta in  a i r  
super ior i ty  over  both  the  Taiwan Stra i t  and even the  is land i t se l f .  
 Regarding a i r - to-a i r  combat ,  you are  cer ta in ly  aware  of  China 's  
new J-10 a i rcraf t  and of  the  SU-27,  SU-30 and J-11 a i rcraf t  programs.   
China  recognizes  that  dominat ing the  skies  over  Taiwan is  a  necessary  
precondi t ion for  successful  coerc ion.   These  p lanes ,  and the  weapons  
they carry,  ref lec t  tha t  fac t .  
 Al though our  group has  not  yet  deeply  examined that  area ,  we 
are  impressed by what  we have seen thus  far .   
 Every  surface  warship  launched by China  in  the  past  decade,  
wi th  the  possib le  exception of  the  new LPD,  carr ies  sophis t ica ted YJ 
ser ies  ant i -ship cruise  miss i les .   These  miss i les  deserve  a  measure  of  
respect ,  in  our  v iew.   I t  i s  impor tant  to  recal l  tha t  a  s ingle  Chinese-
made C-802 ant i -ship  cruise  miss i le ,  which is  less  capable  than China 's  
newer  ant i -ship cruise  miss i les ,  d isabled  Israel ' s  Hani t  Sa 'a r  5-class  
 miss i le  boat  in  2006 and ki l led four  of  Is rael ' s  sa i lors .  
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 Addi t ional ly ,  the  Houbei  c lass ,  or  2208,  wave-pierc ing 
catamarans ,  which are  based on an Austra l ian  fer ry  des ign,  are  an  
impressive  ant i -surface  weapons  system,  h igh-speed,  perhaps  45 knots  
or  so ,  low-observabi l i ty ,  and carrying two or  four  advanced cruise  
miss i les .  
 China  is  bui ld ing dozens  of  these  vesse ls  a t  many shipyards  
s imul taneously .   Al though I  am not  an  exper t  on surface  warfare ,  I  am 
to ld  tha t  these  would  be  h ighly  ef fec t ive  in  a t tacking surface  warships  
in  the  waters  around China .   But  thei r  l imi ted endurance would not  
a l low them to  opera te  for  extended per iods  a t  much greater  dis tances .  
 P ic tures  of  China 's  YJ-62,  YJ-82 and YJ-83 ant i -ship  cruise  
miss i les ,  as  wel l  as  images  of  land a t tack cruise  miss i les ,  appear  
increas ingly  on the  Internet .   These  miss i les ,  according to  Jane 's ,  a re  
a l l  long-range ,  le thal  and,  most  important ly  perhaps ,  indigenously  
developed.   China  a l ready has  the SS-N-27 Klub supersonic  ant i -ship  
cruise  missi le ,  which i t  can  launch from i t s  e ight  newest  Ki lo 
submarines ,  and the  formidable  SS-N-22 Sunburn supersonic  miss i le  
tha t  i t  can and has  f i red  f rom i ts  four  Sovremmeny c lass  des t royers .  
 China  i s  a lso  thought  to  be  in  the  process  of  developing ant i -ship  
homing warheads  for  i t s  ba l l i s t ic  miss i les ,  which is  a  very  worr isome 
development ,  in  our  v iew.   I f  they work,  they would be  ext remely 
di f f icul t  to  defend agains t .  
 As  for  improvements  in  C4ISR capabi l i t ies ,  the  PLA's  obvious  
re l iance  on long-range cruise  and bal l i s t ic  miss i le  sys tems s t rongly  
suggests  that  i t s  leaders  recognize  the  importance  of  robust  C4ISR.   
One must  assume that  they have programs in  p lace  to  overcome,  or  a t  
leas t  s igni f icant ly  offse t ,  th is  t radi t ional  weakness .  
 We have not  yet  performed dedicated research in  th is  a rea ,  but  i t  
i s  cer ta inly  on our  l i s t  of  subjects  to  examine as  we go forward.   
 Thank you very  much for  your  t ime and I  welcome your  
ques t ions  and comments .  
[The s ta tement  fo l lows: ]  
 
Prepared Statement  of  Dr.  Andrew S.  Erickson 
Assistant  Professor,  China Marit ime Studies  Inst i tute ,  Strategic  
Research Department ,  U.S.  Naval  War Col lege ,  Newport ,  Rhode 
Is land 
 
 
Chairman Bartholomew, Vice Chairman Blumenthal, Commissioners Reinsch and Wortzel, 
Commissioners, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the important topic of China’s military 
modernization with you today. I must give substantial credit to my fellow scholars at the Naval War 
College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), especially Director Lyle Goldstein and Professor 
William Murray. With your permission, I would like to submit for the record some of our collaborative 
research concerning China’s naval modernization, which draws extensively on Chinese-language sources. 
 Finally, let me emphasize that everything I am about to say represents my personal opinion as a scholar, 
and should in no way be construed to represent the policy or estimates of the Naval War College, the U.S. 
Navy, or any other element of the U.S. Government.  
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You asked me to comment on China’s ability to conduct joint warfare.  There is little doubt that the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) realizes that conducting joint warfare is a critical element of conducting 
limited local war under high tech conditions. The PLA has observed the U.S. closely, particularly in 
Operations Desert Storm/Desert Shield and Operation Iraqi Freedom, and recognizes the need to improve 
its joint capabilities. The question of how good the PLA is at conducting joint warfare, however, is difficult 
to answer. We see some indications that PLA exercises are moving towards jointness, but our research has 
not yet revealed how successful the PLA has been in actually accomplishing its goals. 
 
There is no doubt that the PLA is fully committed to being able to dominate the battlespace of the littorals 
around China, with an intense focus on the waters and air around Taiwan. Everything the PLA is 
developing, with the exception of its ICBM force, ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and perhaps its 
nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) and landing platform dock (LPD), seems to be devoted to this cause. 
Some of the PLA’s more modern ships and aircraft will allow it to extend its combat power slightly further, 
into the South China Sea, and to a limited extent, into parts of the Western Pacific. As you know, the PLA 
Navy (PLAN) is also capable of sending some limited numbers of warships on occasional trips across 
oceans. These deployments, however, are severely limited by the limited number of replenishment vessels.  
While China’s shipyards are fully capable of building vessels that could perform those replenishment 
operations, such ships, apparently, are not being built.  This suggests that, at least for the time being, China 
is limiting its military focus to matters closer to home. 
 
China’s power projection capabilities are focused on the Taiwan contingency. There is little evidence to 
show that the PLAN is developing the capabilities necessary to extend its ability to project power, as the 
U.S. would conceive of it, much beyond China’s claimed territorial waters. Granted, PLAN ships carry 
sophisticated long range anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and some of their aircraft can carry land attack 
cruise missiles (LACMs). Their newest SSNs might be similarly equipped, as well. But, the PLAN does not 
have the capability to deploy to distant areas and establish a sanctuary on the ocean from which it can 
conduct military strikes against opposing navies or targets on shore. 
 
China continues to devote substantial effort to its submarine force. Our book, China’s Future Nuclear 
Submarine Force, just published by Naval Institute Press, offers detailed information. China does not 
appear to have made significant progress in correcting its weakness in anti-submarine warfare (ASW), 
however. Although its newer large surface combatants certainly can carry helicopters, and might carry 
ASW helicopters, none appear to have modern hull-mounted or towed sonars. There is also little evidence 
that China is devoting much effort to developing planes equivalent to the U.S. P-3 maritime patrol aircraft. 
Thus PLAN ASW capabilities, while perhaps slowly improving, cannot yet be counted on to provide a 
reasonable degree of security in open waters.   
 
Large-deck aviation would likely be needed for the PLAN to truly project power in blue water ‘beyond 
Taiwan.’ A small but determined contingent of PLA leaders has long advocated aircraft carrier 
development. Perhaps because of Beijing’s determination to be respected universally as a great power and 
its growing maritime interests, the PLAN is now apparently contemplating various alternatives for 
developing aircraft carriers. Increasingly numerous statements and writings on this subject offer critical 
insights into Beijing’s emerging maritime strategy. To date, however, Beijing appears to have devoted 
more effort to analyzing and developing the ability to target potential enemy carriers than to building its 
own. Chinese recognition of the increasing vulnerability of carriers, particularly less-sophisticated versions 
such as China might develop, may thus retard Beijing’s indigenous carrier development. 
China has already purchased four decommissioned aircraft carriers. China’s old carriers, especially Minsk 
and Kiev, were probably purchased for dissection to inform future indigenous design. Varyag, the largest 
and most advanced Soviet carrier design, may ultimately also somehow be used as a “test platform” for 
 general research and China’s development of relevant ship-board systems. To this end, Varyag may be 
retrofitted with a power plant, shafts, and screws (which it was said not to have at time of sale to China), so 
that it can go to sea under its own power. Eventually, a modestly capable Varyag might become a 
centerpiece of PLAN diplomacy, humanitarian operations, and disaster relief. Varyag, or even a more 
advanced PLAN carrier, would have little role in a near-term Taiwan scenario, however, as land-based 
PLAAF and PLANAF aircraft could cover all required air operations across the narrow Taiwan Strait. 
Unless China were able to produce and incorporate a range of carriers in a cohesive and effective concept 
of operations, it is difficult to envision them as the centerpiece of PLAN doctrine in future decades. 
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Ultimately the aircraft carrier itself is essentially a platform for air operations--the system of systems that 
allows for the projection of air power from the sea. The acquisition of a PLAN carrier vessel would merely 
be the first step (together with improvements in hardware, software, and training) toward true operational 
capability. PLAN aerial power-projection increases hinge on breakthroughs in sea-based aviation, mid-air 
refueling, PLAN doctrine, ASW, and PLANAF service culture. Without major improvements in ASW, for 
instance, any PLAN carrier would be vulnerable to submarines.  
 
For the foreseeable future, therefore, any Chinese carrier(s) would most likely: (1) independently conduct 
humanitarian missions (i.e., disaster relief); or (2) support China’s fleet in collective maritime security 
(e.g., SLOC protection and counter-piracy), and even allow modest force projection to assert Chinese 
claims in the South China Sea. For these relatively modest purposes, helicopter and other smaller deck 
aviation platforms are appropriate. We can thus expect China to be flexible in its definition of what 
constitutes an ‘aircraft carrier.’   
 
In the meantime, the PLA has recognized its overall naval weakness in air defense and surface warfare, and 
has taken impressive steps to overcome those problems. China’s three most recent classes of surface 
combatants all have sophisticated air search and missile guidance radars, and also are said to have the 
advanced, long range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to afford these ships a respectable area air defense 
capability. Thus, the Luyang II destroyers (hulls 170 and 171) carry the HHQ-9 SAM, the two Luzhou-class 
destroyers have a marinized SA-20 SAM, and the now five Jiangkai II frigates have vertical launch cells 
and phased array and guidance radars that strongly suggest a similar capability.  
  
We have recently completed a two-year-long study of over 1000 Chinese language articles concerning 
naval mine warfare (MIW). Our three most important findings are: (1) China has a large inventory of naval 
mines, many of which are obsolete but still deadly, and somewhat more limited numbers of sophisticated 
modern mines, some of which are optimized to destroy enemy submarines. (2) We think that China would 
rely heavily on offensive mining in any Taiwan scenario. (3) If China were able to employ these mines, 
(and we think that they could), it would greatly hinder operations, for an extended time, in waters where the 
mines were thought to have been laid. The obvious means of employing mines are through submarines and 
surface ships. Use of civilian assets should not be discounted. But we also see signs of Chinese recognition 
of the fact that aircraft offer the best means of quickly laying mines in significant quantity. These aircraft 
would be useless, however, without air superiority. China’s increasingly impressive conventional ballistic 
missile force and inventory of SAMs and advanced tactical aircraft cast real doubts on Taiwan’s ability to 
maintain air superiority over both the Taiwan Strait and the island itself. 
 
Regarding air-to-air combat, you are certainly aware of China’s new J-10 aircraft, and of the SU-27, SU-
30, and J-11 aircraft programs. China recognizes that dominating the skies over Taiwan is a necessary 
precondition for successful coercion. These planes, and the weapons they can carry, reflect that fact. 
Although our group has not yet deeply examined that area, we are impressed by what we have seen thus 
far.  
 
Every surface warship launched by China in the past decade (with the possible exception of the new LPD) 
carries sophisticated YJ series ASCMs. These missiles deserve a measure of respect. It is important to 
recall that a single, Chinese-made C-802 ASCM, which is less capable than China’s newer ASCMs, 
disabled Israel’s Hanit Sa’ar 5-class missile boat in 2006 and killed four sailors. Additionally, the Houbei 
 class, or 2208, wave piercing catamarans (based on an Australian ferry design) are an impressive anti-
surface weapons system, employing high speed (perhaps 45 knots or so), low observability, and two or four 
advanced cruise missiles. China is building dozens of these vessels at many shipyards. Although I am not 
an expert on surface warfare, I am told that these would be highly effective in attacking surface warships in 
the waters around China, but their limited endurance would not allow them to operate for extended periods 
at much greater distances.  
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Pictures of China’s YJ-62, YJ-82, and YJ-83 ASCMs, as well as images of LACMs, appear increasingly on 
the Internet. These missiles, according to Jane’s, are all long range, lethal, and most importantly perhaps, 
indigenously developed. China also has the SS-N-27 Klub supersonic ASCM, which it can launch from its 
eight newest Kilo submarines, and the formidable SS-N-22 Sunburn supersonic missile that it can, (and 
has) fired from its four Sovremmeny class destroyers. China is also thought to be in the process of 
developing anti-ship homing warheads for its ballistic missiles, which is a very worrisome development. If 
they work, they would be extraordinarily difficult to defend against.  
 
As for improvements in C4ISR capabilities, the PLA’s obvious reliance on long-range cruise and ballistic 
missile systems strongly suggests that its leaders recognize the importance of robust C4ISR. One must 
assume that they have programs in place to overcome, or at least significantly offset, this traditional 
weakness.  We have not yet performed dedicated research in this area, but it is on our list of subjects to 
examine.   
 
Thank you very much for your time. I welcome your questions and comments. 
 
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Thank you,  Andrew.   Cor tez ,  
thank you very  much for  being here .  
 
STATEMENT OF CORTEZ A.  COOPER III  
DIRECTOR, EAST ASIA STUDIES CENTER, HICKS AND 
ASSOCIATES,  McLEAN, VIRGINIA 
 
 MR.  COOPER:  Thanks ,  Larry .   Let  me begin  by express ing my 
apprecia t ion to  the  chai rman and the  other  d is t inguished members  of  
the  Commiss ion.  I t ' s  an  honor  to  once  again  have the  oppor tuni ty  to  
tes t i fy  before  you here  today.    
 My tes t imony is  going to  br ief ly  examine three  areas .   The f i rs t  
i s  the  People 's  Liberat ion Army in tent  and capabi l i ty  to  conduct  
in tegrated join t  mi l i ta ry opera t ions;  and I  wi l l  unpack that  te rm a  l i t t le  
b i t  as  we go a long.  
 Secondly ,  improvements  in  PLA power  project ion capabi l i t ies ,  
par t icular ly  as  evidenced in  the  development  of  long-range precis ion 
s t r ike  capabi l i t ies .  
 F inal ly ,  the  increas ing prof ic iency of  PLA uni ts  to  perform 
opera t ional  tasks  speci f ic  to  f ight ing a  high intensi ty  informat ion-era  
war  in  the  Western  Paci f ic .  
 The mi l i tary  component  of  Chinese  nat ional  power  i s  rooted in  
the  s t ra tegic  guidel ines  governing army bui ld ing which were  
promulgated by J iang Zemin in  1993,  and adjus ted dur ing subsequent  
f ive-year  p lans .   J iang 's  mi l i tary  s t ra tegic  guidel ines  for  the  new 
 period establ ished the  ro le  and direct ion  of  China 's  mi l i ta ry in  
responding to  post -Cold  War  real i t ies  and the  r ise  of  the  U.S.  as  the  
sole  g lobal  superpower .  
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 These  guidel ines  a lso  p lace  mi l i tary  developments  in  the  context  
of  a  window of  oppor tuni ty  for  China  to  develop comprehensive  
nat ional  power ,  wi th  par t icular  focus  on economic oppor tuni ty .   
According to  the  Chinese ,  comprehensive  nat ional  power  development  
focuses  on a  s t ra tegic  object ive  that  represents  the  bas ic  nat ional  
in teres t ;  and the bas ic  na t ional  interes t  for  the  Chinese  appears  to  be  
sus ta ined economic  growth wi th  secure  cont rol  of  sovereign ter r i tory  
under ,  of  course ,  the  guiding hand of  the  Chinese  Communis t  Par ty .  
 Bei j ing 's  most  recent ly  publ ished whi te  paper  on defense  def ines  
a  number  of  armed forces  and armed pol ice  object ives  to  address  th is  
bas ic  nat ional  in teres t .   These  object ives  equate  to  pr imari ly  defensive  
and in ternal ly  focused miss ions ,  but  among them is  the  requirement  to  
deter  Taiwan f rom pursuing a  path  of  permanent  independence  f rom the  
mainland a lso  dr ives  the  PLA's  pursui t  of  offens ive  capabi l i t ies .  
 For  China 's  leaders ,  th is  inc ludes  a  convent ional  capabi l i ty  to  
deter  and delay U.S.  forces  tha t  they bel ieve wi l l  bols ter  Taiwan 's  
defense  in  a  conf l ic t .   Should  deterrence  fa i l ,  the  PLA is  expected to  
conduct  one or  a  number  of  jo in t  offens ive  campaigns  in  a  Taiwan war  
zone or  theater .  
 A couple  of  terms that  I  th ink we need to  unders tand as  we ta lk  
about  bui ld ing a  force  to  conduct  these  sor t  of  offensive  campaigns  
are ,  f i r s t ,  the  concept  of  in tegrated  jo in t  opera t ions  and then,  secondly ,  
the  concept  of  those  opera t ions  in  what  the  Chinese  ca l l  the  
“ informat ionized warfare”  environment .  
 Informat ionizat ion a t  the  operat ional  level ,  which is  where  I 'd  
l ike  to  dwel l ,  appears  focused on providing an in tegrated pla t form for  
jo in t  war  zone command,  control ,  communicat ions ,  computer ,  
in te l l igence,  survei l lance ,  and reconnaissance,  or  C4ISR,  connect iv i ty .  
 In tegra ted joint  operat ions i s  the  current  PLA buzz phrase  for  
t ra in ing,  equipping and sus ta ining the  force  to  conduct  mul t i -service  
campaigns  control led  by a  jo int  headquar ter  wi th  tha t  C4ISR in tegra ted  
C4ISR pla t form.  
 An integra ted  archi tecture  would  overcome a  major  obstac le  to  
jo in t  command and control  and could  potent ia l ly  fuse  data  f rom ISR 
assets  in to  a  near  rea l  t ime sensor- to-shooter  network--potent ia l ly  
g iving the  PLA capabi l i t ies  to  conduct  over- the-hor izon precis ion 
s t r ikes  agains t  both  land and mar i t ime targets ;  k inet ic  and non-kinet ic  
counter-C4ISR at tacks  agains t  a  technologica l ly  capable  adversary;  a i r  
super ior i ty  operat ions;  and a i rborne  and a i r -mobi le  opera t ions .  
 Chinese  wri t ings  emphasize  that  the  success  of  any campaign 
hinges  largely  on the  abi l i ty  to  es tabl ish  and mainta in informat ion 
 dominance and bat t le  space  awareness  a t  the  outse t  of  a  conf l ic t .   
Over- the-hor izon detect ion and target ing are  a  s igni f icant  capabi l i ty  
shor t fa l l  for  the  PLA current ly .   But  they wi l l  improve great ly  as  new 
space-based sensors ,  long dis tance  a i r  reconnaissance drones ,  and 
a i rborne ear ly  warning pla t forms deploy over  the  next  few years .  
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 The  key space  system required  by Bei j ing  to  achieve  a  more  
in tegrated C4ISR archi tecture  is  a  sa te l l i te  da ta  re lay p la t form,  a  
sys tem that  many analys ts  of  PLA space  programs bel ieve  could be  in  
orbi t  wi thin  three  to  f ive  years .  
 Over  the  pas t  decade,  the  PLA has  placed a  great  deal  of  
emphasis  on developing a i rborne  warning and control  sys tems.   With  
compat ible  data  l ink  systems on f ighter  a i rcraf t ,  sh ip-borne 
hel icopters ,  and surface  ships .   These  a i rborne  asse ts  wi l l  great ly  
improve PLA ISR and target ing out  to  approximate ly  400 miles  f rom 
China 's  coast l ine ,  and wi th in  range of  potent ia l  operat ing areas  for  
U.S.  carr iers  in  a  Taiwan cr is is  response  scenar io .  
 In  order  to  degrade the  C4ISR capabi l i t ies  of  an  adversary ,  PLA 
s t ra tegis ts  are  developing the  doct r ine  and f ie ld ing the  sys tems to  
conduct  what  some of  thei r  s t ra tegis ts  ca l l  in tegrated network 
e lec t ronic  warfare .   The components  of  th is  in tegra ted  e lec t ronic 
warfare  include ter rest r ia l  and a i rborne jammers ,  as  General  
Car twr ight  ment ioned,  to  include GPS jamming sys tems;  ant i - radiat ion 
miss i les  and UAVs such as  that  purchased f rom the  Is rael is ,  the  
HARPY system;  laser  and di rec ted-energy systems;  d i rec t  ascent  ant i -
sa te l l i te  weapons ,  as  we 've  heard;  and computer  network a t tack 
capabi l i t ies .  
 These  asse ts  potent ia l ly  improve the  PLA's  abi l i ty  to  jam or  
spoof  precis ion-guided muni t ions ,  degrade or  des t roy a i r  defense  
radars ,  and disrupt  communicat ion and in te l l igence networks .  
 The recent  successful  tes t  of  a  Chinese  d i rec t -ascent  kinet ic  ki l l  
ant i -sa te l l i te  vehic le  i l lus t ra tes  tha t  Bei j ing has  the  wherewi thal  to  
hold  cr i t ica l  U.S.  C4ISR assets  a t  r i sk .  
 Beyond the  informat ion war ,  there  are  two overarching 
components  in  PLA effor ts  to  rea l ize  the  broader  a i r  defense ,  offensive  
counter-a i r ,  and mar i t ime s t r ike  capabi l i t ies  required  for  the  campaigns 
they want  to  conduct :   pr imar i ly  jo int  b lockade,  ant i -access  and is land 
invas ion campaigns .  
 The f i rs t  i s  the  format ion of  e l i te  conf igurat ions  of  a i r  and 
mar i t ime packages to  conduct  regional  a i r  super ior i ty  and sea  denia l  
opera t ions .   
 The second is  a  long-range precis ion s t r ike  capabi l i ty  or  
s t ra tegy,  represented by a  large  ar ray of  cruise  and bal l i s t ic  miss i les  
and suppor ted  by a  var ie ty  of  sensors .  
 China 's  submarine  force ,  as  we 've  a l ready heard ,  i s  the  key 
 component  in  Bei j ing 's  sea  denia l  s t ra tegy.   The PLA has  about  28 
modern  submarines  in  the  f leet ,  the  backbone of  which is  the  Ki lo 
c lass ,  which we 've  heard  about- -of  which Bei j ing wi l l  have,  I  th ink,  
ten  in  the  f leet  by the  end of  th is  year .   China 's  new indigenously 
produced nuclear  a t tack submarine ,  the  SHANG class ,  armed with  both  
ant i -ship  cruise  miss i les  and land a t tack cruise  miss i les ,  g ives  the  PLA 
i ts  f i rs t  non-nuclear  g lobal  s t r ike  capabi l i ty .   The PLA may have more  
than ten  of  these  operat ional  by the  end of  next  year .  
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 The second component  of  Bei j ing 's  sea  denia l  s t ra tegy is  the  
upgraded des t royer  and f r igate  f lee t .   As  Dr .  Er ickson ment ioned,  
Bei j ing has  qui te  a  few modern des t royers-- I  th ink around nine  in  
service ,  wi th great ly  improved ant i -a i r  and ant i -ship  miss i le  sys tems.  
 Of  par t icular  note  i s  the  Luyang I I  c lass  des t royer ,  which has  a  
ver t ica l - launch area  a i r  defense  sys tem,  wi th  a  phased-array radar  
somewhat  s imi lar  to  that  of  the  U.S.  Aegis  sys tem.  
 Bei j ing  a lso  has  about  17 modern fr igates  in  service  which a lso 
incorporate  much improved a i r  defenses .   
 The PLA Air  Force  has  both  defensive  and offens ive  mandates  in  
suppor t  of  in tegra ted  jo in t  campaign opera t ions .   With  advanced,  
increas ingly  in tegrated land-based a i r  defenses ,  the  PLA has  great ly  
improved capabi l i t ies  to  conduct  i t s  t radi t ional  s t ra tegic  a i r  defense  
campaign.  
 The SA-10/20 surface- to-a i r  miss i le  sys tems purchased from 
Russ ia  provide the  hear t  of  these defenses  wi th  powerful  radar  
capabi l i t ies  and high performance miss i les  tha t  can range in  excess  of  
100 naut ica l  mi les .  
 The PLA Air  Force  aspi res  in  the near  future  to  develop 
capabi l i t ies  to  conduct  the  offensive  a i r  campaign required to  gain  a i r  
super ior i ty  over  the  St rai t ,  suppor t  ground forces  deployed in  the  
region,  and suppor t  sea  denia l  opera t ions  in  adjacent  seas .  
 The SU-30 mul t i - ro le  and mar i t ime s t r ike  a i rcraf t  and newer ,  
longer-range s t rategic  SAM systems purchased f rom Russ ia  provide  the  
capabi l i ty  to  conduct  offensive  operat ions  out  to  a t  leas t  200 
ki lometers  f rom China 's  land and sea  borders  and perhaps  beyond when 
the  sea-based a i r  defenses  that  Dr .  Er ickson ment ioned become more  
capable  over  the  next  f ive  years  or  so .  
 The PLA also  has  made progress  in  aer ia l  refuel ing and improved 
target ing capabi l i t ies  v ia  UAVs,  ship-borne hel icopters  and over- the-
hor izon radars .   These  sys tems are  probably  not  yet  in tegrated wi th 
each other  or  wi th  space-based detect ion and t racking systems.   
Current  programs could  shore  up th is  weakness  wi thin  f ive  years .  
 The convent ional  arm of  China 's  s t ra tegic  rocket  force ,  the  
Second Art i l lery ,  i s  probably  the  bes t  t ra ined and most  ready service  
arm wi thin  the  PLA,  and i t  serves  a  cr i t ica l  ro le  in  Bei j ing 's  approach 
 to  severa l  key jo int  campaigns .   These  forces  by doctr ine  and t ra in ing 
are  focused on se iz ing the  in i t ia t ive  in  offensive  operat ions .   The rapid  
growth of  the  CSS-6 and 7  shor t  range bal l i s t ic  miss i le  force  and 
qual i ta t ive  improvements  in  miss i le  technologies  over  the  past  decade 
yie ld  a  force  of  approximately  850 miss i les  providing a  precis ion 
s t r ike  capabi l i ty .  
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 Whi le  the  SRBM force  serves  pr imari ly  to  address  a  potent ia l  
conf l ic t ,  developments  in  the  convent ional  medium range and 
in termedia te- range rea lm pose  the  poss ibi l i ty  of  holding a t  r isk  a l l  
U.S.  forward bases  in  the  Western  Pacif ic .  
 China 's  program to  develop an ant i -ship  bal l i s t ic  missi le  
capabi l i ty  i s  of  the  gravest  concern to  U.S.  naval  forces  operat ing in  
the  Paci f ic .   This  fu ture  ASBM system could  be  an in tegra l  par t  of  a  
reconnaissance s t r ike  complex able  to  target  naval  forces  a t  sea  a t  
unprecedented ranges .  
 U.S.  carr ier  groups  responding to  a  Taiwan cr is is  may have to  
opera te  much fur ther  f rom China 's  coas t  to  avoid  unacceptable  r i sk ,  
making a i r  super ior i ty  opera t ions  over  the  St ra i t  increasingly  di f f icul t .  
 China 's  ground forces  have taken a  backseat  in  resource  
pr ior i t iza t ion to  a i r ,  naval  and miss i le  forces ,  but  approximate ly  a  
th i rd  of  the  force  const i tu tes  an  increas ingly profess ional  war-f ight ing 
core .   Unders tanding the  requirement  to  bui ld  an  amphibious  and a i r -
t ransportable  force  capable  of  responding to  a  ca l l  to  arms in  the  
Taiwan St ra i t ,  PLA force  planners  have  c lear ly  begun to  res t ructure ,  
equip ,  and t ra in  uni ts  for  speci f ic  offens ive  miss ions .  
 Over  the  course  of  the  past  decade,  the  PLA bui l t  a t  leas t  four  
major  amphibious  t ra in ing bases ,  and about  a  quar ter  of  the  PLA's  
maneuver  d ivis ions  and br igades  focus  on t ra in ing for  amphibious  
opera t ions .  
 The specia l  operat ions  and a i r  mobi le  capabi l i t ies  needed in  
suppor t  of  miss i le  and a i r  s t r ikes  agains t  Taiwan are  a lso  pr ior i t ies  for  
ground force  development  in i t ia t ives .    
 S t ra tegic  l i f t  in  the  a i r  force  i s  a  constra int  on  a i rborne  power  
projec t ion a t  the  moment ,  but  Bei j ing has  inked a  deal  to  purchase  
addi t ional  IL-76 t ranspor t  a i rcraf t  f rom Russia  which could  increase  
l i f t  capaci ty  for  a i rborne forces  by as  much as  150 percent .  
 The abi l i ty  of  the  PLA to  in tegra te  new weapon sys tems,  perform 
new miss ions  and develop the  logis t ic  s t ructure  to  susta in  high 
in tensi ty  combat  wi l l  largely determine whether  or  not  PLA forces  can 
put  joint  offensive  campaigns  into  operat ion  under  complex 
informat ion-era  condi t ions .  
 Legacy logis t ic  suppor t  for  the  PLA is  s tove-piped by service .   
I t ' s  s low and ineff ic ient ,  but  an  automated t r i -service  logis t ic  pla t form 
was  repor tedly  in t roduced recent ly  in a  sub-depar tment  of  the  Bei j ing 
 mil i tary  region and a  s imi lar  p la t form has  a lso  been deployed 
previously  in  the  J inan mi l i tary  region.   So there  are  some effor ts  
obviously  underfoot  to  get  jo int  logis t ics  in  the  p ipel ine .  
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 In  the  af termath  of  the  recent  sess ion of  China 's  Nat ional  
People 's  Congress ,  Chinese  media  analys is  of  PLA plenary sess ions  
heavi ly  s t ressed the  impor tance  that  was  p laced by PLA leaders  on 
t ra in ing to  f ight  informat ionized war ,  wi th  an  emphasis  on weapon 
sys tem in tegrat ion  and join t  C2 (command and control )  and command 
post  procedures  and networks .  
 The effect iveness  of  PLA t ra ining over  the  next  f ive  years  wi l l  
de termine the  extent  to  which the  force  i s  meet ing Bei j ing 's  s ta ted 
modernizat ion goals .  
 Thanks  very  much.  
[The s ta tement  fo l lows: ]  
 
Prepared Statement  of  Cortez A.  Cooper III  
Director ,  East  Asia  Studies  Center,  Hicks and Associates ,   
Mclean,  Virginia  
 
[The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should not be 
construed as representing those of Hicks and Associates, Inc. or any of its clients.  Hicks and Associates, 
Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Science Applications International Corporation.] 
 
Let me begin by expressing my appreciation to the Chairman and the other distinguished members of the 
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.  It is an honor to have the opportunity to testify 
here today. 
 
My testimony will briefly examine three areas of concern: 
• People’s Liberation Army (PLA) intent and capability to conduct integrated joint military 
operations 
• Improvements in PLA power projection capabilities; particularly as evidenced in the development 
of “blue water” and long-range, precision strike capabilities 
• Increasing proficiency of PLA units to perform operational tasks specific to fighting a high-
intensity, information-era war on China’s periphery 
 
Chinese National Power and Defense Modernization 
 
The direction of the military component of Chinese national power is rooted in the strategic guidelines 
governing army building as promulgated by Jiang Zemin in 1993, and adjusted over the course of the last 
decade during subsequent five-year plans.  Jiang’s “Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period” 
established the role and direction of China’s military in responding to post-Cold War realities and the 
ascendance of the U.S. as the world’s sole superpower.  These guidelines also placed military 
developments in the context of a window of opportunity for China to increase its comprehensive national 
power (CNP), with particular focus on economic opportunity.  Developing CNP is a quantitative endeavor 
for the Chinese, involving a wide variety of factors—encompassing tangible and intangible strength in 
political, economic, scientific, technological, military, cultural, and educational spheres. National 
development strategists must consider all elements of power, and resolve fundamental contradictions, in 
order for balanced development to occur. According to the Chinese War Mobilization Encyclopedia, CNP 
development focused on a “strategic objective” that represents the “basic national interest” will yield 
 stability and growth.  The “basic national interest” for China appears to be sustained economic growth with 
secure control of sovereign territory (from both internal and external threats)—under, of course, the guiding 
hand of the Chinese Communist Party. 
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Based on these fundamental interests, Beijing’s most recent White Paper on defense, China’s National 
Defense in 2006, defines armed forces and armed police objectives as follows:  
• Uphold national security and unity, and ensure the interests of national development 
• Provide the source of strength for consolidating the rule of the Communist Party… and a solid 
security guarantee for sustaining this period of strategic opportunity for national development 
• Guard against and resist aggression… defend against violation of China’s territorial sea and air 
space, and borders 
• Oppose and contain the separatist forces for Taiwan independence and their activities 
• Take precautions against and crack down on terrorism, separatism and extremism in all forms 
 
These objectives highlight the continuing importance of the military and armed police in protecting Party 
control—which requires capabilities to secure and defend border regions, provide air defense for key 
political and economic centers, and conduct domestic control and disaster relief operations.  The PLA also 
derives offensive war fighting missions from these objectives, and directs force structure, campaign 
planning, and training programs accordingly.  It is for these offensive missions that the PLA finds itself 
most in need of modernization and reform.  The requirement to deter Taiwan from pursuing a path of 
permanent independence from the mainland is the central driver for the PLA’s pursuit of offensive 
capabilities.  For China’s leaders, this includes a conventional capability to deter and delay the U.S. forces 
they believe will bolster Taiwan’s defense in a conflict.   Should deterrence fail, the PLA is expected to 
conduct one or a number of joint offensive campaigns in a Taiwan war zone, depending on the immediate 
strategic objective.  Many of the campaign capabilities required to defeat Taiwan forces, control part or all 
of the island, and prevent the U.S. from denying China its strategic objectives, will also prepare the PLA to 
conduct a broader range of offensive operations in potential future regional contingencies.   
 
One of the chief advances in analysis of PLA modernization over the past few years has been deeper access 
to and understanding of the Chinese doctrinal and strategic military lexicon.  From a dissection of the now 
well-known text, The Science of Military Strategy, through more rigorous efforts by PLA watchers to mine 
a wealth of Chinese writings on doctrine, operational art, and defense programs, analysts have penetrated 
some of the dense shroud surrounding military modernization priorities, focus and intent.  The emerging 
picture is of a PLA determined to use the current peaceful environment in East Asia to build and train a 
force capable of fighting and winning a high-intensity, information-era war in the region against a 
technologically advanced adversary—and to minimize the vulnerability of the political and economic 
centers along China’s eastern seaboard in such a conflict. 
 
According to the 2006 Defense White Paper, the PLA’s modernization drive is unfolding in three steps.  
The first step is to establish a “solid foundation” for a modernized force by 2010.  Step two is to make 
“major progress” by 2020.  The ultimate goal, to be realized by mid-century, is to field a force capable of 
winning “informationized wars.”   The war fighting core of the PLA will be equipped, task-organized and 
trained to conduct joint offensive campaigns—such as the joint island landing campaign, the joint 
firepower campaign, and the joint blockade campaign—requiring regional air superiority, sea control, and 
information dominance capabilities.  China’s defense programs appear on track to deploy and integrate 
over the next decade the key components needed to conduct these campaigns as doctrinally designed—such 
as joint command and control systems, long-range surveillance and reconnaissance assets, precision over-
the-horizon strike systems, maritime area air defenses, and a real-time, joint targeting architecture.   
 
“Informationized Warfare” 
 
“Informationization” at the operational level appears focused on providing an integrated platform for joint 
war zone command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
 (C4ISR) connectivity. According to official Chinese media, the 11th Five-Year Plan tasks the PLA 
Informationization Work Office to move the PLA toward a “perfect universal transmission…and 
processing platform.”  Recent programs to establish integrated joint communications and data transfer 
capabilities attest to the priority placed on this effort, and China’s information technology sector is 
certainly capable of providing an effective architecture commensurate with the high level of resource 
commitment.  
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One of the primary tasks of conducting “informationized warfare” is to transform traditional modes of 
mobilization to fit the conditions of modern warfare—the concept of “people’s war” in a new era. For this 
reason, the modernization and reorganization of militia and reserve forces is to great extent focused on 
bringing in high-technology qualified reservists and militia members—both to form new high-tech units 
(such as information and electronic warfare detachments), and to leaven existing or transforming units with 
more capable engineers and computer technicians. According to a recent PLA Daily article, “specialized 
technical detachments” comprise 41% of reserve units; and the PLA has introduced a number of new 
reserve units responsible for communications and electronic warfare missions.  The urban militia is 
evolving to provide the war fighting force with high-tech support, providing access to an increasingly tech-
savvy workforce. 
 
Putting the Pieces Together… Integrated Joint Campaign Operations 
 
This Commission has over the past few years been briefed on the many foreign-acquired and indigenous 
missile, naval, and airborne systems that could potentially place at risk U.S. forces responding to a crisis in 
the Taiwan Strait.  But the systems in isolation do not equate to a capability for sustained combat on a 
modern, multi-dimensional battlefield.  “Integrated joint operations” is the current PLA buzz-phrase for 
training, equipping, and sustaining the force to conduct multi-service operations in an “informationized” 
environment.  While definitions of joint operations differ between Chinese strategists and their American 
counterparts, integrated joint operations specifically refer to multi-service campaigns controlled by a joint 
headquarters with an integrated command and control (C2) architecture. Analysts are unsure of the status of 
this architecture, but PLA and Military Region periodicals run numerous articles referring to tests and 
experiments involving its components. An integrated architecture would overcome a major obstacle to joint 
C2 and could potentially fuse data from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets into a 
near-real time “sensor-to-shooter” targeting network.  As joint C4ISR and targeting systems and processes 
mature over the next decade, the PLA will be able to bring to bear the modern weapon systems afforded by 
increased defense spending and ongoing research, development, and acquisition programs.  These systems 
and programs potentially allow the PLA to conduct the operations that underpin the PLA’s joint offensive 
campaigns—to include over-the-horizon precision strikes against land and maritime targets; kinetic and 
non-kinetic counter-C4ISR attacks; air superiority operations; and airborne and airmobile operations. 
 
First Things First: The Information Fight.  Chinese doctrinal writings emphasize that the success of any 
campaign hinges largely on the ability to establish and maintain information dominance.  This involves 
deploying and protecting a robust C4ISR capability in the theater of operations, and denying the enemy the 
use of the electro-magnetic spectrum to command forces and gain information.  As previously noted, the 
PLA has prioritized programs to provide an integrated, joint C4ISR platform that will fuse data from 
multiple sources.  This platform will use both space and terrestrial systems to locate, classify, track, and 
target enemy forces, and to command and control PLA forces in a variety of frequency bands. 
 
Over-the-horizon detection and targeting are a significant capability shortfall for the PLA, but will improve 
greatly as new space-based sensors, long distance air reconnaissance drones, and airborne early warning 
platforms deploy over the next few years.  While data link, data relay, and data fusion program details are 
obviously shrouded in secrecy, it seems likely that systems linking and fusing data between space, air, and 
terrestrial systems will be available to combat commanders across the force in five to ten years.  The key 
space system required by Beijing to achieve a more integrated architecture is a satellite data relay 
platform—a system that analysts of PLA space programs believe could be in orbit within three to five 
 years.  China also has programs to develop small satellite systems for rapid launch in a contingency, to 
provide augmentation for communications and intelligence networks. 
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Over the past decade, the PLA has placed a great deal of emphasis on developing airborne warning and 
control systems (AWACS).  The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) MAINSTAY system, based on the Russian A-50 
aircraft, now provides airborne warning and control with phased-array radar and data link capability.  
China’s indigenous Y-8 turboprop aircraft also has an airborne early warning/C2 variant.  With compatible 
data link systems on fighter aircraft, ship-borne helicopters, and surface ships, these airborne assets will 
greatly improve PLA ISR and targeting operations offshore—out to approximately 400 nautical miles from 
China’s coast, and within range of potential operating areas for U.S. carriers in a Taiwan crisis response 
scenario.  Reportedly, all PLA Navy (PLAN) destroyers are able to data link with AWACS aircraft, each 
other, on-board helicopters, and their anti-ship cruise missiles.  The extent to which Chinese surface 
combatants are able to employ these capabilities is unknown—but PLAN publications indicate that naval 
exercises reflect PLA guidance to prioritize systems integration training.  
 
In order to degrade the C4ISR capabilities of a technologically sophisticated adversary, PLA strategists are 
developing the doctrine and fielding the systems to conduct “integrated network electronic warfare.”  This 
concept borrows from U.S. theories of net-centric warfare, but is focused more specifically on establishing 
the conditions to paralyze a technology-dependent adversary and rapidly seize strategic objectives.  The 
components of network electronic warfare include terrestrial and airborne jammers, to include GPS 
jamming systems; anti-radiation missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) such as the Israeli HARPY; 
laser and directed-energy systems; direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons; and computer network 
attack capabilities.  These assets potentially improve the PLA’s ability to jam or spoof precision-guided 
munitions, degrade or destroy air defense radars, and disrupt communication and intelligence networks.   
 
China can already track most satellites with sufficient accuracy for targeting purposes, and has programs to 
disrupt or destroy overhead sensors.  The recent successful test of a Chinese direct-ascent, kinetic kill anti-
satellite vehicle illustrates that Beijing has the wherewithal to hold critical U.S. C4ISR assets at risk.  China 
is investing in high energy lasers for a variety of missions including air defense, ASAT operations, and 
theater missile defense.  Radiofrequency weapons, such as a conventional electro-magnetic pulse warhead, 
would enhance an anti-access strategy designed to slow and confuse a force responding to a regional crisis.  
Although some of these capabilities are many years from weaponization, the PLA is poising to wage 
increasingly sophisticated information warfare on a broad scale. 
 
Improving Air and Maritime Power Projection Capabilities.  For the campaigns that the PLA expects to 
wage in the western Pacific, establishing a favorable information environment is the first step toward 
gaining air and maritime superiority at key times and places.  There are two overarching components in 
PLA efforts to realize the broader air defense, offensive counter-air, and maritime strike capabilities 
required for joint blockade, anti-access, and island invasion campaigns.  The first is the formation of elite 
configurations of air and maritime packages to conduct regional air superiority, sea denial, and sea control 
operations.  The second is a long-range precision strike strategy, represented by a large array of cruise and 
ballistic missiles supported by a variety of sensors.  The objective of this strategy is to bring together 
network electronic warfare, space-based and airborne ISR, and advanced missile systems to provide the 
capability to strike bases on Taiwan, forward U.S. bases in the region, and naval formations at sea. 
 
China’s navy is focused on fielding modern destroyers, submarines, cruise missiles, and maritime strike 
aircraft to deter or prevent an adversary from operating for a given period of time in or above a critical sea 
lane or maritime zone of maneuver.  Even confronting a modern naval foe, China likely can control for 
long periods of time the waters covered by its land-based air defenses.  The PLAN also has the systems to 
credibly conduct short-term sea denial operations out to about 400 nautical miles from its eastern and 
southern coastlines—by 2010, with more robust maritime area air defenses, the PLAN may be able to 
sustain such operations for a few weeks.  Obviously, this capability does not accrue to the Straits of 
Malacca and the Indian Ocean—China can at best hope to “show the flag” for coercive and/or defensive 
 purposes in those waters until after 2015.  Nor would it apply to the blue water of the Western Pacific, 
particularly if opposed by U.S. or allied naval forces. 
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China’s submarine force is the key component in Beijing’s sea denial strategy, and for future extended sea 
control aspirations.  Beijing is concurrently building four classes of submarines, and acquiring another from 
Russia.  China commissioned approximately 17 submarines in the last two years.  The PLAN has about 28 
modern submarines in the fleet, in addition to a similar number of older boats that continue to require the 
attention of American commanders in the Pacific theater.  The backbone of the modern diesel attack fleet is 
the Russian KILO class, of which Beijing will have 10 in the fleet by the end of this year.  Because China 
has access to the entire family of Russian CLUB missiles, the new KILO submarines that began arriving in 
2005 could have the 300km-range 3M-14 land attack cruise missile (LACM), the 220km-range 3M-54E 
anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM), and the 91RE1 rocket. This is an extremely lethal weapons suite that 
allows the KILO to support a number of PLA campaign requirements.   
 
China’s new indigenously produced nuclear attack submarine, the SHANG class, benefits greatly from 
Russian technology and design—it will be armed with both ASCMs and LACMs.  The SHANG’s range 
and weaponry will give the PLA its first non-nuclear global strike capability—the PLA may have more 
than 10 SHANGs operational by the end of next year.  The new indigenously produced YUAN class diesel 
boat may include air-independent propulsion systems that will increase the submerged endurance of the 
platform.  China’s older MING and ROMEO submarines remain in service, and likely will continue to do 
so for some years.  They can serve as mine-laying platforms, and can be used to complicate the anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) picture. 
 
The second component of Beijing’s sea denial strategy is the upgraded destroyer and frigate fleet (about 21 
destroyers and 43 frigates).  Beijing has purchased four Russian SOVREMENNY destroyers, and is 
building eight new classes of indigenous destroyers and frigates.  China has around nine modern destroyers 
in service, with greatly improved anti-air and anti-ship missile systems.  The LUHAI and LUYANG 
destroyers are designed to ameliorate the PLAN’s most glaring maritime power projection shortfall—ship-
borne area air defenses.  Of particular note is the LUYANG II class destroyer, which has the vertical-
launch HQ-9 area air defense system, with phased-array radar somewhat similar to that of the U.S. AEGIS 
system. The LUHAI and LUYANG also will have the capability to conduct long-range anti-surface warfare 
(ASuW) missions with supersonic ASCMs.   
 
Beijing has 17 modern frigates in service, incorporating much-improved air defenses.  The JIANGKAI 
class is noteworthy, as it has a stealthy design similar to the French LAFAYETTE class.  China has also 
introduced a new fast-attack missile platform with a stealthy, catamaran hull design; and is investing in a 
deep-water mining capability, with a wide variety of applications via varied delivery and activation 
mechanisms, to include acoustically activated, remote control technology. 
 
To shift from sea denial to sea control operations further from its coastline, China will need to realize 
success in its aircraft carrier program, increase production of nuclear attack submarines, and integrate 
space-based and terrestrial command, control, and intelligence architectures.  The Chinese do not appear to 
be pursuing a transition to a carrier navy; but this does not rule out the possibility of a “hybrid” navy that 
has one or two carrier groups designed to provide minimum blue-water power projection for regional 
contingencies.  Some observers believe that China will indigenously build a 45,000-60,000-ton carrier that 
could carry 30-40 SU30MKK multi-role fighters—something that the PLAN could probably achieve 
around 2015. 
 
Command and control, at-sea replenishment, and ASW remain capability shortfalls that plague PLAN 
efforts to extend its reach.  Even for “green water” operations, the PLAN has yet to achieve full integration 
and automation of fleet command and control systems.  The Chinese acquisition of the French TAVITAC 
system, which is very similar to the U.S. Navy’s Link 11 secure tactical data system, will probably allow 
China to address this shortfall by 2010.  To fill the at-sea replenishment gap, two new DAYUN class 
 supply ships are entering service.  The Chinese do not appear to have given a high priority to ASW 
improvements.  Some of their Russian acquisitions, both surface and submarine, have included advanced 
ASW weapons; but Chinese maritime formations likely will remain highly vulnerable to enemy submarines 
for at least the next decade. 
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The PLAAF has both defensive and offensive mandates in support of integrated joint campaign operations.  
With advanced, layered, and increasingly integrated land-based air defenses, the PLAAF has greatly 
improved capabilities to conduct its traditional defensive mission, the strategic air defense campaign.  The 
SA10/20 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems acquired from Russia provide the heart of these defenses, 
with powerful radar capabilities and high-performance missiles that can range in excess of 100 nautical 
miles.  Extended range missiles are available from Russia and will probably be fielded soon—giving the 
PLAAF the ability to cover the island of Taiwan from deployment locations near the Chinese coast.  The 
growing, modern PLAAF and PLAN Air Force (PLANAF) indigenous and Russian-produced fighter fleet 
is capable of supporting the air defense campaign, but is not yet prepared to sustain even regional air 
superiority operations against a modern adversary. 
 
The PLAAF, however, aspires in the near future to develop capabilities to conduct the offensive air 
campaign required to gain air superiority over the Taiwan Strait, support ground forces if deployed in the 
region, and support sea denial and control operations in adjacent seas.  The SU-30 multi-role and maritime 
strike aircraft and newer, longer range strategic SAM systems purchased from Russia provide the capability 
to conduct temporary offensive operations out to at least 200 KM from China’s land and sea borders—and 
perhaps beyond when sea-based air defenses become more capable over the next five years.  The stand-off 
capabilities of the PLANAF’s SU-30MKK2 maritime strike fleet would also benefit if Russia sells Beijing 
the new 300km-range Kh-59MK ASCM.  We have previously discussed Beijing’s deployment of airborne 
early warning systems—the PLAAF also has made progress in aerial refueling and improved targeting 
capabilities via UAVs, ship-borne helicopters, and over-the-horizon radars.  These systems are probably 
not yet integrated with each other and with space-based detection and tracking systems, but current 
programs could shore up this weakness within five years.  Beijing is purchasing IL-78 refueling tankers, 
which will refuel the Russian SU-30 aircraft in both PLAAF and PLANAF inventories—giving them reach 
out into the Sea of Japan, the South China Sea, and to Guam.  
 
The 2nd Artillery: Missile Forces Modernize for Joint Offensive Campaigns.  The conventional arm of 
China’s strategic rocket force, the 2nd Artillery, is probably the best-trained and most ready service arm 
within the PLA; and serves a critical role in Beijing’s approach to several key joint campaigns, including 
the joint island landing and joint blockade campaigns.  These forces are not focused on deterrent or 
retaliatory missions—by doctrine and training they are focused on seizing the initiative in offensive 
operations.  PLA writings stress that conventional missiles forces are most effective in preemptive strikes 
against high value targets. 
 
The rapid growth of the CSS-6 and CSS-7 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) force, and qualitative 
improvements in missile technology over the past ten years, yield a force of approximately 850 missiles 
providing a precision strike capability.  Terminal homing technology and satellite-assisted navigation 
(using GPS, Russian GLONASS and indigenous Bei Dou satellite navigation systems) make these missiles 
highly accurate.  While the SRBM force serves primarily to address a potential Taiwan conflict, 
developments in the conventional medium-range and intermediate-range (MRBM/IRBM) realm pose the 
possibility of holding at risk all U.S. forward bases in the Western Pacific.  These missiles, in conjunction 
with long-range cruise missiles launched from air platforms, provide stand-off capabilities out to Guam. 
 
China’s program to develop an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) capability is of greatest concern to U.S. 
naval forces operating in the Western Pacific.  This future ASBM system would be an integral part of a 
reconnaissance-strike complex able to target naval forces at sea at unprecedented ranges. Chinese writings 
recognize this as a watershed capability with the potential to change the regional strategic balance. As the 
Chinese seek to transition from sea denial to sea control operations further from the Chinese coast, an 
 ASBM capability could prove decisive.  U.S. carrier groups responding to a Taiwan crisis may have to 
operate much further from China’s coast to avoid unacceptable risk—ensuring air superiority over the 
Strait will increasingly involve difficult decisions about the extent to which the U.S. is willing to strike 
targets on the Chinese mainland.  An ASBM capability will be extremely difficult to realize, involving a 
complex “system of systems” including: C2 infrastructures; space and surface over-the-horizon 
reconnaissance and targeting systems; real-time targeting data fusion; seeker systems able to track, target, 
and engage naval platforms at great range; long-range missile systems; advanced maneuverable warhead 
technology; and a science, technology and industrial sector capable of supporting these systems and 
technologies.  The Chinese, however, appear focused on integrating a mobile, maneuverable re-entry 
(MaRV) ASBM with a C4ISR architecture increasingly capable of geo-locating targets at sea.  If 
successful, this capability would enhance sea denial operations as much as 1,000 miles from China’s 
eastern seaboard, and facilitate the PLA navy’s burgeoning drive to control waters within 300-400 miles of 
the coast. 
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Regarding the nuclear arm of the 2nd Artillery strategic rocket force, Beijing appears to view modernization 
as a means to strengthen its traditional role—as a tool to deter nuclear aggression and prevent more 
powerful states from using strategic capabilities to politically blackmail Beijing.  The “nuclear counter-
strike campaign” remains the only stated operational mission for the force.  While the nuclear force is 
expected to grow over the next decade, and mobile, solid-fueled missiles will replace older, less survivable 
systems, there seems to be little indication that China’s fundamental nuclear posture is changing to 
encompass broader nuclear-warfighting constructs.  It will be absolutely critical, however, for analysts to 
closely watch for indications of nuclear armed air- and ground-launched cruise missiles—a development 
that would have obvious implications for regional stability, strategic deterrence, and escalation control.  
 
To improve the deterrent impact of Beijing’s strategy, the PLAN is also modernizing the sea-based nuclear 
force.  China’s navy is a strategic force in name only at the moment, but this is changing.  A new SSBN, 
the Type 094 class, should enter service within the next three years.  Analysts expect it to be armed with 12 
JL-2 ballistic missiles, which could have a range of as much as 12,000km.  This would permit attacks on 
most continental U.S. targets from protected locations close to China’s shore. 
 
Ground Forces: The Forgotten Service?  As Beijing seeks to rapidly develop niche capabilities to deter 
Taiwan independence activities, China’s ground forces have taken a backseat in resource prioritization to 
air, naval and missile forces.  A significant portion of the ground force remains committed to border, 
garrison, and key point defense, and to providing the visible extension of Communist Party power 
throughout the country.  Approximately a third of the force, however, constitutes an increasingly 
professional war fighting core.  Understanding the requirement to build an amphibious and air transportable 
force capable of responding to a call to arms in the Taiwan Strait—and also to have a heavy mobile warfare 
force for contingency use in Central Asia, the Korean Peninsula, or the Russian Far East—PLA force 
planners have clearly begun to restructure, equip, and train units for specific offensive missions. The 2006 
National Defense White Paper states that, “the Army aims at moving from regional defense to trans-
regional mobility, and improving its capabilities in air-ground integrated operations, long-distance 
maneuvers, rapid assaults and special operations.”  
 
Over the course of the past decade, the PLA built at least four major amphibious training bases, and about 
one quarter of the PLA’s maneuver divisions and brigades focused on training for amphibious operations. 
The special operations and airmobile capabilities needed in support of missile and air strikes against 
Taiwan are also priorities for ground force development initiatives. Downsizing or retiring a number of old 
divisions in favor of modernized, task-organized brigades possibly improves the PLA’s capability to 
respond to potential crises along the full length of China’s northern border and tailors some units to more 
effectively conduct amphibious operations against Taiwan or Taiwan-controlled islands in the Strait. 
 
Recent developments in the helicopter force indicate that the General Staff is well aware of the need for air 
assault capabilities to address shortfalls in contingency mission areas, such as a landing campaign against 
 Taiwan or a mechanized campaign on the Korean border, in Siberia, or along China’s Central Asian 
periphery. The force remains small and focused on limited transport capabilities, but the PLA has a 
coherent, focused plan for transitioning the force to deliver the firepower needed for air assault missions.  
Strategic lift in the PLAAF is a constraint on airborne power projection at the moment, but Beijing has 
inked a deal to purchase additional IL-76 transport aircraft, which could increase lift capacity for airborne 
forces by as much as 150 percent.   
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Training and Logistics: Making Integrated Joint Operations a Reality 
 
The PLA officer and fledgling NCO corps are largely combat inexperienced—veterans of the Vietnam 
incursion of 1979 are for the most part gone, and the PLA at the unit level is no longer their army.   As 
such, the ability of the PLA to integrate new weapons systems, perform new missions, and develop the 
logistics structure to sustain high-intensity combat will largely determine whether or not PLA forces can 
put joint offensive campaigns into operation under complex information-era conditions. 
 
Logistics is a key area of concern in integrated joint operations—legacy logistics support for the PLA is 
“stove-piped” by service, slow, and inefficient. However, an automated “tri-service logistic interaction 
platform” was reportedly introduced recently in a sub-department of the Beijing Military Region (following 
a similar fielding in the Jinan region).  Of particular interest is the fact that the report indicated that the 
platform was introduced to provide joint logistic support to the “Beijing Theater of Operation,” rather than 
to the Beijing Military Region—stressing the wartime mission. 
 
In the aftermath of the recent session of China’s National People’s Congress, Chinese media analysis of 
PLA plenary sessions heavily stressed the importance placed by PLA leadership on training to fight 
“informationized” war—with emphasis on weapons system integration, joint C2 and command post 
procedures and architectures, and electronic warfare capabilities.  Most reports on exercise activity do not 
indicate that PLA units are attempting large-scale joint scenarios.  They do paint a picture, however, of a 
force that is exercising the discrete elements required of certain offensive campaigns; and they indicate that 
higher-level joint C2 processes are being exercised via simulations and command post training.  Of 
particular note, Chinese open sources have been more openly critical of training shortfalls, and the fixes 
required—indicating that the PLA is serious about training evaluation procedures and corrective action.  
The effectiveness of PLA training over the next five years—in terms of new weapons integration, joint C2, 
and joint firepower operations—will determine the extent to which the force is meeting Beijing’s stated 
modernization goals. 
 
Panel  III:   Discuss ion,  Quest ions  and Answers  
 
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:   Thank you very  much.   A 
number  of  commiss ioners  have ques t ions  of  you.   I  apprecia te  very  
much your  generos i ty  wi th  your  t ime.   Vice  Chairman Blumenthal  i s  
f i rs t .  
 VICE CHAIRMAN BLUMENTHAL:  Thank you very  much to  a l l  
of  you.   A quest ion for  General  Car twright  and then i f  I  have t ime for  
Mr.  Cooper  and Dr.  Er ickson.   
 The spect rum you descr ibed that  you ' re  seeing r ight  now of  cyber  
abi l i t ies  and cyber  a t tacks  going f rom hackers  a l l  the  way down to the 
use  of  nat ion-s ta te  resources ,  what  i s  th is  type  of  cyber  ac t iv i ty  a imed 
a t ,  a t  th is  point?   What  would  you specula te  i t  i s  going to  be  a imed a t  
in  the  future?  
 Are  we looking r ight  now at  probes  of  U.S.  sys tems that  la ter  
 wil l  be  able  to  take  advantage  of  vulnerabi l i t ies  or  what  are  we 
actual ly  th inking the  a im is  here?  
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 GENERAL CARTWRIGHT:  My sense  i s  that  there  is  a  
substant ia l  amount  of  reconnaissance going on to  unders tand in  our  
terms “map out” ,  networks ,  unders tand who 's  ta lk ing to  who,  and what  
means  they are  using to  communicate .   And that  i s  broader  than jus t  
the  U.S.  government .   I  mean that  i s  indust ry  for  this  nat ion,  and so  
that  ac t iv i ty  i s  ongoing.  
 When you do that  type  of  ac t ivi ty ,  the  opportuni ty  to  s tar t  to  
unders tand where  the  in te l lec tual  capi ta l  of  a  nat ion is  and what  i t  has  
put  together  to  g ive  you the  chance to  potent ia l ly  skip  generat ions  in  
your  R&D effor ts - -and th is  i s  not  jus t  mi l i tary-- th is  goes  across  the  
commercia l  sec tors ,  e t  ce tera  i s  usual ly  avai led .   
 For  us ,  we genera l ly  th ink about  th ings  in  terms of- -and I 'm 
ta lking about  mi l i tary--as  a  threshold  i s  the  law of  armed conf l ic t .   As  
long as  you ' re  wi l l ing  to  s tay  below that ,  you are  probing around,  you 
are  looking for  opportuni ty ,  you may s tumble  across  oppor tuni ty ,  
probably  some of  i t  serendipi ty  when you ' re  ta lk ing informat ion 
operat ions .   In  fac t ,  probably  a  large  par t  of  i t  i s ,  but  the  idea  i s  to  get  
an  unders tanding of  the  neighborhood.  
 The bet ter  you unders tand i t ,  the  more  l ikely  you are  to  be  able  
to  use  that  to  your  advantage  should  there  be  a  conf l ic t  between us . .  
 I t  may not  seem l ike  much to  unders tand jus t  bas ic  rudimentary  
networks ,  but  i t  s tar t s  to  ref lect  how we th ink,  how we interac t  and 
who in teracts  wi th  who,  and unders tanding that  about  your  adversary  i s  
very  important .   And the  speed a t  which we can unders tand that  about  
our  adversar ies  today,  because  of  cyber ,  in  compar ison to  the  way we 
had to  do i t  say  in  World  War  I I  or  the  Korean conf l ic t  for  the  Uni ted 
Sta tes ,  i s  vast ly  d i fferent .  
 You a l l  know what  a  thumb dr ive  can do in  exf i l t ra t ion in  
compar ison to  how many encounters  in HUMINT.   And so  the  scale  a t  
which you can operate  in  th is  envi ronment  i s  pre t ty  s igni f icant .  
 So unders tanding the  pat terns  and the  in ter re la t ionships  is  one 
level  of  i t .   Unders tanding potent ia l ly  where  in te l lec tual  capi ta l  might  
be  inves ted  and how you might  s tar t  to  take  advantage of  that  in  an  
asymmetr ic  way is  a  second th ing.   The th i rd  i s  to  s tar t  to  unders tand 
i f  we decide  to  breach through the  law of  armed conf l ic t ,  I  could  then 
unders tand how my adversary  is  going to  behave and potent ia l ly 
in tercede and make i t  harder ,  f ind  his  seams,  weak spots .  
 VICE CHAIRMAN BLUMENTHAL:  Is  a  law of  armed conf l ic t  
wel l  developed in  cyber  warfare?   Wil l  you have a  very  good sense  of  
when i t  was  breached by an adversary?  
 GENERAL CARTWRIGHT:  My feel ing is  that  i t  i s  very 
analogous .   In  o ther  words ,  you do not  need to  go out  and develop a  
 new law of  armed conf l ic t  for  cyber .   You have suff ic ient  analogy to  
o ther  areas  of  conf l ic t  in  the  k inet ic  sense  that  (a)  you rea l ly  don ' t  
need to  do that ;  and (b)  you may need to  do a  s l ight  in terpre ta t ion.   
But  I  th ink i t ' s  wel l  documented.   I t  probably  is  bes t  documented in  
compar ing i t  to  e lec t ronic  warfare ,  what ' s  appropr ia te ,  what ' s  not .  
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 Even i f  you don ' t  in tend to  do harm and col la tera l  damage,  i f  you 
complete ly  obscure  the  a i rspace ,  you have put  a t  r i sk  c iv i l  avia t ion,  e t  
ce tera .   You have gone through that  threshold.   I t ' s  not  unl ike  tha t  in  
th is  environment .  
 So I  th ink you have good analogy in  law and we may need to  
work a  l i t t le  b i t  on  the  nuances,  but  you have a  good bas is  there .  
 VICE CHAIRMAN BLUMENTHAL:  Thank you.  
 GENERAL CARTWRIGHT:  When the  president  vis i ted ,  there  
was ,  I  guess ,  two dia logues  that  were  se t  up.   One was  for  Mike 
Gri f f in ,  my counterpar t  a t  NASA, to  enter  in to  a  d ia logue wi th  China  
on space  and that  d ia logue was  to  have him,  the  d i rec tor ,  go  to  China  
and have an exchange and tha t  d id  occur .  
 The  second was for  the  Second Art i l le ry  and STRATCOM to have 
an  interact ion .   We have been in  a  d ia logue to  se t  tha t  in terac t ion  up.   
I  would  say that  one  of  the  i ssues  tha t  the  Chinese  are  t ry ing to  work 
thei r  way through is  the  organizat ions  don ' t  necessar i ly  match up in  
miss ion.   So is  tha t  the  r ight  meet ing or  should  they send someone 
e lse?   Or  should they send more  than one,  th is  i ssue  person is  
something they 've  been t ry ing to  work thei r  way through.  
 In  addi t ion,  we went  through the  Four th  of  July .   We went  
through a  tes t  in  North  Korea .   We've  gone through severa l  events  
which give  us  pause-- le t ' s  wai t  a  l i t t le  bi t  here  and make sure  we 
unders tand what 's  going on.  
 So we jus t  completed an  act ivi ty  where  the  Chairman,  Genera l  
Pace ,  went  over  and conducted a  v is i t ,  hopeful ly  to  t ry  to  s t imulate  
mi l - to-mi l  conversa t ions  again .   I  th ink they ' re  cr i t ica l .   They ' re  
cr i t ica l  f rom several  d i f ferent  approaches .  
 One is  be ing able  to  s i t  down mil i tary  commander  to  mi l i tary  
commander  and unders tand your  adversary  and unders tand whether  or  
not  you have a  bas is  in  d ia logue that  you can defuse  something very  
quickly  wi th jus t  a  mere  conversa t ion,  par t icular ly  when we have a  lot  
of  media  that  help  us  interpret  what  we say .  
 So somet imes  i t ' s  quick  to  p ick up the  phone,  get  the  
oppor tuni ty ,  say ,  “hey,  th is  i s  rea l ly  where  I 'm coming f rom,  th is  i s  
what  I  was  t ry ing to  do.”   Right  now we are  communicat ing,  but  i t  i s  
through the  t rack ser ies  of  d ia logues .   These  have been extremely 
valuable ,  but  i t  i s  whisper ing in  one person 's  ear  and then to  another  
person 's  and then back across .   I t ' s  a  very  s low way to  do business ,  and 
i t ' s  not  ter r ibly  eff ic ient .  
  I t ' s  helpful ,  but  i t ' s  not  eff ic ient .   We need to  move forward and 
s tar t  to  f ind  mi l - to-mil  d ia logues  that  can s tar t  to  work through some 
of  the  i ssues .   We need to  be  able  to ,  in  par t icular ,  s tar t  to  have  a  
d ia logue about  bal l i s t ic  missi les .   
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 What 's  our  intent?   Where are  we going?   How do we f ind 
comfor t?   How do I  te l l  you that  I 'm uncomfor table  wi th  what  you ' re  
doing? And for  you to  come back to  me and say i t ' s  okay,  th is  i s  where  
we ' re  heading.   I f  I  don ' t  go  in  the  d i rec t ion I  jus t  painted,  you ought  
to  be  uncomfor table ,  but  i f  I  do ,  th is  i s  where  we 're  going.  
 Jus t  in  the  s imple  launch of  a  miss i le ,  i f  someone te l l s  you where  
i t  was  supposed to  come from and where  i t  i s  supposed to  go,  and you 
can assess  tha t  re la t ive ly  quickly,  i t  changes  the  whole  dia logue 
between the  two par t ies .  
 I f  the  miss i le  i s  launched and nobody knew i t  was  going to  be  
launched,  and you have no idea  where  i t ' s  going,  there  i s  a  per iod of  
ambigui ty  there  that  can be  very  disquie t ing.  
 And so  I  be l ieve  th is  i s  cr i t ica l .   We can ' t  rush  i t ,  but  the  sooner  
that  we can get  a  meaningful  mi l - to-mil  d ia logue going,  the  bet ter .  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Thank you very  much.   
Chairman Bar tholomew.  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Thank you.   And thank you very  
much,  gent lemen,  for  your  very  in teres t ing tes t imony and a lso  for  your  
service  to  our  nat ion over  the  years .   I t ' s  benefi ted  us  a l l  and I  a lways  
fee l  tha t  i t ' s  a  t remendous  pr iv i lege  for  us  to  have people  wi th  your  
exper ience  come and tes t i fy  before  us .   So  thank you very  much.  
 I  have a  broader  pic ture  ques t ion ,  which is  there 's  obviously  a  
debate  going on about  what  China  is ,  whether  i t ' s  a  s t ra tegic  
compet i tor ,  a  f r iend,  an  a l ly ,  and we have def ined th is  ques t ion over  a  
number  of  years ,  tha t  i t ' s  a  l i t t le  uncer ta in  as  to  what  that  re la t ionship  
is .   Within  our  own pol icy  debate ,  there  i s  no consensus  o ther  than 
China 's  b ig  and i t ' s  growing and i t ' s  a  country  in  Asia ,  and i t  has  a  
permanent  seat  on the  U.N.  Securi ty  Counci l ,  and af ter  that  i t  a l l  
breaks  down.  
 But  my quest ion is  rea l ly  about  war  p lanning when we don ' t  
necessar i ly  have  a  c lear  p ic ture  of  e i ther  what  we think an  outcome in 
some cases  should  be  and i f  we don ' t  have a  c lear  p ic ture  of  Chinese  
mi l i tary  campaign objec t ives .   So  i f  we ' re  not  c lear  of  what  we th ink 
an outcome should  be  and we don ' t  have enough informat ion about  
what  they th ink thei r  mi l i tary  object ives  should  be  or  are ,  how do we 
plan to  counter  any of  these  th ings?  
 I ' l l  open tha t  up to  a l l  of  you.  
 GENERAL CARTWRIGHT:  I  th ink there 's  a  couple  of  a t t r ibutes  
that  we can work our  way through.   We have some bas ic  t ru ths  that  
apply  across  a l l  of  the  domains  of  a  desi re  for  access ,  a  des i re  to  be  
 able  to  move through any medium,  whether  i t ' s  a i r ,  space ,  cyber ,  land,  
and conduct  commerce .   You know real ly  a t  the  end of  the  day th is  
nat ion 's  greates t  nat ional  in teres t  i s  to  be  able  to  conduct  business .  
 
 
 
 
  
94
 
 To the  extent  tha t  we might  be  inhibi ted  f rom doing that  would 
be  a  reason that  we would view with concern act iv i t ies ,  which hinder  
our  abi l i ty  to  opera te  wi thin  or  through a  medium,  to  go out  and 
discover ,  do  sc ience ,  or  whether  i t 's  in  the  business  world ,  law of  the  
sea ,  e t  ce tera .  
 I f  those  areas  are  denied us ,  then what  are  appropr ia te  
responses?   What  p lans  should  we lay  in  p lace  and to  some extent  make 
t ransparent  so  that  people  unders tand what 's  important  to  us ,  and a t  
what  level  we place  the  impor tance?  
 I f  we can do re la t ively  gener ic  p lanning,  couple  that  wi th  
exerc ises  which rea l ly  then demonst ra te  the  capabi l i t ies  that  we ' re  
wi l l ing to  associa te  wi th a  cer ta in  regre t  or  harm to  us ,  then they can 
view those ,  they can see .   They can see  that  i f  we do th is  they ' re  going 
to  send an a i rcraf t  carr ier  over .  
 I f  they send an a i rcraft  carr ier  over ,  tha t  sends  a  message to  us  
that  they ' re  uncomfor table  about  something.   That  es tabl ishes  
thresholds .   I t  a l lows us  to  p lan .   I f  we send an a i rcraf t  carr ier  over ,  as  
an  example ,  one  a i rcraf t  carr ier  i s  not  going to  take  on China .   But  i t  
sends  a  message.   I t  changes  the  dynamic .   
 For  us ,  i t  s tar ts  to  expand the  warning t ime,  which al lows us  to  
seek other  venues ra ther  than force to  solve the  problem.   But  i t  
increases  the  credibi l i ty  of  the  fact  tha t  i f  we decide  to  use  force ,  i f  
that ' s  appropria te ,  that  we ' re  a l ready on a  path  to  do that ,  and the 
amount  of  t ime to  do i t  i s  now s tar t ing to  be  reduced.  
 So you t ry  to  bui ld  scenar ios  that  a l low you to  communicate  in  
your  p lanning,  that  communicate  and are  carr ied  over  in to  your  
exerc ises ,  that  le t  you be  re la t ively  t ransparent  about  when you 're  
uncomfor table  and what  condi t ions  make you uncomfor table ,  and to  
what  extent  you ' re  wi l l ing to  escala te  in  that  s i tuat ion.  
 The most  d i f f icul t  par t  of  th is  equat ion is  when you move to  the  
nuclear  end of  the  equat ion,  and that  i s  why i t  i s  so  cr i t ica l  to  ge t  a  
d ia logue going.   For  the  Sovie t  Union,  when i t  was  the  Sovie t  Union,  
we had t ime and we had proximity  and we used t ime and proximity  to  
te l l  each other  when we were  uncomfor table .   I f  your  submarines  got  
too c lose  to  my shorel ine ,  i f  your  bombers  were  a t  the  end of  the  
runway and loaded and running,  those  were  s igna ls  tha t  were very  c lear  
and unambiguous .   I t  a l lowed a  d ia logue in  act ions  that  rea l ly  
fac i l i ta ted  a l ternat ive  measures  to  solve  the  problem.  
 That  to  me is  the  type of  p lanning that  we want  to  be  doing,  but  
we want  to  do i t  wi th  a  mi l - to-mil  d ia logue so there  i s  no 
mis interpre ta t ion of  the  ac t iv i ty .  
  CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Gent lemen,  and our  o ther  
wi tnesses ,  i f  you have comments ,  maybe you can put  them on the  
record .   General  Car twright ,  I  wanted to  ment ion speci f ica l ly ,  though,  
tha t  one  of  the  reasons  I  asked th is  ques t ion is  because  I  have heard  
f rom some of  our  young mil i tary  p lanners  that  they bel ieve  that  they 
are  doing thei r  bes t  to  t ry  to  come up wi th  p lans ,  but  they are  uncer ta in  
what  the  u l t imate  outcomes are  supposed to  be .   They fee l  l ike  they are  
f ly ing bl ind,  i f  you wi l l ,  in  terms of  what  they ' re  t ry ing to  p lan for .  
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 GENERAL CARTWRIGHT:  Fai r .   Al l  of  us  Type As would  l ike  
to  have i t  wr i t ten  down:   “okay,  there 's  exact ly  what  my object ive  i s .”   
We are  moving,  though,  to  a  s t ra tegy that  a l lows us  to  address  
ambigui ty  in  a  much larger  way.   The new t r iad  was  to  accept  the  fac t  
that  one-s ize-does-not- f i t -al l  for  our  adversar ies .  
 I t  a lso  acknowledges  the  fac t  tha t  our  adversary  is  looking for  
our  seams,  and i f  we show them s t rength  in  one area ,  they ' l l  move to  
another .  So the  same is  t rue  of  the  d ia logue.   I t  needs to  be  f lexible  
enough to  communicate  a t  a  large  level ,  but  acknowledge the  fac t  that  
maybe i t ' s  cyber  today and we s tar t  to  bui ld  a  l i t t le  bet ter  defense.   We 
don ' t  want  to  end up in  a  n ine-year-old  soccer  game where  everybody 
is  rushing to  the  bal l  and we 're  leaving huge amounts  of  the  f ie ld 
exposed.  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:   Commiss ioner  Brookes .  
 COMMISSIONER BROOKES:   Thank you very  much.   Thank you 
a l l  for  your  tes t imony today.   I 'm going to  d i rec t  these  quest ions ,  I  
th ink,  to  Dr .  Er ickson,  but  i f  o thers  have input ,  I 'd  apprecia te  i t .  
 I  have  two ques t ions :   One is  this  morning,  one of  our  wi tnesses  
sa id  that  i t  was  his  bel ief  tha t  the  Chinese  were  pursuing an  a i rcraf t  
carr ier  program.   I  d idn ' t  hear  you ment ion i t  and I  d idn ' t  not ice  i t  in  
your  tes t imony,  though I  may have missed i t .   I f  I  d id ,  I  apologize .   I 'd  
ask  for  a  quick assessment  of  that .  
 Also ,  the  SS-N-27,  which I  guess  the  NATO name would be  
Russ ian  Sizzler ,  or  in  the  Chinese  inventory ,  we ' re  ca l l ing i t  the  Klub--
is  that  correct?   Have we done any net  assessments  on that  versus  
carr ier  vulnerabi l i t ies?  And i f  you could  address  that  in  an  open forum,  
I  would  apprecia te  your  v iews of  tha t .   There  has  been some discuss ion 
recent ly  in  the  press ,  address ing some concerns  about  American 
a i rcraf t  carr ier  vulnerabi l i ty  to  the  SS-N-27.   Thank you.  
 DR.  ERICKSON:  Commiss ioner  Brookes ,  thank you for  those  
excel lent  quest ions .   As  for  your  second quest ion,  le t  me request  tha t  I  
be  able  to  furnish  an  answer  to  you in  wri t ing .   I  want  to  make sure  I  
get  th is  s t ra ight  and s tay  wi thin  the  goalposts ,  i f  you wi l l .  
 As  to  the  a i rcraf t  car r ier  i ssue ,  I  have coauthored a  p iece  wi th  a  
col league of  mine on th is .   I  th ink i t ' s  a  rea l ly  fasc inat ing  i ssue 
because  i t  ge ts  to  the  quest ion of  what ,  i f  any,  are  the  scenar ios  
 beyond Taiwan?  To what  extent  does  China  in tend to  project  power  
in to  the  Western  Paci f ic  and beyond? 
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 In  the  course  of  doing th is  research,  and I  would  be  happy to  
furnish  you wi th  copies  showing the  deta i led  sources  we 've  drawn th is  
f rom,  we 've  seen a  def ini te  in terest  in this  subject .   This  appears  to  be  
under  debate  in  China .   What  we ' re  a lso  careful  to  emphasize ,  however ,  
i s  tha t  should  China  pursue  such a  course ,  i t  would  have a  long way to  
go in  making th is  a  t ru ly  ef fec t ive  p la t form.  
 In  our  view,  an  a i rcraf t  carr ier  i s  t ru ly  a  complex sys tem of  
sys tem,  to  project  a i r  power  on the  sea .   That  takes  a  lot  of  a i r  
exper t i se .   I t  takes  t ime to  prac t ice  and master .   So we would not  be  
surpr ised  i f  China  were  indeed making some s ignif icant  s teps  in  these  
di rect ions ,  but  we ' re  jus t  very  careful  to  emphasize  that  i t  wi l l  take  a  
lo t  of  broad-based effor t  and would  be  a  major  inves tment  for  China  to  
ac tual ly  have an operat ional ly-useful  a i rcraf t  carr ier .  
 I  would  not  be  surpr ised i f ,  in  the  years  ahead,  China  does  
indeed move in  th is  d i rec t ion,  but  were  a  Chinese  a i rcraf t  carr ier  to  
appear  in  some form in  the  near  future ,  I  don ' t  th ink that  automat ical ly  
means  a  s t rong opera t ional  capabi l i ty .   I  think i t ' s  something we have 
to  look a t  very  c losely .  
 COMMISSIONER BROOKES:   I  th ink people  were  in teres ted  in  
the  fac t  tha t  i t  may show a  change in  Chinese  s t ra tegy in  terms  one  of  
the  pure ly  mi l i tary  modernizat ion as  opposed to  one of  asymmetry ,  you 
know,  submarines ,  ant i -ship  cruise  miss i les .   But  I  a lso  th ink there  are  
o ther  oppor tuni t ies  for  a  Chinese  a i rcraf t  carr ier  bes ides  power  
project ion.   There 's  presence .   There  i s  the  energy secur i ty  di lemma 
that  they have,  the  Malacca  St ra i t  d ilemma as  some of  them cal l  i t ,  that  
a  carr ier  could  provide  that  sor t  of  presence .    Maybe not  our  sor t  of  
a i r  opera t ions ,  but  maybe VSTOL (Very Shor t  Take Off  and Landing)  
or  something a long that  l ine ,  and I  guess  there  was  some commentary 
via  the  Hong Kong press  recent ly  about  a  Chinese  admira l  saying 
something a t  the  Nat ional  People 's  Congress ,  and I  was  jus t  t ry ing to  
f ind  out  more ,  s ince  one  of  our  wi tnesses  this  morning sa id  i t ,  I  was 
in terested.  
 I  rea l ize  i t ' s  probably  something down the  road.   I  don ' t  want  to  
emphasize  i t  too  much,  but  i t  does  show a  t rend s ince  we have to  th ink 
beyond the  next  few years  in  terms of  the  Chinese  mi l i tary  
modernizat ion.   So i f  any of  you gent lemen have any comment  on that ,  
I 'd  apprecia te  i t .  
 MR.  COOPER:  Jus t  one  comment  and I  th ink i t  jus t  echoes  what  
Dr .  Er ickson said in  terms of  the  di f ference between put t ing out  
potent ia l ly  one or  two carr iers  over  the  next  ten  years ,  maybe one 
carr ier  somet ime around or  af ter  2015,  and t ransi t ioning to  a  carr ier  
navy--ent i re ly  d i f ferent  things .   I  don ' t  th ink we have much  bas is  for  
 seeing a  t ransi t ion plan  to  a  carr ier  navy in  the  PLA r ight  now,  nor  
does  i t  seem to  f i t  wi th  what  they perce ive  to  be thei r  most  immedia te  
threats .  
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 But  I  th ink we shouldn’ t  d ismiss  the  program out  of  hand based 
on that .   I  th ink the  idea  that  having a  hybr id  navy gets  them in  the  
same neighborhood as  Thai land,  the  Indians ,  in  terms of  being able  to  
put  out  a  carr ier  for  some use--and again  opera t ional ly  probably  not  
that  great  for  the  th ings  that  are  immediate ly  on thei r  p la te ,  but  s t i l l  
qui te  poss ible .   Then again  you have  to  th ink of  potent ia l ly  o ther  
miss ions  that  could  be  used for  a  carr ier  p la t form,  that  might  involve  
hel i -borne  assets  and things  l ike  that .  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  Commiss ioner ,  could  I  fo l low up?  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  General ,  you ' re  probably  the  
only  guy on that  panel  that ' s  f lown off  a  carr ier .  
 GENERAL CARTWRIGHT:  I  th ink he 's  got  i t  r ight ,  but  I  would  
watch,  i f  a t  say  15 years  out ,  i t ' s  not  one  or  two,  they go in to  a  b ig--
that  would be  a  t r ip  wire .    
 COMMISSIONER BROOKES:   So i t  depends  how you def ine  
a i rcraf t  carr ier .   I f  you ta lk  about  hel icopters  or  amphibious  assaul t  
ships ,  as  opposed to  what  we th ink of  as  an a i rcraf t  carr ier ,  100,000 
tons  of  sovere ign U.S.  ter r i tory .   So I  guess  i t  a lso  depends  how we 
def ine  i t .  
 Do you have a  v iew as  to  whether  th is  i s  a  VSTOL or  a  
hel icopter  program? 
  
 DR.  ERICKSON:  I t ' s  hard  to  f ind def in i t ive  evidence.   I  would  
emphasize  what  you 've  sa id  about  a  broad def ini t ion of  a  carr ier  and a  
broad def in i t ion of  opera t ional  ut i l i ty  to  inc lude  presence .   I  th ink they 
would value  that .  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Thanks  very  much.   
Commiss ioner  Fiedler .  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  Genera l  Car twright ,  I 'd  l ike  to  
make a  comment  or  an  observat ion and then ask a  ques t ion,  and i f  my 
observat ion is  faul ty  in  any way,  I 'd  l ike  you to  correc t  me on i t .  
 When we ta lk  about  convent ional  weapons  and/or  power  
project ion,  we ta lk  about  physica l  dis tances ,  and we 've  heard  tes t imony 
about  200 miles ,  400 miles ,  but  when we enter  the  rea lm of  cyber  
warfare ,  power  project ion has  a  d i f ferent  meaning.   Dis tances  are  
re la t ively  meaningless  because  anybody can get  r ight  to  us  re la t ively  
quickly .   
 So my quest ion is  two par ts :  (one)  i s  our  greatest  vulnerabi l i ty  
our  informat ion sys tems;  and ( two) ,  i s  China  our  most  capable  
opponent?   Or  i f  China  is  not ,  who is  our  most  capable  opponent?  
 GENERAL CARTWRIGHT:  The f i rs t  premise ,  which is  the  
 geographic  premise ,  I  th ink is  accurate .   I t  i s  chal lenging us  on one  
hand-- the  fac t  tha t  you move so  quickly  and that  borders  because  of  
these  networks ,  geographic  borders ,  a re  somewhat  i r re levant .   But  
having sa id  that ,  one  has  to  be  careful  because  i f  you fol low that  down,  
then our  laws s tar t  to  become ques t ionable ,  which are  general ly  based 
in  proper ty  and geography.  
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 So i t  i s  a  chal lenge,  and the  quest ion is  can you bui ld  analogies  
so  your  law remains  f i rm and you can s tar t  to  bui ld  analogy f rom that .    
 The i ssue  then becomes,  i s  China  the  most  sophis t icated  
adversary  in  th is  environment  or  capable?   Let ' s  put  i t  as  capable .   I f  
not  China,  who?  Their  degree  of  capabi l i ty  i s  not  c lear .   I  would te l l  
you that  the  capabi l i t ies  that  are  most  in t r iguing are  thei r  dedicat ion 
to ,  one ,  br inging th is  in to  thei r  mi l i tary  s t ructure ;  two,  bui ld ing 
schools  a l l  the  way through doctr ine ,  e t  ce tera ,  and plans  to  be  able  to  
use  th is  type  of  capabi l i ty  in  a  mi l i tary  context .  
 Other  nat ions  are  doing l ikewise,  but  I  do  not  bel ieve  any have 
demonst ra ted  the  sca le  or  the  f inancial  commitment  to  move in  the 
d i rec t ion that  China  has  demonstra ted.   And when I  go back to  my 
or ig inal  s ta tement  about  what  tends to  d i f ferent ia te  i s  how much 
resource  a  nat ion is  wi l l ing  to  put  a t  i t ,  that ' s  where  I  would  say China 
s tar ts  to  break out  of  the  crowd.  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  And the  t ime hor izon of  the  
development  of  most  weapon sys tems is  in  years ,  convent ional  weapon 
sys tems,  whereas  the  t ime hor izon in  developing the  offensive  
capabi l i ty  in  cyber  warfare  i s  compressed.  
 GENERAL CARTWRIGHT:  Closer  to  Moore 's  law.  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  Yes .   And so  you didn ' t  qui te  
answer  my ques t ion  about  vulnerabi l i ty .   You used the term 
"chal lenge ,"  "a  grea t  chal lenge  to  us ."   But  of  a l l  of  our  vulnerabi l i t ies  
as  a  nat ion to  our  adversar ies ,  i s  cyber  warfare  one of  our  greates t  or  
our  greates t  or  second or  th i rd  or  what?  
 GENERAL CARTWRIGHT:  There 's  a  good debate  s tar t ing  to  
emerge,  and I  don ' t  know yet  that  we unders tand.   But  i s  a  cyber  a t tack 
a  weapon of  mass  dest ruct ion?   What  i s  the  regre t  fac tor  associa ted  
wi th  i t ,  should  i t  be  t rea ted in  that  context?   I  th ink people  are  s tar t ing 
to  get  the i r  head around th is .   Indust ry  has  cer ta in ly  a l ready got ten  
thei r  head around th is  i ssue .  
 I  don ' t  th ink the  nat ion has  got ten  thei r  head around that  i ssue  
yet ,  but  I  th ink that  we should  s tar t  to  consider  that  regret  factors  
associa ted  wi th a  cyber  a t tack could ,  in  fact ,  be  in  the  magni tude  of  a  
weapon of  mass  des t ruct ion.  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  Thank you.  
 GENERAL CARTWRIGHT:  That  wi l l  cause  some noise ,  but- -  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Gent lemen,  we ' re  scheduled 
 to  end a t  2 :30.   I  th ink i f  you can go f ive  more  minutes ,  I  th ink we can 
get  a t  leas t  one  more  commiss ioner  to  ask  a  quest ion.  
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 GENERAL CARTWRIGHT:  Yes ,  s i r .  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:   So I  guess  next  to  
Commiss ioner  Shea .  
 COMMISSIONER SHEA:  I  have a  bunch of  ques t ions ,  but  I ' l l  
t ry  to  get  a  couple  of  them in  here.   Thank you,  gent lemen,  for  coming 
today.   You ta lked a  lot  about  the  moderniza t ion  of  the  PRC mil i ta ry  
and i t s  profess ional iza t ion.   I  was  wonder ing i f  you could  give  me a  
sense  of  the  Par ty  control  over  the  mil i tary?   And my unders tanding is  
that  the  PRC mil i tary  has  become more  professional ized over  the  years ,  
wi th  much greater  focus  on professional iza t ion,  and there 's  been less  
emphasis  on Par ty  control .   And I  jus t  was  wonder ing i f  you had a  
sense  of  that ,  how big  an  influence  the  Communist  Par ty p lays  in  PLA 
and PLAN thinking today?  
 MR.  COOPER:  I  don ' t  th ink you can approach that  as  a  zero-sum 
game.   The fac t  tha t  they are  becoming more  profess ional ,  to  then 
make the  leap to  say  tha t  they wi l l  begin  to  look more  l ike  a  s ta te  army 
as  opposed to  a  par ty  army.   I  don ' t  think we can say that .   That  debate  
has  been going on for  a  number  of  years .   Folks  a  lot  smar ter  than 
myself  have weighed in  over  the  pas t  decade in  terms of  what  the  
l ikely  t rends  are .  
 But  what  I  see ,  and par t icular ly what  I  see  f rom the  las t  couple  
of  sess ions  of  thei r  Par ty  and People 's  Congresses ,  i s  tha t  the  par ty  i s  
cer ta in ly  worr ied  about  that ,  because  you now see  that  concern  in  
s ta ted  miss ion object ives ,  a t  the  very  top,  f rom Hu J in tao  down 
through the  mi l i tary  leaders  a t  each of  these  sess ions  in  enumerat ions  
of  PLA miss ions  and object ives-- i t ' s  r ight  there  a t  the  top.  
 I t  says  that  the  PLA wil l  ensure  that  nat ional  development  
cont inues ,  and that  this  i s  speci f ica l ly  l inked to  cont inuance of  the  
Par ty 's  control  over  the  country  as  a  whole  as  pr imary protector  of  
thei r  sovereignty .   So there 's  obviously  concern on the  par t  of  the  
Par ty  that  profess ional ism might  take  the  army away f rom the  
t radi t ional  modes  of  Par ty  control .  
 But  I  have not  seen that  happen,  and I  th ink that  the  concern  on 
the  par t  of  the  Par ty  to  ensure  that  pol i t ical  educat ion cont inues ,  and 
that  the  power  and the  in ter face  of  the  pol i t ica l  cadre  throughout  every  
level  of  the  army cont inues ,  i s  evidence of  cont inued control .   So 
again ,  don ' t  equate  the  profess ional ism and profess ional iza t ion,  which 
is  cer ta inly  ongoing--and some wi l l  say  that  as  the  nascent  NCO corps  
goes ,  we ' l l  rea l ly  be  able  to  te l l  jus t  where  that ' s  headed--but  don ' t  
equate  tha t  necessar i ly  wi th  a  loosening of  Par ty  control  over  the  
apparatus  wi th in the  PLA.   I  have not  seen that  to  be  the  case .   In  fac t ,  
in  some areas  they have worked to  s t rengthen control  a l l  the  more .  
  COMMISSIONER SHEA:  In  the  same vein ,  I  know there 's  been a  
lo t  of  specula t ion,  and I  th ink in  your  wri t ten  tes t imony,  which I  jus t  
saw,  Mr.  Cooper ,  you address  th is  i ssue .   I ’m cur ious  to  know whether  
you th ink or  the  gent lemen on the  panel  have any thoughts  on whether  
the  pol i t ica l  leadership  of  the  PRC was  in  the  know wi th  respect  to  the  
recent  ASAT tes t?  
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 GENERAL CARTWRIGHT:  That  would  have been my comment  
because  I  agree  exact ly  wi th  what  he  sa id ,  but  then you see  th is  
ac t ivi ty  associated  wi th  the  ASAT----where  there  seems to  be  a  large  
d isconnect ,  or  a t  leas t  i t ' s  perceived because  of  who indicated they 
knew and didn ' t  know,  that  somehow the  mi l i tary  got  d isconnected 
f rom senior  leadership .   What  worr ies  me in  that  case  is  you have a  
mi l i ta ry  organizat ion,  i f  they somehow become disconnected f rom the  
pol i t ica l  leadership,  there  are  any number  of  scenar ios  tha t  would be  
very  worr isome in  that  k ind of  a  s i tuat ion .   So I  say  that ,  but  we have  
not ,  tha t ' s  not  been unl ike  we have seen in  the  former  Sovie t  Union,  
the  Uni ted  Sta tes .   Things  do happen that  don ' t  necessar i ly  get  
connected.   So you have to  be  carefu l  not  to  be  too l i tera l  wi th  th is ,  
but  tha t  was  the  one  instance  I  th ink that  gave  us  a l l  pause was  thei r  
react ion to  the  ASAT tes t  when we sa id ,  gee ,  what  are  you doing and,  
“oh,  nothing.”  
 COMMISSIONER SHEA:  Right .   S i lence .  
 GENERAL CARTWRIGHT:  Yes .  
 MR.  COOPER:  Let  me address  that  a  l i t t le  b i t  and I ' l l  caveat  
f i rs t  by saying I  have not  done a  lo t  of  research in  the  af termath  of  the  
tes t  on  this .   I  think that  we have not  seen some of  the  th ings  in  the  
af termath  of  this  tes t  happen internal ly  in  China  to  indica te  that  they 
real ly  were  unaware  of  what  was  going on—at  leas t  to  the  extent  that  
heads  are  going to  ro l l  wi th in  the  PLA; there 's  going to  be  s ignif icant  
changes  to  the  way they do business  based on th is .  
 There  have  been in  the  af termath  of  events  l ike  SARS outbreak,  
the  submarine  s inking--we saw evidence  af terwards of  how the  
pol i t ica l  leadership responded to  and deal t  wi th  what  they saw as  being 
the  mi l i tary  being out  of  the  box.   Again ,  some of  that  could  be  going 
on,  but  I  haven ' t  seen a  lo t  of  tha t .  
 In  the  case  of  an ac tual  p lanned tes t  a t  that  level—with the  sor t  
of  impl ica t ions  tha t  we ' re  ta lk ing about  wi th  space  debr is  and other  
th ings-- to  say that  the  level  of  foreknowledge was  not  there  or  that  
there  was that  major  disconnect  between Par ty  and Army-- there  may 
have been disconnects  a t  a  var ie ty  of  levels ,  but  I  would f ind that  hard  
to  bel ieve  that  tha t  would  be  an  indicat ion of  the  mi l i tary  being out  
f rom under  the  Par ty 's  control .  
 GENERAL CARTWRIGHT:  Let ' s  jus t  fo l low that  l ine-- that  there  
i s  a  level  of  compar tmenta l iza t ion  in  the  government  then,  and that  too 
 i s  ins ightful .  
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 COMMISSIONER SHEA:  Thank you.    
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Gent lemen,  I  want  to  thank 
a l l  of  you very  much for  your  t ime.  Our  next  panel  i s  a  branch and 
sequel  of  th is  one.  
 Thank you for  your  t ime.   Thank you for  your  a t tempts  to  
educate  us  and for  your  service  here .   We 're  going to  take  about  a  f ive  
minute  break and se t  up  the  next  panel .  
 [Whereupon,  a  shor t  recess  was  taken. ]  
 
PANEL IV:  THE TAIWAN STRAIT MILITARY BALANCE 
 
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  The four th  and f inal  panel  
today wi l l  address  the  Taiwan Stra i t  mi l i tary  balance ,  and as  I  sa id ,  as  
I  c losed the  las t  panel ,  this  i s  rea l ly  k ind of  a  fo l low on of  what  we 
th ink of  as  t radi t ional  warfare  and the  in tersect ion of  what  could  be  
disrupt ive  and i r regular .   So th is  i s  k ind of  the  nexus  of  th is  QDR 
problem.  
 We hope that  the  panel is ts  wi l l  he lp  us  address  severa l  important  
quest ions .   How do you assess  the  mi l i tary balance  in  the  Taiwan 
Stra i t?   And how adequate  i s  Taiwan 's  mi l i tary capabi l i ty  to  meet  the  
threat  tha t  the  Chinese  mi l i tary  poses  to  the  i s land?   These  
improvements  in  China 's  submarine  warfare  capabi l i t ies  and force  
project ion and how they affect  Taiwan 's  defensive  capabi l i t ies?   And 
a lso  the  effec t  of  the  increas ing economic  in tegrat ion  between Taiwan 
and the  mainland and how that  af fects  the  wi l l  on Taiwan and how i t  
v iews the  problem.  
 We have three  very  dis t inguished panel is ts .   The f i rs t  wi l l  be  
Rear  Admiral  Er ic  McVadon.   Admiral  McVadon is  the  Director  of  
Asia  Pacif ic  Studies  a t  the  Ins t i tute  for  Foreign Pol icy Analysis  here  in  
Washington.   Whi le  he  was  on ac t ive  duty  in  the  Navy for  35 years ,  he  
was  a  P-3 naval  ant i -submarine  avia tor .   He was  out  in  Ice land before  
he  was  defense  a t taché  in  China .  
 REAR ADMIRAL McVADON:  Ice land.  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Ice land,  and of  course ,  he  was 
our  defense  and Naval  a t taché  a t  the  American Embassy in  Bei j ing.    
 Dr .  Bernard Cole ,  Bud Cole ,  i s  Professor  of  In ternat ional  His tory  
a t  the  Nat ional  War  Col lege  here  in  Washington.   He spent  30 years  as  
a  surface  warfare  off icer  in  the  Navy,  and he a lso  served as  a  Plans  
Off icer  a t  the  Off ice  of  the  Commander- in-Chief  of  the  Paci f ic  Flee t ,  
and special  ass is tant  to  the  Chief  of  Naval  Opera t ions  for  
expedi t ionary  Warfare .  
 He 's  the  author  of  a  number  of  books  on China  secur i ty ,  and the  
most  recent  was  Taiwan Secur i ty:  His tory  and Prospects .   I  th ink i t ' s  
 an excel lent  book.   I  reviewed i t  in  the  Army War  Col lege  Review 
Parameters  this  year .    
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 Our  thi rd panel is t  i s  Mark Cozad.   He 's  the  Senior  Defense  
In te l l igence  Analyst  for  China  in  the  Directora te  for  Analys is  a t  the  
Defense  In te l l igence  Agency.   He ass is t s  the  Direc tor  of  Analysis  in 
suppor t ing China analys is  and in te l l igence product ion requirements  to  
the  Off ice  of  Secre tary  of  Defense  and the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff .  
 Gent lemen,  there 's  going to  be  a  l i t t le  t imer  on there .   You ' l l  see  
a  green l ight .   You ' l l  each have seven minutes .   As  i t  winds  down,  the  
l ight  wi l l  go  to  orange and then to  yel low and then to  red ,  and then we  
hope you wi l l  sum i t  up  a t  about  the  red  l ight .   Then we ' l l  go for  
rounds  of  quest ions ,  and each commiss ioner  wi l l  have about  a  f ive  
minute  per iod.  
 So thank you.   Admiral  McVadon.  
 
STATEMENT OF ERIC A.  McVADON, REAR ADMIRAL 
U.S.  NAVY (RET.) ,  DIRECTOR, ASIA-PACIFIC STUDIES 
INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS,  INC.  
WASHINGTON, D.C.  
 
 REAR ADMIRAL McVADON:  Thank you.   I 'm reminded that  
when I  told  the  pres ident  of  Iceland that  I  was going to  China,  she  sa id  
p lease  te l l  me in  Ice landic ;  “I  don ' t  ge t  the  punch l ine .”   
 I t  was  ser ious .   Larry ,  in  my wr i t ten  s ta tement  I  have a t tempted 
to  answer  the  ques t ions ,  and I  hope that  you wi l l  f ind  that  tha t ' s  the  
case .   Let  me in  the  next  seven minutes  provide  the  shor t  vers ion 
answers  to  that  the  quest ions  posed to  me in  advance.   I  do  apprecia te 
th is  second oppor tuni ty  to  offer  the  Commiss ion my views.   The f i rs t  
was  in  2005,  on the  ongoing modernizat ion of  China 's  mi l i tary ,  which I  
consider  a  major  ef for t  by  Bei j ing,  la rgely  focused on a  combinat ion,  
and I  haven ' t  heard  other  people  say th is ,  of  deterr ing and prepar ing 
for  a  Taiwan cont ingency.   I  emphasize  the  deterr ing because  the  
Chinese  say that  to  me.   You can bel ieve  i t  or  not ,  as  you wish.  
 Chinese  leaders  do not  want  to  a t tack Taiwan or  have  a  war  wi th  
the  U.S. ,  of  course ,  and poss ibly  wi th  Japan,  but  obsess ively  fee l  they 
must  be  ready for  such conf l ic t .  
 I  th ink most  prominent  are  the  PLA's  many hundreds  of  
increas ingly  accura te  shor t -  and medium-range bal l i s t ic  miss i les  wi th 
convent ional  warheads  targeted on Taiwan,  which are  soon to  be  
complemented by long-range land-at tack cruise  miss i les .  
 Taiwan 's  meager  missi le  defenses  face  an escala t ing chal lenge 
wel l  beyond any conceivable  enhancements  or  augmenta t ion.   That ' s  
not  even a  contes t .   These  miss i les  p lus  Special  Forces  ac t ions 
sabotage,  and informat ion opera t ions to  disrupt  the  defenses  would 
 al low fol low-on a t tacks  by modern PLA tac t ica l  a i rcraft  a iming I  think 
for  chaos and capi tu la t ion.   Amphibious  and a i rborne assaul ts  on a  
demoral ized Taiwan could  fol low rela t ively  safely  a t  that  point .  
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 Taiwan cannot  successful ly  defend i t se l f  a lone and consequent ly  
must  e i ther  avoid  conf l ic t ,  convince  Bei j ing i t s  in teres ts  are  not  served 
by an  a t tack,  or  re ly  on prompt  and effec t ive  U.S.  in tervent ion.   
Bei j ing  seeks  to  thwar t  that  in tervent ion.   For  example ,  something 
that ' s  been ment ioned of ten  today,  spearheading the  ef for t  to  
compl icate  U.S.  Navy access  are  e ight  new quiet  and capable  Ki lo 
c lass  submarines  wi th  very advanced supersonic  miss i les .   That ' s  the  
SS-N-27 Bravo ant i -ship cruise  miss i les  that  China  has  procured f rom 
Russia .   Would we  unhesi ta t ingly  sa i l  carr ier  s t r ike  groups  in to  waters  
wi th  these  Ki los  and many other  undetected PLA Navy submarines ,  a l l  
capable  of  submerged launch of  very  potent  long-range ant i -ship  cruise  
miss i les ,  some speci f ica l ly  des igned to  defeat  our  Aegis  defenses?  
 Addi t ional ly  ( th is  has  been a l luded to  a lso)  there  i s  looming very  
large  the  prospect  of  convent ional  warhead bal l i s t ic  miss i les  tha t  wi th  
maneuver ing reentry  vehic les ,  MaRVs,  not  MiRVs but  MaRVs,  and 
other  penetra t ion a ids  could both avoid intercept  and home on major  
ships  a t  sea  as  wel l  as  regional  bases ,  of  course .   These  in i t ia l  a t tacks  
and such disrupt ive  things  as  ASAT and computer  network a t tacks  
could  degrade U.S.  defenses  and a l low at tacks  wi th  modern PLA 
ai rcraf t  launching advanced weapons.   
 This  complex dual  campaign-- th is  i s  something e lse  I  haven ' t  
heard  ment ioned today-- the  dual  campaign--I  mean by that  defeat ing 
Taiwan and thwart ing the  U.S.  and poss ibly  Japan--arguably  exceeds  
the  current  capabi l i ty  of  an  inexper ienced PLA.   However ,  the  PLA 
aspi res  to  c lose  the  gaps  and may in  any case  fee l  compel led  to  ac t  i f  
deterrence fa i l s .   I  mean deter r ing Taiwan f rom doing what  China  
doesn ' t  want  i t  to .  
 Yes ,  the  U.S.  mi l i tary  could  defeat  the  PLA in  an  extended 
conf l ic t .   Nonetheless ,  huge and prosperous  China has  won the  arms 
race  wi th  Taiwan and threatens  t imely  U.S.  in tervent ion.   
Consequent ly ,  we should  now s t r ive  to  make the  mil i tary  balance 
i r re levant .   Some in  Taiwan recognize  th is  d isappoint ing s i tuat ion and 
advocate  counters t r ike  miss i les  to  threaten China .  
 I  v iew this  as  inf l ic t ing  p inpr icks  to  a  dragon.   There  are  far  
more  prudent  a l ternat ives .  Economic and cul tura l  t ies  do offer  hope of  
a  fu ture  peaceful  solut ion.   However ,  innovat ive  th inking now must  not  
only  cope wi th  a  new threat  mi l i tar i ly ,  of  course ,  but  a lso  influence 
Bei j ing  in  non-mil i tary  ways.   Bei j ing 's  idea  of  lessening the  apparent  
threat  to  Taiwan,  the  campaign to  win the  hear ts  and minds  ra ther  than 
in t imidat ing,  jus t  might  grow to  s ignif icance i f  nur tured.  
 More broadly,  we must  encourage Bei j ing to  rea l ize  that  an  
 at tack on Taiwan could  prove not  to  be  a  solut ion ,  but  ra ther  a  
profoundly  weakening,  even disas t rous ,  exper ience  for  China .    
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 The PRC's  s t rength  s tems f rom i ts  remarkable  economic s t r ides  
and const ruct ive  in ternat ional  role .   An a t tack on Taiwan would 
torpedo these  accompl ishments .   Moreover ,  PRC regime survival  could  
be  jeopardized and reunif ica t ion with Taiwan would  l ike ly  not  be  a  
resul t .   Lectur ing Bei j ing won ' t  work.   But  our  re inforc ing China 's  
progress ive  posture  and global  s take-holding role  jus t  might  help .  
 Taiwan does  warrant  the  emphasis  I 've  g iven i t .   However ,  
Chinese  leaders  are  looking beyond Taiwan.   Energy secur i ty  and 
protect ion of  ocean commerce  are  major  concerns ,  and Bei j ing could ,  
of  course ,  have s in is ter  long- term hegemonic  in tent ions .   In  any case ,  
emerging China  natural ly  seeks  a  mi l i ta ry  commensurate  wi th  i t s  new 
s ta tus  as  a  regional  and mar i t ime power .  
 Two examples  of  logical  developments  tha t  might  ref lect  the i r  
looking beyond Taiwan are  the  new Shang c lass  nuclear-powered a t tack 
submarines ,  the  SSNs,  and the  poss ible  prototype a i rcraf t  carr ier .  
 Potent ia l  d is ruptors  of  the  f low of  o i l  to  China--we might  
envis ion India’s  fa l l ing  into  th is  category  in  some c i rcumstances--
would  have to  heed the  prospect  of long endurance Chinese  SSNs as  far  
as  the  Indian Ocean and an organic  a i r  capabi l i ty  beyond the  range of  
PLA land-based a i rcraft  near  the  St ra i t  of  Malacca ,  for  example .  
 The point  i s  tha t  there  i s  much of  in teres t  and much of  concern 
about  the  modernizat ion of  the  PLA,  but  not  every  PLA acquis i t ion is  
cause  for  a larm.   This  more  capable  PLA is  arguably  the  major  mi l i ta ry  
that  the  U.S.  must  deter  or  be  able  to  defeat .   However ,  we can guide  
bi la tera l  re la t ions  toward cooperat ion despi te  the  need as  legi t imate ly  
perceived in  Washington and Bei j ing,  to  hedge in  a  very  ser ious  way 
across  the  spect rum of  warfare .  
 One prominent  potentia l  oppor tuni ty  for  cooperat ion spurred by 
China 's  pos i t ive  role  in  the  Six  Par ty  Talks  i s  par tnership in  a  regional  
secur i ty  communi ty ,  a  secur i ty  archi tecture  inclus ive  of  China,  as  hard  
as  tha t  i s  for  some of  us  to  swal low.   I  can envis ion the  PLA Navy and 
U.S.  Navy as  par tners  on the  high seas ,  coordina t ing effor ts  to  ensure  
f reedom of  navigat ion and enhanced mari t ime secur i ty ,  to  curb  pi racy,  
smuggl ing,  ter ror ism and prol i fera t ion of  weapons  of  mass  des t ruct ion,  
and to  conduct  humani tar ian  ass is tance .  
 I t ' s  reasonable  to  envis ion the  PLA Navy as  par t  of  our  thousand 
ship  navy concept ,  descr ibed by the  U.S.  Chief  of  Naval  Operat ions ,  as  
an  in ternat ional  f lee t  of  l ike-minded nat ions  par t ic ipat ing in  secur i ty  
opera t ions  around the  world .  
 U.S.  pol ic ies  can fos ter ,  i f  not  ensure ,  a  favorable  outcome.   I  
conclude,  presumptuously  I  guess ,  by  suggest ing that  the  ro le  of  th is  
Commiss ion in  promot ing bet ter  unders tanding of  a  changing China  
 and i t s  mi l i ta ry  i s  impor tant  so  the  U.S.  can achieve the  r ight  balance  
of  deterrence ,  encouragement ,  cooperat ion,  and we can hope for  
par tnership  in  the  region and on the  high seas .  
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 Thanks ,  and I  look forward to  your  comments  and quest ions .  
[The s ta tement  fo l lows: ]  
 
Prepared Statement  of  Eric A.  McVadon,  Rear Admiral  
U.S.  Navy (Ret . ) ,  Director ,  Asia-Pacif ic  Studies  
Inst i tute  for  Foreign Pol icy Analysis ,  Inc .  
Washington,  D.C.  
 
[The ideas and opinions are my own.] 
 As requested, I will (1) examine the implications of Chinese military modernization primarily for 
the U.S. and Taiwan, while not ignoring Japan, with respect to cross-Strait conflict issues, offering the 
prospect of reduced tension and cooperative relations; and (2) look beyond the Taiwan problem to try to 
discern Chinese goals and possible early force structure planning.   
The focus on Taiwan.  China’s ongoing modernization of its military has been extensive and largely 
focused on a Taiwan contingency.  The enhancements of the capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) accomplished over the last decade have significantly increased the threat to Taiwan; i.e., made it 
more dangerous for Taiwan to take steps that could provoke or be intolerable to a wary Beijing.  
Notwithstanding the major military modernization program, Chinese leaders do not want to attack Taiwan 
and certainly do not want a war with the U.S., and possibly Japan, but feel they must strive to be ready to 
do so if they deem it necessary.  They show to Taiwan both a “soft hand” and a “hard hand,” the latter 
being this more capable PLA that, they believe, provides an inherently greater deterrent effect that 
decreases the prospects of having to use force. 
Accurate ballistic missiles to start.  If, however, intimidation and deterrence fail, Chinese leaders could 
now be more confident with the modernized PLA of prompt success—before U.S. forces could react 
effectively.  Beijing almost certainly would start its campaign by employing a very large and greatly 
improved arsenal of ballistic missiles to disrupt and degrade Taiwan’s communications, command and 
control, and defenses—and terrorize the population.  The missile attack would logically be accompanied by 
special forces actions, fifth column sabotage, and information operations encompassing such things as anti-
satellite and computer network attacks. 
Taiwan vs. China: out-gunned, out-numbered, and out-sized.  The PLA’s impressive array of accurate 
short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs and MRBMs) with conventional warheads is expected 
soon to be complemented by long-range land-attack cruise missiles.  Taiwan’s already meager missile 
defenses would then face the doubly daunting prospect of large numbers of overwhelming simultaneous 
attacks from various types of ballistic missiles reentering from space and cruise missiles skimming the 
earth—a challenge well beyond the capabilities of any existing missile defenses with respect to both sheer 
numbers of defending missiles as well as intercept capabilities.  Taiwan’s missile defenses may be made 
further ineffective through initial attacks on missile defenses by offensive missiles less likely to be subject 
to intercept. The “new PLA Navy” with more than adequate numbers of very impressive new submarines, 
destroyers, frigates, and aircraft armed with modern, lethal, long-range anti-ship cruise missiles could 
readily overwhelm the ROC Navy, were that force to be a factor.   
This disruption of defensive capabilities, if successful, would allow effective employment of numerous 
modern PLA tactical aircraft to attack Taiwan, seeking to produce chaos and capitulation.  Beijing may 
envision that amphibious and airborne assaults to secure lodgments on Taiwan could then be prudently 
undertaken.  These limited amphibious and airborne assaults (within existing lift constraints) could then be 
followed by the introduction, essentially unopposed, of large numbers of occupation forces.  PLA Air Force 
modern fighter aircraft supported by very effective surface-to-air missiles could readily maintain air 
 superiority once Taiwan’s air defenses, including airfields, had been disrupted or disabled by the missile 
attacks. 
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Taiwan does not have missile defenses to cope with the described missile attacks, and prompt procurement 
of all the missile defenses discussed over recent years would still leave Taiwan quite inadequately defended 
against the described extensive PLA arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles.  These missiles have been 
tailored or designed specifically toward the goal of giving Beijing a set of weapons that Taiwan, even with 
the full support of the U.S. and whatever aid Japanese ballistic missile defense may provide, cannot defend 
against.  The full spectrum of missile defense of Taiwan, broadly defined, including extensive hardening of 
facilities, hiding of high value targets, dispersal of assets, use of decoys, etc., if undertaken by Taipei would 
complicate things for China but would almost certainly fall short of adequate protection.  These measures 
might serve well if Beijing somehow chose to conduct only a limited attack.  Some critical facilities might 
be spared.  China, if holding most of its missiles in reserve for some reason, might be less confident of the 
assured effectiveness of an attack.  Nevertheless, the Chinese missile forces must be viewed as a very 
successful undertaking to intimidate and deter Taiwan and to be able to bring Taipei to its knees if 
intimidation fails. 
China vs. the U.S.: layered options to complicate and delay intervention.  As a consequence of the 
realization of these astutely conceived concepts for PLA modernization and the inescapable factors of the 
proximity, size and strategic depth of China, Taiwan cannot expect successfully to defend itself alone.  
Taipei, I argue, is necessarily dependent on avoiding conflict, convincing Beijing that its interests are not 
served by an attack on Taiwan, or having prompt and effective U.S. intervention.  Beijing has not, in its 
modernization program, ignored the importance of this potential intervention, including the role of U.S. 
forces and bases in Japan.  (Less attention has been seen with respect to U.S. forces and bases in South 
Korea.)  Prominent in the anti-access strategy is the PLA Navy submarine force.  The effort to complicate 
U.S. Navy intervention would, it appears, be spearheaded by eight new Kilo-class submarines from Russia 
that would pose a dilemma for U.S. decision makers.  Would it be prudent to sail several U.S. Navy carrier 
strike groups (CSGs) into waters with many undetected PLAN submarines capable of submerged launch of 
very potent anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs)—notably the Kilos with SS-N-27B Sizzlers with ranges over 
100 miles?  China, it is noted, does not yet have consistently reliable means to detect and target 
approaching CSGs, but it has various means that could, with a little luck, provide targeting information.  
Consequently, even before China achieves reliable targeting, there is ample reason for concern. 
Beyond this ASCM threat, there is the looming prospect of conventional warhead ballistic missiles that, 
with maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs), could both avoid intercept and home on major ships.  Such 
missiles are also likely, even sooner, to be highly effective against U.S. bases in the region—although 
Guam, for the present, seems to be out of range. Tokyo and Beijing would both face interesting political 
dilemmas concerning the degree of involvement of Japanese bases and forces and the Chinese reaction 
thereto.  These missiles, it appears, would incorporate advanced penetration aids and decoys, in addition to 
maneuvering—making them serious threats, not simply weapons of terror. 
The described ASCM and ballistic missile attacks, if successful, would be expected to degrade U.S. 
defenses.  For example, air defense radars and the carrier flight deck would be vulnerable.  The degradation 
of defenses, including at land bases in Japan, could allow follow-on air attacks with modern long-range 
missile-carrying bombers and inflight-refuelable maritime interdiction aircraft armed with very capable and 
lethal ASCMs.  Further options employing submarines and very potent surface combatant ships would be 
available, depending on the circumstances and the residual ability of the U.S. to defend. 
Too complex for the PLA to pull off?  Should we count on that?  This complex dual campaign—defeating 
Taiwan and confronting the U.S. (and possibly Japan)—is arguably beyond the capability of a PLA 
leadership inexperienced in such complex and extensive joint operations.  Moreover, the PLA has not 
rehearsed and trained for meeting major U.S. and other enemy forces hundreds of miles distant from China.  
Nevertheless, the PLA clearly has acquired or is acquiring the wherewithal to conduct such operations.  It is 
also clear that the PLA aspires to such capabilities, including the ability for an inferior force to defeat a 
superior force by achieving surprise, employing asymmetric means (such as the ballistic missiles that 
circumvent U.S. air defense advantages), and exploiting what are perceived as U.S. niche vulnerabilities 
 (e.g., extreme reliance on advanced technologies that China hopes to disrupt long enough to gain a tactical 
advantage).   
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Consequently, this strategy, the accompanying weapon systems, and other elements of the PLA 
modernization (e.g., striving for “jointness,” more realistic training, distant operations) introduce at least 
the specter that the U.S., along with Japan, could be deterred from prompt and effective intervention or that 
delay, confusion, and uncertainty may be introduced—leading Taipei to doubt Washington’s commitment 
and feel it has no choice but to accede to Beijing’s demands, or so the thinking in Beijing may go.  (Tokyo 
would almost certainly not move faster than Washington.)  Whether or not this reflects reality as it is likely 
to unfold, Beijing may be emboldened by having achieved this remarkable enhancement of its forces.  It 
may either believe the prevalent rhetoric about preparation of its forces for real combat or receive 
assurances from PLA leaders unwilling to admit to continued unreadiness to attack Taiwan and repel the 
U.S. (and Japanese forces, if that decision were made) after so much money and effort have been expended 
toward that goal.  Moreover, given the emotional aspect of Beijing’s Taiwan obsession, we cannot be 
confident that China will weigh capabilities, risks, and consequences rationally. 
Striving to make the military balance irrelevant.  None of this is to suggest that the U.S. military could not 
defeat the PLA in a conventional force-on-force extended conflict, and, of course, the U.S. also has an 
overwhelming advantage in a nuclear conflict.  To take a flight of fantasy, the sudden miraculous 
acquisition of P-3 maritime aircraft, submarines, PAC-3 improved missile defenses, and more would not 
turn the tables or restore a military balance—even if some of these systems would serve to raise somewhat 
the costs of a PLA victory and make it more difficult for Beijing to decide that success would likely come 
quickly and easily.  Nonetheless, huge and prosperous China has won the arms race with Taiwan—
irreversibly in my view.  The point is that, although Taiwan cannot adequately defend against huge China, 
there are means to avoid conflict.  Consequently, the effort now should be to continue all the more 
diligently to make the military balance irrelevant, to make resort to military force an anachronism or an 
absurdity. 
Some in Taiwan recognize this disappointing situation concerning the military balance and advocate 
Taiwan’s development of counter-strike missiles intended to threaten China if it initiated an attack.  I view 
this as foolishly developing the capability to inflict pin pricks to a dragon—far more likely to ensure 
disaster for Taiwan than to deter an attack.  I have suggested in speeches, conferences, and meetings with 
influential people in Taiwan (and the U.S.) that there are far more prudent alternatives to be explored.  To 
begin, the extensive economic interdependence between Taiwan and the PRC does matter.  Depending on 
one’s view of China, the economic ties either hold out the prospect of eventual peaceful resolution, making 
military action an irrational choice, or place Taiwan in a disadvantageous position in several ways: (1) 
vulnerable to pressure by Beijing, (2) threatened by a modern PLA funded by PRC economic growth based 
on Taiwan investments, and (3) confronted by advanced technologies obtained via Taiwan companies in 
China.  Regardless of one’s conclusion on the effects of the economic bonds, the interwoven economies of 
the mainland and Taiwan might be viewed as a facilitator or even a catalyst for potential opportunities to 
deal with the new cross-Strait situation I have described.  Using the familiar explanation, no one wants to 
shoot a goose laying golden eggs.  Taking a stab at another illustrative explanation, despite all the sparks 
that fly as Beijing’s obnoxious behavior clashes with Taiwan’s testing the limits of tolerance, leaders on 
both sides of the strait see the economic and cultural ties as yet another good reason to avoid armed 
conflict. 
Making the case to the ROC military.  In October 2006 I made two comprehensive presentations at the 
ROC National Defense University south of Taipei.  The large audiences included flag and general officers, 
faculty, and the students (typically up-and-coming officers at the rank of colonel or lieutenant colonel).  My 
idea was to encourage new thinking about how to cope with the new situation stemming from PLA 
modernization.  The audience was, to my surprise, overwhelmingly receptive to the message. The general 
officer who is the president of the ROC NDU attended both of my extended lectures and participated in the 
question-and-answer periods.  He said he agreed and supported the concepts and the type of new thinking I 
offered.  In the following extracts from those presentations, I have preserved the words used there [but have 
added in brackets direct mention of Japan in place of the allusions to Japan that I had elected to employ in 
 Taiwan].  I think the impact is greater if one knows these words—some hard for those ROC officers to 
listen to—were delivered orally and written to a prestigious and important  audience of  key senior and very 
promising ROC military officers: 
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Beijing and the PLA have devoted innovative, imaginative, single-minded, and focused–yet 
comprehensive–efforts toward achieving this new posture [the “new,” modernized PLA].  The 
same sort of innovative and comprehensive effort in Washington and Taipei [as well as Tokyo] is, 
it would seem, appropriate to determine how best to cope with or manage the new situation.   The 
effort must encompass thinking on how to cope with the new threat militarily, of course; however, 
there is another at least equally important dimension.  The thinking must also be geared to achieve 
a successful outcome in other non-military, non-hardware ways.  This other dimension 
should…not only focus on means to avoid conflict but also on ways to influence Beijing’s 
thinking.  It could succeed where military efforts could produce mostly frustration for Taipei. 
On this matter of shaping Beijing’s thinking, the thrust of the effort by Taipei and Washington [in 
careful concert with Tokyo, I should have added] might be to reinforce feelings that appear to 
have taken root among Chinese leaders.  There seems to be an inclination now in Beijing toward 
thinking that the use of military force against Taiwan would be imprudent, risky, dangerous, and 
not in the best interests of the PRC.  The idea of having China appear as less threatening to 
Taiwan and more cooperative in cross-Strait relations seems to have currency in Beijing—if not 
necessarily in the PLA.  That kernel might be nurtured. 
There are other factors that can be gently exploited in making Beijing less inclined to think that 
military force is a reasonable recourse.  As has been illustrated, the PRC’s military vulnerabilities 
are now far fewer than a few years ago, but other vulnerabilities and concerns persist.  These 
center on the need for the Chinese Communist Party to sustain China’s unprecedented economic 
growth and the regional stability upon which it depends, the desire of a more worldly Chinese 
nation to preserve its international stature and reputation as a constructive member of the 
community of nations, and the need for the Party and the government to devote full attention to 
the social inequities, corruption, structural flaws and other matters that create unrest, dissent, and 
other domestic problems.  It is not that lectures to Beijing on these matters will prevent a decision 
to use military force.  It is rather that opportunities such as the exchanges between senior U.S. and 
Chinese officials should serve as a venue to subtly remind those in Beijing that all [especially 
Americans and Japanese] wish for China continuing economic success, a stable internal and 
external environment, and a continuing important role in the region and the world.  The demise of 
all those favorable elements for Beijing could be the result of a decision to attack Taiwan…. 
[I]t is virtually certain that these remarkable improvements in the PLA will not be reversed as the 
result of pressure from Washington or elsewhere.  There is little prospect that Taiwan can surge in 
overall military capability or find the “silver bullets” to close the gap.  Consequently, Washington 
and Taipei [with Tokyo] must be as clever in responding to these new circumstances as Beijing 
was in producing them….  Regardless of how much one dislikes or disagrees with Beijing, the 
response must not be restricted to the realm of military counters to PLA modernization but must 
be far broader and more positive in scope….  
How we might accommodate to the fact of this “new PLA.”  Beijing must be deterred from using 
military force—an increasingly less attainable military goal for Taiwan and a monumental 
challenge for the U.S. [and, of course, for Japan].  Consequently, in addition to the military 
component of deterrence, it is increasingly important that Beijing be positively influenced to 
realize that its strengthened PLA, used in an attack on Taiwan, would, or at least could, prove not 
to be a solution for the problem as Beijing sees it but rather to be a profoundly weakening 
experience for China.  The PRC’s strength stems from its remarkable economic strides for three 
decades and from its rapidly expanding role as a constructive, responsible player in the community 
of nations.  An attack on Taiwan, with resultant regional turbulence and the other ramifications of 
a demonstration of irresponsible and even reckless PRC conduct would torpedo these 
accomplishments; moreover PRC regime survival could be sorely jeopardized and reunification 
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with Taiwan would likely not be a result.  Beijing needs subtly to be guided to assimilate this 
lesson and to recognition of the likely consequences of military action.  This seems a worthy 
undertaking for Washington, Taipei, and other capitals [implying Tokyo] in high-level exchanges 
with Beijing.  Lectures will not likely work; but dialogue that demonstrates a genuine concern for 
the future of China as an open and prosperous nation serves as a good foundation….   
We are faced with a profound and complex challenge in influencing or shaping Beijing’s thinking 
with respect to Taiwan.  Reinforcing positive PRC inclinations concerning its relations with 
Taiwan are now all the more important because of the “new PLA” that could embolden Beijing to 
act imprudently and bring about devastation in Taiwan (and China) and conflict with the U.S. [and 
possibly Japan] that would produce regional instability and have highly unpredictable 
ramifications. 
Beijing seems now to be seeking ways to better balance the military threat it poses with efforts to 
create a more favorable impression of the PRC among the Taiwan citizenry.  However, this newly 
commenced effort is surely not certain to achieve grand, or even moderate, success.  Some PRC 
specialists on the Taiwan issue seem to be exaggerating the effectiveness of these early initiatives 
by Beijing to capture Taiwanese hearts and minds….  It is simply not clear whether future larger-
scale efforts might, indeed, succeed to the point where there is real de-emphasis of the military 
threat.  But, for the present, there appears to be more in the form of gestures than there is of 
substance. 
A glimmer in the gloom.  We, including Japan, should encourage Beijing’s effort rather than belittling or 
ridiculing it—and all, especially Taipei, stop shooting down trial balloons.  Some Chinese interlocutors 
suggest the military threat to Taiwan has become counterproductive.  Military deterrence is essential, they 
emphasize, but the large missile force aimed at Taiwan and other threats are now serving to alienate the 
people of Taiwan and counteract the efforts there to improve the image of China.  One well-informed 
interlocutor hinted at having knowledge of discussion in Beijing of lessening the missile threat if the 
Taiwan elections go as Beijing hopes. 
Looking beyond the cross-Strait problem.  A Taiwan scenario is, appropriately, where our attention is 
focused.  However, Chinese leaders and the PLA seem now to be looking beyond Taiwan, and so should 
we.  Stated succinctly, the PLA focuses on a Taiwan contingency for the immediate future and for the 
longer term is striving for a military to meet the needs of emerging China.  Beyond the fundamentals of 
protecting its sovereignty, Beijing has made it quite clear that energy security and the security of its ocean 
commerce are among its major concerns.  That implies at least two things: (1) security of pipelines bringing 
oil and natural gas to China over land, and (2) security of the sea lanes that bring oil and natural gas to 
China from the Middle East and elsewhere and that are the conduits bringing essential imports for rapidly 
growing China and serving this huge export economy. 
There may, of course, be other more sinister intentions harbored now or in the future by Beijing, despite 
protestations by PRC leaders and strategists that China is a peaceful and non-threatening country.  We and 
the world must be alert to China’s possible turn to pursuing regional hegemony and to a possible future 
effort to expel the U.S. from East Asia.  Although many thoughtful and influential Japanese are working to 
ease Sino-Japanese tensions and seek cooperative bilateral relations, Tokyo is profoundly concerned about 
China’s future intentions.  Nevertheless, we should recognize that emerging China will seek a military 
commensurate with its new status in the world.  Many features of today’s PLA have utility beyond Taiwan, 
but we should not be surprised or disturbed when the PLA seeks appropriate means to carry out its new 
missions.   
Two possible examples of reasonable and understandable developments that might reflect an effort by 
Beijing and the PLA to look beyond Taiwan (rather than an intensification of the capability to attack 
Taiwan or become a threat to its neighbors) could be the new class of nuclear-powered attack submarines 
(SSNs), the Shang class, and the possible prototype aircraft carrier. 
- These SSNs have essentially unlimited range and endurance.  Their presence (or suspected 
presence) at the right place in the Indian Ocean, for example, could deter other nations from 
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thinking that disrupting oil flow from the Middle East through the Indian Ocean and on to China 
would be easy.  Japan and China have common interests in the flow of oil to Northeast Asia. 
- A similar situation might involve Beijing’s sending the PLAN to the vicinity of the Strait of 
Malacca to protect shipping.  It would be imprudent and ineffective to have a PLAN surface action 
group (SAG) far outside of the range of China-based tactical aircraft.  Some sort of “organic air” 
capability would make imminent sense.  A “carrier” of some sort could provide “eyes” or 
firepower at some distance, and generally round out the capabilities that would be lacking most 
prominently in a SAG of only destroyers and frigates.  The ongoing shipyard work with the old 
Ukrainian carrier Varyag may be the development of a prototype of such a ship. 
 
This carrier acquisition program, if work on Varyag represents that, is cited by some as another threat to 
Taiwan, ignoring that there are more than ample numbers of suitable airfields (including aircraft fueling 
and parking) to stage aircraft and to conduct an unlimited air campaign against Taiwan and still have the 
capacity to employ strikes against U.S. forces and bases in Japan and Korea if circumstances dictate.  
Moreover, in my judgment, a PLAN carrier would be more a target than an asset in a Taiwan crisis 
situation.  The argument about non-utility for Taiwan is not so strong with respect to the SSNs as these 
submarines will certainly be of value in a Taiwan contingency against Taiwan, U.S., and Japanese forces 
(should they be involved); however, the SSNs are expensive and the PLAN has many modern submarines 
(and more building) that serve exceedingly well for missions related to Taiwan.  Songs, Yuans, and Kilos 
are well suited to be the heart of an undersea effort in a Taiwan contingency, with older submarines also 
useful.  Consequently, the Shang-class SSNs may well be part of the PLA’s sensible vision of itself as it 
looks at missions “beyond Taiwan.” 
The carrier and nuclear submarine programs are among the PLA’s most dramatic (and tenuous) 
modernization efforts, and they might also be seen as challenging, bold, and provocative—or rational and 
understandable.  The point is that there is much to be concerned about and much we should be doing with 
respect to the modernization of the PLA and a Taiwan contingency.  But to keep it all in perspective, it is 
reasonable for the PRC to have a military to meet the needs of the China that is emerging.  Not every twitch 
by the PLA should cause Taipei reflexively to duck and Washington (and Tokyo) instinctively to criticize 
and counter. 
The U.S. outlook: China, simultaneously a potential adversary and promising partner.  As has been 
described, a new and much more capable Chinese military is being acquired and deployed. It is arguably 
the major military that the U.S. must deter or be able to defeat—and about which Japan must be concerned.  
However, at the same time, Washington and Beijing potentially can direct Sino-American bilateral relations 
toward cooperation rather than an adversarial situation—despite the need, as legitimately perceived in 
Washington and Beijing, to hedge in a very serious way across the spectrum of warfare.  The same can be 
said for Sino-Japanese relations and, more broadly viewed, for trilateral relations—or even adding a fourth 
(Korean) leg. 
One currently prominent potential element of the cooperative relationship(s) is partnership in a regional 
security framework or community—a concept that is now being intensely discussed, especially in 
connection with one of the Six-Party Talks working groups. For many, the specter of China as an inevitable 
or potential adversary fades as Washington (as well as Tokyo, Seoul, and Moscow) and Beijing work in 
concert on matters of common interest, with the Six-Party Talks and combating terrorism possibly the most 
prominent current examples.  As a retired navy officer, I can envision the PLA Navy’s joining the U.S. 
Navy and other navies, notably the JMSDF, as a partner on the high seas, moving from today’s rudimentary 
search-and-rescue drills (coincident with port visits) to meaningful exercises and coordinated operations to 
ensure freedom of navigation and provide enhanced maritime security, to curb piracy, smuggling, 
terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and to conduct humanitarian assistance—as 
Beijing wishes it had been able to do for the 2005 tsunami relief operation. 
U.S. policies will be a factor in whether this favorable outcome is achieved but could also be a factor in 
possible future Chinese decisions to act less constructively, for Beijing to ignore its own declarations about 
its non-expansionist, non-aggressive nature.  Understanding today’s PLA and how it is changing is 
 important so the U.S., and its allies and friends, can lessen the prospects of an undesirable outcome and 
enhance the prospects of achieving the right balance of deterrence, encouragement, cooperation, and, we 
can hope, partnership in the region and on the high seas. 
 
 
 
 
  
111
 
 
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Thank you.   Dr .  Cole .   
 
STATEMENT OF DR. BERNARD D.  COLE 
PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL HISTORY, NATIONAL WAR 
COLLEGE, WASHINGTON, D.C.  
  
 DR.  COLE:   Thank you.   I  have to  note ,  f i rs t ,  tha t  I 'm honored to  
be  asked to  appear  again  before  the  Commiss ion,  and I  have to  note  
tha t  the  v iews I  express  are  my own and may not  represent  those  of  any 
agency of  the  U.S.  government .  
 Dr .  Wortzel  asked the  real  quest ion ear l ier  when he  sa id  how 
does  one measure  the  mi l i tary  balance?   I t  reminds  me of  when I  
worked for  Admira l  Dave Jeremiah many years  ago and asked him a  
s imi lar  quest ion  wi th  respect  to  the  Sovie ts .   He sa id  jus t  assume that  
the  ent i re  Sovie t  Navy is  in  that  corner  of  the  room and the  ent i re  U.S.  
Navy is  in  that  corner  of  the  room,  we a l l  shoot  everything we have a t  
the  same t ime,  and then we see  who is  s t i l l  f loat ing.  
 In  some ways ,  tha t  expresses  the  problem across  the  St rai t  
because  i t ' s  easy  to  th ink about  a  John Wayne s ty le  amphibious  
invasion of  Taiwan launched by the  PLA,  but  as  the  commiss ioners  a l l  
know,  there 's  a  whole  host  of  o ther  ways  in  which mil i tary  pressure  
can be  put  against  Taiwan t rying to  force  a  decis ion favorable  to  
Bei j ing.   I t  makes  the  assessment  problem that  much more  complex.  
 I  spent  severa l  weeks  in  Taiwan in  2004 and 2005 conduct ing 
in terviews among senior  Taiwan mil i tary  off icers ,  and that  exper ience 
s t rengthened my admira t ion for  a lmost  a l l  those  off icers  wi th  whom I  
in teracted.   And i f  I  of fer  my own opinions  on Taiwan 's  mi l i tary  
capabi l i ty  and suggest  improvements  or  make recommendat ions ,  i t ' s  
not  a t  a l l  presumptuous ,  i t ' s  wi th  the  bel ief  tha t  Taiwan 's  mi l i tary 
es tabl ishment  i s  wel l  aware  of  i t s  s i tuat ion.  
 Minis ter  of  Defense  Lee Jye  argued in  March 2005 that  Taiwan 's  
mi l i tary had enough equipment  and suppl ies  to  susta in a  conf l ic t  wi th 
the  mainland for  two weeks  a t  most .   That ' s  a  d i rect  quote .   He impl ied 
that  tha t  was  sa t i s fac tory s ince ,  quote ,  "U.S.  in tervent ion forces  would 
take  one week to  reach the  i s land."  
 He a lso  offered the  opinion that  the  passage of  the  specia l  
defense  budget ,  tha t  i s  a t  tha t  t ime the  budget  for  Taiwan that  included 
P-3s ,  convent ional ly  powered submarines ,  and PAC-3 miss i les ,  would  
a l low the  Taiwan mil i tary to ,  quote ,  " las t  a  shor t  t ime longer ,"  but  then 
c la imed that  this  arms procurement  would,  quote ,  "ensure  peace  across  
 the  Taiwan Stra i t  for  30 years ."  
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 I 've  known Admiral  Lee  s ince  1978,  and I  have the  greates t  
respect  for  h im.   I  th ink that  th is  complex schedule  that  he  offered,  the  
d i f ferent  t ime l ines--we keep reading about  them in  the  Taiwan press--
ref lec t  Taiwan 's  s ta tus  as  a  democracy.   They ' re  subject  to  a l l  the  
f lexibi l i ty ,  shal l  we say inherent  in  a  democracy,  and whi le  that  
cer ta in ly  earns  i t  U.S.  suppor t ,  i t  a lso  makes  i t  d i f f icul t  somet imes  to  
carry  out  that  suppor t .  
 Current ly ,  the  pol i t ical  s i tua t ion in  Taipei  i s  character ized  by a  
t roubled president ,  a  s t i l l  developing c ivi l -mi l i ta ry  re la t ionship  wi th  
r i f ts  be tween the legis la ture  and the  defense  es tabl ishment ,  and a  very  
daunt ing geopol i t ica l  s i tuat ion.    
 A key point  in  the  ca lculus  of  American mil i tary  suppor t  for  
Taiwan may l ie  in  the  views expressed by then Vice  Minis ter  of  
Foreign Affa i rs  Ying-mao Kau,  immediate ly  fo l lowing the  November  
2004 U.S.  pres ident ia l  e lec t ion,  when he  s ta ted that  whi le  tens ion 
would cont inue across  the  St ra i t ,  he  foresaw no war ,  and noted that ,  
quote ,  "only  the  U.S.  i s  qual i f ied  to  in tervene in  a  cross-St ra i t  
s i tuat ion ."  
 This  ref lec ts  the  thought  process  I 've  heard  f rom both  mil i tary  
off icers  and c ivi l ian  off ic ia ls  in  Taipei .   And that  i s ,  why should  
Taiwan spend money on the  defense  i f  (1)  one  does  not  credi t  the  PRC 
threat  to  employ mil i tary  force ,  does  not  be l ieve  China  would  employ 
mi l i tary  force ;  and (b)  i f  they  d id ,  tha t  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  i s  cer ta in  to  
in tervene in  the  event  of  such an  a t tack and in tervene a lmost  
immedia te ly?  
 I  think that  a  real i s t ic  s t ra tegic  es t imate  of  Taiwan 's  posi t ion was  
that  of fered by re t i red Admiral  Dennis  Bla i r ,  former  PACOM 
Commander ,  a  year  or  two ago,  when he  urged Taiwan to ,  quote ,  
" reverse  the  decl ine  in  mi l i ta ry  spending of  the  las t  decade,"  but  then 
a lso  went  on to  note  the  di f f icul ty  the  PLA would face  in  a t tacking the  
is lands  and concluded that  to  win  Taiwan,  quote ,  "needs  only  to  endure  
and pose  a  threat ."  
 In  other  words ,  I  th ink Admiral  Blai r  was  under l in ing that  the  
foundat ion of  Taiwan 's  mi l i tary  defense  remains  the  dedicated,  
profess ional  ski l l  of  i t s  mi l i tary  and more  important ly  the  wi l l  of  i t s  
c iv i l ian  government  and people .  
 As  for  the  ca lculus  of  mi l i tary  equipment  and i t s  quant i ta t ive  
capabi l i ty ,  present  t rends  in  China  and Taiwan mean that  only 
successful  U.S.  in tervent ion could  a l ter  the  mi l i tary balance tha t  
exis ts .   Taiwan 's  defense  capabi l i ty  requires  more  than anything e lse  
the  rea l iza t ion that  even i f  U.S.  suppor t  i s  for thcoming,  the  i s land wi l l  
have to  be  able  to  defend i t se l f  agains t  the  PLA,  in  my opinion,  for  
about  a  month .  
  Japan and Austra l ia  are  s t rong enough American a l l ies  tha t  they 
probably  would ,  a lbei t  re luctant ly ,  a t  leas t  logis t ica l ly  suppor t  U.S.  
mi l i tary  ac t ion  agains t  China  in  the  event  of  tha t  na t ion 's  taking 
mi l i tary  ac t ion  agains t  Taiwan.  
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 Recent  exerc ises  indicate  that  the  i s land 's  mi l i tary  leaders  are  
t rying to  prepare  for  a  fu l l -spect rum of  Chinese  mi l i tary opt ions  from 
sabotage  to  missi le  s t r ikes  to  a l l  out  amphibious  assaul t .   Defens ive  
improvements  underway include a  survivable  a i r  defense ,  bet ter  
in tegra ted  command and control  and improved jo int  opera t ional  
capabi l i ty .   The government  suppor t  for  these  object ives  i s  inadequate ,  
however .  
 Let  me turn  very br ief ly  to  the  four  speci f ic  quest ions  tha t  the  
Commiss ion provided.   How do you assess  the  mi l i tary  balance  across  
the  Taiwan Stra i t?   I  th ink China  has  a l ready swung that  balance  in  i t s  
favor .   One has  only  to  look a t  the  development  of  the  People 's  
Libera t ion Army Air  Force  over  the  las t  decade compared to  the  
Taiwan Air  Force  to  see tha t  imbalance .  
 Second,  how adequate  i s  Taiwan 's  mi l i tary  capabi l i ty  to  meet  the  
threat  that  the  Chinese  mi l i tary  poses  to  the  i s land?   Pas t  mi l i ta ry 
c lashes  have shown Taiwan 's  personnel  consis tent ly to  exceed the 
performance of  mainland counterpar ts ,  but  that  sa id ,  the  growing 
imbalance  in  equipment  capabi l i t ies  very  ser ious ly  hampers  Taiwan 's  
mi l i tary  capabi l i ty  against  poss ib le  Chinese  mi l i tary  ac t ion.  
 In  the  way of  weapon sys tems and other  equipment  that  I  th ink 
Taiwan needs ,  I  think,  f i rs t  of  a l l ,  i t  should  cont inue development  of  
command and control  fac i l i t ies  and capabi l i ty ,  a i r  f ie ld  defense  and 
repair  capabi l i t ies ,  ant i - submar ine  warfare  capabi l i t ies  to  include  
ocean bot tom l is tening arrays  and deep-reaching changes  to  the 
mi l i tary  personnel  sys tem.  
 Taiwan should  immediate ly  purchase a t  least  one fu l l  load out  of  
the  s tandard  surface- to-  a i r  miss i les  for  the  four  Kidd-class  dest royers  
i t  acquired  f rom the  Uni ted Sta tes ,  and i t  should  immediate ly  modify  
the  three  Kidd c lass  des troyers  not  present ly  equipped to  f ly  modern 
hel icopters  which are  crucia l  to  that  sh ip 's  both  sel f-defense  and 
abi l i ty  to  project  power  in  defense  of  o ther  naval  forces .  
 What  i s  the  ef fec t  of  China 's  improvements  in  submarine  warfare  
and force  project ion?   I  th ink China has  long had the  capabi l i ty  to  
overwhelm Taiwan 's  ant i  submarine warfare  (ASW).   I  think the  
current  modernizat ion and expansion of  China 's  submarine  force  i s  
real ly  more  acutely  appreciated  as  a  mi l i tary  ins t rument  d i rec ted 
against  potent ia l  U.S.  intervent ion in  a  Taiwan mi l i tary  scenar io .  
 Do I  bel ieve  that  Taiwan 's  increas ing economic integra t ion wi th  
the  mainland has  a  s igni f icant  ef fec t  on the  l ikel ihood China would 
launch a  mi l i tary  a t tack  on Taiwan?  Not  in  a  mi l i tary  sense  perhaps 
 but  as  a  pul l  on  Taiwan toward the  mainland,  I  do th ink that  the  
increas ing economic in tegra t ion and increas ing numbers  of  Taiwan 
c i t izens-- the  current  f igure  f rom Taipei  i s  now two mil l ion  who are  on 
the  mainland on any given day--wil l  lessen  the percept ion by Bei j ing 
that  i t  wi l l  have  to  u t i l ize  mi l i tary  force  agains t  the  i s land.  
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 Thank you and I  look forward to  your  quest ions .  
[The s ta tement  fo l lows:] 6    
 
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Thank you very  much,  Dr .  
Cole .   Mr.  Cozad,  we look forward to  your  tes t imony.  
 
STATEMENT OF MR. MARK COZAD 
SENIOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ANALYST 
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WASHINGTON, D.C.  
  
 MR.  COZAD:  Good af ternoon and thank you for  having me here  
th is  af ternoon.   The mil i tary  balance  of  power  in  the  Taiwan Stra i t  
cont inues  to  shi f t  in  China 's  favor  for  three  pr imary reasons .  Fi rs t  and 
foremost  has  been due to  the  fac t  that  resources  are  being made 
avai lable  to  the  People 's  Libera t ion Army on a  host  of  d i f ferent  areas  
and they 've  cont inued to  grow at  double  digi t  ra tes  s ince  the  ear ly  to  
mid-1990s .  
 We see  nothing tha t  indica tes  to  us  tha t  these  numbers  are  going 
to  change and that  resources  are  going to  become more  scarce  for  the  
PLA,  a l lowing them to  be  able  to  pursue  moderniza t ion ef for ts  in  a  
host  of  areas ,  inc luding acquis i t ion  and development  of  advanced 
weapon sys tems as  wel l  as  programs des igned to  reform the  personnel  
sys tem and improve the  overal l  qual i ty  and profess ional iza t ion of  the  
Chinese  mi l i tary .  
 China 's  mi l i ta ry moderniza t ion  program is  a  long- term and 
comprehensive  ef for t  tha t  covers  a  wide  range of  areas .   The 
development  and acquis i t ion  has  h i t  a l l  of  the  services  wi th the 
pr imary benef ic iar ies  being the  a i r  forces ,  the  naval  forces  and the 
Second Art i l le ry .   We are  a lso now s tar t ing to  see  s ignif icant  
modernizat ion effor ts  being focused on the  PLA ground forces  as  wel l  
as  a  host  of  asymmetr ic  capabi l i t ies  that  the  Chinese  appear  to  be  us ing 
as  the  centerpiece  of  any fu ture  confronta t ion wi th  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .  
 S ince  2000,  China 's  modernizat ion has  included a  wide  range of  
these  capabi l i t ies .   The mix of  these  developments  has  proved not  only  
the  qual i ty  of  the  weapon sys tems in China 's  inventory  but  a lso  thei r  
overa l l  capabi l i t ies  for  fu ture  cont ingencies .  
 DoD bel ieves  th is  t rend wi l l  cont inue a t  a  s teady pace and the  
 
6
 Click here to read the prepared testimony of Dr. Bernard Cole, Professor or International History, 
National War College, Washington, DC
 Chinese  wi l l  cont inue  to  a l ter  the  balance  of  power  much greater  in  
thei r  favor  over  the  next  several  years .  
 
 
 
 
  
115
 
 PLA Navy modernizat ion focuses  on present ing a  credible  threat  
to  Taiwan and prevent ing any thi rd-par ty  in tervent ion in  a  cross-Stra i t  
c r i s is .   The PLAN has been the  major  benef ic iary of  Chinese  defense  
spending and has  focused i t s  e f for ts  on acquir ing modern diese l  
submarines ,  modern des t royers  wi th  long-range a i r  defense  sys tems,  
long-range mari t ime s t r ike  a i rcraf t ,  and a  host  of  sophis t ica ted ant i -
ship  cruise  miss i les .  
 The PLAN has  a lso  been impor tant ly  focused on developing the  
opera t ional  prof ic iency of  the  personnel  in  that  organizat ion ,  and they 
have been in tent  on improving the  t ra in ing and the  professional  
mi l i tary  educat ion  programs across  that  service .   They have s tar ted to  
reap the  benef i t s  of  th is  over  the  pas t  couple  of  years .  
 The People 's  Libera t ion Army Air  Force  has  been another  pr ime 
benef ic iary  of  China 's  defense  budgets .   PLAAF moderniza t ion is  
focused on enhancing i t s  defensive  capabi l i t ies  as  wel l  as  developing 
i t s  offensive  s t r ike  capabi l i ty .   The PLAAF has  focused a  host  of  
modern sys tems to  include advanced f ighter  a i rcraft  both  indigenously  
developed as  wel l  as  f rom the  Russ ians ,  moderniz ing old  bombers  in to  
a i rcraf t  capable  of  car rying modern a i r - launched cruise  miss i les ,  
developing thei r  command and control  sys tems and suppor t  a i rcraft ,  
wi th  the  u l t imate  goal  of  enabl ing a  mobi le ,  a l l -weather ,  day/night ,  
over-water  force  capable  and f lexible  enough to  quickly  perform 
mul t ip le  opera t ional  tasks  and providing a  great  deal  of  f lexibi l i ty  to  
PLA leadership  in  a  cross-Strai t  c r i s i s .  
 S imi lar  to  the  PLAN, the  PLAAF is  act ively  improving i t s  
t ra in ing programs and focusing on developing increas ingly  complex 
tact ics ,  improving i t s  mobi l i ty  through a  ser ies  of  mobi l i ty  exercises ,  
tha t  we 've  seen over  the  pas t  couple  of  summers  and increasing the  
rea l ism of  i t s  day- to-day t ra in ing.  
 I t ,  as  wel l ,  has  seen a  great  deal  of  improvement  in  the  
opera t ional  prof ic iency of  i t s  force ,  not  only  in  terms of  weapon 
sys tems but  a lso in  the  capabi l i ty  of  the  operators .  
 The PLA ground forces  who,  up unt i l  a  couple  of  years  ago,  have 
not  been as  big  a  benef ic iary  as  the  other  two services  in  thei r  
modernizat ion programs have a lso  seen modernizat ion effor ts  
s igni f icant ly  spike  over  the  pas t  couple  of  years ,  focused on improving 
the  qual i ty  of  armor ,  aviat ion ,  ar t i l le ry  and amphibious  equipment  
across  the  PLA.   
 Whi le  these  modernizat ion ef for ts  have been uneven across  the  
PLA,  th is  i s  largely  due  to  geographic  locat ions  and di f ferent  miss ion 
des ignat ions  for  var ious  par ts  of  the  PLA.   However ,  they have been 
focused comprehensively  across  the  ground forces  in  making a  wide 
 range of  modernizat ion and new capabi l i t ies  into  the  force .  
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 The  focus of  th is  force  moderniza t ion i s  on  offensive  capabi l i ty  
employing deep bat t le  concepts .   To accompl ish  th is  goal ,  recent  
t ra ining has  concentra ted  on improving PLA long-range mobi l i ty  and 
improving combined arms opera t ions  for  China 's  ground forces .  
 Whi le  t ra in ing across  the  PLA cont inues  to  lag behind tha t  of  the  
PLAN and PLAAF,  in  recent  years ,  DIA has  seen substant ia l  ef for ts  
dedicated to  improving the  overa l l  profess ional ism and prof ic iency of  
the  ground forces .   Notable  examples  of  these  ef for ts  include  
developing a  profess ional  noncommiss ioned off icer  corps ,  improving 
profess ional  mi l i tary  educat ion programs for  off icers ,  reforming and 
improving the  qual i ty  of  t ra in ing and an emphasis  on in tegrat ing 
informat ion technology into  dai ly  opera t ions .  
 China 's  shor t - range bal l i s t ic  miss i le  forces  form a  core  of  
operat ional  excel lence  wi thin  the  PLA.   The most  te l l ing  s igns  of  
China 's  modernizat ion in  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Taiwan Stra i t  i s  
demonst ra ted  by the  large  number  of  shor t - range bal l i s t ic  miss i les  
d i rect ly  opposi te  Taiwan.   This  force  is  growing a t  an  average ra te  of  
100 miss i les  per  year  and the  range and accuracy of  these  sys tems i s  
improving on a  regular  bas is  as  wel l .  
 China 's  current  specia l  opera t ions  force  comprise  rapid  react ion 
forces  in  the  army,  a i r  force  and navy,  as  wel l  as  dedicated army,  
mar ine ,  army avia t ion and a i rborne  SOF uni ts .   Fol lowing observat ions  
of  U.S.  Specia l  Forces  in  the  1991 Pers ian  Gulf  War ,  the  PLA began to  
p lace  greater  emphasis  on expanding China 's  own SOF capabi l i ty ,  
par t icular ly  as  a  force  mul t ip l ier  in  a  Taiwan Stra i t  scenar io .  
 PLA researchers  cont inue to  s tudy SOF involved in  U.S.  and 
Coal i t ion operat ions .   In  2002,  the  PLA also  repor tedly  se t  up a  
dedicated uni t  to  moni tor  U.S.  Specia l  Forces  ac t ivi t ies  including 
target  acquis i t ion  and use  of  unmanned aer ia l  vehic les  in  Afghanis tan .   
The PLA also  s tudied the  ro le  of  specia l  opera t ions  forces  Operat ion 
I raqi  Freedom.  
 As  I  ment ioned,  China 's  moderniza t ion effor ts  are  
comprehensive .   Over  the  pas t  several  years ,  they have focused on 
in tegrat ing  lessons  learned from what  they have seen in  U.S.  
opera t ions  s ince  1991 in  the  Pers ian  Gulf  War .   Some of  the  key 
takeaways in  moderniza t ion programs that  the  PLA has  been involved 
wi th  have been focused on developing capabi l i t ies  in  the  rea lm of  jo int  
opera t ions ,  mobi l i ty ,  precis ion s t r ike ,  command and control ,  space and 
counterspace  capabi l i t ies ,  informat ion opera t ions  and e lec t ronic  
warfare ,  us ing informat ion technology to  enhance the  capabi l i t ies  of  
the  PLA,  and las t ly  reforming the  logis t ic  system.  
 Whi le  the  PLA cont inues  to  recognize that  i t  has  a  ser ies  of  
def ic iencies ,  the  key point  i s  that  they understand the  programs that  
 need to  be  put  in  place  to  rec t i fy  those  def ic iencies  and they have wel l  
organized and orches t ra ted  programs to  be  able  to  address  those .  
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 Impor tant ly ,  the  PLA is  focusing on ways  that  i t  can counter  key 
U.S.  dependencies ,  the  three most  important  be ing space ,  in te l l igence 
survei l lance  and reconnaissance  capabi l i t ies  and advanced 
communicat ions .  
 As  I  ment ioned,  wi th  the  balance  of  favor  cont inuing to  shi f t  in  
China 's  favor ,  the  impor tant  point  here  i s  tha t  China  today has  a  far  
greater  range of  mi l i tary  opt ions  than i t  d id  in  the  mid-1990s  and the  
2000 t ime f rame.   Whi le  DIA s t i l l  be l ieves  that  China  is  incapable  a t  
th is  point  of  conduct ing a  fu l l -scale  invasion of  Taiwan,  the  
capabi l i t ies  presented to  the  Chinese  leadership  are  much greater  and  
enable  them a  wider  range of  courses  of  ac t ion than they have  a t  any 
point  over  the  pas t  15 to  20 years .  
 Thank you.  
[The s ta tement  fo l lows: ]  
 
Prepared Statement  of  Mr.  Mark Cozad 
Senior  Defense  Intel l igence Analyst  
Defense  Inte l l igence Agency,  Washington,  D.C.  
 
The military balance of power in the Taiwan Strait continues to shift in China’s favor.  China’s 
military modernization program is a long-term, comprehensive effort to improve its capabilities.  Most 
importantly, China’s power projection and access denial capabilities continue to grow and will provide it 
with a greater range of capabilities to counter third-party intervention in a future Taiwan Strait conflict.  
Consistent with a near-term focus on preparing for Taiwan Strait contingencies, China is deploying an 
increasingly large number of its most advanced systems to the military regions opposite Taiwan. 
 
Since 2000, China’s modernization has included a wide range of capabilities such as advanced air, 
naval, ground, and ballistic missile systems, in concert with a focused effort to improve the level of 
operational proficiency within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).  The mix of these developments has 
improved not only the overall quality of the weapons systems in China’s inventory, it also has improved the 
PLA’s overall capabilities for any future contingency in the Taiwan Strait.  DIA believes this trend will 
continue at a steady pace with future PLA efforts focused on improving command and control, developing 
guidelines for its nascent joint operations capabilities, and streamlining its logistics system. 
 
The PLA Navy (PLAN) modernization focuses on presenting a credible threat to Taiwan and 
preventing any third party that might intervene on Taiwan’s behalf in a crisis.  The PLAN has been one of 
the major beneficiaries of China’s rising defense budgets and has purchased or developed a range of new 
capabilities to include modern diesel submarines, modern destroyers with long-range air defense systems, 
long-range maritime strike aircraft, and a host of sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles.  The PLAN also 
has focused on its operational proficiency with increasingly sophisticated exercises designed to improve the 
level of coordination between various PLAN components. 
 
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has been another prime beneficiary of China’s rising defense 
budgets.  PLAAF modernization focuses on enhancing its defensive capabilities while developing its 
offensive strike capability.  The PLAAF purchased and developed a number of advanced fighter aircraft, 
bombers, command and control, and support aircraft with the ultimate goal of enabling a mobile, all-
weather, day-night, over-water force capable and flexible enough to quickly perform multiple operational 
 tasks.  Similar to the PLAN, the PLAAF also is actively improving its training programs and focusing on 
developing increasingly complex tactics, improving mobility, and increasing realism in day-to-day training. 
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The PLA ground forces are modernizing on a number of fronts and are improving the quality of 
armor, aviation, artillery, and amphibious equipment across the PLA.  The focus of ground force 
modernization is on offensive combat employing deep battle concepts.  To accomplish this goal, recent 
training has concentrated on improving PLA long-range mobility and improving the combined-arms 
operations of China’s ground forces.  While training across the PLA continues to lag behind that of the 
PLAN and PLAAF, in recent years DIA has seen substantial efforts dedicated to improving the overall 
professionalism and proficiency of the ground forces.  Notable examples of these efforts include 
developing a professional noncommissioned officer corps, improving professional military education for 
army officers, reforming and improving the quality of training, and an emphasis on integrating information 
technology into daily operations. 
 
China’s short-range ballistic missile forces form a core operational capability and are a center of 
excellence within the PLA.  The most telling sign of China’s modernization and the balance of power in the 
Taiwan Strait is demonstrated by the large number of short-range ballistic missiles directly opposite 
Taiwan.  This force is growing at an average rate of 100 missiles per year; the range and accuracy of these 
systems is improving as well. 
 
China’s current special operations forces (SOF) comprise “rapid reaction” forces in the Army, Air 
Force, and Navy as well as dedicated army, marine, army aviation, and airborne SOF units.  Following 
observations of U.S. Special Forces in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the PLA began to place greater emphasis 
on expanding China’s own SOF capability, particularly as a force multiplier in a Taiwan Strait scenario.  
PLA researchers continue to study SOF involved in U.S. and Coalition operations.  In 2002, the PLA 
reportedly set up a dedicated unit to monitor U.S. Special Operations activities, including target acquisition 
and use of unmanned aerial vehicles, in Afghanistan.  The PLA also studied the role of special operations 
forces in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. 
 
 In addition to these critical areas, the PLA continues to seek solutions that will allow it to 
“leapfrog” from an army based on mechanization to one built around advanced information technology.  
Critical developments in this realm include PLA advances in space capabilities, information operations, 
electronic warfare, and advanced command and control systems.  While developments in these areas are 
moving forward at varying paces, they will form the backbone of future PLA capabilities and are a central 
part of any consideration of the cross-Strait military balance.  The PLA will vigorously pursue 
modernization in these critical areas. 
 
Another key component of China’s military modernization is the PLA’s ambition to conduct joint 
operations.  This effort can be traced to lessons learned from U.S. and Coalition operations since the 1991 
Persian Gulf War.  Although the PLA has devoted considerable effort to developing joint capabilities, it 
faces a persistent lack of interservice cooperation and a lack of actual experience in joint operations.  The 
PLA hopes eventually to fuse service-level capabilities with an integrated C4ISR (command, control, 
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) network, a new command 
structure, and a joint logistics system.  Since 2000, the PLA also has improved its multiservice exercises, 
improving PLA experience levels and yielding some insights into its future direction.  These insights will 
become clearer as more advanced weapons, sensors, and platforms enter the inventory and training begins 
to reflect true multiservice operations. 
 
Lastly, at an all-Army conference in June 2006, President Hu Jintao instructed the PLA to 
concentrate its efforts on military training.  Hu provided the direction for the future development of military 
training, and PLA was expected to adjust its training plans accordingly.  To meet the requirements of joint 
integrated operations in local wars under “informatized” conditions (the application of information 
technology to equipment, operations, training, etc.), Hu’s guidance is aimed at transforming military 
 training from training under mechanized conditions to joint training under informatized conditions; military 
training contributes to innovations in military theory, research and development of weapons and equipment, 
and fostering development of high-quality officers and men. 
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China’s capability for limited and relatively precise uses of force is growing, expanding the 
military options available to People’s Republic of China (PRC) leaders.  While these capabilities are not 
uniquely tailored to a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the PRC’s options for the use of force in a future crisis 
are far greater than they were in 2000.  As China’s military modernization program continues to improve 
the quality of PLA weapons systems and personnel, the balance of military power in the Taiwan Strait will 
continue to shift in China’s favor. 
 
PANEL IV:  Discuss ion,  Quest ions  and Answers  
   
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Thank you for  that  excel lent  
tes t imony.   Commiss ioner  D'Amato.  
 COMMISSIONER D'AMATO:  Thank you,  Mr.  Chairman,  and 
thank the  panel  for  coming today and ta lking to  us  about  th is  important  
subject .   
 As  the  balance  shi f t s  toward the  mainland in  th is  re la t ionship ,  
the  quest ion ar ises  and Dr .  Cole ,  you ta lked to  us  before  about  the  
mi l i tary  ba lance and the  naval  ba lance .   How has  the  vulnerabi l i ty  of  
the  American carr ier  task  force  been affec ted  in  th is  shi f t ing  balance 
to  Chinese  space ,  a i r ,  surface  and subsurface  chal lenge?   And has  i t  
e roded so  much or  has  i t  got ten  to  the  point  where  i t ' s  e roded that  we 
have to  re th ink the  defense  of  Taiwan in  terms  of  the  posi t ion  and 
viabi l i ty  of  the  carr ier  bat t legroup?  Any one of  you?  
 DR.  COLE:   I  think,  s i r ,  that  the  vulnerabi l i ty  has  increased due 
to  China 's  increased submarine  force ,  not  only  the  increased capabi l i ty  
of  the  submarines  themselves ,  but  a lso  the  increased avai labi l i ty  of  
submerged launched ant i -ship  cruise  miss i les  tha t  Admira l  McVadon 
referred  to .  
 I t ' s  not  so much a  mat ter  of  counter ing the  carr iers  di rect ly ,  i t  i s  
a  s lowing thei r  ent ry  into  an area  for  a  Taiwan theater .   China 's  shore-
based ai r  remains  re la t ive ly shor t - range pending fur ther  increases  in  
thei r  a i r - to-a i r  refuel ing capabi l i ty ,  and the  carr iers  themselves  are  
wel l  defended wi th  mul t iple  bel ts  of  defense.   But  nonetheless  i f  
China ,  for  instance ,  were  able  to  k ick  two dozen submarines  out  
undetected and put  them on s ta t ion,  i t  would cer ta inly  s low down the  
entry  in to  any sor t  of  contes t  of  U.S.  carr ier  bat t legroups .  
 That  in  turn  ref lects  d i rec t ly  on the  point  I  ment ioned about  the  
wi l l  and abi l i ty  of  the  Taiwan government  and people  to  cont inue to  
res is t .  I f  they actual ly  expect  U.S.  mi l i tary in tervent ion to  occur  
wi thin  a  mat ter  of  jus t  a  very  few days  and that  in tervent ion in  fac t  
takes  a  month ,  I  rea l ly  wonder  how long they ' re  going to  be  able  to  
res is t  mi l i tary  pressure  f rom the  mainland.  
 And again ,  I  th ink we 've  a l l  sa id here ,  we ' re  not  ta lk ing 
 necessar i ly  about  a  fu l l -scale  amphibious  invas ion,  but  ra ther  se lec t ive  
s t r ikes  that  would  impress  upon the  government  and people  of  Taiwan 
thei r  vulnerabi l i ty  pending eventual  American in tervent ion.  
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 COMMISSIONER D'AMATO:  Admiral .  
 REAR ADMIRAL McVADON:  I  th ink i t ' s  very  important  in  th is  
regard  to  look ahead.   The Chinese  are  wri t ing and apparent ly  are  qui te  
ser ious  about  developing th is  medium-range bal l i s t ic  miss i le ,  probably  
an MRBM, that  has  a  homing warhead that  would  jeopardize  carr iers  
and cruisers  and so  for th .   I f  they,  in  fac t ,  a re  able  to  pul l  tha t  of f ,  and 
of  course  r ight  now one of  the  barr iers ,  even i f  they do,  i s  the  target ing 
problem?  But  even today they might  luck out .   They might  be  able  to  
br ing the  r ight  forces  to  bear .  
 I t  would be  a  d i f f icul t  proposi t ion for  us  to  count  on the  fact  that  
they were  not  target ing us  i f  they had that  miss i le .   So,  boy,  tha t ' s  
something looking to  the  future .   Imagine  the  s i tuat ion where  you have 
those  bal l i s t ic  miss i les ,  and you have the  ant i -ship  cruise  miss i les  that  
Dr .  Cole  and I  have both  referred to .  
 That ' s  a  daunt ing chal lenge,  something you 'd  rea l ly  have to  g ive  
a  lo t  of  thought  to ,  and jus t  what  sor t  of  preparat ion,  sani t iza t ion,  and 
so  for th  would you want  so i t  ends up wi th  the  scenar io  tha t  Bud was  
descr ib ing.  
 MR.  COZAD:  And i f  I  could  add something as  wel l .   I  don ' t  
th ink we can real ly  just  look at  i t  as  Chinese  effor ts  to  defeat  the  
carr ier .   That ' s  one  par t  of  a  mul t i -pronged defensive s t ra tegy that ' s  
des igned to  delay us  f rom get t ing in to  the  theater  and once  we get  in to 
the  theater ,  i f  we do become involved in  the  f ight ,  be ing able  to  
prevent  or  present  as  much of  a  chal lenge to  us  opera t ional ly  across  as  
many di f ferent  f ronts  as  poss ible .   
 I  th ink as  we look a t  defeat ing  the  carr ier ,  one of  the  quest ions  
that  has  to  come up is  not  necessar i ly  the  accuracy of  the  miss i les  or  
the  accuracy or  the  capabi l i ty  of  the  PLA Air  Force .   I t ' s  tha t  i t  
presents  us  wi th  a  planning chal lenge that  we haven ' t  had to  address  in  
the  pas t .   So as  th is  i s  coupled wi th counterspace  capabi l i t ies ,  wi th 
informat ion opera t ions ,  wi th  e lec t ronic warfare ,  there  are  a  whole  host  
of  d i f ferent  areas  where  U.S.  p lanners  are  going to  have to  focus  where 
ten  years  ago wi th  the  PLA they didn ' t  rea l ly  have to  spend as  much 
t ime worr ied  about  those  speci f ic  i ssues .  
 COMMISSIONER D'AMATO:  Thank you,  Mr.  Chairman.   I t  
seems to  me that  based on th is ,  we’re  going to  have to  re th ink the  ro le  
of  the  carr ier  bat t legroup as  an  exclus ive  defense  of  Taiwan,  and our  
p lanners  are  going to  have  to  take  a  look at  some th ings  outs ide  the 
box beyond,  or  a t  leas t  cer ta in ly  in  supplement  to ,  the  ro le  of  the  
carr ier .  
 REAR ADMIRAL McVADON:  Maybe we a l ready have wi th  
 global  s t r ike  and other  advanced,  long-range weapon sys tems,  but  i t ' s  
s t i l l  a  very  complex s i tuat ion,  and you could  cer ta in ly ,  when you 're  
s i t t ing  in  Taipei  wonder  jus t  what  i s  going on and where  are  the  
Americans  and so  for th .  So i t  presents  a  d i f f icul t  s i tuat ion when you 
t ry  to  look a t  the  pol i t ics  of  i t  f rom both  Taipei ' s  v iewpoint  and what  
Bei j ing is  th inking--a  d i f ferent  world .  
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 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Commiss ioner  Videnieks .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   A quest ion for  the  Admiral ,  a  
quest ion for  you,  s i r .   You ment ioned the  fu ture  poss ibi l i ty  of  the  U.S.  
and PRC navies  cooperat ing to  keep the  sea  lanes  of  communicat ion 
open.   I  don ' t  think the U.S.  a t  this  point  has  even ra t i f ied  the  Law of  
the  Sea  Treaty .   I 'm not  up  on the  la tes t  developments .  
 How would the  sovereignty  issue  be  affec ted in  a  joint  operat ion 
to  keep the  sea  lanes  of  communicat ion open when we have not  even 
rat i f ied  the  t reaty a t  this  point .   That’s  k ind of  a  genera l  ques t ion.
 REAR ADMIRAL McVADON:  Yes ,  every  t ime that  you look a t  a  
s i tuat ion of  t ry ing to  achieve cooperat ion,  even the  Northeas t  Asian 
Secur i ty  Communi ty  concept ,  the  di f f icul ty  of  the  thorn of  Taiwan is  
there .   However ,  and I  say  this  more  intu i t ively  than being able  to  back 
i t  up  wi th  something concre te ,  i t  seems to  me that  r ight  now the 
Taiwan s i tuat ion is  s l ipping in to  the  background a  l i t t le  b i t  as  an  
in t rus ion in to  the  prospect  of  cont inuing peace  in  the  region.  
 And I  guess  the  reasons  for  Bei j ing’s  greater  tendency to  peace  
is  because  maybe the  Chinese  are  more  fu l ly  rea l iz ing some of  the  
points  tha t  I  t r ied  to  make most  s t rongly ,  especia l ly  that  i t  does  not  
serve  China 's  in teres ts  to conduct  an  a t tack on Taiwan;  so  a t  leas t  we 
have hope.   Yes ,  Taiwan is  a  terr ib le  int rusion into  the  abi l i ty  to  
cooperate  and so  for th ,  and whomever  you blame--cer ta in ly  I  do  not  
l ike  China 's  posi t ion  on that ,  but  they do make a  case  that  you have to  
unders tand and a t  leas t  accept  the  fac t  that  that  i s  thei r  argument .  
 So,  yes ,  the  Taiwan issue  keeps  us ,  f rom being able  to  cooperate  
in  o ther  areas .   Remember  when we do that ,  we probably  then lessen 
the  chances  of  the  Taiwan conf l ic t .   So these  fac tors  are  not  
independent .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   How would the  sovereignty 
i ssue  be involved in  a  join t  operat ion  to  keep the sea  lanes  of  
communicat ion open when we have not  even rat i f ied  the  t reaty  a t  th is  
point?   That 's  k ind of  a  general  ques t ion.  
 REAR ADMIRAL McVADON:  I  don ' t  see  that - -maybe I 'm not  
see ing the  same th ings  you are--as  being something that  prevents  our  
abi l i ty  to  coordinate  opera t ions ,  jus t  as  we have done wi th  the  War  on 
Terror ism.   And so  you proceed to  the  l imi ts  tha t  you can wi th in  what 's  
reasonable ,  you hope that  that  grows,  and you t ry  to  resolve  problems 
that  come up as  they do.  
  I t  seems to  me that  we have  so  much in  common.   For  example ,  
the  energy problem has  been ta lked about  a  great  deal .   You can look 
a t  the  energy problem from the  o ther  s ide  and say i t ' s  not  necessar i ly  a  
source  of  compet i t ion  but  ra ther  an area  where  both  countr ies  have a  
need to  ensure  that  energy f lows f reely  to  thei r  countr ies  and to  thei r  
a l l ies ,  and so  i t ' s  a  reason for  us  to  f ind a  way to  cooperate  in  
protect ing oi l  sh ipments .  
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 So  i t  seems to  me that  there  are  oppor tuni t ies  here .   Yes ,  there  
are  oppor tuni t ies  to  s top  i t  a l l  i f  you look a t  the  o ther  s ide  of  i t .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Thank you.    HEARING 
COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Commiss ioner  Esper .  
 COMMISSIONER ESPER:  Thank you.   And thank you to  the  
panel is ts  for  your  presenta t ions  today.  I  have two quest ions  and I  want  
to  d i rec t  the  f i rs t  to  Dr .  Cole  and Admiral  McVadon,  and the  second 
quest ion to  you,  Mr.  Cozad.  
 The f i rs t  ques t ion deals  wi th  comments  you made,  Dr .  Cole ,  and 
I  th ink the  Admira l  just  ment ioned,  wi th  regard  to  Taiwan.   We 've  
heard  th is  before  about  Taipei  fa i l ing  to  make adequate  inves tments  in  
i t s  defense .  
 Clear ly ,  i t ' s  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes '  in teres t  to  promote  s tabi l i ty ,  to  
deter  any conf l ic t ,  and obvious ly  our  pol icy  i s  to have both  Taiwan and 
China  reach a  solut ion between them,  a  peaceful  resolut ion to  the i r  
d i f ferences .  
 Many would  a lso  say,  though,  that  a  gross  imbalance of  power  
between the  two promotes  ins tabi l i ty ;  that  i t  could invi te  aggress ion a t  
some point .  And so  I  ask ,  what  do you think i s  real ly  going on?   Why 
is  there  a  fa i lure  to  make the  investments  in  defense  to  a t  leas t  br ing 
some par i ty  in  the  balance  of  power?   And what  should  we do to  get  
Taiwan,  to  make those  investments?  
 The second quest ion i s  separate ,  deal ing more  maybe our  
previous  panel ,  but  the  quest ion I  was  going to  ask of  General  
Car twr ight  was  how do you,  Mr.  Cozad,  in terpre t  China 's  inves tment  in  
i t s  bal l i s t ic  missi le  moderniza t ion and expansion plans?   How do you 
in terpret  that  in  l ight  of  their  previous  pol ic ies  of  minimal  deterrence ,  
and how they now they seem to  be  moderniz ing and expanding?  What  
should  we in terpre t  f rom that?  Is  that  a  react ion to  external  events  or  
i s  i t  something e lse ,  a  change in  thei r  thinking wi th  regard to  the i r  
s t ra tegic  pol icy?  
 So I ' l l  ask  you,  Dr .  Cole ,  and then Admiral  McVadon for  the  
answer  to  the  f i rs t  quest ion  f i rs t .  
 DR.  COLE:   Thank you,  s i r .   Let  me emphasize  that  Taiwan is  
making s ignif icant  inves tments  in  thei r  defense  capabi l i t ies  in  many 
di f ferent  areas .   I  th ink that  both  we and Taiwan perhaps  focus  a  l i t t le  
b i t  over ly  much on th is  so-cal led  special  budget ,  the  i tems that  we 
 made avai lable  to  them many years  ago.  
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 Having sa id  that ,  number  one,  number  two I  don ' t  th ink Taiwan 
ever  i s  going to  achieve par i ty  wi th the mainland.   I  mean the 
di f ference in  resources ,  you know 1.3  bi l l ion people  agains t  22.6  
mi l l ion,  and the  s ize  of  the  budgets  and the  natura l  resources  and so 
for th ,  the  s izes  of  the  economies ,  I  think i s  s imply ,  i s  jus t  s imply  too  
great .  
 I  th ink we 're  doing about  a l l  we can do to  urge  the  government  in  
Taiwan,  and by government ,  I  don ' t  mean to  lay  a l l  th is  on the  Chen 
Shui-bian adminis t ra t ion because  he  faces  a  s i tua t ion in  the  legis la t ive  
Yuan there  that  would  make i t  d i f f icul t  for  any president  to  do  more  
than they ' re  doing.  
 When Pres ident  Chen took off ice  before  h is  f i rs t  te rm in  2000,  he  
sa id  tha t  h is  pr ior i t ies  were  on bet ter ing the  economic and socia l  
condi t ions  of  the  people  of  Taiwan.   And as  a  democrat ical ly  e lected 
president ,  he  made that  choice  and was  reelected on that  bas is ,  and I  
th ink we have to  respect  that .  
 Our  present  adminis t ra t ion has  made avai lable  to  Taiwan a  very 
much expanded shopping l i s t ,  i f  you wi l l ,  of  weapons.   We've  sent  
several  evaluat ion teams over  there .   Ret i red four-s tar  off icers  l ike  
Admira l  Bla i r  have  gone there  on severa l  occas ions  to evaluate  and 
advise  and so  for th .   Af ter  a  cer ta in  point ,  i t ' s  s imply  up to  the  
government  and the  people  of  Taiwan to  decide  how much money they 
want  to  invest  in  defense  and what  they th ink is  necessary .  
 The other  s ide  of  tha t  coin ,  of  course ,  i s  recogniz ing that  and 
acknowledging that ,  then the  Uni ted  Sta tes  has  to  decide  a t  what  point  
perhaps  Taiwan is  not  making enough investment  to  engage our  ef for ts  
fur ther .  
 REAR ADMIRAL McVADON:  Remember  how tough i t  i s  when 
you ' re  t ry ing to  decide  how to  spend your  money on defense  measures .   
Taiwan legis la tors  real ize ,  i f  they buy everything the  U.S.  offers ,  i t  
s t i l l  doesn ' t  work agains t  th is  formidable  modernized PLA.   When I  put  
i t  in  cold  b lunt ,  s impl is t ic  terms that ' s  what  the  impl ica t ions  are .  
 Actual ly ,  of  course ,  i t ' s  more  compl ica ted  than that .   I f  China  
e lec ts ,  for  example ,  to  shoot  a  bunch of  miss i les  but  in  smal ler  
numbers ,  then even i f  you have very  meager  defenses ,  i t  probably  
mat ters ,  and i f  you harden th ings ,  i t  probably  mat ters .   But  making the  
decis ions  about  what  to spend your  money on in Taiwan is  real ly  a  
tough cal l  because  so  much of  what  i s  offered fa i ls  to  do much agains t  
the  new threat  f rom China .  
 When you add the  pol i t ica l  impl ica t ions  of  i t  where  nei ther  s ide ,  
the  Pan-Blue  or  the  Pan-Green,  wants  to  see  the  o ther  one  able  to  c la im 
success  in  something,  you end up wi th  th is  impasse  concerning arms 
purchases .  
  To ensure  th is  i s  crys ta l  c lear ,  I  remind you that  i f ,  for  example ,  
they bought  a l l  the  miss i le  defenses  as  I  suggested  in  my both  wri t ten  
and ora l  tes t imony,  i t  probably  doesn ' t  do  much when they’re  fac ing a  
thousand SRBMs and some MRBMs that  could  be  used f i rs t  that  are  
even more  d i f f icul t  to  in tercept ;  MRBMs could  take  out  the  defenses  
and give  a l l  the  miss i les  a  f ree  r ide  to  thei r  targets .   So do you want  to  
spend a  great  deal  of  money on that?   Maybe you do i f  you want  to  s tay  
in  bed wi th  the  country  that  has  the  lead in  miss i le  defense  in  the  
world ,  but  that ' s  ye t  another  fac tor  i l lus t ra t ing the  complexi t ies .  
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 MR.  COZAD:  In  terms of  the  investment  in  shor t - range bal l i s t ic  
miss i les ,  I  th ink one  way we need to  look--  
 COMMISSIONER ESPER:  I  was  referr ing to  long range--
in tercont inenta l  bal l i s t ic  miss i les .  
 MR.  COZAD:  In tercont inenta l  bal l i s t ic  miss i les .  
 COMMISSIONER ESPER:  Right .  
 MR.  COZAD:  At  th is  point ,  we real ly  do not  have a  great  deal  of  
ins ight  into  why the  Chinese are  modernizing tha t  force .   This  i s  an 
area ,  when we ta lk  about  t ransparency,  that  we have  very  l i t t le  
unders tanding of  how the  Chinese  see  the  nuclear  balance ,  how they 
see  the fu ture  of  us ing nuclear  forces ,  and exact ly  what  role  those 
would  play in  any future  Taiwan scenar io.  
 They are  in  the  midst  of  a  very  s igni f icant  moderniza t ion of  tha t  
force ,  but  a t  this  point  there  i sn ' t  a  grea t  deal  tha t  they 've  made 
avai lable  to  us  in  terms of  d iscuss ions  wi th  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  
government .  
 COMMISSIONER ESPER:  Thank you.   Thank you,  Mr.  
Chairman.  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Gent lemen,  I  have a  quest ion 
for  any of  you that  care  to  address  i t ,  about  how China  employs  some 
of  the  pr inciples  of  war  in  the i r  mi l i tary  doct r ine ,  and how that  affec ts  
the  Uni ted Sta tes '  abi l i ty  to  defend i t se l f ,  par t icular ly  a t  sea ,  and 
speci f ica l ly  one  of  the  things tha t  the  PLA emphasizes  i s  the  pr incip le  
of  mass  and that  inc ludes  massed f i res .  
 So the  quest ion would be:   what  can the  Uni ted Sta tes  do or  what  
defenses  does  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  have today agains t  massed hypersonic  
ant i -ship  cruise  miss i les  l ike  the  SS-N-22 or  the  SS-N-27,  or  even 
agains t  a  s ingle  one,  but  worse ,  massed miss i le  a t tacks ,  should  they be  
able  to  get  c lose  enough?  
 REAR ADMIRAL McVADON:  You s ink the  launching pla t form,  
the  submarine  or  des t royer ,  before  i t  f i res  a t  you.   That ' s ,  of  course ,  
what  you ' re  t ry ing to  do.   I f  you are  caut ious  about  sending the  
carr iers ,  the  reason you ' re  caut ious  i s  because  you want ,  before  put t ing 
the  carr iers  in  those  waters  to  create  a  s i tuat ion where  those  ant i -ship  
cruise  miss i les  you descr ibed are  a  far  lesser  threat .  
  Now,  of  course ,  you would  l ike  to  be  able  to  develop the  
defenses  that  would in tercept  them and des t roy in  f l ight ,  but  r ight  now 
we 're  probably  faced wi th  a  s i tuat ion  that  combines  those sor ts  of  mass  
f i repower  p lus  the  poss ibi l i ty  of  the  bal l i s t ic  missi les  compl ica t ing the  
a t tack,  coupled wi th  Chinese  effor ts  a t  surpr ise  and a l l  of  those  other  
fac tors ,  too .   The successful  coordinat ion of  a l l  tha t  may be  a  p ipe  
dream for  the  PLA,  but  i t ' s  not  something tha t  we can completely 
ignore .   Anyway I  th ink the solut ion  for  the  moment  i s  t rying to  make 
sure  the  p la t forms do not  get  in  the  posi t ion where  they can f i re  on us .  
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 Bud,  d id  you want  to  add something?  
 DR.  COLE:   That ' s  rea l ly  the  key ques t ion.  I  th ink the  very  f i rs t  
s tep  i s  what  are  the  ru les  of  engagement  as  a  cr is is  develops  in  Taiwan 
and U.S.  mi l i tary forces ,  as  we did  in  1996,  for  instance ,  are  
d ispatched to  the  scene?   There 's  a lways  the  grave  r i sk ,  I  think,  that  
our  ideas  of  how cr i t ica l  the  cr is i s  i s  would  be  very  much di f ferent  
f rom Bei j ing 's  idea .  
 We might  s imply misevaluate  Bei j ing 's  courses  of  ac t ion.   
S tudying a l l  the  St rai t ' s  c r i ses  going back to  1950 is  not  reassur ing in  
th is  respect .   Cer ta inly ,  in  every  case ,  I  would  argue,  Bei j ing 
misunders tood what  the  U.S.  react ion would be ,  to  every one of  those  
cr ises ,  except  possib ly  1962,  and I 'm not  sure  we ' re  a l l  a  whole  lot  
smar ter  in  unders tanding how Bei j ing may judge a  par t icular  cr is is .  
 Assuming,  however ,  for  purposes  of  argument ,  tha t  the  proper  
a ler t  s ta tus  exis ts  and we ' re  not  surpr ised by a  bol t  out  of  the  blue  by a  
Chinese  miss i le- f i r ing  submarines ,  I  think what  Admira l  McVadon 
sa id ,  of  course ,  i s  the  key,  going back to  our  preparat ions  and doct r ine  
against  the  Sovie ts  where  we were  going to  send carr ier  bat t legroups  
against  the  Sovie t  land mass ,  and the  Chinese  seem to  be  emulat ing a  
lo t  of  the  o ld Sovie t  tac t ics  in  terms of  mass  f i re  power ,  repet i t ive  
waves  of  miss i le  and a i rcraf t  a t tacks  and augmented by submarine-
launched miss i les  and submarine  torpedo a t tacks.  
 I  th ink in  those  days  we re l ied  on layered defense  to  protect  our  
carr ier  task  forces .   The problem is ,  and we 've  not  often  discussed,  i s  
(a)  the  l imi ted  amount  of  f i re  power ,  and I  say th is  advisedly ,  that  can 
be  genera ted by a  modern a i rcraf t  car r ier .   I t  seems to  surpr ise  most  
people ,  but  i f  you look a t  the  deckload of  a i rcraf t  on  a  modern a i rcraf t  
carr ier ,  you may f ind yoursel f  wi th  perhaps 18 F/A-18 a i rcraf t  that  
you ' re  able  to  dedicate  to  carrying bombs agains t  enemy ships  or  any 
enemy shor t  ta rgets .  
 The reason I  ment ion that  i s  you get  in to  an offense/defense  
t radeoff .   Dur ing the  Cold  War ,  the  U.S.  Air  Force  used to  love  to  
conduct  these  s tudies  of  carr ier  bat t legroups  where  they would  t ry  to  
wri te  off  the  Navy 's  ef for t  by saying that  so  much of  the  carr iers '  f i re  
power  has  to  be  dedicated to  defending i t se l f ,  that  there  i s  re la t ive ly 
 l i t t le  le f t  over  to  launch agains t  an  enemy.  
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 I  don ' t  buy the  Air  Force  argument  in  i t s  to ta l i ty ,  but  they do 
have a  point .   And so  that  by posing enough waves  of  threat  to  a  
carr ier  bat t legroup or  bat t le  force ,  you might  force  that  sor t  of  t radeoff  
to  where  you 'd  be  lef t  wi th  re la t ively  l i t t le  power  project ion 
capabi l i ty .  
 MR.  COZAD:  I  th ink a long wi th the  concept  of  mass ,  get t ing 
back to  the  i ssue  of  how the  Chinese  integrate  thei r  key concepts  in  
thei r  warfight ing doct r ine ,  another  area  to  look a t  i s  the  idea of  key 
point  s t r ikes  which the  Chinese  have ta lked about ,  and which we see  a  
number  of  modernizat ion programs focused on speci f ic  areas  tha t  they 
view as  key U.S.  dependencies  wi thout  which we would have a  
s ignif icant  d i f f icul ty  being able  to  deploy and susta in  forces  in  a  
region.  
 I  ment ioned some of  those  in  my opening s ta tements ,  but  I  would 
go back and re i tera te  tha t  those  capabi l i t ies  are  space ,  inte l l igence  
survei l lance  and reconnaissance,  advanced communicat ions ,  command 
and control  sys tems,  and logis t ics .  
 The PLA has  gone through and done very  in-depth  sys temat ic  
s tudies  of  the  way that  a l l  of  these  capabi l i t ies  have been brought  to  
bear  in  previous  confl ic ts ,  whether  i t ' s  the  Gulf  War  I  or  Gulf  War  I I ,  
Al l ied  Force  or  Endur ing Freedom,  and they have some very  in teres t ing 
f indings  in  those  s tudies ,  and I  th ink i t ' s  very  important  to  note  tha t  as  
we see  th ings  come a long,  such as  a  PLA emphasis  on informat ion 
opera t ions ,  a  PLA emphasis  and the  tes t  of  the  ant i -sa te l l i te ,  di rec t  
ascent  ant i -sa te l l i te  weapon,  tha t  they are  in tent ly  focusing on these  
areas ,  and a t  this  point  I  don ' t  fee l  tha t  I 'm qual i f ied to  g ive  an answer  
on speci f ica l ly  what  our  capabi l i t ies  are  and what  we can do.  
 But  i t  shows that  those  are  the  areas  that  the  PLA are  very 
focused on in  addi t ion to  the  more  convent ional  toe- to- toe  
confronta t ion in  those  types  of  capabi l i t ies  tha t  we ' re  much more  
readi ly  wi l l ing to  ta lk  about .  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Thank you.   One th ing is  
c lear :  nobody has  sa id  jus t  turn  on that  ship-based laser  and hose  a l l  
those  cruise  miss i les .   I t  doesn ' t  exis t .  
 Al l  r ight .   Commiss ioner  Wessel .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Thank you.   I  apprecia te  your  a l l  
be ing here  today.   I  would  l ike  to ask a  quest ion about  how conf ident  
we should  be  of  our  assessment  capabi l i t ies  a t  this  point .   I t  seems tha t  
we have been surpr ised  in  recent  years  by the  deployment  of  cer ta in 
assets  quicker  than had been ant ic ipated.   I  guess  i t  was  the  Ki t ty  
Hawk bat t legroup where  a  submarine  surfaced wi thin  i t s  mids t  or  
nearby,  and i t  seems there  have been a  lo t  of  surpr ises  over  the  pas t  
years .  
  How conf ident  are  we of  our  assessments  that  China  has  not  
exceeded the  capaci ty  that  we 've  ant ic ipated--for  each of  the  panel is ts?  
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 MR.  COZAD:  I  would  be  re luctant  to  get  too deep in to  that  
ques t ion in  th is  forum.   I  would  be  happy to  come back a t  any t ime that  
you choose  and give  you a  br ief ing on some of  those  assessments ,  but  
we have had a  mixed record.   I  wi l l  readi ly  admit  that ,  and there  are  a  
lo t  of  areas  where  we don ' t  fee l  tha t  the  ins ight  we have in to  speci f ic  
Chinese  decis ion-making processes  i s  what  i t  needs  to  be .  
 The issue  cont inual ly  comes up about  t ransparency and,  as  I  had 
ment ioned,  wi th  the  ques t ion on the  modernizat ion of  China 's  nuclear  
force .   The Chinese  have not  been very for thcoming in  what  they have 
to ld  us  about  in  terms of  the  in tent  of  modernizat ion of  thei r  nuclear  
force  a t  a  t ime where  i t  does  look l ike  the  t rends  are  going toward a  
re la t ive ly peaceful  in teract ion between major  powers .  
 Another  key area  i s  the  defense  budget .   I f  you look a t  the  
es t imates  that  are  being done on China 's  defense  budget ,  you see  
numbers  that  range f rom the  off ic ia l  PRC es t imate  of ,  I  bel ieve ,  i t ' s  
$30 bi l l ion  a l l  the  way up to  a  h igh end es t imate  of $140 bi l l ion.   That  
makes  i t  very  di f f icul t  for  us  to  do assessments  on what  types  and how 
many weapon sys tems that  the  Chinese  are  going to  be  looking a t  
providing,  what  types  of  resource  const ra in ts  or  the  lack of  resource  
const ra ints  tha t  they may have placed on them.  
 But  a t  th is  point ,  I  would  defer  any fur ther  comment  on that  to  a  
c losed sess ion.  
 REAR ADMIRAL McVADON:  Let  me turn  that  ques t ion on i t s  
head for  jus t  a  quick moment .   I  th ink however  there  would be  real  
surpr ise  on the  par t  of  the  Chinese  as  to  what  the  fu l l  U.S.  capabi l i t ies  
are .   So le t ' s  remember  that  aspect  of  i t ,  too .   
 This  i s  cer ta inly  a  subject ive  assessment  on my par t .  I  th ink they 
could  succeed wel l  and quickly  agains t  Taiwan;  however ,   I  think they 
would get  some awful ly  b ig  surpr ises  wi th  what  they think they can do 
wi th  respect  to  the U.S.  Navy and to  the  U.S.  armed forces .   So le t ' s  
remember ,  there  are  surpr ises  both  ways .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Dr .  Cole .  
 DR.  COLE:   I  think I 'm somewhat  of  a  maver ick  on th is  ques t ion 
of  t ransparency,  s i r .   I 'm not  a  profess ional  in tel l igence analys t  
obviously ,  and I  f rankly  t ry  to  s tay  away f rom class i f ied  mater ia l .   But  
I  haven ' t  seen anything develop in  the  Chinese  Navy or  Air  Force  
which are  the  areas  that  I  look a t ,  in  the  las t  few years ,  tha t  I  think we 
should  be  a t  a l l  surpr ised a t .  
 We could  argue about  the  t iming of  some of  the  developments ,  
but  i f  you assume,  as  I  do,  that  China has  got  an  increas ing amount  of  
money each year  to  devote  to  i t s  mi l i tary  and therefore  i s  making 
propor t ional  budget  increases ,  I  th ink we should expect  them to  
 develop Aegis- l ike  sys tems and we should  expect  them to  develop 
cont inued submarine  capabi l i ty ,  which they 've  apparent ly  decided is  
the  chief  way to  s low any U.S.  intervent ion in to a  Taiwan scenar io .  
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 As  far  as  the  budget  i s  concerned,  frankly  whether  i t ' s  30  bi l l ion  
or  60 bi l l ion  or  90 bi l l ion ,  I  th ink i t ' s  pre t ty  apparent  what  they ' re  
doing wi th  i t .   As  far  as  the  ICBM force  is  concerned,  cer ta inly  in  the  
open press ,  I  haven ' t  seen any evidence  that  they ' re  about  to  launch 
some mass ive  expansion of  their  ICBM force ,  but  ra ther  they ' re  
replac ing 30-year-old  DF-3s ,  I  guess  they are ,  wi th  more  modern 
capable  nuclear  miss i les .   I 'd  be  surpr ised  i f  they weren ' t  taking these  
s teps .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Thank you.  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Thank you.   Thank you,  
gent lemen,  for  your  tes t imony and a lso  thank you for  your  service  to  
our  country  over  the  years .  Mr.  Cozad,  I 'd  par t icular ly  l ike  to  
acknowledge that  I  th ink that  you have  given one of  the  c leares t  most  
comprehensive  open assessments  that  I  have heard  f rom the  
in te l l igence communi ty  so  I  thank you very  much for  that  service ,  
which is  going to  be  he lpful  to  a l l  of  us .  
 I  want  to  go to  a  ques t ion that  I  asked Genera l  Car twright  and 
the  panel  before ,  but  I ' l l  phrase  i t  a  l i t t le  b i t  d i f ferent ly .   Given the  
ro le  tha t  ambigui ty  p lays  in  the  U.S.  pol icy  regarding Taiwan,  do our  
war  p lanners  have enough of  an  unders tanding of  what  our  object ive  is  
supposed to  be  or  what  our  object ive  might  be  in  order  to  p lan  
suff ic ient ly  for  what  might  be  coming down the  road? 
 REAR ADMIRAL McVADON:  I t ' s  my impress ion,  and remember  
I  have not  been on ac t ive  duty  for  th is  per iod,  tha t  cer ta inly  s ince  the  
t ime that  Admira l  Blai r  was  the  Paci f ic  Commander ,  that  there  has  
been this  focused dual  ef for t  to  say,  “How do we both get  a long wi th  
China  and be  prepared to  take  China  on?”  
 So I  th ink that  wi th  the  cal iber  of  people  that  we 've  had as  the  
Paci f ic  Commander  and the  unders tanding they have had of  that  China  
s i tuat ion  and the  need to  do both  th ings--engage and deter  or  defeat ,  
tha t ,  in  fac t ,  we have had good guidance to  p lanners .   So I  don ' t  share  
your  concern  there .   I  hope that  I 'm not  being jus t  too  opt imis t ic .  
 DR.  COLE:   When I  th ink back to  when I  was  head of  Paci f ic  
Fleet  p lans  in  the  mid-1980s ,  we rea l ly  had th ings  very  easy.   There  
was  only  one scenar io,  tha t  was  g lobal  nuclear  war  agains t  the  Soviet  
Union and everything devolved f rom that .  Having sa id  that ,  my 
in teract ion wi th  the  PACOM planners  over  the  las t  few years  leads me 
to  bel ieve  that  they,  in  fac t ,  do  have a  handle .   There  are  a  number  of  
branches  and sequels  that  you can plan for ,  and that  they 're  doing thei r  
bes t  to  p lan  for  those .  
 The quest ion would  be  wi th  each var ia t ion on a  p lan  to  get  
 involved in  a  Taiwan scenar io  to  one  degree  or  another  i s  the 
avai labi l i ty  of  resources  wi th  respect  to  o ther  obl igat ions  around the  
world .  
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 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Mr.  Cozad,  any comment?   And 
again ,  the  reason tha t  I  ra ise  th is  ques t ion is  tha t  I 've  heard  f rom some 
junior  p lanners  some f rust ra t ion or  confusion that  they aren ' t  qui te  sure  
what  outcome i t  i s  tha t  they ' re  supposed to  be  planning for ,  which is  
inherent  in  the  ambigui ty .  
 I t  i s  of  concern  i f  these  are  the  people  who are  on the  ground 
t rying to  pul l  p lans  together .   
 DR.  COLE:   Let  me jus t  add one quick thing.   When Admira l  
Bla i r  was  PACOM, he  se t  up  a  dedicated se t  of  fo lks  to  s tudy the  
Chinese  mi l i tary  to  t ry  to  take  the  b ig p ic ture  view.   Al l  too  of ten ,  our  
in te l l igence analys ts  get  so  bur ied  in  the detai l s  that  they real ly  lack 
the  t ime to  look at  the  larger  sor t  of  s t ra tegic  pic ture .  
 I  would  agree  wi th  you that  g iven the  resources  we 're  able  to  
devote  to  the  Chinese  mi l i tary ,  both  unclassi f ied and wi thin  the  
in te l l igence  communi ty ,  I  am concerned that  there  are  enough people  
t ry ing to  look a t  the  s t ra tegic  level  a t  what  the  Chinese  might  do in  a  
g iven conf l ic t  s i tuat ion.  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  And Dr .  Cole ,  s ince  I  s t i l l  have  
a  l i t t le  t ime to  jus t  engage in  the  discuss ion,  do you th ink that  i t  i s  
c lear  enough what  the  U.S.  government  bel ieves  the  outcome should  
be ,  say ,  God forbid ,  some sor t  of  conf l ic t  over  Taiwan that  people  can 
deal  wi th  that  kind of  p lanning?  
 DR.  COLE:   I  th ink i t ' s  probably  as  c lear  as  i t ' s  going to  get  
g iven the  geost ra tegic  s i tuat ion among China  and Taiwan and the  
Uni ted  Sta tes  as  wel l  as  everything e lse  that ' s  going on in  East  Asia .  
 I t ' s  jus t  not  ar i thmet ic ;  i t ' s  ca lculus ,  and I  think that  p lanners  are  
never  going to  have perfect  knowledge and unfor tunate ly  never  have 
perfec t  pol i t ical  di rect ion  even,  and I  th ink they ' re  press ing on 
probably  as  bes t  as  we can expect  r ight  now.   I 'm not  saying there 's  not  
a  problem;  I 'm jus t  not  sure  how to  f ix  i t  or  make i t  be t ter .  
 REAR ADMIRAL McVADON:  I  th ink i t ' s  wor th  reemphasiz ing 
Dr .  Cole 's  point  there .   I t ' s  hard  for  me to  imagine  that  any president  
of  the  Uni ted Sta tes  i s  qui te  cer ta in  as  to  how he wants  that  outcome to  
be  r ight  now beyond opposing a  mi l i tary  solut ion.   So as  a  p lanner  
you ' re  working,  yes ,  a  very  nebulous  s i tuat ion,  but  one a t  leas t  where  
you have some poss ibi l i ty  of  knowing that  cer ta in  mi l i tary  outcomes 
are  des i rable .   Remember  the  i ssue  of ,  for  example ,  do  you s t r ike  the  
mainland or  not  and so  for th?   My point  here  i s  tha t  v ic tory  in  a  war  
wi th  China  may come a t  a  ter r ible  pr ice  to  a l l  par t ies .  
 So the  p lanners  are  deal ing wi th  a  great  many of  those  
di f f icul t ies ,  but  we should  not  be  surpr ised that  there  i s  not  a  c lear  
 pol i t ica l  outcome speci f ied .   I  think i t  would be  imprudent  for  any 
Paci f ic  Commander  to  presume that  he  knows precise ly  which way i t  
wi l l  happen whatever  the  scenar io  i s .   So,  yes ,  i t ' s  an  ext remely  
complex scenar io .  
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 I t  jus t  means  i t ' s  a  very  compl ica ted wor ld  and our  re la t ionship  
wi th  China  and the  Taiwan issue  are  among the  most  compl ica ted  of  a l l  
those  a lmost  imponderable  aspects  that  we have to  deal  wi th .  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Thank you.  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  Thank you.   I  apprecia te  the  
d iscuss ion we 've  been having about  mi l i tary  speci f ics .   I 'd  l ike  to  
broaden the  discuss ion s l ight ly ,  and i f  you don ' t  want  to ,  you te l l  me.   
I  f ind i t  d i f f icul t  in  terms of  the  decis ion for  China  to  go to  war  over  
Taiwan not  to  consider  a l l  sor t s  of  o ther  impl ica t ions ,  not  s imply  
whether  we send a  carr ier  group there  or  not ,  and what  can happen to  
that .  
 But  le t ' s  say  whether  they can expor t  anything over  the  next  
per iod,  the  next  three  months ,  s ix  months ,  a  year ,  and what  the  
impl ica t ions  of  tha t  might  be?   And I  a lso  f igure  that  our  fo lks ,  
cer ta inly  our  c ivi l ian  leadership ,  wi l l  be  worrying about  the  impact  of  
tha t  on the  economy of  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  l ike  maybe we won ' t  be  able  
to  buy c lothing for  awhi le  or  shoes  or  toas ters  or  microwave ovens .  
 So how does  the  p lanning consider  those  re la t ively  large-scale  
considera t ions?   I  jus t  haven ' t  ta lked to  the  people  in  the  government  
who I  th ink should  be  th inking about  that .   Tel l  me,  how are  people  
th inking about  that  r ight  now? 
 REAR ADMIRAL McVADON:  This  sounds  l ike  I 'm pat t ing 
mysel f  on  the  back.   I  don ' t  mean i t  tha t  way.   However ,  for  a t  leas t  ten  
years--I  th ink I  made my f i rs t  speech on th is  mat ter  on  the  20th  
anniversary  of  the  Taiwan Rela t ions  Act ,  so  that  was  1999.   I ’ve  made 
exact ly  the  point  tha t  you ' re  making,  tha t  China  must  take  in to  
account ,  and we must  he lp  them real ize  they should  take  into  account ,  
the  broader  consequences  for  China  of  an a t tack on Taiwan.  
 Of  course ,  what  China  has  rea l ly to  be  proud of  in  the  las t  
quar ter  century  is  i t s  economic development ,  and a l l  of  tha t ,  as  I 've  
pointed out  today,  could  be  sore ly  jeopardized.  
 The fu ture  of  the  regime could  be  jeopardized.   Al l  of  those  
th ings  are  cer ta in ly  th ings  to  be  taken in to  account ,  but  you take  me 
beyond what  I  have given any thought  when you ask  what  are  the  
consequences  for  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  of  tha t  sor t  of  th ing.   Of  course  you 
pointed  out  tha t  we are  a  major  t rading par tner  wi th China ,  and so ,  yes ,  
i t  has  those  factors .  
 But  as  far  as  mi l i tary  p lanning is  concerned,  tha t  probably  i s  not  
something that  we want  the  mi l i tary  planner  to  be  concerned wi th .   Of  
course  we hope that  a t  the  NSC and among senior  government  leaders  
 tha t  those  fac tors  are  cer ta inly  wel l  unders tood.  
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 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  I  apprecia te  tha t ,  which is  why I  
prefaced my remarks  the  way I  d id .   You wanted to  answer  something? 
 MR.  COZAD:  Yes .   With  th is  discuss ion on the  Taiwan Stra i t  
mi l i tary  balance ,  you know this  i s  a  very  smal l  por t ion .   I  shouldn ' t  say 
a  smal l  por t ion;  i t ' s  one  por t ion of  a  much broader  Chinese  ca lcula t ion 
of  how they view themselves  in  the  world  and in  the  region.   I t ' s  a  
concept  known as  comprehensive  nat ional  power ,  that  i s  an  assessment  
tha t  they make on a  regular  bas is  of  thei r  power  re la t ive  to  o ther  wor ld  
powers  based on a  ser ies  of  fac tors .   Mil i tary  power  i s  one  par t  of  that .  
 There  are  o thers  such as  economic  power ,  domest ic  secur i ty  and 
a  whole  host  of  o ther  calculat ions  tha t  go  in to  tha t .   In  terms of  how 
that  would  fac tor  in to  their  decis ion-making in  a  cross-Stra i t  cr is is ,  I  
th ink that  would depend on how s t r ic t  or  how extreme the  s i tua t ion 
was .  
 I  don ' t  see  a  mi l i ta ry  confronta t ion  as  being China 's  f i rs t  opt ion.   
I  th ink the  mi l i tary bui ldup,  f i r s t  and foremost ,  has  to  be  seen as  a  
resul t  of  Chinese  d iscomfor t  wi th  thei r  pos i t ion  in  1999-2000 t ime 
f rame.   They had to  get  capabi l i t ies  on the  shel f  to  be  able  to  g ive 
themselves  a  range of  opt ions  so  that  they could  deal  wi th  fu ture  
cont ingencies  in  the  Taiwan Stra i t .  
 Now,  that  factors  s igni f icant ly  into the  res t  of  that  equat ion 
because  as  China  becomes more  mi l i tar i ly  confident  in  the  capabi l i t ies  
that  i t  can  use to  deter  Taiwan moves  towards  independence,  i t  g ives  
them a  wider  range of  movement  where  they can pursue  economic and 
diplomat ic  goals  to  t ry  to  in tegrate  Taiwan back in to  thei r  fo ld .  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  The point  tha t  I  was  t ry ing to  make 
is  tha t  I  don ' t  hear  our  own leadership  speaking to  the  quest ion of  
economic  impact  of  war  in  the  Taiwan Stra i t .   Publ ic ly ,  our  d iplomats  
don ' t  ta lk  about  i t ;  I  haven ' t  read a  lo t  of  l i te rature  about  i t .   To the  
American publ ic ;  I  don ' t  mean doing a  book that  2 ,000 people  read or  
20,000,  but  a  few more--  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  My book.   Andrew held  h is  
book up.  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  The f i t  wi thin  the  overal l  s t ra tegic  
re la t ionship ,  i t ' s  a  ser ious  d iscuss ion.   Some people  would  argue that  
an  economic  impact  on the  Uni ted States  might  act  as  a  res t ra int  on 
U.S.  mi l i ta ry  power  or  the  use  of  U.S.  mi l i tary  power ,  i .e . ,  the  fear  of  
the  impact ,  the  economic  impact  to  the  Uni ted Sta tes .   Maybe we 
should  le t  Taiwan go i f  they,  you know--  
 REAR ADMIRAL McVADON:  I  shan ' t  enter  in to  that  argument  
th is  af ternoon,  par t icular ly  a t  th is  hour ,  but  i t - -  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  I 'm not  arguing the  point .   I 'm 
rais ing  i t .  
  REAR ADMIRAL McVADON:  But  i t  does  make the  point  tha t  i t  
i s  much more  prudent  for  us  to  do as  we did  and discuss  wi th  China  i t s  
ro le  as  a  s takeholder  in  the  in ternat ional  s i tua t ion,  in  o ther  words ,  to  
remind China  of  i t s  reputa t ion as  a  responsible  member  of  the  
communi ty  of  nat ions ,  and to  emphasize  a l l  of  those  things,  ra ther  than 
the  U.S.  s ide  of  i t ,  as  you pointed out .   So i t  seems to  me maybe  our  
people  have thought  that  through and had the  r ight  d iscuss ion wi th  the  
r ight  people  in  Bei j ing .  
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 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  Thank you.   Thank you very  much.  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Dr .  Cole ,  you ra ised a  point  
that  I  agreed wi th  and i t  brought  up another  quest ion.   You ta lked 
about  speed,  and I  agree  wi th  you,  I  th ink you are  absolute ly  correct ,  
that  we should  not  have been surpr i sed by any of  the  developments  in  
People 's  Libera t ion Army mil i tary  growth or  d i rect ion.  
 There  have  been a  lo t  of  indicators  these  were  happening,  but  I  
f rankly  was  surpr ised by the  speed with  which some of  them happened.   
You sa id  that - -and actual ly Genera l  Car twr ight  made that  point  in  the  
las t  panel  very  c lear ly- - these things  are  happening quickly .  
 In  the  pas t ,  we used to  say,  wel l ,  as  we were  looking a t  the  PLA,  
you know,  i t  takes  them years  to  get  anything f ie lded,  and then of  
course  when they f ie ld  i t ,  they don ' t  know how to  use  i t  for  another  
decade.   Has  tha t  t ime compressed?   So we 're  surpr ised  when they f ie ld  
i t  now?  I t  came fas ter  than we thought .   But  has  the  t ime f rom f ie ld ing 
to  being able  to  employ i t  opera t ional ly  a lso  become quicker  and what  
does  that  mean for  us?   
 DR.  COLE:   I  th ink that  1996 presents  a  good s tar t ing date  for  
looking a t  tha t  sor t  of  th ing.   I f  we look a t  the  very  smal l  ship  c lasses ,  
for  ins tance ,  tha t  were  bui l t  by  the  Chinese  dur ing the  1990s ,  very  
heavi ly  dependent  on fore ign technology and so  for th ,  we now see  a  
s i tuat ion  where  those  ship  c lasses  seem to  be  increasing in  number  and 
are  more  quickly  integrated  in to  the  operat ing  f lee t .  
 I  th ink,  as  I 've  argued e lsewhere ,  tha t  the  most  s igni f icant  
advances  made by the  PLA in  the  las t  decade and a  hal f  are  not  so 
much the  hardware  they 've  acqui red as  the  way they 've  complete ly  
overhauled the  personnel  t ra in ing sys tem and educat ion sys tem and the  
way f rom a  Navy perspect ive ,  the  way they have s ignif icant ly  changed 
the  way the  f leet  i s  t ra ined fol lowing our  example  qui te  f rankly  in  a  
much more  sys temic  sor t  of  way.  
 So I  do  th ink that  we are  see ing a  more  concentra ted  effor t ,  not  
necessar i ly  speeded up perhaps ,  but  much more  coherent ,  and I  th ink 
they ' re  get t ing  capable  operat ional  uni ts  more  quickly  than they used 
to .   I  would  agree  wi th  you on that .  
 MR.  COZAD:  And i f  I  could  add on to  that ,  as  wel l .   In  2001,  I  
th ink one of  the  big  changes  that  we saw was the  development  and the  
 i ssuance  of  the  mi l i tary  t ra in ing and evaluat ion program within  the  
PLA.   That  was  a  new guidel ine  that  went  across  a l l  the  d i f ferent  
services  and i t  se t  up  s tandards  across  the  PLA in  terms of  t ra in ing 
content ,  miss ion speci f ic  t ra in ing,  and a lso  evaluat ion programs.  
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 They 've  had f i t s  and s tar ts  on  a l l  of  those ,  but  every  t ime they 've  
come up to  a  problem,  they 've  implemented a  program to  t ry  to  address  
tha t  problem.   I  would  say r ight  now we haven ' t  necessar i ly  seen a  t ime 
l ine  that  i s  shrunk in  terms of  f ie ld ing to  opera t ional  capaci ty,  but  I  do 
expect  as  they get  more  and more  down this  road and they get  
processes  to  develop tac t ics ,  techniques  and procedures  and bet ter  
educate  the i r  off icer  corps  and the i r  NCO corps  tha t  we wi l l  see  a  
compressed t ime l ine  on those .  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Did we help  teach them to  do 
that  wi th  our  mi l i tary  exchanges?  
 MR.  COZAD:  I  don ' t  know i f  I  would  say that ' s  through the  
mi l i tary  exchanges ,  but  they do have,  they have  a  very  act ive  program 
worldwide  mi l i tary- to-mi l i tary  engagement  and I  th ink that  there  are  a  
lo t  of  benef i ts  that  they ' re  der iv ing from those  programs.   
 DR.  COLE:   I  would  jus t  say  tha t  when I  used to  escor t  PLA 
groups  in  the  '90s ,  in  the  ear ly  '90s ,  one  of  the  f i rs t  ques t ions  was  
a lways  about  our  ROTC programs,  which they la ter  in  the  '90s  se t  up.   
I 'm not  so  sure  tha t ' s  an  i ssue  of  b laming mi l - to-mi l  exchanges ,  but  
they cer ta in ly  have been observing very  c losely ,  cer ta inly s ince  Deser t  
Storm,  everything we do and t ry ing to  emulate  those  th ings  they th ink 
are  benef ic ia l  to  them.  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Thank you.   Commiss ioner  
Esper .  
 REAR ADMIRAL McVADON:  Larry ,  le t  me add jus t  one  quick  
point  on that .   A lo t  of  i t ,  though,  i s  s t i l l  words ,  more  words  than 
concre te  ac t ions .   Yes ,  the  f i rs t  s tep  in  progress  i s  to  recognize  the 
problem,  but  they ' re  s t i l l  not  doing th ings  l ike  tes t ing thei r  weapons to  
the  maximum range and a l l  those  k inds  of  th ings .   So there  i s  s t i l l  a  lot  
tha t  they ' re  fa l l ing  shor t  on .  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:   Commiss ioner  Esper .  
 COMMISSIONER ESPER:  Thank you,  and I  apprecia te  Dr .  
Wortzel  br inging th is  up because  i t  was  ment ioned about  modernizat ion 
and the  t ransparency comment .   I  asked the  ques t ion in  the  f i rs t  panel  
today:   what  they ' re  moderniz ing is  important ,  but  equal ly  impor tant ,  i f  
not  more  so ,  i s  why?   And that ' s  what  I 'm very  cur ious  about ,  i s  what  
i s  the  purpose  for  which they are  moderniz ing and redes igning and 
reconfigur ing  the i r  mi l i tary  forces?  
 And i t ' s  not  jus t  the  i r regular  asymmetr ic  aspects  of  th is  
modernizat ion for  which we began today’s  sess ion,  but  i t ' s  across  the  
board .   I t ' s  convent ional  navy,  a i r  force ,  and army.   I t ' s  s t ra tegic  wi th  
 the i r  Second Art i l le ry .   I t  jus t  begs  the  ques t ion as  to  what  i s  the  
purpose ,  which I  th ink is  why the  t ransparency quest ion becomes a l l  
the  more  important - - that  we unders tand whether  i t ' s  to  ensure  the  
in tegr i ty  of  the  s ta te  and s tabi l i ty?   Or  i s  i t  focused on Taiwan?  Is  i t  
in tended to  secure  the i r  sea  l ines  of  communicat ion?   I f  so ,  how far  
out?   Al l  the  way to  the  Pers ian  Gulf?    
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 To me,  these  are  the  fundamenta l  ques t ions ,  and I  don ' t  know i f  
any of  you have any comments  on that  or  can answer  that  quest ion? 
 REAR ADMIRAL McVADON:  Let  me give  the  most  succinct  
answer  I  can.   They are  focused on deterr ing  a  confl ic t  wi th  Taiwan or  
being able  to  defeat  Taiwan and to  be  able  to  thwart  our  in tervent ion,  
and a  great  deal  i s  focused on that .   They say i t  and we should  bel ieve 
them.  
 Beyond that ,  they are  beginning to  look beyond Taiwan,  to  
recognize  that  ocean commerce is  absolute ly  v i ta l  to  them,  and that  
they need to  be  able  to  protec t  i t .   With  respect  to  bal l i s t ic  miss i les ,  
le t  me offer  a  thought .  They are  not  going to  le t  any miss i le  defenses  
we develop be  able  to  keep them from having a  deter rent  force .  
 DR.  COLE:   I  think,  s i r ,  tha t  the  bas ic  reason for  modernizing 
the  mi l i tary  i s  they bel ieve  i t ' s  par t  of  being a  great  power ,  and they 
deserve  the  g lobal  respect ,  and now they 've  got  the  money to  be  able  to 
do that .  
 Having sa id  that ,  I  th ink a t  one  level ,  they ' re  s imply  concerned 
about  border  secur i ty .   I  th ink they bel ieve ,  i f  you ask  a  PLA analys t  a t  
the  Academy of  Mil i tary  Sciences or  a t  thei r  Nat ional  Defense  
Univers i ty  what  the  mi l i ta ry threa t  to  China  i s ,  they ' l l  say  Japan,  and 
they ' l l  say  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .   They see  us  cont inuing to  modernize .   
They ' re  f rankly  awed by the  performance in  Deser t  Storm and a  lo t  of  
the  operat ions  they 've  observed in  I raq  and Afghanis tan .  
 At  a  lower  level ,  they are  focused on Taiwan,  I  agree  wi th 
Admira l  McVadon on that ,  and beyond Taiwan,  I  think that  the  navy 
planners  in  Bei j ing are  cer ta inly ,  I  am sure ,  s inging a  song about  sea  
l ines ,  of  defending sea  l ines  of  communicat ions  loud and c lear .   I 'm 
not  sure  how much of  a  hear ing they ' re  rece iving by the PLA 
leadership  r ight  now,  but  I  do  bel ieve  that ' s  something that  they are  
probably  going to  pursue  in  the  future ,  assuming they bel ieve  that  the  
Taiwan s i tuat ion is  under  control .  
 COMMISSIONER ESPER:  Thank you a l l .  
 MR.  COZAD:  I  would  agree  wi th  Dr .  Cole 's  point .   One of  the  
ques t ions  that  we regular ly  get  asked is  i f  the  Taiwan s i tuat ion  were 
resolved tomorrow,  would  China  cont inue  on i t s  mi l i tary  moderniza t ion 
program,  and we say yes .  
 We bel ieve  that  Taiwan has  served as  a  mechanism to  focus  tha t  
modernizat ion and focus  i t  on  cer ta in  key capabi l i ty  areas ,  but  that  
 even absent  tha t ,  tha t  des i re  to  be  a  g lobal  power ,  as  I  ment ioned,  the  
concept  of  comprehensive  nat ional  power ,  having a  modern  mi l i tary  i s  
an  absolute ly  crucia l  component  to  tha t .  
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 In  terms of  the i r  abi l i ty  to  look beyond Taiwan,  I  th ink energy 
secur i ty  i s  a  big i ssue .   One of  the  things we ' re  not  see ing are  those  
discuss ions  about  energy--outs ide  of  the  navy actual ly--are  energy 
secur i ty  dr iv ing a  PLA Navy force  modernizat ion ef for t .   They 
recognize  that  th is  could  be  a  problem,  but  I  th ink i t ' s  ear ly  s tages  of  
tha t  discuss ion.  
 In  terms of  the i r  g lobal  engagement ,  much of  tha t  has  been 
mi l i tary dip lomacy or  actual  d iplomacy,  and so there  are  jus t  a  lot  of  
th ings  tha t  are  churning r ight  now,  but  I  do  think the  Taiwan Stra i t  
wi l l  cont inue  to  focus  thei r  modernizat ion ef for ts  unt i l  the  s i tuat ion is  
resolved or  unt i l  they feel  that  they absolute ly  have i t  in  hand.  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Gent lemen,  thank you very  
much for  some thoughtful  remarks  and an excel lent  panel .   I  want  to  
take  the  t ime,  too,  to  thank Shannon Knight  and Luke Armerding on 
the  Commiss ion s taf f .   I  know you 've  been in  touch wi th  them,  but  they 
suppor ted  us  very  wel l  in  helping to  ar range th is  hear ing and giving us  
the  suppor t  to  se lec t  out  a  group of  wi tnesses  that  are  as  good as  you 
have been.  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  With  that ,  we are  c los ing for  
today.   Thank you very  much,  everybody.   We ' l l  be  back a t  8 :30 
tomorrow morning.  
 [Whereupon,  a t  4 :00 p .m. ,  the  hearing recessed,  to  reconvene a t  
8 :34 a .m. ,  Fr iday,  March 30,  2007.]  
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FRIDAY,  MARCH 30,  1007  
 
U.S. -CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION 
  Washington,  D.C.  
 
  
 
 The commiss ion met  in  Room 562,  Dirksen Senate  Off ice  
Bui ld ing,  Washington,  D.C.  a t  8 :34 a .m. ,  Chairman Carolyn 
Bar tholomew and Commiss ioners  Wil l iam A.  Reinsch and Larry  M.  
Wortze l  (Hear ing Cochairs ) ,  presiding.  
 
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CAROLYN 
BARTHOLOMEW 
 
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Welcome to  the  second day of  
our  hear ing on China 's  Mil i tary  Modernizat ion:  I t s  Impact  on the  
Uni ted  Sta tes  and the  Asia-Paci f ic .  
 Yesterday we heard  tes t imony f rom the  Commander  of  the  U.S.  
St ra tegic  Command and a  representa t ive  of  the  Defense In tel l igence 
Agency and a  number  of  pr ivate  sector  and academic  exper ts  gave us  
thei r  analys is  of  the  regional  impact  of  China 's  mi l i tary  moderniza t ion 
as  wel l  as  i t s  impact  on  the  secur i ty  of  the  Uni ted Sta tes .  
 Today,  we wi l l  cont inue to  examine the  moderniza t ion of  the  
People 's  Libera t ion Army wi th  a  special  emphasis  on  asymmetr ic  
capabi l i t ies  as  wel l  as  recent ly  demonstra ted space  and counterspace 
capabi l i t ies .   We look forward to  the  tes t imony of  today 's  panel is ts ,  
who are  some of  the  foremost  exper ts  s tudying these  issues .  
 With  that ,  I ' l l  turn  the  microphone and the  gavel  over  to  the  
hear ing cochair ,  Commiss ioner  Bi l l  Reinsch,  who wi l l  chai r  today 's  
panels .   Thank you.  
 
OPENING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER WILLIAM A.  
REINSCH, HEARING COCHAIR 
 
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thank you.   The issues  we ' re  
going to  explore  today are  impor tant ,  not  because  conf l ic t  wi th  China  
 i s  l ike ly ,  but  because  the  cos t  of  miscalcula t ion is  unaffordably  high.  
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 For  th is  reason,  i t ' s  impor tant  that  we unders tand as  bes t  we can 
the  in tent ions  behind China 's  mi l i ta ry and s t ra tegic  p lanning.   In  the  
las t  decade,  the  Chinese  mi l i tary  has  expanded i t s  technologica l  
sophis t ica t ion and power  project ion to  a  greater  extent  than in  any 
previous  t ime in  the las t  century .  
 In  October  2003,  China  became the  th i rd  country  to  put  a  human 
being in to  space .   In  January 2007,  China  a lso  became the  th i rd 
country  to  in tent ional ly  dest roy a  sate l l i te  in  space .   Three  months  
pr ior  to  the  ant i -sa te l l i te  launch,  Bei j ing re leased a  space  whi te  paper  
which gives  the  assurance  tha t ,  quote ,  "China  is  unf l inching in  taking 
the  road of  peaceful  development  and a lways mainta ins  tha t  outer  
space  i s  the  commonweal th  of  mankind."  
 Al l  of  these recent  developments  indicate  that  China  i s  rapidly  
becoming more  technological ly  sophis t icated .   Were  our  effor ts  to  
coexis t  peaceful ly  to  fai l  and we were  to  f ind ourse lves  in  a  conf l ic t  
over  Taiwan or  something e lse ,  the i r  asymmetr ica l  mi l i tary  capabi l i t ies  
could  lengthen the  conf l ic t  and make i t  considerably  more  d i f f icul t  and 
expensive  for  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .  
 The quest ion for  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  and for  the  Congress  in  
par t icular ,  i s  what  should  we do about  a l l  this?   How can we best  
protect  our  fundamenta l  nat ional  in teres ts  whi le  ac t ing as  a  responsible  
member  of  the  communi ty  of  nat ions?  
 The Commiss ion great ly  apprec ia tes  the  wi tnesses  who are  
appear ing today and those  who appeared yes terday,  shar ing thei r  
wisdom about  how these  ques t ions  should  be  answered.  
 We have two panels  th is  morning.   The f i rs t  wi l l  address  China 's  
informat ion warfare ,  miss i le  warfare ,  cyber  opera t ions  and other  
d isrupt ive  capabi l i t ies .   And the  second wi l l  focus  speci f ica l ly  on what  
China 's  mi l i tary  object ives  are  in  space .  
 Those  who are  on the  f i rs t  panel  have been asked to  g ive  thei r  
v iews on the  technologies  tha t  are  being developed for  or  are  a l ready 
employed in  the  Chinese  mi l i tary that  could thwar t  the  qual i ta t ive  
super ior i ty  of  U.S.  forces  including technologies  used for  conduct ing 
informat ion warfare ,  cyber  a t tacks  and counterspace  s t r ikes .  
 Today 's  two wi tnesses  are  Dr .  James Lewis ,  who is  the  Director  
of  the  Technology and Publ ic  Pol icy  Program at  the  Center  for  
St ra tegic  and Internat ional  Studies .   Before  joining the  CSIS,  he  was  a  
career  d ip lomat  and worked on a  range of  nat ional  secur i ty  i ssues  in  
that  capaci ty ,  an  in t roduct ion which unders ta tes  both  his  background 
and his  capabi l i t ies .  
 He has  a  long career  both  a t  the  Sta te  Depar tment  and a t  the  
former  Bureau of  Expor t  Adminis t rat ion,  now the  Bureau of  Indust ry  
and Secur i ty  a t  the  Depar tment  of  Commerce .  
  Our  second wi tness ,  who is  on his  way,  I 'm to ld ,  i s  Dr .  Ehsan 
Ahrar i ,  who is  a  professor  a t  the  Asia-Paci f ic  Center  for  Secur i ty  
Studies  in  Honolulu ,  Hawai i .   He has  authored numerous  books  and 
journal  ar t ic les  and specia l izes  in  U.S.  s t ra tegic  i ssues  af fect ing the  
Middle  East  and par ts  of  Asia  including China .  
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 Let  me remind the  panel is ts  tha t  in i t ia l  remarks  should  be  l imi ted  
to  seven minutes .   When you reach the  f ive-minute  mark,  the  yel low 
l ight  wi l l  be  i l luminated in  the  box in  f ront  of  you.   When your  ful l  
seven minutes  has  been consumed,  the  red  l ight  wi l l  be  i l luminated.  
 I f  you reach that  point ,  p lease  t ry  to  wrap up as  quickly  as  you 
can.   I  want  to  emphasize  that  your  ent i re  prepared s ta tement  as  you 
submit ted i t  wi l l  be  put  in  the  hear ing record  and that ,  in  turn ,  wi l l  be  
posted  on the  Commiss ion 's  Web s i te ,  a long wi th  the  t ranscr ip t  of  your  
ora l  tes t imony and the  dia logue wi th  commiss ioners  that  wi l l  fo l low.  
  
PANEL V: INFORMATION WARFARE, MISSILE WARFARE, 
CYBER OPERATIONS,  AND OTHER DISRUPTIVE 
CAPABILITIES OF THE PLA 
  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  We 're  p leased to  cont inue  the  
hear ing th is  morning and to  have our  panel is ts  wi th  us .   We ' l l  begin  
wi th  Dr .  Lewis .  
 
STATEMENT OF JAMES A.  LEWIS 
DIRECTOR AND SENIOR FELLOW OF THE TECHNOLOGY AND 
PUBLIC POLICY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,  WASHINGTON, D.C.  
 
 DR.  LEWIS:   Thank you,  Mr.  Chairman,  and I  thank the  
Commiss ion for  the  oppor tuni ty  to  tes t i fy .   This  i s  an  area  I 've  been 
s tudying for  the  las t  f ive  or  s ix  years ,  and I 've  put  out  f ive  or  s ix  
repor ts ,  one  a  year  s ince  I 've  been a t  CSIS,  on issues  of  cyber  secur i ty  
and asymmetr ic  warfare .  So my remarks  summarize  the  research I 've  
done.   I 'd  be  happy to  provide  that  i f  there 's  any in teres t .  
 What  I 'd  l ike  to  comment  on is  the  changes in  the  na ture  of  
warfare ,  the  impl ica t ion  of  these  changes  for  mi l i tary  moderniza t ion 
and the  chal lenge these  pose  for  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .   The f i rs t  change--
you a l l  know this- - i s  the  development  of  a  h igh tech informat ion 
in tens ive  mode of  combat .   The U.S.  p ioneered this .   The U.S.  i s  the  
world 's  leader  in  i t ,  and i t  g ives  us  an  amazing degree  of  convent ional  
mi l i tary  super ior i ty ,  more  than any other  force  tha t  we could  face .  
 The resul t  of  that  i s  tha t  our  opponents  are  looking for  new kinds  
of  weapons  and a t tacks ,  th ings  they can do that  g ive  them asymmetr ic  
advantage,  avoiding conf l ic t  where  the  U.S.  i s  s t rong,  in  the  
 convent ional  arena ,  for  example ,  and a t tacking where  the  U.S.  i s  weak.   
These  are  the  things  tha t  the  Chinese  are  explor ing a t  the  same t ime 
they ' re  bui ld ing thei r  convent ional  mi l i tary  forces .   This  expla ins ,  I  
th ink,  some of  the  mi l i tary  moderniza t ion.  
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 I 'd  l ike  to  put  i t  in a  larger  context  though.   Some of  i t ,  as  you ' re  
wel l  aware ,  i s  s t i l l  a  degree  of  recovery .   We could probably discuss  
how far  they 've  recovered from the  mis takes  the  Chinese  made for  the  
f i rs t  30  years  of  the  People 's  Republ ic in  bui ld ing thei r  mi l i ta ry  forces .  
 They ' re  deeply  concerned with  pres t ige .   A lot  of  th is  i s ,  ‘ i f  the  
Indians  have  a  carr ier ,  I  should  have  a  carr ier ,  too .”   They 'd  l ike  to  be  
recognized as  the  paramount  power  in  the  Asia-Paci f ic  region,  and th is  
i s  where  the  chal lenge for  the  U.S.  ar ises .  
 There 's  a lso  been a  theme for  decades  in  Chinese  thinking about  
ca tching up to  the  West ,  or  even leapfrogging,  adopt ing new 
technologies  tha t  wi l l  put  them ahead of  the  former  great  powers ,  and 
the  not ion of  leapfrogging re inforces  Chinese  th inking about  
asymmetr ic  advantage .   There 's  some magical  th ing you can develop 
that  wi l l  immediately  give  you a  bet ter  capabi l i ty .  
 China 's  mi l i ta ry  i s  not  a  peer  to  the  U.S. ,  but  i t  i s  a  chal lenger .   
The chal lenge comes f rom this  combinat ion of  growing convent ional  
capabi l i t ies  and f rom the  pursui t  of  asymmetr ic  advantage.   Seeking 
asymmetr ic  advantage  is  not  new and the  Chinese  are  not  the  only  
people  to  be  seeking i t .  
 What  i s  new is  the  means  used to  gain tha t  asymmetr ic  
advantage.   One of  the  programs ,  and I  apologize ,  but  I  had got  
s l ight ly  mixed s ignals  on what  I  was  ta lk ing about ,  so  I  have a  l i t t le  
b i t  of  ant i -sate l l i te  informat ion in  here .  
  
 I  hope I  note  somewhere  in  here ,  tha t  there  i s  a  connect ion in  
that  one  of  the  bes t  ways you can a t tack sa te l l i tes  i s  to  a t tack the  cyber  
networks  that  suppor t  them.   So there  i s  a  c lear  l ink here  in  my mind 
and probably  in  the  mind of  the  Chinese .  
 China  has  expended considerable  ef for t  on ant i -sa te l l i te  weapons  
and informat ion opera t ions .  These  I  th ink are  the  pr imary areas  a long 
wi th  perhaps  a t tacks  on our  carr iers  for  asymmetr ic  warfare ,  and a t  th is  
point ,  however ,  ne i ther  ant i -sa te l l i te  weapons  nor  informat ion 
opera t ions  pose  much r i sk to  U.S.  mi l i ta ry  super ior i ty .  
 The U.S.  can undercut  many of  these  Chinese  ef for ts  i f  i t  has  a  
robust  response .   Space  is  an  area  of  asymmetr ic  advantage and one 
way to  counter  China 's  ef for ts  i s  to  cont inue to  aggress ively  pursue  the 
USA symmetr ic  advantage  in  space .  
 Pr ior  to  the  ant i -sa te l l i te  tes t ,  many nat ions ,  inc luding China ,  
cast igated the  U.S.  for  i t s  planned mil i tary  ac t iv i t ies  in  space .   My 
own view is  tha t  space  arms control  i s  not  in  the  U.S.  in teres t ;  i t  would 
 not  advance U.S.  na t ional  secur i ty .   My formal  s ta tement  g ives  a  
number  of  reasons  why th is  i s  so ,  but  the  pr imary reasons  are  tha t  a  
ban on space  mi l i tar iza t ion,  on  space  weapons ,  would  be unver i f iable  
and we are  not  negot ia t ing wi th  a  par tner  who has  e i ther  exper ience or  
credibi l i ty .  
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 Ant i -sa te l l i te  weapons ,  however ,  may not  pose  the  greates t  
threat ,  and I  want  to  h ighl ight  two par t icular  th ings  for  the  
Commiss ion to  th ink about .   We should  assume that  the  Chinese  are  
working on decept ion and denia l  ef for ts  including jamming of  sa te l l i te  
s ignals  and spoof ing of  targets .  
 This  involves ,  for  example ,  s tudying the  s ignature  of  a  weapon.   
What  i s  the  heat  s ignature  of  a  tank?   What  i s  the  heat  s ignature  of  a  
miss i le  sys tem?  And then f inding a  way to  dupl icate  that  s ignature  in  
a  decoy.   This  worked very  wel l  in  Kosovo.  
 The Chinese  and others  have  s tudied the  exper ience  in  Kosovo 
where  Serbian forces  were  able  to  confuse  U.S.  sensors  and use  a  
combinat ion of  concealment ,  mobi l i ty  and decept ion to  defeat  our  
h igh- tech mode of  warfare .   Now,  defeat  might  be  a  l i t t le  
overs ta tement ,  but  there  are  th ings  that  you can do,  and our  opponents  
including China  are  explor ing them,  to  make i t  harder  for  us  to  win,  
g iven the  way we f ight  wars .  
 Denia l  and decept ion are  one par t  of  informat ion warfare .   
Another  informat ion warfare  tact ic  i s  to  corrupt  data  af ter  i t ' s  been 
col lec ted  or  damage the  computer  networks  that  process  and dis t r ibute 
data  and that  suppor t  decis ion-making.  
 China has  targeted U.S.  informat ion systems as  a  vulnerable  
component  of  our  new high tech s ty le  of  combat .    
 In  the  larger  sense ,  informat ion technologies  are  a  pr imary target  
for  asymmetr ic  a t tack.   Gaining informat ion super ior i ty  i s  the  hal lmark 
of  the  new s ty le  of  warfare  and i f  you can in ter rupt  or  damage that  
informat ion super ior i ty ,  you erode your  opponents '  capabi l i t ies .   
Conf l ic t  in  cyber  space  i s  c landest ine .   I t  can  be  d i f f icul t  to  assess  
in tent ions and threats .  
 I t ' s  eas ier  to  assess  vulnerabi l i t ies .   U.S.  ne tworks  are  very 
vulnerable  f rom an in tel l igence  perspect ive ,  which i s  the  perspect ive  
I 'm more  in teres ted  in .   Severa l  nat ions  including China  have  exploi ted 
these  vulnerabi l i t ies  in  U.S.  ne tworks  to  gain valuable  informat ion.   
These  ef for ts  and our  own inadequate  response  have damaged U.S.  
na t ional  secur i ty .   I t ' s  safe  to  assume that  in  the  event  of  a  conf l ic t ,  a  
fore ign opponent  would  a t tempt  to  exploi t  our  vulnerable  networks  to  
d isrupt  or  damage mi l i tary  opera t ions  including sa te l l i te  opera t ions .  
 The centra l  point  to  consider  in this  assessment ,  however ,  i s  how 
closely  l inked are  mi l i tary  capabi l i t ies  and informat ion networks?  I f  
there  i s  redundancy in  networks  or  i f  ne tworks  are  res i l ient ,  cyber  
 at tacks  wi l l  not  do much damage.  
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 My own view,  and the  view I  have s ta ted  rout inely  now for  a  
number  of  years ,  i s  tha t  the  press  overs ta tes  the  r i sk of  cyber  a t tack 
and that  cyber  weapons  wi l l  not  provide  China  wi th  a  mi l i tary 
advantage.  
 Surrept i t ious  long- term at tacks  on the  U.S.  economic sys tem 
might  seem at t rac t ive ,  but  I  th ink there  i s  considerable  r i sk  in  them,  
not  only  the  r i sk  of  d iscovery,  but  the  r i sk  that  they could  rebound and 
damage China 's  economy as  much as  they damage the  U.S.  
 Again ,  a  robust  U.S.  prepara t ion can mit igate  the  consequences  
of  cyber  a t tack.   A bet ter  informat ional  warfare  s t ra tegy and again 
something the  Commiss ion might  wish  to  consider  would  be  one that  
focused on increas ing an opponent 's  uncer ta in ty .   An uncer ta in ty  
s t ra tegy makes  an  opponent  unsure  that  they know what  i s  happening,  
unsure  about  the i r  da ta .   F inding ways to  in ject  fa lse  informat ion in to  
the  planning and decis ion processes  or  manipula t ing informat ion that  i s  
a l ready in  the  sys tem can provide mi l i ta ry  advantage .  
 The Chinese  are  famil iar  wi th  the  use  of  fa lse  or  misleading 
informat ion to  confuse  thei r  opponents  and we should  not  d iscount  the 
possib i l i ty  tha t  they ' l l  pursue  an informat ional  s t ra tegy that  seeks  to 
expand uncer ta inty  and confusion ins tead of  a t tempt ing to  unleash  
what  I  would  consider  an  improbable  e lec t ronic Pear l  Harbor .  
 My assessment  downplays  the  effect  of  both  cyber  and ant i -
sa te l l i te  weapons  in  terms of  the  mi l i tary  balance  between the  U.S.  and 
China .   The r i sk  here  i s  that  the  Chinese  wi l l  miscalculate ,  that  they ' l l  
assume that  the i r  weapons  g ive  them a  much greater  advantage  than 
they ac tual ly  have.  
 They c lear ly  miscalcula ted  the  ant i -sate l l i te  tes t .   I t ' s  fa i r  to  ask  
i f  they could  miscalculate  again  on the  benef i ts  thei r  asymmetr ic  
weapons  give  them or  the  benef i ts  they could  gain  in  a  conf l ic t?  
 We should  a lways  bear  in  mind that  asymmetr ic  weapons  are  
second-best - - r ight- - that  cyber  a t tack ant i -sa tel l i te  weapons  are  not  as  
good as  having convent ional  super ior i ty .   But  i t ' s  fa i r  to  say that  we  
need to  consider  whether  or  not  our  potent ia l  opponents  wi l l  
miscalcula te  th is  and s tar t  a  confl ic t ,  as  we 've  seen happen in  the  past ,  
tha t  they th ink they can win and which they wi l l  not .  
 Thank you.   I ' l l  be  happy to  take  your  quest ions .  
[The s ta tement  fo l lows: ]  
 
Prepared Statement  of  James A.  Lewis ,  Director  and Senior  Fel low 
of  the  Technology and Publ ic  Pol icy Program, Center  for  Strategic  
and Internat ional  Studies ,  Washington,  D.C.  
 
 
Let me thank the Commission for the opportunity to testify.  I would like to talk about changes in the nature 
 of warfare, the implications of these changes for China’s military modernization, and the nature of the 
challenge these changes pose to the U.S. and others. 
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A discussion of these issues would need to consider China’s intentions and capabilities.  China’s intentions 
are unclear – the policy processes in Beijing are opaque when they are not impenetrable, but we can make 
deductions about these intentions by observing the kinds of military capabilities China is acquiring.  There 
needs to be some care taken in making these deductions - modernization could reflect military ambitions, a 
desire for improved defense, a wish to demonstrate prestige and status, or a combination of all of these.  
Any estimate of the effect of China’s military modernization also needs to consider the strengths and 
vulnerabilities of potential opponents, and in particular the U.S.    
 
We should consider China’s military modernization in the context of changes in the nature of warfare.  
Three related developments shape the environment for armed conflict.  The first is the development of a 
high tech, information-intensive style of combat pioneered by the United States in the first Persian Gulf 
War.  The second is the reaction of our potential opponents to the conventional military superiority this 
high tech, information intensive mode of combat has given the U.S.  The third is the development of new 
kinds of weapons and new modes of attack.  In combination the conventional strength provided by the high 
tech, information intensive style of combat adopted by the U.S. means that potential opponents would seek 
asymmetric advantage – avoiding conflict where the U.S. is strong and attacking where the U.S. is weak, 
and they will use unconventional weapons and tactics in doing this.   
 
Modernization  
 
These trends explain some of what China is doing in its military modernization efforts, but they are not the 
full explanation.  China appears to be deeply concerned with prestige, with gaining international 
recognition that it has reclaimed it place among the great nations of the world.  China would also like to be 
recognized as the paramount power in the Asia-Pacific region.  Some of its activities and acquisitions are 
made in the interests of prestige and influence, and the competitors for China in these efforts include not 
only the U.S. but also China’s powerful neighbors; India, Russia and Japan.   
 
China’s military was, for many decades, very poorly adapted to the high tech style of combat that began to 
appear in the 1970s.  A decade ago, China’s military lagged behind the larger powers, such as India.  More 
embarrassingly, it also lagged behind smaller countries like Korea or Singapore in the sophistication of its 
arsenal.  China’s national policies to develop a high tech economy, with efforts like the 863 Program, have 
always had a military component in order to remedy China’s lag in military technology.   
 
There has also been a theme for many decades in Chinese policy and thinking of ‘catching up’ to the west 
or even ‘leapfrogging’ western nations.  The notion that China would be able to find some way to surpass 
other nations remains attractive in China, despite the many failed leapfrogging efforts, and it reinforces 
Chinese thinking about the need to gain asymmetric advantage.  
 
China’s military modernization programs was at first an effort to repair the damage done by Mao’s 
romantic notions of combat and to build the forces needed to deter potential attackers.  It is now an effort to 
assemble the forces needed to assert regional primacy.  China’s likely goal in this modernization is to build 
military forces that are superior to its regional peers, that create the option for quick and successful action 
against Taiwan, and that are capable of defeating U.S. forces in a regional contest. 
 
These are not easy goals to attain, however.  India, Russia, Japan, and even Korea all have formidable 
military forces.  U.S. forces far surpass these nations in their capabilities, and even though the war in Iraq 
has seriously eroded U.S. ground force capabilities, U.S. air and naval forces remain superior to China or 
any other nation.  Nothing China has done in its modernization efforts changes this.  Reaction to China’s 
programs, particularly in Japan, means that the goal of regional supremacy is probably unattainable, but 
this does not mean the Chinese will stop their pursuit of it.   
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Asymmetric Warfare  
 
China is not at all likely to stop its pursuit of capabilities that counter U.S. strengths.  China’s military is 
not a peer to the U.S., but it is a challenger.  The challenge comes from a combination of increased 
conventional capabilities and from the pursuit of asymmetric advantage – using new weapons and tactics to 
attack an opponent in areas where it is weak or vulnerable.  Seeking asymmetric advantage is not new, nor 
is China the only country to seek it.  What is new is the means that U.S. opponents like China and others 
plan to use to gain asymmetric advantage.  One part of the modernization effort looks for ways to counter 
U.S. force projection capabilities.  Other modernization efforts look for ways to erode the U.S. military 
advantage by attacking information and communications assets, including satellites and networks.     
 
China’s military is developing weapons and tactics to produce this erosion.  The most dangerous of these 
programs are those aimed against U.S. carriers.  China has acquired many of the technologies developed by 
the Soviet Union to attack U.S.  Carriers and it is refining these technologies and the tactics needed to use 
them.  Another set of programs id developing anti-satellite capabilities and a third involves information 
operations.  While China has expended considerable effort on anti-satellite weapons and information 
operations, neither activity poses much risk to U.S. military superiority.     
 
Anti-Satellite Weapons 
 
China’s January 2007 anti-satellite test has received much attention.  The test should not have been a 
surprise.  The Chinese have been working on anti-satellite weapons for at least a decade, despite their 
denials.  The particular weapon used in the test – a kinetic intercept of a low earth orbit satellite - is the 
least sophisticated mode of anti-satellite attack, and something that the Soviets and the U.S. developed, 
tested and abandoned decades ago. 
 
China is working on other anti-satellite weapons, and public reports speculate that these include ground-
based lasers and, perhaps, attack satellites.  It also includes cyber attacks against the ground facilities and 
networks that control U.S. space assets.  Since it is clear to most militaries that a good portion of the U.S. 
advantage in combat comes from satellite data, potential opponents like China are searching for ways to 
interfere with these services from space and the networks that support them.   
  
As with many of China’s military modernization programs, a robust U.S. response can undercut China’s 
efforts.  In anti-satellite weapons, the U.S. can reinforce its advantage in space by continuing to harden its 
satellites, by moving to a more flexible military space architecture, by accelerating its Operationally 
Responsive Space programs and by developing alternative technologies, such as high-altitude UAVs and 
mini-satellites.  These alternate technologies could provide ‘space-like’ services that would render attacks 
on satellites useless.  Since the U.S. is already pursuing many of these programs, and given the robustness 
of its satellite fleet, if the Chinese were to use anti-satellite weapons in a clash, they would gain no 
advantage.  It is in the U.S. interest to ensure that this continues to be the case. 
 
Prior to the test, many nations, including China, castigated the U.S. for its plans for future military 
activities in space.  The U.S. ignored them, and this has proven to be the right decision.  Space arms control 
efforts would not help the U.S. retain its military advantage, nor would they make a positive contribution to 
national security.  A UN treaty banning weapons in space would harm U.S. national security.  We would 
observe it; others would not.  One reason China has been an advocate of a treaty is because it calculates that 
an agreement would put the U.S. at a disadvantage.    
 
A ban would be unverifiable, even if there were an inspection regime put in place.  There are many ways to 
attack satellites and the services they provide, and the kinetic weapon China used is the most primitive and 
most detectable means of attack.  No treaty could credibly address all of them.  It is difficult to negotiate 
seriously with a partner who has little experience of arms control and whose credibility, after years of 
 denying that it had anti-satellite programs and asserting that its intentions in space are entirely peaceful, is 
badly tattered.  Space is an area of U.S. military advantage – asymmetric advantage in that no other nation 
can match it.  One way to counter China’s military modernization is to continue to pursue aggressively the 
U.S. asymmetric military advantage in space.              
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However, anti-satellite weapons might not pose the greatest problem for the military space services used by 
the U.S. military.  We should also assume that the Chinese are putting considerable work into deception 
and denial efforts, including jamming of satellites signals, interference with networks, and spoofing of 
targets.  This can involve, for example, carefully studying the signature of a target weapons system that the 
U.S. sensor collects, and then duplicating that signature in a decoy.  Denial and deception efforts may 
actually be of greater concern, since we know from the experience in Kosovo that a skilful combination of 
concealment, mobility and deception can confuse U.S. technical collection.   
 
Informational Warfare 
 
Denial and deception are one aspect of information warfare.  The data collected by sensors is erroneous, 
making the decisions based on that data also erroneous.  Another information warfare tactic would be to 
corrupt stored data, or to damage the computer networks that process and distribute data and support 
decision-making.  Like satellites, China has targeted U.S. information systems as a vulnerable component 
of the U.S. style of combat.   
 
Information technologies are a primary target for asymmetric attack.  Information – an array  of intangible 
goods that include technological know–how, data, statistics, and news, and the networks and processing 
technologies that aggregate, process and distribute it have become an integral part of national power.  
Gaining information superiority, whether through knowing more than an opponent  or from disrupting his 
ability to know, has also become one of the keys to success in conflict. 
 
Conflict in cyberspace is clandestine, so it can be difficult to assess intentions and risks.  It is easier to 
assess the vulnerability of U.S. systems and the potential consequences of an information attack.  U.S. 
networks are very vulnerable.  Even highly sensitive networks used for command and control or 
intelligence are not invulnerable.  From an intelligence perspective, several nations, including China, have 
exploited the vulnerabilities to gain valuable information.  These foreign intelligence efforts and the feeble 
U.S. response have damaged U.S. national security.  It is safe to assume that in the event of a conflict, a 
foreign opponent would also attempt to exploit our vulnerable networks in an attempt to disrupt and 
damage our military operations.                 
 
The central point to consider in this assessment of cyber vulnerability and the consequences of cyber attack 
is the linkage between information systems and military capability.  If U.S. military capabilities depend 
entirely upon information systems, cyber attacks will greatly do considerable damage.  If there is 
redundancy in information systems or if networks are resilient (e.g. they recover quickly), cyber attacks 
will not do much damage.  For the U.S., so far, vulnerability in a computer network does not automatically 
translate into a loss of military capability.  The risks and consequences of cyber attack are routinely 
overstated in the popular press, and cyber attack will not provide China with a decisive military advantage.  
 
One way to assess this risk is to ask whether a cyber attack by China launched a few days in advance of a 
clash could prevent U.S. carrier battle groups from deploying to the Taiwan Straits.  Launching the attacks 
too early would create the risk of discovery and countermeasures.  China could attempt to interfere with 
telecommunications systems – although a successful effort would have to simultaneously disrupt land lines, 
cellphones, the Internet and satellite communications – a next to impossible task.  China could attempt to 
interfere with transportations, ranging from air traffic control to traffic signals to make it more difficult for 
the crews to assemble, although it is hard to see what a cyber attack could add to the gridlock and 
overcrowding that occurs routinely on bad days.  It could attempt to interfere with the electrical grid, which 
could complicate and slow a ship’s departure.  Hackers could take over broadcast radio and TV stations, 
 and play Chinese music and propaganda, or change broadcast parameters in an effort to create radio 
interference.  But these sorts of annoyances do not provide military advantage.     
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China could attempt to interfere with the computer networks that support logistics and supply chains, but 
since any clash is likely to be a come-as-you-are conflict, there would be no immediate effect.  The Chinese 
could attempt to disrupt critical infrastructure.  This also would not seriously affect the deployment of U.S. 
forces, but it could hold the risk for China of widening any conflict in exchange for very little benefit.  An 
attack against U.S. civilian infrastructures could easily prompt retaliatory measures.  Surreptitious, long 
term cyber attacks on the U.S. economic system might seem attractive as a way to weaken the U.S. before a 
conflict,  but the uncertain benefits of such attacks – and they are uncertain because the attacks might not 
work and are as likely to damage China’s economy along with any harm done to the U.S - would have to be 
weighed against the serious risk and damage that would occur if the effort was discovered.    
Again, robust U.S. preparations can mitigate the consequences of a cyber attack or a campaign of 
deception.  If the U.S. plans for how it can continue to operate even though its information systems are 
under attack, if it builds redundancy and resiliency into those networks that are important for military 
performance, it can greatly reduce the risk of cyber attack by China or other potential opponents. 
 
A better strategy for informational warfare would be to seek to increase an opponent’s uncertainty.  
Increasing uncertainty in the mind of opposing commanders degrades that opponent’s effectiveness.  
Denial and deception leaves opponents certain that they know what is happening when, in fact, what they 
believe is wrong.  An uncertainty strategy makes an opponent unsure that they know what is happening.  
Finding ways to inject false information into the planning and decision processes of an opponent, or 
manipulating information that is already in that system to make it untrustworthy, can provide considerable 
military advantage.  There is reason to believe that the Chinese now use false or misleading information to 
manipulate and confuse their opponents.  We should not discount the possibility that China will pursue an 
informational strategy that seeks to expand uncertainty and confusion instead of attempting to unleash an 
improbable ‘electronic pearl harbor’ that offers only uncertain results.        
 
Miscalculation 
 
This assessment of the risk posed by China’s development of unconventional weapons and tactics 
downplays the effect of cyber weapons or anti-satellite weapons on the military balance between China and 
the U.S.  It is important for all concerned to remember that in the same period that China has been 
modernizing its military forces, the U.S. has also made significant improvements to the capabilities of its 
own forces and that these efforts at improvement continue.  These U.S. improvements increase the 
likelihood of success in any conflict, and, if used correctly, will deter opponents from even beginning 
conflict.  There is however, one area of risk that deserves greater attention. 
 
That is the risk that the Chinese government will miscalculate the U.S. response and the international 
reaction to a military adventure, and that they miscalculate the benefits and effect on the military balance of 
anti-satellite or cyber weapons. 
 
The Chinese clearly miscalculated the reaction to the anti-satellite test.  This miscalculation reflects a 
degree of parochialism in Chinese security policy, a lack of experience in international politics and a 
certain degree of hubris, perhaps justifiable, over China’s tremendous economic success.  Whatever the 
reasons, they did something that a more experienced nation might have decided against doing. 
 
This makes it fair to ask if the Chinese could similarly miscalculate the balance of power in the region.  It is 
not inconceivable that they could overestimate the advantages provided by asymmetric attacks and 
overestimate the exhaustion of U.S. forces because of Iraq.  We can think of several incidents in the past - 
in 1914 or 1941, for example - when authoritarian regimes have made such miscalculations and initiated 
conflicts that appeared unthinkable.  While it is unlikely that China would make this sort of miscalculation, 
 particularly before the 2008 Olympics, it would benefit the U.S. to make clear to all of its  potential 
opponents that asymmetric attacks are ‘second best,’ unlikely to degrade U.S. military capabilities, or 
change the likely outcome of any clash.   
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In a rational and transparent world, such miscalculations would not occur.  While we do not live in such a 
world, the U.S. can take actions to decrease both the risks of miscalculation and the risks of asymmetric 
attack.  We cannot prevent China’s military modernization but the right policies will let us manage any risk 
that modernization poses. 
 
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thank you very  much.   We' l l  
proceed wi th  Dr .  Ahrar i ,  and then we ' l l  have quest ions  for  both .   Dr .  
Ahrar i ,  welcome.    
 
STATEMENT OF EHSAN M. AHRARI,  PH.D.  
PROFESSOR, SECURITY STUDIES (COUNTERTERRORISM),  
ASIA-PACIFIC CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES 
HONOLULU, HAWAII 
 
 DR.  AHRARI:   Thank you very  much.   Mr.  Chairman and 
commiss ioners ,  thank you for  invi t ing me to  share  wi th  you my views  
on what  appears  to  be  a  new and very  s igni f icant  wr inkle  in  the  
conduct  of  informat ion war  by the  People’s  Republ ic  of  China  
address ing the  world  of  Is lam.  
 In  the  las t  two years  of  the  post -9/11 era ,  China  seems to  have  
real ized that  the  Uni ted Sta tes  i s  fac ing an uphi l l  bat t le  in  i t s  war  on 
ter ror ism in  the  world of  Is lam.   This  is  decidedly a  s i tuat ion which in  
the es t imat ion of  China’s  leadership provides  r ipe  oppor tuni t ies  for  
gaining new fr iends  and new s t ra tegic  openings  to  se l l  weapons ,  to  
s ign energy contracts ,  and above a l l ,  to  develop spheres  of  inf luence.  
 In  addi t ion ,  I  wish  to  br ing to  your  a t tent ion a  recent  asymmetr ic  
war  tha t  was  fought  between the  Hezbol lah  of  Lebanon and Israel  in  
July-August  2006.   Given the  impor t  of  asymmetr ic  warfare  to  the  
People’s  Republ ic  of  China ,  the  Hezbol lah-Israel i  war  of  2006 was  a  
cr i t ica l  development .   In  my deta i led  tes t imony,  I  have focused on 
what  I  cons ider  to  be  some major  lessons  learned f rom the  mi l i tary  
conf l ic t  by the  People’s  Republ ic  of  China .  
 My premise  i s  tha t  consider ing the  f ledgl ing s t ra tegic  par tnership  
between China  and I ran ,  the  chances  are  high that  China’s  asymmetr ic  
warfare  specia l i s ts  not  only  careful ly  s tudied the  Hezbol lah-Israel i  
war ,  but  a lso  consul ted  wi th  their  counterpar ts  f rom Iran  and 
Hezbol lah  about  what  worked and what  d id  not  work.   That  type  of  
informat ion wi l l  be  incorporated in  China’s  own operat ional  and 
tac t ica l  countermeasures  for  any future  potent ia l  mi l i tary  conf l ic t  wi th  
a  powerful  adversary .  
 No one is  more  of  a  voracious  reader  of  the  most  recent  t rends  in  
America’s  warf ight ing  capabi l i t ies ,  in  America’s  mi l i tary  and civi l ian  
 off ic ia ls ’  handl ing of  informat ion war ,  publ ic  d iplomacy and 
asymmetr ic  war ,  than China’s  s t ra tegic  communi ty.  
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 As  a  resul t  of  these  s tudies ,  they at tempt  not  only  to  adopt  in to  
thei r  s t ra tegic  reper to i re  what  they consider  to  be  some of  the  most  
re levant  t rends ,  but  a lso  to  focus  on developing prof ic ient  
countermeasures .  
 In  the  rea lm of  informat ion war  and publ ic  d iplomacy,  China’s  
s t ra tegic  th inkers  are  c lose ly  s tudying America’s  vulnerabi l i t ies  
re la ted  to  i t s  g lobal  war  on ter ror ism in  the  wor ld  of  Is lam and are 
eager  to  adopt  s t ra tegies  tha t  would make thei r  own country  look 
sympathet ic  to  the  Musl im pl ight .  
 In  the  domain of  asymmetr ic  war ,  an  impor tant  aspect  of  China’s  
s t ra tegy is  to  arm surrogates  and to  le t  them do the  f ight ing wi th  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes  or  i t s  a l l ies .   In  th is  context ,  special  a t tent ion  should be  
paid  not  only  to  what  they are  supplying to  I ran ,  but  what  I ran  in  turn  
is  supplying to  Hezbol lah  of  Lebanon.   This  is  a  gener ic  descr ipt ion of  
China’s  asymmetr ic  war  and informat ion war  s t ra tegies .   I t s  speci f ics  
are  spel led  out  in  my deta i led  tes t imony.  
 We must  watch wi th  rapt  a t tent ion China’s  own innovat ive  
approaches  to  informat ion war  and publ ic  d iplomacy,  i t s  in terpreta t ion 
of  our  s t ra tegic  th inking,  and especia l ly  i t s  capabi l i t ies  and approaches 
to  asymmetr ic  war .  
 The under ly ing purpose  in  a l l  these  rea lms is  to  look for  
openings ,  points  of  vulnerabi l i t ies ,  and then maximize  China’s 
advantages .  
 Looking toward the  fu ture ,  a  long term,  i f  not  permanent ,  aspect  
of  China’s  approach to  informat ion war  and publ ic  d iplomacy is  to  
enhance i t s  s t ra tegic  presence  in  the  world  of  Is lam,  regardless  of  what  
happens  in  I raq  and Afghanis tan .  China  seems to  have  recognized the  
power  of  pol i t ica l  Is lam and the  impl icat ions  of  the  s t ruggle  wi thin 
Is lam to  the  s tabi l i ty  of  a  number  of  Musl im countr ies  in  the  Middle  
East ,  South  Asia ,  as  wel l  as  Indonesia .  
 Cr i t ic iz ing America’s  approach to  the  war  on ter ror ,  which China 
has  or ig inal ly  suppor ted ,  but  about  which i t  might  be  in  the  process  of  
developing a  nuanced posi t ion,  emerges  as  a  new dimension of  China’s  
publ ic  d iplomacy.   As  China  sees  i t ,  the  Musl im world ,  especia l ly  the  
Middle  East ,  i s  a  region where  the  U.S.  presence  and inf luence  i s  
l ikely  to  exper ience  increasing chal lenges  in  the  coming years .  
 New al ignments  are  l ike ly to  emerge as  a  Shia-dominated I raq 
and Shia  I ran  are  seeking new avenues of  coopera t ion and 
rapprochement .   The Sunni  s ta tes  of  the  Middle  East ,  despi te  the  fac t  
that  Sunnis  grea t ly  outnumber  the Shias  a l l  over  the wor ld of  Is lam,  
are  on the  defensive  in  the  wake of  the  r i s ing inf luence of  I ran,  both  
inside and outs ide the  Middle  Eas t .   They are  seeking new avenues  of  
 resolving the  Pales t inian-Israe l i  conf l ic t  as  wel l  as  of  crea t ing a  
rapprochement  wi th I ran .  
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 China  seems to  have  decided tha t  i t  wi l l  no  longer  leave  the 
increas ingly  s igni f icant  s t ra tegic  affai rs  of  the  Middle  Eas t  and that  of  
the  world of  Is lam largely  for  the  U.S.  presence  and inf luence.   This  
appears  to  be  an  ext remely  important  development  in  China’s 
cont inuing emergence  as  a  power  of  g lobal  s igni f icance ,  presence  and 
inf luence.  
 From the  Chinese  perspect ive ,  improving i t s  capabi l i t ies  in  
asymmetr ic  war  i s  a  tool  that  susta ins  the  high level  of  the  concern  of  
America’s  s t ra tegic  th inkers  and warf ighters .   As  long as  the  Uni ted  
Sta tes  and China  do not  s tar t  a  mi l i tary  conf l ic t ,  China  envis ions  the  
asymmetr ic  war- re la ted  research and development  of  new operat ional  
and technical  maneuvers  as  an  ongoing chess  game wi th  the lone 
superpower .   China  may not  come out  and say i t ;  however ,  as  an  
ancient  c iv i l iza t ion,  i t  considers  i t se l f  as  one  of  the  grea t  champions  of  
th is  game.  
 Thank you very  much.  
[The s ta tement  fo l lows:] 7
 
Panel  V:   Discuss ion,  Quest ions  and Answers  
 
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thank you very  much.   Thank 
you both .   Commiss ioner  Wortzel .  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Dr .  Lewis ,  Dr .  Ahrar i ,  thank 
you very  much for  being here  and shar ing your  years  of  research and 
exper t i se  wi th  us .   
 Dr .  Lewis ,  one  of  the  comments  you made in  your  ora l  tes t imony,  
and I  th ink I 'm quot ing i t  accurate ly ,  i s  about  the  improbable  
l ikel ihood of  "an e lec t ronic  Pear l  Harbor ."  
 So I 'd  l ike  to  hear  f rom both  of  you,  i f  you care  to  comment ,  Dr .  
Ahrar i - -why do you th ink th is  i s  improbable  and why a  devasta t ing 
cyber  network a t tack would  not  amount  to  an  e lec t ronic  Pear l  Harbor?  
 DR.  LEWIS:   Thank you.   That ' s  a  great  quest ion and le t  me note  
that  my wri t ten  tes t imony has  some explanat ion of  th is .   The case  I  
look to  in  tha t  one  is ,  “Could  China  use  cyber  weapons  to  b lock carr ier  
bat t legroup f rom deploying to  Taiwan?  
 What  I  have done for  the  pas t  few years  i s  t ry  and look a t  the  
ac tual  degree  of  vulnerabi l i ty  compar ing cyber  weapons ,  say ,  to  a i r  
power  which is  the  ear l ier  asymmetr ic  weapon.   The a i rplane would be  
able  to  a lways  get  through.   You could  a t tack cr i t ica l  infras t ructure ,  
and this  i s  s t ra tegic  a i r  power ,  tha t  you would  be  able  to  win a  war  or  
 
7
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 defeat  an  opponent  wi thout  having to ac tual ly  engage in  convent ional  
c lash  of  armies .  
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 The theory  grew up af ter  World  War  I  when convent ional  warfare  
d idn ' t  seem to  be  working so  wel l .   When you compare  cyber  weapons  
to  k inet ic  weapons ,  to  explos ives ,  they don ' t  compare  very  wel l .   Why 
is  that?   The f i rs t  reason is  that  we are  not  as  interconnected as  we 
might  th ink.  
 There  are  a  few networks  that  are  a t t ract ive  targets .   The 
e lec t r ica l  power  supply ,  very  in terconnected,  poss ibly  a  target  for  
cyber  a t tack.   I  tend to  discount  that  one because everyday the  e lect r ic  
companies  wi l l  te l l  you thei r  computer  networks  are  probed thousands  
of  t imes ,  and yet  we have never  seen anyone be  able  to  do th is .  
 You 're  more  l ikely  to  exper ience  a  blackout  as  a  resul t  of  t rees  
or  labor  problems than you are  f rom cyber  a t tack.  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  Never  heard  of  a  b lackout  because  
of  a  labor  d ispute .  
 DR.  LEWIS:   I  can give  you an example ,  but  I  won ' t ,  i f  you wish.   
The other  th ing to  ask  i s  the  res i l iency of  these  networks .   How 
quickly  does  i t  take  them to  recover?   And the  answer  i s  we know that  
the  e lec t r ica l  ne tworks are  rea l ly  good a t  recover ing,  that  they can 
usual ly  res tore  service  wi thin  two or  three  days ,  especia l ly  s ince  the  
cyber  a t tack doesn ' t  do  any physical  damage.  
 Financia l  ne tworks ,  another  good target ,  a  broad target ,  
in teres t ing to  a t tack.   What  we found in  that  case ,  though,  i s  that  again  
di f ferent  par ts  of  the  f inancia l  network have di f ferent  levels  of  
secur i ty .   A c lass ic  example  was  a  worm that  was  re leased on the  west  
coas t  a  few years  ago.   One large  bank chain  had a l l  the i r  ATMs go 
down.   Wel l ,  tha t ' s  the  end of  the  world .  
 However ,  i t s  compet i tor ,  another  large  bank chain ,  d idn ' t  suffer  
any disrupt ions  a t  a l l ,  and we can see  the  same th ing in  t ransporta t ion,  
in  a  whole  ser ies  of  in terconnected networks .   Because  we are  not  
dependent  on  a  s ingle  company,  because  there  are  mul t iple  companies ,  
some wi l l  cont inue  to  operate  and some won ' t .  
 The degree  of  degradat ion is  smal ler  than a  physica l  a t tack and 
the  t ime to  recover  i s  shor ter .   So that ' s  a  very  long answer ,  but  i t  
turns  out  to  be  very  di f f icul t  to  achieve  las t ing  damage or  indeed 
not iceable  damage us ing cyber  weapons .  
 DR.  AHRARI:   S i r ,  in  my previous  l i fe  a t  the  Nat ional  Defense 
Univers i ty ,  I  was  Director  of  Informat ion Ops,  so  my informat ion i s  a  
l i t t le  dated  maybe.   But  ta lk ing to  the  bankers  and a l l  k inds  of  people ,  
I  was  persuaded that  our  sys tems are  very  redundant .   I  don ' t  th ink we 
have to  worry  about  any kind of  a  mass ive  a t tack f rom China  or  f rom 
anybody e lse .  
 What  worr ies  me is  computer  hacking.   What  worr ies  me about  
 the  Trojan horse-re la ted  technologies  i s  tha t  they are  ext remely 
widespread.  I  go to  India  qui te  of ten and I  see  these  technologies  are 
being sold  on the  s idewalks .   We have to  be  concerned about  these  
types  of  technologies .  
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 We have to  enhance our  knowledge of  China’s  capabi l i t ies  
re la ted  to  e lect ronic  jamming.  We have  to  be  developing 
countermeasures  for  China’s  pers is tent  resolve  re la ted  to  f inding our  
Achi l les '  heels ,  those  sof t  points ,  which do not  require  enormous  
amounts  of  technological  sophis t ica t ion on thei r  par t .    China 's  recent  
b l inding of  i t s  own sa te l l i te ,  which was  uppermost  concern in  
yes terday 's  tes t imony of  the  Commander  of  St ra tegic  Command is  
another  case  in  point .   We must  be  on the  look out  for  those  types  of  
Chinese  capabi l i t ies .   We have to be  constant ly  on guard,  and 
determine which way they ' re  heading and,  most  important ly ,  how to  
develop our  own countermeasures  to  China’s  countermeasures .   This  i s  
especia l ly  t rue  about  cyber  warfare .  
 They get  our  mi l i tary  l i te ra ture  on a  dai ly  bas is .   They read the  
th inking,  the  new thinking,  the  current  t rends ,  and as  good as  they are ,  
as  br i l l iant  as  they are ,  project ing the  long- term capabi l i t ies .   We have 
to  worry  about  which way they ' re  heading.   For  ins tance ,  I ' l l  g ive  you 
one more  example .  
   Af ter  s tudying the  Gulf  War  of  1991,  the  PLA focused on 
e lec t ronic  informat ion warfare ,  e lect ronic  warfare ,  and so  on and so  
for th .   Then when they saw what  we did  in  Afghanis tan wi th  high tech 
and low tech capabi l i t ies ,  they prompt ly incorporated tha t  s t ra tegy to  
thei r  corporate  memory.   So you see  they are  very capable  and highly  
adapt ive  and they ' re  working hard  to be  as  maneuverable  in  te rms of  
new thinking,  as  we are .  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thank you.   Commiss ioner  
Bar tholomew.  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Thank you very  much.   Thank 
you,  gent lemen,  both  for  your  tes t imony today and for  your  service  to  
our  country  over  the  years  in  your  d i f ferent  capaci t ies .   I ' l l  jus t  note  
before  I  ask  quest ions  that  yes terday General  Car twright  ra ised the 
ques t ion of  whether  cyber  a t tacks  could  be  considered a  form of  
weapons  of  mass  des t ruct ion.   I  th ink i t ' s  an  in teres t ing quest ion.  
 Dr .  Lewis ,  you sound a  whole  lo t  ca lmer  about  the  whole  th ing,  
i f  you parse  i t  out .   But  I  was  wonder ing s ince  these  probes  are  taking 
place  a l l  the  t ime,  people  are  c lear ly  interested  in  t ry ing to  create  a  
mechanism to  br ing th ings  down.  Whether  they succeed or  not  i s  
another  quest ion.  
 I  have a  ques t ion for  each of  you,  but  i f  you want  to  answer  wi th  
each other ,  tha t  would  be  great .   Dr .  Lewis ,  f i r s t ,  I  wanted to  know,  
why should  we consider  that  asymmetr ica l  i s  second-best?   You sa id  
 tha t .   I f  essent ia l ly  a  country  or  a  par ty  can disarm i ts  enemy through 
an asymmetr ica l  a t tack and they know that  they can ' t  beat  them with  in  
a  convent ional  f ight ,  why wouldn ' t  they go the  asymmetr ical  route?  
 
 
 
 
  
151
 
 DR.  LEWIS:   There  are  a  couple  of  reasons  for  tha t ,  again ,  
another  good quest ion.   The f i rs t  reason and probably  most  important  
reason is  that  a  lo t  of  the  resul t  of  the  conf l ic t  depends  on not  only  the  
capabi l i t ies  that  a  country  br ings  to  the  f ight ,  the  equipment  i t  has ,  i t s  
s t ra tegic  abi l i t ies ,  i t s  t ra in ing,  a l l  the  t radi t ional  th ings  you th ink 
about ,  but  a  lo t  of  i t  has  to  do wi th  wi l l .  
 One of  the  things people  rout inely  miscalcula te ,  inc luding the 
Uni ted  Sta tes ,  i s  the  ef fec t  of  some asymmetr ic  a t tacks  on the  target  
popula t ion.   The effect  i s  usual ly  to  sol id i fy  res is tance ,  to  encourage 
people  to  cont inue the  f ight ,  and i f  you haven ' t  ac tual ly  badly  damaged 
thei r  abi l i t ies  to  cont inue to  f ight ,  a l l  you 've  done is  annoy them,  and 
what  many of  us  cal l  cyber  a t tacks  i s  not  weapons  of  mass  des t ruct ion 
but  weapons  of  mass  annoyance.  
 And that ’s ,  I  th ink,  one of  the  reasons  asymmetr ic  a t tacks  can be  
second bes t  i s  tha t  you are  doing something that  doesn ' t  rea l ly  change 
the  balance  of  forces  that  much and may actual ly  only  encourage your  
opponent  to  res is t  even more  s t rongly ,  something to  th ink about .  
 The other  th ing is  you do have to  ask ,  and again  this  points  to  
the  i ssues  of  redundancy and res i l iency,  i s  i f  I 'm not  des t roying 
weapon sys tems,  i f  I 'm not  eroding your  capaci ty  to  f ight ,  i f  you have 
the  abi l i ty  to  recover  quickly  f rom my asymmetr ic  a t tack  or  i f  my 
asymmetr ic  a t tack  whi le  damaging does  not  e l iminate  your  capabi l i ty ,  
which is  I  th ink the  case in  sate l l i tes ,  then  I 'm not  real ly  tha t  much 
fur ther  ahead.  
 The key to  v ic tory  remains  pre t ty  much convent ional  warfare ,  
forces  on the  ground,  a i r  power  and the  re la ted  things  you a l l  know 
about .  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Two comments  or  thoughts  on 
that .   I  don ' t  know whether  I ' l l  ge t  to  go to  a  second round or  not .  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  There  wi l l  be  a  second round.  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Oh,  great .   So I 'm going to  
pursue  th is  and then I ' l l  ask  you,  Dr .  Ahrar i ,  in  my second round.  
 One is  th is  concept  of  weapons  of  mass  annoyance.   I  jus t  f ind 
mysel f  thinking tha t  pr ior  to  September  11,  indeed that  might  have 
been the  response .   But  par t  of  ter ror ism,  of  course ,  i s  in ject ing 
uncer ta in ty  as  wel l  as  ter ror .   I  say  that  only  because  I  happened to  be  
in  New York Ci ty  when that  t ree  fe l l  in- -where--Ohio and brought  the  
e lec t r ica l  gr id  down and the  f i rs t  thought  tha t  everybody had was  
something had happened,  and I  ended up having to  use  my cel l  phone 
to  ca l l  down here  to  Washington,  D.C. ,  to  f ind out  i f  somebody could  
watch CNN and te l l  me i f  there  was  something I  needed to  be 
 concerned about .  
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 I t  was  jus t  a  natura l  response  on a l l  of  tha t .   So I  jus t  wonder  
whether  the  analyt ica l  ground has  shi fted  in  the  fac t  tha t  there  i s  a  
psychology that  goes  a long wi th  a l l  of  i t?    
 DR.  LEWIS:   Let  me t ry  and answer  tha t ,  which i s  tha t  i t ' s  
a lways  poss ib le ,  and I  th ink as  I  look a t  some of  our  European a l l ies ,  I  
wouldn ' t  th ink they would react  perhaps  as  robust ly  as  we might  hope 
to  an  a t tack l ike  this .  
 The New York blackout ,  though,  i s  a  good example ,  which is  tha t  
the  popula t ion behaved very wel l .  They were  ca lm,  they were  order ly ,  
there  was no r io t ing,  and when you look a t  our  mi l i tary  capabi l i t ies  or  
our  economic  capabi l i t ies ,  there  was  no immediate  ef fec t  on our  
mi l i tary  capabi l i t ies .   There  was  no long-term effec t  on  our  economy.  
 I f  that  had been an a t tack,  the  a t tacker  would  not  have been 
bet ter  off  three  days  la ter ,  and i f  he  had been discovered as  an  
a t tacker ,  he  or  she ,  he  would have actual ly  been much worse off .   So  
when I  look a t  this ,  I  say ,  what  are  the  pol i t ica l  things  the  U.S.  can do 
to  make sure  that  the  popula t ion responds in  th is  robust  fashion,  and 
what  are  the  th ings  we can do to  bui ld  in  addi t ional  redundancy and 
res i l iency?  
 New York provides  another  c lass ic  example .   As  you f ly  in to  
LaGuardia ,  coming f rom the  south,  the  por t  s ide  of  the  a i rcraf t - -you ' l l  
see  a  power  plant  on the  bank of  the  Hudson.   That  plant  i s  being 
c losed,  but  i t  i s  s t i l l  opera t ional ,  and you had the  anomaly of  a  
perfect ly  f ine  and working power  p lant  in  the  middle  of  New York Ci ty  
not  connected to  any of  the  pol ice  s ta t ions ,  hospi ta ls ,  subways.  
 I t  i s  things  l ike  tha t  we have to  think about .   How do we make 
our  system more  res i l ient  to  face  these  k inds  of  a t tacks?   But  for  those  
reasons ,  we are  a l ready re la t ively  res i l ient .   Our  popula t ion is  
re la t ively  s t rong and we have a  great  deal  of  redundancy.   I  tend to  not  
worry  about  these  th ings so  much.  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  One more  point ,  and that  i s  
according to  Chinese  bat t le  theory,  the  bes t  th ing is  to  beat  the  enemy 
before  you have to  meet  them on the  bat t leground,  be  that  economic  
i ssues  or  something asymmetr ic .  
 DR.  LEWIS:   Can I  jus t  make one point  on tha t?   And that ' s  one 
of  the  points  I  wanted to  conclude on in  my tes t imony,  which is  people  
of ten  have s t ra tegies  going in to  wars  that  they th ink are  rea l ly  good,  
and the  famous l ine  i s  no s t ra tegy survives  f i rs t  contact .  
 I  wouldn ' t  want  somebody to  th ink that - -you hear  th is  a l l  the  
t ime-- the  U.S.  i s  th is ,  the  U.S.  i s  that .   We don ' t  want  our  opponents  to  
miscalcula te .   They might  th ink they can f ind that  k ind of  advantage 
and I  would  not  want  them to  bel ieve  that  would  be  suff ic ient  for  them 
to  take  the  r i sk  of  s tar t ing a  conf l ic t ,  because  I  don ' t  be l ieve  that  
 advantage i s  there .  
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 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Dr .  Ahrar i .  
 DR.  AHRARI:   Before  we get  too  far  away,  I  don ' t  think I  have 
too much disagreement  wi th  my col league,  but  i t ' s  hard  for  me to  
accept  the  proposi t ion that  asymmetr ic  warfare  i s  second-bes t  s t ra tegy 
for  China .   China  knows that  on a  force-on-force  bas is ,  i t  has  no 
chance  to  f ight  and win agains t  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .  
 In  the  realm of  mil i tary  R&D, China is  not  going to  ca tch  up 
wi th  us .   Even in  year  2025,  those  who say that  i t  wi l l  ca tch  up wi th 
us ,  they assume that  whi le  China  i s  making a l l  the  progress ,  and we ' l l  
be  s i t t ing and res t ing on our  laure ls .  
 So knowing that ,  China ,  in  my es t imat ion,  envis ions  asymmetr ic  
war  as  i t s  n iche .   In  the  meant ime,  i t  wi l l  cont inue to  look for  
vulnerabi l i t ies ,  and wi l l  focus  on developing offens ive measures  in  
order  to  inf l ic t  maximum damage in  the  wake of  a  mi l i tary  conf l ic t .   
As  we develop highly  sophis t icated  mi l i tary  plat forms,  China  i s  fu l ly  
aware  that  a l l  sophis t ica ted  pla t forms a lso  conta in  weak l inks  or  
vulnerable  points .   They are  sys temat ica l ly  s tudying those  pla t forms  
us ing as  many sources  of  informat ion for  developing countermeasures .   
Even in  UAV warfare  China  is  cons tant ly  developing countermeasures .  
 I  would  love to  see  what  k ind of  exchanges  China and I ran have 
made in  the  af termath  of  Hezbol lah-Israe l i  war  in  terms of  UAV 
warfare ,  drones ,  and so  on and so  for th .   So I  don ' t  d isagree  too much 
wi th my col league,  but  tha t  asymmetr ic  war  to  them is  not  the i r  
second-bes t .   Probably  i t ' s  the i r  bes t  whi le  they ' re  s t i l l  t ry ing to  catch 
up wi th  us  technological ly ,  knowing ful ly  wel l  that  that  might  be  an 
unwinnable  proposi t ion  for  a  long t ime.  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thank you.   Commiss ioner  
Shea .  
 COMMISSIONER SHEA:  Thank you,  both  of  you,  for  coming 
here  and shar ing your  thoughts .   I  have a  number  of  quest ions .   My 
f i rs t  ques t ion was  I  think par t ly  answered in  response to  what  
Commiss ioner  Wortzel  asked you,  but  le t  me jus t  ask  you again  and 
maybe get  a  fu l ler  response .   
 We heard dur ing our  hear ings  yes terday and today a  lo t  about  
how the  Chinese  are  probing our  vulnerabi l i t ies ,  probing our  seams,  
looking for  our  Achi l les '  heels .   What  do you th ink the  Chinese  th ink 
are  those  seams,  vulnerabi l i t ies ,  Achi l les '  heels?  
 DR.  LEWIS:   The one that  I  th ink I  touched on i t  br ief ly  in  my 
wri t ten  tes t imony,  and I  hope the  Commiss ion has  got ten  other  exper ts  
to  ta lk  about  th is  because  this  i s  a  l i t t le  outs ide  of  my f ie ld ,  but  when I  
am in  d iscuss ions  about  what  the  Chinese  might  be  t ry ing to  do,  I  
would look a t  thei r  ef for ts  to  come up wi th  weapons and tact ics  to  
dest roy ai rcraf t  car r iers ,  and they ' re  put t ing  a  lot  of  effor t  in to  that .  
  They have thoughtful ly  purchased a l l  the  work that  the  Soviets  
put  in to  defeat ing a i rcraf t  carr iers  and which the  Russ ians  have 
cont inued.   I  th ink that  tha t  would  be ,  i f  there  was  a  conf l ic t ,  I  would  
be  afra id that  even a  shor t  conf l ic t  over  Taiwan,  I  would  be  af ra id  that  
we would lose  an a i rcraf t  car r ier  or  two.   And I  th ink that ' s  the  one 
tha t  concerns  me the  most  i s  the  high speed miss i les ,  the  submarines ,  
the  a i rcraf t  p la t forms,  the  o ther  th ings  they ' re  doing.  
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 That ' s  a  more  t radi t ional  mi l i tary  approach,  but  i t  i s  one  where 
there  are  vulnerabi l i t ies .   We 've  opera ted  in  a  way wi th  impuni ty ;  no 
naval  vesse l  has  been sunk in  decades .  That ' s  the  k ind of  asymmetr ic  
a t tack I  worry about .  
 DR.  AHRARI:   I  th ink Dr .  Lewis  i s  r ight  on the  money.   The 
PLA is  fu l ly  focused on our  a i rcraf t  carr iers ,  wi th  a  v iew to  developing 
asymmetr ic  techniques  to  cr ipple  them in  the  wake of  a  mi l i tary  
conf l ic t .  I t  i s  developing ant i -ship  miss i les  of  a l l  potency.   The PLA is  
a lso  developing i t s  capabi l i t ies  in  the  rea lm of  UAV warfare ,  drones  
and re la ted  technologies .  They are  a lso  di l igent ly  s tudying our  tac t ics  
in  the  I raqi  and Afghan theaters  of  war ,  and a lso  Is rael i ’s  own 
opera t ional  and tac t ica l  measures  agains t  Hezbol lah  in  July-August  
2006.  
 In  fac t ,  my sense  i s  tha t  whatever  technology the  PLA has 
purchased f rom Russ ia  and other  sources ,  i t  i s  a lso  ref lec t ing about  the  
ways  of  us ing i t  agains t  the  U.S.  forces  in  a  future  mi l i tary  conf l ic t .  
 COMMISSIONER SHEA:  Dr .  Lewis ,  you ment ioned the  issue  of  
leapfrogging,  the  concept  of  leapfrogging.   What  types  of  technology 
are  the  Chinese  looking a t  under  th is  leapfrog concept?   Is  i t  
nanotechnology or  what  do you th ink thei r  thinking could  get  them 
suddenly  beyond us  in  cer ta in  areas  of  capabi l i ty?  
 DR.  LEWIS:   I  th ink some of  i t ,  as  Dr .  Ahrar i  has  ment ioned,  i s  
on the  aerospace  s ide ,  unmanned aer ial  vehicles ,  miss i les ,  tac t ical  
miss i les .   They 've  put  a  lo t  of  ef for t  in to  that ,  as  you know.  
 I  th ink on the  informat ion warfare  s ide ,  they 're  cont inuing to  
explore  the  abi l i ty  to  deceive  or  corrupt  the  informat ional  resources  
tha t  our  mi l i ta ry  depends  on.   There  are  ant i -sa te l l i te  weapons.   We 
know that  the  tes t ,  the  k inet ic  tes t ,  tha t ' s  l ike  the  cheapest  and leas t  
in teres t ing way to  damage a  sa te l l i te .   So I  would look a t  o thers .   
Whether  i t ' s  h igh energy weapons ,  whether  i t ' s  jamming or  some other  
non-kinet ic  ef fec t ,  I  th ink they ' re  looking a t  tha t .  
 Those  are  the  three  areas  I 'd  look a t .   I  don ' t  th ink there  wi l l  be  a  
sudden breakthrough that  wi l l  g ive  them and,  as  Dr .  Ahrar i  has  
ment ioned,  because  of  our  lead in  mi l i tary  R&D, there  i s  no  par t icular  
th ing they ' re  looking a t ,  but  miss i les ,  aerospace ,  informat ion warfare  
and non-kinet ic  ant i -sa te l l i te  weapons  would be  my top three .  
 DR.  AHRARI:   Actual ly ,  one of  the  sources  for  China 's  
 technology t ransfer  i s  Russ ia  i t se l f .   So,  I 'm not  sure  whether  Russ ia  i s  
going to  be  very  generous  about  providing i t s  top-of- the  l ine  
technology to  the  PLA.   The t radi t ional  r ival ry  between China and 
Russ ia  i s  such that  Russ ia  wi l l  se l l  whatever  i t  can.   However ,  i t  wi l l  
never  a l low the  PLA access  to  i t s  crown jewel  technology.   Otherwise ,  
the  Russian  mi l i ta ry  wi l l  be  f ight ing i t s  own cut t ing-edge technology,  
i f  or  when there  i s  a  mi l i ta ry confl ic t  wi th  the  PRC.   This  i s  the  worse-
case  scenar io ,  but  the  Russian  mi l i ta ry i s  qui te  mindful  of  i t .    
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 Jus t  a  br ief  observat ion regarding minia tur iza t ion.   I 'm not  
impressed wi th China 's  capabi l i ty  to  minia tur ize .   So in  terms of  thei r  
lack of  sophis t ica t ion in  minia tur iza t ion,  I  personal ly  would not  make 
any kind of  bold  s ta tement ,  and of  course  Dr .  Lewis  has  not  made any 
s ta tement  on that  point ,  but  I 'm not  cer ta in  whether  the  Chinese  
mi l i ta ry  has  made major  breakthroughs  in  the  rea lm of  nanotechnology.  
 Perhaps  they ' l l  wai t  unt i l  tha t  technology comes to  them through 
Europe or  through some other  sources .  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thank you.  
 COMMISSIONER SHEA:  Thank you.  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:   Commiss ioner  Fiedler .  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  Thank you.   I  want  to  address  the  
dis tance  between annoyance and des t ruct ion which seems to  be  a  new 
growing debate  that  we ' re  about  to  have,  and I  want  to  a lso  get  into the 
quest ion of  second-best  in  the  fo l lowing way.  
 Let  me pose  a  scenar io  tha t  we 've  been ta lking about  in  this  
hear ing and ear l ier  hear ings .  The abi l i ty  of  the  Chinese  to  delay  the  
arr iva l  of  our  f leet  in  the  Taiwan Stra i t  may be  suff ic ient  to  present  us  
wi th  a  fa i t  accompl i  on  the  ground in  Taiwan,  therefore ,  weakening our  
wi l l  to  proceed and,  therefore ,  fur thermore  redef in ing ”win”.  
 And that ' s  the  concern  that  I  have about  the  abi l i ty  of  
asymmetr ic  warfare .   So now I 'm seeking the  dis tance  between 
annoyance and des t ruct ion,  r ight?   One might  be  able  to  argue that  i t ' s  
c loser  to  annoyance but  ef fect ive  enough.  Would you comment?  
 DR.  AHRARI:   Si r ,  you ' re  r ight  on  the  money.   I  was  reading a  
s tudy a  few years  back,  a  specia l is t  on  China 's  warfare /war  exerc ises ,  
and he  was  ta lk ing precise ly  what  you jus t  ment ioned.   He sa id  that  a l l  
China  has  to  do is  e i ther  delay the  arr ival  of  U.S.  warships  or  postpone 
indefin i te ly  or  even conduct  some very ,  very  smal l  tac t ica l  nuclear ,  I  
mean explode some tac t ica l  nuclear  weapons,  and that  wi l l  c rea te  
ample  chaos ,  uncer ta in ty  and fear  for  us  to  re think our  s t ra tegy.   That ' s  
a l l  the  t ime that  they want .  
 That  might  be  one reason why they have s ta t ioned 750 plus  
miss i les  agains t  Taiwan.   So th is  i s  psychological  warfare .   This  i s  tes t  
of  wi l l .    
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  Al l  warfare  i s  psychologica l  to  the  
 extent  tha t  we t ry  to  af fec t  the  o ther  s ide 's  wi l l  to  f ight .  
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 DR.  AHRARI:   Yes ,  s i r .   
 DR.  LEWIS:   Wel l ,  i t ' s  a  good point .   That ' s  c lear ly  the  game in  
the  St ra i t s .   The Chinese  have made i t  c lear ,  intent ional ly  or  not ,  tha t  
they ' l l  do  something tha t  combines  miss i le  a t tacks  on Taiwan to  
e l iminate  thei r  defens ive  capabi l i t ies  fo l lowed by special ly  t ra ined 
assaul t  forces .   
 The Chinese  have mockups  of  Taiwanese  defense  fac i l i t ies  that  
they pract ice  in .  They ' re  vis ib le  f rom space  so  i t ' s  not  a  b ig  secre t .   
The other  s ide  of  th is ,  though,  and i f  the  Chinese  could-- they ' re  c lear ly  
in terested in  the  fa i t  accompl i .   I t  won ' t  happen before  the  Olympics .   
I t  may never  happen,  but  tha t ' s  the  di rec t ion they ' re  th inking in .   And 
we need to  ask ourselves  in  re turn,  what  can we do to  delay  them a  few 
days  because  af ter  a  week or  so ,  af ter  f ive  days ,  i f  the  Chinese  haven ' t  
accompl ished thei r  goals ,  i t  wi l l  be  embarrass ing,  there  wi l l  be  
in ternat ional  pressure .  
 They face  s imi lar  problems.   What  I 'd  look a t  i f  I  was  doing th is ,  
i t ' s  not  so much what  can the Chinese  do to  delay us ,  but  what  can we 
do to  deter  them from thinking they can delay us?  For  example ,  i f  I  
was  China ,  I  would  not  have gone out  of  my way to  i r r i ta te  the  
Japanese  because  the  Japanese  are  moving in  a  d i rec t ion where  they 
may not  be  as  amenable  as  they would  have been ten  years  ago to  
Chinese  in tervent ion in  Taiwan.  
 I  would  ask  what  forces  do we have in  the  region,  in  Guam and 
in  Japan,  and poss ibly  even Korea ,  where  we could  in tervene,  and I 'd  
want  to  say  what  i s  i t  tha t  we could  do to  delay the  Chinese ,  and that ' s  
where  some of  the  th ings  that  we have,  some of  our  advantages  in  
space ,  a  fas ter  s t r ike  capabi l i ty  for  the  U.S.   So i f  there  were  Chinese 
targets  tha t  we ident i f ied  prepar ing to  enter  Taiwan,  once  the  confl ic t  
had begun,  we could  s t r ike  them from a  long dis tance .  
 Those  are  the  k inds  of  th ings  where  we have some advantages  
and th is  i s  a  game and we need to  s t rengthen our  advantages  and 
reduce  the i rs .  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  Thank you.    
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thank you.   Commiss ioner  
Wessel .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Thank you,  gent lemen,  for  being 
here ,  and Commiss ioner  Fiedler  took one of  my quest ions  in  terms of  
seeming that  the  ear l ies t  concerns  about  asymmetr ic  warfare ,  what  
impact  they may have on a  potent ia l  Taiwan confl ic t .  
 But  I  want  to  a lso  ask ,  i t  seems to  me that  most  of  the  knowledge 
we have about  Chinese  cyber  warfare  ef for ts  have real ly  been based on 
reconnaissance  so  far .   They have not  rea l ly  t r ied  to  br ing down any of  
our  mi l i tary  systems.   Most  of  i t  seems to  be  mapping our  routers ,  our  
 sys tems,  t ry ing to  unders tand what  the  points  of  vulnerabi l i ty  are .  
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 Has  i t  gone beyond recon to  any kind of  adversar ia l  e ffor ts  and 
how much do we real ly  know of  what  thei r  capabi l i t ies  are?  
 DR.  LEWIS:   The knowledge of  thei r  capabi l i t ies  i s  somewhat  
l imi ted .   There  i s  c lass i f ied  knowledge and that  might  be  in teres t ing 
for  the  Commiss ion to  get  a  c lass i f ied  br ief ing on that .   You 're  r ight  to  
say,  and a l l  of  you have  been r ight  to  say,  that  they ' re  engaged in  an  
extensive tes t ing  and reconnaissance of  our  networks ,  and that  means  
we don ' t  know what  might  happen in  a  conf l ic t ,  tha t  they are  looking 
for  vulnerabi l i t ies .   They may have implanted th ings  that  would  give  
us  concern.  
 So far  we have not  seen any tes ts .   One of  the  thresholds  I  
a lways  look for ,  and i t ' s  a  threshold they crossed in  the  ant i -sa te l l i te  
ef for t ,  they 've  been developing ant i -sa te l l i te  weapons  for  ten  or  15 
years ,  and the  threshold  I  a lways  had in  my mind was  we have to  take  
them ser ious ly when they tes t  one  because  then they ' l l  be  coming out  
of  the  c lose t .  
 They 've  come out .   And the  quest ion  i s ,  “Are  they doing the  
same on the  cyber  s ide?”   Harder  to  te l l .   Somebody is  tes t ing  i t .   We 
know there 's  been a t tacks  a t  des tabi l iz ing the  In ternet .   We know 
there 's  been effor ts  to  break in to--successful  ef for ts  to  break in to  U.S.  
sys tems,  so  the  tes t ing is  going on,  and in  some ways  s ince  we don ' t  
know what  they can do,  we don ' t  even know who's  doing i t - - i t  could  be  
the  Chinese;  i t  could  be  the  Russians;  i t  could be  a  number  of  o ther  
countr ies- -we have to  focus  more  a t tent ion on our  defenses .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   You ta lked ear l ier  about  the  
redundancy in  the  business  sec tor ,  and a  lot  of  tha t  i s  because  of  the  
to ta l ly  separa te  business  sys tems,  ATMs,  e tce tera .   Do you have the  
same confidence  in  our  current  mil i ta ry  s t ruc ture  as  i t  re la tes  to  
backbones ,  e t  ce tera?  
 DR.  AHRARI:   No,  s i r ,  I  don ' t  because  they are  focusing on our  
mi l i tary  sys tem.   They may not  be  focus ing on our  f inancial  systems as  
much as  they are  focusing on our  mi l i tary  sys tem.   So I  th ink Dr .  
Lewis  made a  very  good point - -creat ing uncer ta inty .   I f  I  were  a  
psychological  warr ior ,  I  wouldn ' t  be  spending a  whole  bunch of  t ime in  
te l l ing  the  o ther  s ide ,  s ignal ing the  other  s ide  what  I  have,  as  opposed 
to  spending a  whole  lo t  of  t ime creat ing uncer ta in ty  on the  o ther  s ide .  
So that  i s  a  very  important  var iable .    
 Another  point  that  Dr .  Lewis  ment ioned that  needs  re inforc ing is  
constant ly  mapping,  constant ly  explor ing,  constantly  looking for  f laws.  
The more  sophis t ica ted  we become,  I  submit  to  you that  the  more  
vulnerable  we become,  and that ' s  what  they ' re  looking for .   So that ' s  
where  the problem is .  
 S ince  they would l ike  to  c lose  that  gap between the  U.S.  mi l i tary 
 technology and thei r  own technology,  they are  focusing more  on 
f inding ant i -bal l i s t ic  miss i le  type  of  technology or  countermeasures  for  
deep penetra t ing bombs or  countermeasures  for  ant i -submarine  warfare  
than maybe cashing some checks  and breaking in to  some ATM 
machines .  
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 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Thank you.  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Dr .  Lewis ,  would you comment  
on the  adequacy and effec t iveness  of  the  federa l  government 's  e f for ts  
to  promote  bet ter  cyber  secur i ty  in  the  pr ivate  sec tor?  
 DR.  LEWIS:   This  has  been one  of  the  more  problemat ic  areas  
for  both  th is  adminis t ra t ion and the  previous  adminis t ra t ion and in  no 
sense  have  we made adequate  progress .   Par t  of  the  reason has  been a  
des i re ,  again  in  both  th is  adminis t ra t ion and the  previous  
adminis t ra t ion,  to  re ly  on the  pr ivate  sector .   You hear  the  l ine  a l l  the  
t ime about  how the  pr ivate  sec tor  owns 80 percent  of  the  
infras t ructure ,  and therefore  we should  leave i t  up  them.  
 That 's  not  a  par t icular ly  good defense  s t ra tegy because  thei r  
response  has  been very  uneven.   Some sectors ,  the  e lec t r ica l  sec tor ,  the  
f inancia l  sec tor ,  and I  hear  now the  chemical  sector  have done very  
wel l  a t  secur ing thei r  networks .   Other  par ts  of  the  pr ivate  sector  have  
perhaps  not  done as  wel l  as  we might  hope.  
 The problems wi th  the  federa l  government  are  a lso  extens ive .   I 'd  
note  that  the  Depar tment  of  Defense  i s  making a  s igni f icant  effor t  to  
improve i t s  network secur i ty ,  and so  there  may be  in  the  next  few years  
a  reduct ion of  the  vulnerabi l i ty ,  but  a t  the  moment ,  we are  
except ional ly  vulnerable ,  and we don ' t  rea l ly  have any adequate  
pol ic ies  in  p lace  to  address  tha t .  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  I f  you ' re  going to  say that  the  
re l iance  on the  pr ivate  sector  to  do the job  for  i t se l f  i s  inadequate ,  and 
I  agree  wi th  you that ' s  been the  mantra  for  the  las t  12 years  or  so ,  how 
are  you suggest ing the  federa l  government  be  more  ac t ive  in  l ight  of  
the  fac t  tha t  a t  the  end of  the  day the  th ings  we 're  ta lk ing about  rea l ly  
are  a l l  owned pr ivate ly?  
 DR.  LEWIS:   There  are  a  couple  th ings  you can do.   The f i rs t  
th ing is  there  are  some networks  where  our  nat ional  secur i ty  interes t  i s  
so  h igh that  the  idea  of  regula t ion or  federa l ly  mandated s tandards  i s  
not  a  bad one,  and of  course ,  this  i s  something we 've  done in  
te lecommunicat ions  for  many years ,  rea l ly  s ince  the  Eisenhower  
adminis t ra t ion.  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  What  o ther  sectors  would  you 
suggest  would  qual i fy?  
 DR.  LEWIS:   The e lec t r ica l  power sec tor  i s  a  good example  of  an  
a l ternate  way of  doing these  things .   We 're  get t ing  a  bi t  in  the  weeds  
here ,  but  there 's  both  a  federa l  regula tory  body and an indust ry  body 
 tha t  looks  a t  secur ing e lect r ica l  networks .  
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 These  two bodies  have been able  to  work together  very  
successful ly  to  come up wi th  s tandards  for  e lect r ica l  power  operators  
to  secure  the i r  networks .   So this  k ind of  th ing,  knowing that  the  
federa l  government  i s  in teres ted  and wi l l  enforce ,  perhaps ,  s tandards ,  
but  a l lowing the  pr ivate  sector  to  develop them and to  amend them as  
necessary ,  i t ' s  d i f ferent  from the  way we 've  done regula t ion in  the 
pas t ,  but  i t  appears  to  have been ef fec t ive  in  th is  one sector .  
 So I  would  say in  those  p laces  where  we have real ly  grave 
nat ional  secur i ty  concerns ,  a  more  robust  federa l  ro le  may be  
appropr ia te .   In  most  o ther  areas ,  and this  would be  most  of  the  
infras t ructure  we 're  ta lk ing about ,  f inding ways  to  energize  the  pr ivate 
sector  response  would be  crucia l .  
 I t ' s  worth  making a  th i rd  point ,  too ,  which is  a  lo t  of  the  
economic  ac t iv i t ies  in  the  country  real ly  aren ' t  necessary  f rom a  
mi l i ta ry  s tandpoint ,  in  an  immedia te  mi l i ta ry  s tandpoint .   We should 
not  get  in to  regula t ing them.  
 One of  the  problems we have i s  a  long l i s t  of  cr i t ical  
infras t ructures ,  many of  which rea l ly  aren ' t  c r i t ical .   Agricul ture  i s  a  
cr i t ica l  infras t ructure .   In  what  sense?   Are  you going to  launch a  
cyber  a t tack agains t  a  cow?  Probably  not .   I 'm making l ight  of  i t ,  but  a  
c learer  def in i t ion  of  what  rea l ly  i s  crucia l  and an unders tanding of  
what  we can do to  secure  that  would  be  helpful .  I 'm not  sure  tha t ' s  a  
good point  e i ther .   We have two compet ing goals  here .   The one is  
where  there  i s  s t rong nat ional  secur i ty  concerns--we want  to  ensure  
very  high s tandards .   Where  the  nat ional  secur i ty  concerns  are  lower ,  
we want  to  l imi t  the  scope as  much as  poss ible  of  regula t ion.   And so  
f inding a  way to  do that  i s  very  di f f icul t ,  and I  th ink that ' s  par t  of  why 
we 're  lagging a  b i t  behind.   This  i s  a  very  di f f icul t  problem.  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Dr .  Ahrar i ,  do  you want  to  
comment?    
 DR.  AHRARI:   Yes .   I  think he  said i t  wel l .   One of  the  things  
tha t  I  encountered in  my previous  l i fe in  ta lk ing to  the  pr ivate  sec tor  i s  
that  they were  very much concerned about  losing thei r  t rade  secre ts  
and they were  not- - there  was  a  lack of  t rus t  on thei r  par t  about  ta lk ing 
to  the  government  and government  not  g iving thei r  t rade  secre ts  away.  
 So those  kinds  of  th ings ,  and then the  th i rd  point ,  tha t  they used 
to  say,  look,  we ' re  doing qui te  wel l  by  ourse lves  and you know we 
don ' t  need government 's  he lp .   We don ' t  need government 's  regula t ion.   
So there  was  that  fee l ing.   So maybe Dr .  Lewis  has  more  informat ion 
on that .   I  don ' t  f ind any points  of  d isagreement  wi th  h im.  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Okay.   Thank you.   
Commiss ioner  Wortzel .  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Gent lemen,  thank you very  
 much.   Are  we able  to  e lec t ronical ly  f ingerpr int  any of  these  probing 
a t tacks  that  e lements  of  the  U.S.  government  and Depar tment  of  
Defense  have suffered to  speci f ic  organizat ions  in  China?  
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 DR.  LEWIS:   The c lass ic  example  i s  an  event  of  a t  th is  point  
about  e ight  years  ago where  defense computer  ne tworks  were  under  
a t tack.   The defense  inves t igators  came to  the  conclus ion i t  was  China.   
There  was  discuss ion a t  h igh levels  wi thin  the  depar tment  of  how we 
should  re ta l ia te  agains t  China  and before  those  discuss ions  concluded,  
i t  turned out  to  be two teenagers  in  Mendocino,  Cal i fornia  who were  
launching the  a t tack.  
 I t ' s  very  d i f f icul t  to  t rack  this  down.   The reason for  that  i s  tha t  
a  ski l led  a t tacker ,  as  you are  aware ,  wi l l  not  only  seek to  d isguise  their  
t racks ,  but  they wi l l  seek to  have t racks  lead up to  someone e lse  and 
everyone knows we 're  suspic ious  of  the  Chinese ,  and so  I 'm re la t ively  
cer ta in  tha t  any country  that  probes  us  wi l l  t ry  and leave  t racks  
point ing to  Bei j ing.  
 The Chinese a lso wi l l  exploi t  th is,  but  one  thing to  ask  is ,  “ I f  I 'm 
launching a  ne twork a t tack,  where  do I  have to  be ,  and I  could  launch 
i t  f rom my home country  or  could  I  go  to  a  place  l ike  Mal ta ,  Cyprus ,  
Panama,  o ther  European dest inat ions ,  and launch f rom there?”   Places  
that  have adequate  business  fac i l i t ies ,  adequate  te lecommunicat ions  
fac i l i t ies  are  good places  to  se t  up  a  front  company and use  that  as  the  
bas is .  
 So there  are  t imes  when we are  fa i r ly  conf ident  that  i t ' s  China ,  
there  are  o ther  t imes  where  we have no idea ,  and there  are  t imes  when 
we 're  fa i r ly  confident  tha t  i t ' s  China  that  I  think we 're  mis taken.   So 
you have three  ca tegor ies  of  answers .   That  said  we know the  Chinese  
are  doing th is .   Somet imes  perhaps i f  we th ink i t ' s  a  Panamanian 
a t tack,  i t ' s  more  l ike ly  to  be  China .  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  I  s t i l l  have some t ime so  I  
want  to  probe fur ther  on this  one  because  i t ' s  pre t ty  impor tant .   There 
are  1 .3  b i l l ion  Chinese .   Are  there  speci f ic  organizat ions  ins ide  the  
People 's  Libera t ion Army or  control led  by Chinese  author i t ies  that  we 
can ident i fy  that  might  be  involved in  these  kinds  of  ef for ts?  
 DR.  LEWIS:   Yes ,  I  think there  are .   There  are  c lear ly  both  
mi l i tary  organiza t ions  and in te l l igence-rela ted  organiza t ions  tha t  are 
involved in  explor ing cyber  weapons,  explor ing asymmetr ic  a t tack.   
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  I 'm a lso  in teres ted  in  a  
combinat ion of  ef fec ts .   I ’d  l ike  to  know,  in  a  mi l i tary  opera t ional  
sense  a t  the  campaign level ,  a  combinat ion of  cyber  network a t tacks  
and kinet ic  a t tacks  involving miss i les ,  whether  the  use  of  cyber  a t tacks  
would  improve the  l ikel ihood of  k inet ic  s t rengths?  
 DR.  LEWIS:   The conf l ic t  tha t  I  look a t  in  t rying to  f igure  some 
of  this  out  i s  the  conf l ic t  in  Kosovo because  the  Serbs  had a  number  of  
 advantages .   They had an  extens ive  espionage network so tha t  people  
parked outs ide  of  runways  in  Europe,  in  I ta ly ,  for  example ,  and could 
use  thei r  ce l l  phones  to  ca l l  when a i rcraf t  took off .  
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 They had coopera t ion f rom perhaps ,  i t  i s  a l leged that  they had 
cooperat ion f rom some of  our  NATO al l ies .   They made an extens ive  
ef for t  a t  decept ion and denia l  and they a lso  used informat ional  a t tacks ,  
cyber  a t tacks  or  cyber  probes .   The net  ef fec t  of  a l l  these  th ings  was  
not  to  ac tual ly  prevent  any U.S.  a i r  s t r ikes ,  but  i t  was  capable ,  and not  
par t icular ly  the  cyber  par t - -  as  the  larger  decept ion and denia l  par t ,  i t  
was  capable  of  great ly  reducing the  ef fec t  of  those  a t tacks .   So I  th ink,  
as  Dr .  Ahrar i  has  sa id ,  tha t  the  Chinese  are  very  eager  to  learn  f rom 
the  exper ience  of  o thers .   We know they ta lk  to  people  rout inely  to  see  
how they defeated i t .  
 In  that  case ,  though,  and admit tedly  i t ' s  a  bi t  o ld  now, i t  wasn ' t  
the  cyber  par t  of  the  Serbian effor t  tha t  had the  most  payoff .   I t  was  
the  o ther  par ts :  the  decept ion and denia l ,  the  confusing of  s ignals .   
And I  wonder  i f  the  Chinese  aren ' t  looking in  that  d i rect ion.  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Thank you.   Dr .  Ahrar i ,  
anything to  add?  
 DR.  AHRARI:   No,  s i r .  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Commiss ioner  Bar tholomew.  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Thank you again ,  Mr.  
Chairman.   I 'm going to  move to  Dr .  Ahrar i ,  but  there  are  a  couple  of  
th ings ,  Dr .  Lewis ,  that  you sa id  that  I  fee l  l ike  I  can ' t  leave  a t  least  
unchal lenged,  not  the  least  of  which is  I  know you were  being a  l i t t le  
facet ious  on cyber  warfare  on a  cow.  
 Dis t r ibut ion sys tems for  our  agr icul tural  products  are  a l l  very 
h igh tech now,  and most  of  our  food that  i s  being produced is  not  being 
produced by somebody wi th  100 acres  and a  mule .   I t  i s  done on a  
scale  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  acres  wi th  i r r igat ion sys tems and so  
i t ' s  not  qui te  as  s imple  as  that .   You know that .  
 Dr .  Ahrar i ,  your  comments  that  Russia  i s  not  going to  se l l  i t s  
crown jewels  of  technology to  China  doesn ' t  preclude the  Chinese  f rom 
s tea l ing the  Russ ian  crown jewels  of  technology,  which I  presume 
they ' re  t ry ing to  do just  as  they ' re  t ry ing to  do that  wi th  ours .  
 I  want  to  shi f t  gears  a  l i t t le  bi t  and go to  th is  concept  tha t  you 
were ta lking about ,  the  Chinese using mi l i tary  ass is tance  to  I ran ,  
which we know some of  which has  gone to  Hezbol lah ,  and your  sense  
of  how much of  th is  i s  proxy war  and how much of  this  i s  tha t  the  
Chinese  government  has  a  lot  to  gain  by being c lose  to  the  I ranians?   
And then the  t ransfers  to  Hezbol lah ,  are  they something the  Chinese  
over look or  they faci l i ta te  but  i sn ' t  necessar i ly  the  end goal?
 That ' s  one  piece  of  i t .    
 The second piece  of  i t  i s  this :  yes terday we heard  about  Chinese  
 low product ion cost  of  weapons ,  and the  example  that  was  given is  tha t  
i t  cos ts  us  a  $1,000 for  an  assaul t  weapon,  and a  Chinese  assaul t  
weapon costs  $10.    
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 Do you th ink that  the  Chinese  s t ra tegy is  going to  be  se l l  
weapons  anywhere  any t ime,  jus t  to  make the  money,  or  i s  i t  more  
l ike ly  to  be  a  targeted  s t ra tegy of  providing weapons?   Fighter  p lanes ,  
there 's  a  huge di f ferent ia l  in  the  cos t  of  product ion there .   I s  i t  going 
to  be  more  targeted sales  to  create  more  proxy wars?  
 DR.  AHRARI:   China  i s  fo l lowing a  targeted s t ra tegy of  
supplying weapons  to  ac tors  that  are  capable  of  waging proxy wars .   
I ran  might  have a  p lan  of  us ing Hezbol lah  as  a  proxy.   But  as  i t  turned 
out ,  s ince  I ran  and China  are  c lose ,  tha t  works for  both of  them.   I ran 's  
use  of  Hezbol lah  a lso  works  in  favor  of  China .   So,  the  fac t  tha t  there 
was  an  asymmetr ic  war  of  an  immense magni tude,  a t  leas t  in  the  
pol i t ica l  rea lm,  even though Israe l  d id  not  lose  in  the  s t r ic t  mi l i ta ry 
sense ,  but  the  symbol ic  effec t  that  Hezbol lah,  a  ragtag  f i f th  ra te  
force—which is  not  even an Army--survived,  i t  i s  perceived as  a  
“winner .”    
 Obviously ,  China  has  ext rac ted  a  number  of  valuable  lessons .   
That  type  of  knowledge is  added to  China’s  own operat ional  and 
tac t ica l  maneuvers  to  use  ant i -ship  miss i les ,  c ruise  miss i les  and the  
UAVs.  I ran’s  la tes t  mi l i tary  exerc ises  a lso  used ant i -ship  miss i les .  The 
I ranian forces  are  obviously  involved in  developing naval  
countermeasures  agains t  the  awesome power of  the  U.S.  submarines .       
 So,  we have to  focus  on these  types  of  techniques .  China 's  
presence in  Afr ica ,  as  I  envis ion i t ,  i s  the  beginning of  a  br i l l iant  
mega-s t ra tegy.  Qaddaf i  i s  no longer  a  bad boy,  but  there  are  lo ts  of  
o ther  ac tors  who are  wi l l ing to  chal lenge the  s ta tus  quo in  Afr ica .    
 Let ’s  take  a  quick look at  Central  Asia .   The fac t  that  we were 
ousted f rom Uzbekis tan  was  a  coups  de  grace  on  the  par t  of  China ,  
and,  to  a  lesser  extent ,  for  Russ ia .   China  has  a lways  sa id—and we 
laughed when they said  i t—that  i t  envis ions the  Shanghai  Coopera t ion 
Organizat ion (SCO) to  acquire  a  ro le  s imi lar  to  that  of  NATO someday.  
 They were  qui te  ser ious  in  that  observat ion.   So creat ing a  
chal lenge for  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  in  Centra l  Asia  might  be  China’s  f i rs t  
sa lvo in  enhancing the  pol i t ica l  c lout  of  the  SCO.   China i s  focused on 
the  areas  where  the  war  on ter ror  i s  in tense .   They ' re  focused on the  
Levant ,  and on South  Asia .   They are  enhancing thei r  presence in  
Gwadar  naval  fac i l i ty  in  Pakis tan .   That  i s  s igni f icant  development  for  
the  Uni ted  Sta tes  and India .   I t  i s  fasc inat ing how they are  developing 
these  mini-s t ra tegies  for  the  evolut ion of  a  mega-s t ra tegy to  f ight  
asymmetr ic  war .  
 We should  remember  that ,  in  thei r  v iew,  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  wants  
to  conta in China.   For  them,  that  s t ra tegy cuts  both  ways .   They seem 
 to  be  saying,  we are  going to  t ry  to  conta in  you in  d i f ferent  par ts  of  
the  world .  
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 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Commiss ioner  Shea.  
 COMMISSIONER SHEA:  My quest ion was  for  Dr .  Ahrar i .   I  
th ink he par t ia l ly  answered i t  in response  to  the  chai rwoman 's  
quest ion,  but  maybe you can e laborate  on i t  jus t  a  l i t t le  b i t  more .   You 
ment ioned that  China  watched the  Is rae l i -Hezbol lah  confl ic t  very ,  very  
c lose ly  and looked a t  what  worked and what  d idn ' t  work,  and could  you 
just  e labora te  on that?   What  lessons  d id  the  Chinese learn f rom that  
conf l ic t ,  and have they internal ized  tha t  into  thei r  own planning?  
 DR.  AHRARI:   I  th ink,  f i rs t  of  a l l ,  the  overa l l  lesson is  that  
asymmetr ic  warfare  i s  going to  be  much more  ef fec t ive  now that  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes  i s  fac ing an uphi l l  bat t le  in  the  Middle  East  or  in  South  
Asia  because  you see ,  they are  s tudying,  they ' re  watching the  debates ,  
domest ic  debate  here  in  the Uni ted  States  in  terms of  the  long- term 
impl icat ions  of  I raq  war ,  the  long- term impl ica t ions  of  Afghanis tan  
war ,  and drawing lessons  in  that  regard .  
 Regarding the  Hezbol lah-Israe l  war ,  I  would  say,  as  I  have  said a  
few t imes  before ,  my sense  i s  that  they ' re  focused on ant i -ship  
miss i les ,  c ruise  miss i les ,  UAV drone technology –  those  kinds  of  
technologies .   And in  fac t ,  I  th ink I 've  developed ten or  12 points  in  
the  table  that  I  g ive  you in  my deta i led  tes t imony.   Those  are  the  
lessons  we have to  be  k ind of  looking a t .  
 In  fact ,  i f  I  had more t ime,  I  would have probably  developed 20 
lessons because  I  was  rea l ly  s tudying--what  I 'm in teres ted  in  i s  the  
evolut ion of  China 's  asymmetr ic  warfare  doct r ine.   A lo t  of  people  ta lk  
about  doct r ines ,  but  they don ' t  even define  doct r ine ,  much less  
descr ibe  i t  in  the  context  of  what  China i s  doing.  
 So my concern  was  i f  I  had more  t ime,  I  would  have probably  
developed a  pre t ty  large  vers ion of  the  doctr ine ,  but  I  s tar t  wi th  those 
ten  lessons  i f  you take  a  look a t  tha t .  
 COMMISSIONER SHEA:  Al l  r ight .   In  the  wri t ten  tes t imony.   
Thank you.  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:   Commiss ioner  Fiedler .  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  I 'd  l ike  to  get  in to  some 
def in i t ional  problems.   I f  I  were  to  ask you what  would count  as  
asymmetr ic  expor ts ,  how would you answer  me?   Right .   We know what  
convent ional  weapons  expor ts  are .   What  would you c lass i fy  as  
asymmetr ic  warfare  expor ts?  
 Also,  how do you prol i fera te  asymmetr ic  warfare ,  whether  i t ' s  
doct r inal ,  as  you say,  or  what  are  the  ingredients  that  would  a l low a  
much smal ler  s ta te  than China ,  i .e . ,  i t s  proxies ,  to  conduct  s l ight ly  
h igher  than annoyance level  asymmetr ic  warfare  agains t  the  Uni ted 
Sta tes  on suff ic ient  sca le ,  say ,  in  ten  p laces  s imul taneously ,  tha t  might  
 have a  much more  dramat ic  ef fec t  on our  abi l i ty  to  respond somewhere  
e lse  in  a  convent ional  way? 
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 The issue  of  words  i s  a  problem in  our  pol icy;  r ight?   Expor ts ,  
asymmetr ic ,  weapons ,  prol i ferat ion,  and we 're  having th is  d iscuss ion 
about  new forms of  warfare ,  so  I 'm beginning to  bel ieve  that  we have  
to  create  some new lexicon.  
 By the  way,  I  would  say to  you,  general ly  speaking in  terms of  
making the  American people  unders tand what  we ' re  ta lk ing about ,  that  
we f ind a  word other  than "asymmetr ic ,"  just  as  a  mat ter  of  
unders tanding.    
 DR.  AHRARI:   One commiss ioner  ment ioned se l l ing  low tech 
weapons  to  anybody who 's  wi l l ing to  pay for  i t .  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  That ' s  fa i r ly  t radi t ional .  
 DR.  AHRARI:   Asymmetr ic  war  descr ibes  the  tac t ics  and 
techniques  used by a  weak actor  against  an  adversary who is  
technological ly  advanced.   I t  i s  a lso  ca l led low-intens i ty  confl ic t .   
This  type of  confl ic t  has  in tens i f ied in  the  pos t -9/11 era .   I t  i s  
cont inuing in  the  t rans-Sahel  area  of Afr ica ,  the  Horn of  Afr ica ,  Sr i  
Lanka,  the  Assam province  of  India ,  e tc .   Central  Asia  might  become a  
bat t leground of  asymmetr ic  war  in  the  coming years ,  s ince  i t  i s  an  area  
where  smal l  a rms t rade  and opium t rade i s  l ike ly  to  cont inue.   
Wherever  t roubles  are ,  they have to  se l l  weapons ,  and create  proxies ,  
and us ing,  hoping that  those  proxies  would  turn  out  to  be  effect ive ,  as  
the  world,  as  the  Arab world ,  a t  leas t ,  has  seen that  Hezbol lah  has  
become very  ef fec t ive .  
 Using that  example--I  s tudied  not  necessar i ly  the  speci f ics  going 
to  back to  your  ques t ion as  much as  the  psychological  impact  of  that  
warfare .  So,  tha t  p lays  a  very  impor tant  ro le  in  the  emergence of  
China 's  doct r ine .  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  I  agree .  
 DR.  AHRARI:   I 'm not  saying that  they are  teaching the  doctr ine  
to  Niger ians  or  Alger ians  or  anybody e lse .   I t ' s  jus t  that  those  who are  
developing doct r ines  in  China ,  those  br i l l iant  minds  in  China 's  war  
col leges  and in  places  of  tha t  sor t ,  they are  s tudying and drawing 
lessons  and drawing s t rands  of  th inking in  terms of  evolut ion of  thei r  
own asymmetr ic  war .   Cal l  i t  low intensi ty  war .   Cal l  i t  what- - t ie  down 
the  Gul l iver ,  quest ion the  s ta tus  quo.  
 Make the  t radi t ional  s ta tus  quo in  sub-Saharan Afr ica  or  in  the  
Middle  Eas t  as  shaky as  poss ib le .   That ' s  very  much par t  of  asymmetr ic  
war .  
 DR.  LEWIS:   Let  me touch on your  expor t  word here ,  and I  agree  
wi th  you.   I  wish there  was  a  bet ter  word than asymmetr ic .   But  i f  
anyone f inds  i t ,  p lease  le t  me know.   I  don ' t  ac tual ly  pay tha t  much 
a t tent ion to  expor ts  anymore.   As  some people  have indicated,  I  used to  
 look a t  them a  lo t .  
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 DR.  LEWIS:   But  expor ts  aren ' t  tha t  useful  a  var iable .   And th is  
i s  something tha t  I  th ink has  changed in  the las t  ten years .   I t ' s  
changed because  of  the  in tegra t ion of  economies  in  the  world ,  the  
creat ion of  g lobal  supply  chains  and the  appearance  of  a  huge global  
market  for  par ts  and more  important ly  for  services .   The expor t  model  
we had f rom the  Cold  War  was  very  much on a  nat ional  indust r ia l  bas is  
sending hardware  to  o ther  p laces .  I t  jus t  doesn ' t  make any sense  
anymore .  
 You have a  g lobal  indust r ia l  base  that  even we now depend on 
and you a lso  have th is  i s sue  of  commercia l  services .  So one of  the  tes ts  
we did  a  few years  ago a t  CSIS was to  ask ,  i f  you were  a  smal l  country 
and you wanted to  mimic  the  U.S.  in  space ,  could  you buy i t  on  the  
open market?   Could  you buy the  remote  sensing?   Could you buy the  
communicat ions?   Could  you buy the  precis ion,  t ime and navigat ion 
services?  
 The shor ter  answer  i s  you couldn ' t  ge t  as  good as  the  U.S. ,  but  
you could  get  pre t ty  darn  good.   Right .   And I  th ink that ' s  the  shor t  
answer ,  i s  that  be tween the abi l i ty  to  access  services ,  the  abi l i ty  to  tap 
in to  a  global  market  tha t  we no longer  control ,  the  expor t  i ssue  i s  less  
re levant .  That ' s  the  t rend we 're  moving in .  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  I  was  not  thinking about  i t  so  much 
f rom a  control  point  of  v iew as  f rom a  def in i t ional  point  of  v iew.   
What  i s  i t  tha t  one  country  could  give  to  another  to  enable  one smal l  
country ,  one  big  country  to  a  smal l  country ,  to  enable  i t  to  conduct  
more  ef fec t ive  asymmetr ic  warfare  agains t  the  Uni ted  Sta tes?  
 DR.  LEWIS:   I  th ink the  short  answer ,  as  Dr .  Ahrar i  has  
indicated ,  i s  they could  g ive  them a  ski l l  se t ,  the  abi l i ty  to  do the  kind 
of  denia l  and decept ion that  the  Serbs  d id ,  for  example ,  and they could  
give  them low end precis ion weapons ,  prec is ion-guided weapons ,  so  
surface- to-a i r  missi les ,  ant i - tank miss i les .   They could  give  them more  
advanced remote  weaponry,  as  the  I ranians  have a l legedly  done in  I raq .  
 Those  are  the  th ings  where  i f  you wanted to  increase  the  abi l i ty  
of  an  insurgent  force or  a  smal ler  force to  res is t ,  g iving them SAMs,  
g iving them ATGMs,  g iving them high-powered explos ives ,  and giving 
them the  ski l l s  to  use  those  and evade our  sensors  would  be  the  bes t  
th ing you could  t ransfer .  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  Do we have any evidence the 
Chinese  are  doing any of  tha t  ye t?   Let ' s  s tar t  wi th  t ra in ing of  o ther  
people?  
 DR.  AHRARI:   Wel l ,  I  th ink i t  i s  worth  looking into  in  terms of  
how many I ranians  they have t ra ined,  because  I ran  has  def in i te ly  g iven 
a  lo t  of  technology,  a  lo t  of  know-how,  t ra in ing and so  on to  
Hezbol lah ,  number  one.  
  Number  two,  as  Dr .  Lewis  pointed out ,  I ran  is  accused of  
expor t ing  s imi lar  type  of ski l l s  and low-tech weaponry in to  I raq .   Now,  
I  have not  seen any evidence  of  I ran 's  involvement  or  China 's  
involvement  in  Somal ia .   But  i f  I  were  a  Chinese asymmetr ic  warfare  
specia l is t ,  I  would be  advis ing the  Chinese  government  def in i te ly  to  
look a t  tha t  theater  as  wel l .   See ,  the  purpose  i s  not  to  f ight  the  Uni ted  
Sta tes .   The purpose  i s  to  crea te  ample  logjams,  ample  uncer ta int ies ,  
ample  shakiness  for  the  lone superpower .     
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 In  the  Trans-Sahel  region,  we might  have a  s l ight  advantage .   
But  Somal ia  i s  too shaky to  draw any conclus ions .   On a  long- term 
basis ,  Uni ted  States  i s  notor ious  about  not  commit t ing  i t se l f  to  a  p lace 
of  conf l ic t ,  a  p lace  of  v iolence ,  a  p lace  of  turbulence  long- term,  i f  not  
on  a  permanent ,  bas is .   So that  i s  the  advantage f rom the  perspect ive  of  
those  using asymmetr ic  tac t ics .   
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  Thank you very  much.  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thank you,  commiss ioner .   Dr .  
Lewis ,  you had an in teres t ing phrase  in  your  tes t imony that  I 'd  l ike  you 
to  e laborate  on.   You referred  to  rebound r isk .   Can you expla in  a  l i t t le  
b i t  more  about  what  tha t  means  and perhaps  c i te  an  example  or  a  
hypothet ica l?  
 DR.  LEWIS:   Sure .   Again ,  s tar t ing  f rom this  idea  that  we are  in  
a  more  in tegra ted economy than we have ever  been,  there  has  a lways  
been t rade .   We are  beyond t rade  now so  that  companies  connect  wi th  
each other ,  global ly  in  a  way that ' s  unprecedented,  and so  a  U.S.  
manufacturer  wi l l  depend on a  g lobal  supply  chain  where  Chinese  
companies ,  European companies ,  companies  f rom-- those  would  be  the  
main  two regions--maybe companies  f rom South  America  wi l l  a l l  be  
sending the  par ts  you need to  make a  product .   The same is  a lso  t rue  
for  China  though.  
 I t ' s  not  tha t  the  Chinese have an  IT indust ry .   I t ' s  tha t  they have 
a  share  of  a  g lobal  IT indust ry ,  and i f  they were  to  d isconnect  
themselves  f rom the  g lobal  supply  chain ,  the i r  companies  would  a lso  
have t rouble .   
 The Chinese  are  par t  of  the  g lobal  f inancial  ne twork.   I f  they 
were  to  dis turb the  f inancia l  network,  they would put  thei r  own assets  
a t  r i sk ,  so there  are  some places  where  because  of  the  connect ivi ty ,  we 
are  in  the  same boat ,  r ight ,  and so  i f  you s tar t  dr i l l ing  holes  in  the  boat  
to  af fect  your  opponent ,  you may have  to  bai l  as  wel l  as  o thers .  
 Let  me point  out  tha t  there  are  some places  where  that ' s  not  t rue ,  
and one of  the  th ings  that ' s  in teres t ing is  what  some people  cal l  the  
"balkanizat ion"  of  the  In ternet ,  an  a t tempt  to  bui ld  off  a  por t ion  of  the  
Internet  that  wi l l  be  independent  of  the  res t  of  the  g lobal  network,  and 
that ' s  one  where  you could  see  them perhaps  launching an  a t tack and 
s t i l l  maintain ing your  own nat ional  capabi l i t ies .  
  But  i t ' s  hard  to  see  Chinese leaders  a t tacking banks  in  which 
they have thei r  own large  deposi ts ,  to  g ive  you an example .    
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 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  You 're  suggest ing that  the  
Chinese  leaders  as  individuals  have  large  deposi t s?  
 DR.  LEWIS:   Yes .  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  I  th ink we ' l l  le t  that  one  s tand 
and not  go down that  road.  
 DR.  LEWIS:   Perhaps  the i r  famil ies .  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  I  th ink there  were  some other  
countr ies  where  that  was  more  character is t ic ,  but  who knows?  
Anyway,  le t  me go back to  your  las t  exchange wi th  Commiss ioner  
Fiedler .   I  a l so interpreted h is  quest ion as  re la t ing to  expor t  controls ,  
so  le t  me pursue  that  for  jus t  a  second and then we ' l l  wrap up.  
 I t  seemed to  me that  you were  c lose  to  saying that  they don ' t  
real ly  make al l  that  much di f ference  anymore .   I 'm jus t  cur ious  i f  tha t  
was  rea l ly  what  you were  get t ing a t?  
 DR.  LEWIS:   There  are  some areas ,  weapons,  weapons-re la ted 
technology,  prol i ferat ion-rela ted  technology,  where  they ' re  s t i l l  very  
important .   In  o ther  areas ,  they have great ly  decreased ut i l i ty .   Once 
you get  from those  speci f ic  areas ,  and the  arms embargo on China  is  a  
good example ,  would  i t  make any sense  for  the  U.S.  to  l i f t  our  arms 
embargo on China?   No,  i t  would  be  completely senseless .    
 Would  i t  be  helpful  i f  the  Europeans  l i f ted their  own arms 
embargo,  whatever  i s  le f t  of  i t?   No,  that  would  be  def in i te ly  
something i t ' s  imposs ib le  to  imagine  anyone c la iming to  be  an  a l ly  and 
doing that .   But  once  you s tar t  moving away from the  most  mi l i tary 
re levant  or  the  prol i fera t ion re levant  technologies ,  i t  doesn ' t  make that  
much di f ference  anymore .  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thank you.   Commiss ioner  
Fiedler  i s  going to  have the  las t ,  second to  las t  word.  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  The measurement  of  r i sk ,  as  you 
descr ibed global iza t ion and i t s  impact  on  the  product ion and 
manufacture  of  products ,  whether  they be  commercia l  or  defense  
indust r ia l  or  defense  re la ted or  what  we used to  term dual-use ,  tha t  i t  
seems to  me that  i t ' s  harder ,  i t ' s  most  cer ta in ly  harder  to  control .  
 One can say  that  i t  i s  imposs ib le  to  control  or  one  can narrow the  
a t tempt  to  cont rol  cer ta in sor ts  of  expor ts .   Whi le  my quest ion wasn ' t  
d i rec ted to  expor t  control ,  i t  had expor t  control  impl icat ions .   I  wi l l  
admit  that .   I  a l so th ink tha t  there 's  a  measure  of  throwing up our  
hands  and saying that  i t  i s  too  di f f icul t  to  do,  and that  we don ' t  know 
what  the  impl ica t ions  of  tha t  are  for  our  na t ional  secur i ty  in  easy ways  
anymore .  
 So I  am arguing ac tual ly  for  a  pr ior i t iza t ion and a  narrowing and 
a  ser ious  discuss ion of  r i sk ,  and I  do unders tand that  that  d iscuss ion 
 differs  when we are  ta lking about  countr ies  l ike  China  versus  Somal ia .   
Because  these  countr ies  represent  di f ferent  r i sks .  
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 I  would  hope that  we are  not ,  quote-unquote ,  "so  in tegra ted that  
we cannot  measure  r i sk  anymore ."   Do you have any comment?  
 DR.  LEWIS:   I t ' s  a  good point .   I  was  t rying to  work on a  
metaphor ,  and I  th ink I ' l l  jus t  g ive  up on i t ,  about  p laying footbal l  in  a  
t ra in  s ta t ion,  which is  more  l ike  our  secur i ty  s i tuat ion today.   For  me,  
the  key to  preserving U.S.  secur i ty  i s  for  us  to  bui ld  bet ter  s tuff  and to  
use  i t  bet ter  than our  opponents ,  and in  that  sense ,  s ince  we are  
dependent  on a  g lobal  supply  chain  in  many,  many things--a i rcraf t ,  
sa te l l i tes .  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  And not  g ive  i t  to  them;  r ight?  
 DR.  LEWIS:   The quest ion is ,  wi l l  they be  able  to  get  access  to  i t  
somewhere  e lse?  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  Right .  
 DR.  LEWIS:   And so  for  me,  you want  to  concentra te  on the  
s t ra tegy that  has  the  greates t  payoff .   I  would  prefer  to  see  us  maintain  
our  leadership  in  defense-re la ted  sc ience  and technology and mainta in  
our  leadership  in  having a  mi l i tary  tha t ' s  capable  of  thinking of  new 
ways  of  us ing those  technologies .  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  Are  you conf ident  that  our  current  
manufactur ing base  and i t s  sor t  of  apparent  constant  diminishing helps  
us  to  that  end?  
 DR.  LEWIS:   I t ' s  unclear ,  Commiss ioner .   There ' s  evidence that  
suggests  tha t  the  problem is  overs tated ,  a t  leas t  in  the  near  te rm.   
There 's  a lso  evidence that  suggests  in  the  long term i t  might  be  a  
di f f icul ty .   
 So we have jus t  begun to  ask  ourselves ,  how do we l ive  in  a  
pos t - indust r ia l  wor ld .   The example  I  use ,  I  do  have a  metaphor  that  
works .   When everyone-- i t ' s  a  d i f ferent  one  that  the  t ra in  s ta t ion--  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  We' l l  judge whether  i t  works .  
 DR.  LEWIS:   Think of  Belgium.   Belgium has  never  had i t s  own 
defense  indust r ia l  base .   They 've  a lways  had to  depend on others  to  
supply  thei r  weapons ,  and they 've  never  expected they would  bui ld  
thei r  own a i rplanes ,  tanks ,  and so  on.   We are  becoming more  l ike  
Belgium.   We are  not  ye t  Belgium thankful ly ,  but  we wi l l  come to  a  
point  where  we wi l l  depend on something other  than a  nat ional  defense  
indust r ia l  base ,  and we need to  th ink about  how we ' l l  deal  wi th  that .  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  So how long did  i t  take  the  
Germans to  take  Belgium? 
 DR.  LEWIS:   How many Belgium jokes  am I  a l lowed?  
  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  How many t imes  has  Belgium 
been overrun in  i t s  h is tory?  
  DR.  LEWIS:   True ,  and that  would  I  th ink get  us  back to  i ssues  
of  pol i t ica l  wi l l ,  redundancy,  res i l iency,  which may not  involve  the  
indust r ia l  base  anymore.  
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 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  I  th ink we 've  wandered in to  
the  land of  inappropr ia te  metaphors ,  and i t ' s  t ime to  thank the  panel  
for  i t s  comments  and for  what  I  think was  a  good exchange.   Thank you 
very  much.  
 We ' l l  take  a  very  shor t  break whi le  the  second panel  i s  coming 
up and taking thei r  seats .   Thank you.  
 [Whereupon,  a  shor t  recess  was  taken. ]  
 
PANEL VI:   THE PLA’S OBJECTIVES IN SPACE 
 
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  We ' l l  come back to  order .    
Thank you very  much.   Our  second panel  consis ts  of  Dr .  Michael  
Pi l l sbury,  consul tant  to  the  Depar tment  of  Defense  and the  former  
Assis tant  Under  Secre tary  of  Defense  for  Pol icy  Planning,  a  t i t le  that  
only  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  Government  Defense  Depar tment  could  come up 
wi th .  Er ic  Hagt ,  Director  of  the  China  Program at  the  World  Secur i ty  
Ins t i tu te ,  and previously  a  v is i t ing  researcher  a t  the  Freeman Chair  in  
China  Studies  a t  the  Center  for  Stra tegic  and In ternat ional  Studies .  
 And then,  f inal ly ,  Mr.  Dean Cheng,  who is  current ly  Senior  Asia  
Analyst  a t  the  Center  for  Naval  Analys is  Corporat ion,  a  not- for-prof i t  
th ink thank,  where  he  specia l izes  in  Chinese  mi l i tary  i ssues  wi th  an 
emphasis  on the  Chinese  space  program.   
 S ince  you were  not  a l l  here  for  the  f i rs t  panel .   I ' l l  ment ion what  
I  sa id  before .   We're  asking you to conf ine  your  ora l  s ta tements  to  
seven minutes .   You ' l l  see  by the  l ights  tha t  when i t  turns  yel low,  that  
means  you have two minutes  lef t .   Your  ent i re  wri t ten  s ta tement  wi l l  
be  p laced in  the  record ,  as  wi l l  your  ora l  s ta tement ,  as  wi l l  the  
t ranscr ip t  of  the  exchange that  fol lows.  
 We also ,  for  th is  panel ,  have wri t ten  tes t imony submit ted  by 
Mary Fi tzgera ld ,  who is  a  Research Fel low at  the  Hudson Inst i tute ,  and 
a l though she  could  not  be  here  personal ly  to  tes t i fy ,  tha t  wi l l  a lso  be  
included as  par t  of  the  hear ing record for  th is  panel .  
 With  tha t ,  le t ' s  begin .   Why don’t  we go in  the  order  in  which I  
in t roduced you,  i f  you don ' t  mind.   Dr .  Pi l l sbury,  you can go f i rs t ,  and 
then Mr.  Hagt ,  and then Mr.  Cheng,  and then we ' l l  do  ques t ions  af ter  
that .   Thank you.  
 
STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL P.  PILLSBURY 
CONSULTANT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, 
D.C.  
 
  DR.  PILLSBURY:  Thank you very  much.   Let  me express  my 
apprecia t ion for  being invi ted  here  to  ta lk  about  the  quest ions  your  
le t ter  and your  hear ing have ra ised.  
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 F i rs t ,  of  course ,  I  represent  nobody but  myself .   And secondly,  I  
wanted  to  adver t i se  in  my f i rs t  paragraph of  my s ta tement  here  that  
there  i s  a  tool  k i t  of  concepts  and ideas  tha t  have  been used by a  smal l  
of f ice  in  the  Defense  Depar tment  cal led  Net  Assessment  over  the  las t  
30  or  more  years  for  how to  unders tand some of  the  ques t ions  that  
commiss ioners  were  asking yes terday.  
 That  i s  when you are  denied informat ion,  in  that  case  by the  
Sovie t  Union,  when you ' re  denied informat ion and when there  i s  a  lack 
of  t ransparency,  how can you make nat ional  secur i ty  decis ions  and 
inves tments  of  b i l l ions  of  dol lars  wisely  wi thout  wai t ing,  shal l  we say,  
for  the  inte l l igence communi ty  or  for  scholars  to  come in  and te l l  you 
the  r ight  answer?  
 There 's  many more  that  I  ment ion here--but  a  se t  of  some of  
those  tools  where  the  creat ion of  a  range,  of ten  ca l led a  fami ly of  
a l ternat ive  scenar ios  of  what  might  happen,  where  you say,  okay,  the  
most  l ikely  i s  this ,  but  there  are  seven or  e ight  more ,  they ' re  very  
unl ikely ,  but  i f  they happen,  one or  more  might  be  ca l led  ki l ler  
scenar ios  and then you tend to  focus  on those  in  great  deta i l .  
 I t  doesn ' t  mean that  tha t  wi l l  happen.   I t  of ten  confuses  the  
in te l l igence  communi ty  and scholars  when they hear  worst -case  
scenar ios  examined.   They th ink,  wel l ,  tha t ' s  not  going to  happen;  
that ' s  the  leas t  l ikely .   Wel l ,  that ' s  correct ;  i t ' s  the  leas t  l ikely .   But  i f  
i t ' s  a  k i l ler  scenar io ,  you want  to  buy a  l i t t le  b i t  of  insurance ,  
especia l ly  i f  i t ' s  cheap,  and by having a  range or  a  family  of  scenar ios  
to  look a t ,  you get  around the  i ssue  of not  having as  much evidence or  
ins ight  as  you might  want  to  have in to  your  opponent  or  poss ible  
opponent .  
 A second se t  of  tools  tha t  was  developed,  mainly  in  the  '70s ,  in  
the  DoD, was  to  examine percept ions  and miscalcula t ions  as  a  f in i te  
problem,  not  jus t  say ,  gee ,  somet imes  people  misunders tand.   We ought  
to  have more  communicat ion,  but  to say exact ly  which miscalcula t ions  
could  be  the  most  dangerous  and exact ly  what  could  be  done to  reduce 
that  l i s t  of  the  most  dangerous  miscalculat ions .  
 A th i rd  area  of  tools  that  were  developed,  again  '60s  and '70s ,  
had to  do wi th  organizat ional  theory .   I t ' s  of ten  taught  in  business  
school  and only  in  bus iness  school  for  execut ives  who want  to  manage 
a  company.   They want  to  know how wil l  tha t  company behave and 
Nobel  Pr izes  have been given to  the  bes t  th inking in  the  organizat ional  
behavior  school .  
 I t  occurred to  Net  Assessment  fa i r ly  ear ly  that  when you ta lk  
about  a  foreign country 's  mi l i ta ry  forces  or  what  i t s  mi l i ta ry  goals  are ,  
 you 're  not  ta lk ing about  some sor t  of  vague,  the  whole  country;  you ' re  
ta lk ing about  a  very  smal l  organizat ional  rea l i ty  of  people  in  ro les  pa id 
money wi th  doctr ine  in  thei r  own heads  who are  doing,  who are ,  le t ' s  
say ,  dr iv ing a  decis ion about  how many Sovie t  tanks  to  buy.  
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 I t  turned out  there  was  a  Sovie t  tank organizat ion.   People 
belonged to  i t .   They had thoughts .   They had thei r  own school .   And 
in terviews showed that  everybody deferred to  the  Sovie t  tank/armor  
people ,  and they got  a  huge share  of  the  pie ,  and they did  cer ta in 
th ings  wi th  i t .  
 But  s tudying al l  of  the  Soviet  Union wouldn ' t  te l l  you very  much 
about  why they had so  many tanks  and why they performed in  a  cer ta in 
way.  
 Another  broad area  i s  psycho-cul tura l  ins ights .   Net  Assessment  
sponsored a  s tudy cal led  the  Operat ional  Code of  the  Sovie t  Pol i tburo ,  
an  ef for t  to  use  a  number  of  insights ,  mainly  f rom anthropology and 
open source  wri t ings  to  say are  there  ru les  of  s t ra tegy that  the  Sovie t  
leaders  tend to  rever t  to ,  especial ly  in  a  cr is is ,  tha t  would be  di f ferent  
f rom what  Americans  or  French or  Germans or  Japanese  might  do? 
 There  are  severa l  more ,  but  the  idea  was  to  be  ec lec t ic  and to  
acknowledge you 're  never  going to  know enough about  the  problem.   
So that  was  in  the  whole  f ie ld  of  d iagnosis .   And I  unders tand f rom 
your  quest ions  yes terday,  you have a  lo t  of  in teres t  in  the  d iagnosis  of  
where  i s  China  going,  especia l ly  in  the  mi l i tary  sense ,  but  a lso  in  the  
sense  of  grand s t ra tegy.  
 But  I  thought  today the  bes t  use  of  your  t ime to  squeeze  the  most  
out  of  my l imi ted  knowledge of  China  would be  to  focus  on 
prescr ipt ions  in  the  area  of  space .   That 's  our  panel .   So I  made a  l i s t  
of  ten  for  you.  
 I ' l l  go  through them very  quickly .   S ince  I 'm down to  two 
minutes ,  I 'm going to  jus t  read the  t i t les .   The f i rs t  one  is  mi l i tary  
countermeasures .   General  Car twright  has  de ta i led  two days  ago,  not  
here ,  but  two days  ago in  h is  s ta tement ,  which I 've  a t tached the  
t ranscr ip t  to  the  end of  th is ,  about  how the  U.S.  can s t r ike  Chinese  
ant i -sa te l l i te  capabi l i t ies  f i rs t ,  i f  necessary ,  and,  second,  very  quickly ,  
i f  necessary ,  a t  the  key nodes .   This  i s  qui te  an  important  s ta tement  
coming f rom General  Car twright .  
 Second is  the  need for  d ia logue that  the  Commiss ion i t se l f  has  
recommended.   I  provide  some thoughts  about  exact ly  what  k ind of  
d ia logue we need wi th  the  Chinese  mi l i tary  in  par t icular ,  but  there  are  
c ivi l ian  leaders  as  wel l  on ASAT issues .  
 In  the  open source wri t ings  I  covered for  the  Commiss ion i t ' s  
a lways  asser ted the  weaponizat ion of  space  is  inevi table  and America  
i s  doing th is  now.   This  in  my view is  a  mispercept ion.   The Congress  
has  put  l imi ts  for  more  than 20 years  on U.S.  weaponizat ion of  space .  
  Our  F-15 ASAT f i r ings  in  '84-85,  ac tual ly  l imi ted  f rom year  to  
year  how many could  be  done,  what  i t  could  do.   Congress  has  a  deep 
ro le .   The Chinese  mi l i tary  seems to  be  unaware that  we have blocked,  
we,  the  Congress ,  I  should  say,  has  blocked the  weaponizat ion of  
space .    
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 Thirdly ,  in te l l igence chal lenge for  uncover ing s ignatures  for  
ASAT is  very  di ff icul t .   I t ' s  worth  a  l i t t le  b i t  of  a t tent ion to  the  
problem of  what  you ' re  looking for .  
 F inal ly ,  number  four ,  we should  not  approach the  mat ter  
uni la tera l ly .   The Japanese  are  in  the  process  of  launching four  
reconnaissance sa te l l i tes  themselves .   They have two up now.   The 
Indians  are  working.   We have a  very  great  oppor tuni ty  here  for  
mul t i la tera l  exchanges  wi th  the  Chinese  on the  i ssue  of  the i r  
mispercept ions  that  the  weaponizat ion of  space  is  inevi table .  
 Then on the  i ssue  of  negot ia t ing an agreement- -point  f ive  here--
the  onsi te  inspect ion and ver i f icat ion  i ssue  has  not  been fu l ly  
addressed yet ,  and there  are  some oppor tuni t ies  there  and some good 
news f rom China .   China  has  accepted 100 vis i t s  by the  inspect ion 
organizat ion of  the  chemical  weapons ban.   So the  old  not ion that  
China  wi l l  not  accept  onsi te  inspect ions  for  arms control  agreements  i s  
no longer  correct .  
 Number  s ix  i s  sor t  of  a  repet i t ion  of  how t ragic  i t  i s  tha t  they 
misperceive  our  in tent ions  in  space .   
 Number  seven,  the  Chinese  v iew seems to  be  that  American 
miss i le  defense  could  expand beyond the  current  idea  of ,  say ,  30,  40,  
50  in terceptors  up to  far  more ,  l ike  the  Sam Nunn level  of  100.   This  
seems to  g ive  them an incent ive  for  the i r  ASAT act iv i t ies  because  they 
expl ic i t ly  say par t  of  ASAT is  to  des t roy U.S.  miss i le  defense ,  
therefore  render ing Chinese  nuclear  forces  secure .  
 Number  e ight ;  I  ment ion the  detai l s  of  expor t  controls ,  what  
would  be  required to  t ry  to  choke off  some of  the  U.S.  help  that ' s  been 
given in  the  pas t  in  space .  
 Number  n ine  is  more  deta i l s  about  something good that  PACOM 
and STRATCOM are  doing and the  so-cal led  t rack 1 .5  exchanges ,  but  
these  have not  been as  helpful  as  we might  have hoped.  
 F inal ly ,  number  ten  is  the  i ssue  what  open sources  can te l l  us .   
There 's  a  tendency to  d ismiss  open sources  i f  you don ' t  l ike  the  
answer .  And you see  th is  in  a  lo t  of  press  coverage of  th is  s tudy in  
par t icular ,  for  example .   Theresa  Hitchens  gave a  comment  in  one  
newspaper  s tory  saying,  wel l ,  P i l l sbury  jus t  p icks  individual ,  I 've  
forgot ten  the  exact  noun,  but  i t ' s  l ike  maver icks  or  f r inge characters ,  
and others  accuse  those  who minimize  the  Chinese  problem as  doing 
the  same th ing,  jus t  cherry-picking out  what  they l ike .  
 I 'm jus t  saying th is :  that ' s  t rue .   That ' s  the  danger ,  but  in  fact  
 when there  are  so  many Chinese  wri t ings  by space  exper ts  and only  the  
space  exper ts ,  of  whom there  are  very  few,  and the  things seem to  be  
consis tent ,  th is  te l l s  us  something even though open sources  are  not  
def in i t ive  by any means .  
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 Thank you.  
[The s ta tement  fo l lows:] 8
 
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thank you.   Mr.  Hagt .  
 
STATEMENT OF MR. ERIC D.  HAGT, CHINA PROGRAM 
WORLD SECURITY INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, D.C.  
 
 MR.  HAGT:  I  would  also l ike  to  thank the Commiss ion for  
invi t ing me today to  ta lk  about  what  I  th ink is  ac tual ly  an  issue  of  the  
u tmost  impor tance ,  and I  be l ieve  that  space secur i ty ,  both  for  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes  and China ,  i s  rapidly  becoming a  defining issue  in  the  
re la t ionship  because  i t  i s  a t  the  nexus  of  deeply  held  economic  and 
secur i ty  in teres t  on both  s ides  f rom global iza t ion,  economic 
development ,  na t ional  pres t ige ,  nuclear  deter rence,  as  wel l  as  a  
potent ia l  conf l ic t  in  the  Taiwan Stra i ts .  
 You 've  asked me to  touch on several  i ssues  about  China 's  
program,  and one of  them was  what  prepara t ions  China  has  made for  
conf l ic t  in  space .   I  would  l ike  to  keep that  br ief  because  I  think there  
are  a  lo t  of  unknowns there  s t i l l ,  but  jus t  to point  out  a  couple  of  
sa l ient  fac ts  or  points .  
 One is  tha t  in  looking a t  capabi l i t ies  or  China 's  preparat ions ,  I  
th ink you need to  not  only  look a t  capabi l i t ies ,  but  China 's  ins t i tu t ions  
and i t s  doct r ine  and how that ' s  developing in  the  mi l i tary  space 
program,  and I  th ink there  has  been some shi f t  in  that  a rea  tha t  i s  
re levant  to  where  China  is  going wi th  i t s  program,  and I 'd  be  happy to  
take  quest ions  on  tha t  la ter .  
 The  second is  that  I  th ink  that  the  assessment  of  tha t  i s  tha t  there  
i s  s t i l l  a  lo t  of  ambigui ty  there  in  China 's  preparat ions  for  space.  We 
shouldn ' t  lose  s ight  of  the  fac t  tha t  tha t  may be  par t ly  due to  a  lack of  
t ransparency.   But  I  think i t  a lso  ref lec ts  China 's  uncer ta inty  about  i t s  
object ives  in  space .  
 Turning to  the  assessment  of  China 's  in tent ions ,  and I  think the  
ASAT tes t  recent ly  goes  to  the  hear t  of  that  d iscuss ion,  in tent ions  
d is t inguished f rom capabi l i t ies  need to  take  in to  account  economic ,  
pol i t ica l  and s t ra tegic  fac tors .  And i t  i s  my assessment  tha t  on  balance  
whi le  there  i s  a  s t ra tegic  logic  for  China  to  bui ld  ASATs and perhaps  
tes t  them,  there  i s  on  balance  very  powerful  reasons  for  Bei j ing  not  to  
 
8
 Click here to read the prepared statement of Dr. Michael P. Pillsbury, Consultant, Department of 
Defense, Washington, D.C.  
 or  to  aver t  a  mi l i tary  race  in  space .  
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 I  th ink tha t  the  tes t  and sor t  of  assess ing the  tes t ,  and this  i s  my,  
wel l ,  specula t ion,  i t ' s  my analys is ,  and we don ' t  know for  sure ,  but  I  
look a t  i t  as  a  confluence of  two thresholds  that  China  perceives .   The 
one is  through U.S.  rhetor ic  and act ion,  China  has  concluded that  p lans  
for  space control  and dominance  i s  inevi table  and wi l l  lead  to  the  
weaponizat ion of  space .  
 With  U.S.  mi l i ta ry  space  program int imate ly  connected  wi th  the 
mul t i - layered miss i le  defense  sys tem,  i t  creates  a  lo t  of  s t ra tegic  angst  
in  Bei j ing  over  China 's  nuclear  de ter rent  and the  s t ra tegic  balance  in  
the  Taiwan Stra i t s .  
 The second threshold  is  tha t  China  i t se l f  s tands  a t  the  cusp,  I  
th ink,  of  becoming a  deeply  inves ted player  in  space  for  reasons  
commercia l  manned space ,  exploratory space  and mi l i ta ry space .  
 China  has  come to  see  the  current  s t ra tegic  balance in  space as 
in to lerable  and in tolerable  to  i t s  core nat ional  secur i ty  in teres ts  and i t s  
sovere ign r ights  to  access  space .   I  th ink the  ASAT was a  response  to  
th is  pr imar i ly .    
 Why Bei j ing 's  response  to  the  form of  an  ASAT tes t  i s  a  ques t ion 
a  lo t  of  people  have pondered,  but  I  bel ieve  that  i t  was not  
uncalcula ted  or  an  accident ,  and I  see  i t  a  resul t  of  a  hedging s t ra tegy 
that  Bei j ing has  had agains t  the  uncer ta inty  of  the  d iplomat ic  thrust  
that  began in  the  1990s .  
 With  China 's  a t tempts  to  prevent  space  a t  the  U.N.  s tymied,  the  
ASAT tes t  was  a  las t  d i tch  ef for t  to  br ing space  back f rom the  br ink 
and redress  the  perceived s t ra tegic  imbalance  in  space .  
 I t ' s  not  tha t  this  response  does  not  represent  a  threat  to  the 
Uni ted  Sta tes .   I t  does  cer ta inly ,  but  I  think the  threat  i s  actual ly  
l imi ted ,  and I  th ink tha t  i s  pr imar i ly  based on the  fac t  tha t  the  tes t  was  
a  response  fundamental ly .  
 I  would  l ike  to  jus t  br ief ly  touch on a  few ideas  about  what ,  how 
I  th ink that ,  where  we go f rom here  in  terms of  the  new secur i ty  
environment  in  space .   I  see  the  Sino-U.S.  re la t ions  in  space  
essent ia l ly  as  a  c lass ic  secur i ty d i lemma dynamic  where  a lmost  any 
act ion by one wi l l  lead to  the  insecur i ty  perceived or  rea l  by the  other .  
 This  i s  an ext remely  complex issue ,  but  pr imar i ly  because  of  the  
dual -use  nature  of  space  and the  b lur red  l ine  between offens ive  and 
defensive  technologies .   So how can th is  cycle ,  the  vic ious  c i rc le  be 
broken?   I  th ink technologica l  solut ions  wi l l  a lways  be  l imi ted ,  and 
perhaps wi thin  the  non-offensive  realm,  th ings  l ike  s i tuat ional  
awareness ,  improving s i tuat ional  awareness  would  probably  fa l l  wi th in  
tha t  to  a  la rge  extent .  
 But  wi thout  c lear  knowledge of  intent ,  I  think technologies  wi l l  
by  and large  cont inue to  dr ive  th is  secur i ty  conundrum.   And I  th ink 
 tha t  goes  for  most  of  the  components  of  the  mul t i - layered miss i le  
defense  sys tem,  which in  my opinion wi l l  invar iably  af fect  the  
percept ions  in  the  Taiwan Strai t s .  
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 There  are  a  number  of  conf idence-bui lding measures  and ideas  
that  have been tabled,  ru les  of  the  road and so  on that  I  th ink are  very  
important .  But  I  would  l ike  to  point  out  a  couple  that  I  th ink are  
pointed  out  less  of ten ,  and the  one is  the  U.S.  posi t ion a t  the  
Conference  on Disarmament ,  and I  th ink tha t  the  argument  that  there  i s  
no  race in  space  and therefore  no need for  a  t reaty  i s ,  I  think i t ' s  
becoming,  rapidly  becoming untenable .  
 And I  th ink that  the  Chinese  do not  be l ieve  that  i t ' s  t rue ,  and the  
tes t  in  a  sense  i s  probably ,  inadver tent ly  or  not ,  I  th ink has  shown that .   
The other  suggest ion that  I  would br ing up to  conclude is  that  we 
rea l ly ,  there 's  so  much in  terms  of  in tent ions  that  go beyond 
capabi l i t ies  and where  they ' re  going in terms of  in tent ions  that  we do  
not  unders tand,  and that  includes  the  reasons  for  the  ASAT tes t .  
 We need to  ta lk  a t  a  s t ra tegic  level  and a t  a l l  levels  across  the 
board  in  a  sys temat ic  way consis tent ly  which we,  I  would argue,  we ' re  
not  doing r ight  now.   I  th ink tha t  that  communicat ion  i s  the  one  thing I  
th ink that  wi l l  rea l ly  he lp  dr ive ,  sor t  of  break that  cycle ,  the  secur i ty  
d i lemma.  
 Al l  of  the  measures ,  I  think,  though,  pr imar i ly  are  somewhat  
pal l ia t ive  in  nature  and I  th ink that  we should  not  ignore  the  
under lying current  of  the  s t ra tegic  di lemma in  space ,  and that  i s  China  
has ,  I  th ink,  demonst ra ted  that  i t  f inds  the  s ta te  of  af fa i rs  in  space  
unacceptable ,  and I 'm not  sure  exact ly  how we ge t  a round that .   But  I  
th ink that  that ' s  sor t  of  the  new s t ra tegic  environment  and is  something 
that  we need to  look a t  and rea l ly  address .  
 So thank you very  much for  your  t ime and I  welcome comments  
and quest ions .  
[The s ta tement  fo l lows: ]  
 
Prepared Statement  of  Mr.  Eric  D.  Hagt ,  China Program 
World Security  Inst i tute ,  Washington,  D.C.  
 
New Frontier in Sino-U.S. Relations: Challenges in Space 
 
The United States must grapple with China’s rapidly growing power and influence in the world on many 
different levels, but China’s military modernization is the Gordian knot in this relationship. Despite close 
economic ties, the objectives of China’s evolving military strength cause great angst about the direction 
China is taking and how the United States should respond. Space is very unique to this relationship because 
as an indispensable and dual-use technology, it is the nexus of deeply held economic and security interests 
on both sides. As such, it also holds very decisive opportunities for cooperation. 
 
The United States must wake up to the fact that China views outer space as far more than just another asset 
to be pursued in competition with others. Satellites play an important role in China’s ambitions for 
 globalization, commerce, finance and continued economic development. Manned space is an important 
driver for advanced science and technology and national prestige. And space, the moon and Mars are 
valued for their potential as resources. On the security front, China has long understood the centrality of 
space for military power in terms of service integration, force enhancement and force projection. China’s 
worries over its nuclear deterrent and the status of Taiwan are also intimately connected to China’s 
perception of its rights in space and the activities of others. These factors are key to both national 
sovereignty and national security and constitute the clear necessity to access space and protect its interests 
there.  
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Understanding how Beijing will act to exercise its perceived rights in space and address threats to those 
interests is central to America’s future security in space and entails a discussion of several issues. First, 
what preparations has China made for conflict in space? This requires an examination of background 
information ranging from capabilities to organizational changes to principles guiding war in space. Second, 
why did China test the anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon, and why now? Analyzing the motivations behind this 
act will bring into focus China’s larger intentions in space, and how this is to be balanced against its 
military preparations and thinking on space warfare. Third, what are the consequences of the test and 
China’s larger ambitions for the United States, China’s neighbors, and the international community? 
Perhaps more importantly, how can the United States respond in a way that does not imperil national 
security or that of the security of outer space? 
 
Space Conflict Preparations 
 
The ASAT test has raised a lot of speculation (and suspicion) of China’s objectives in space, especially 
with regard to its preparations for military conflict. In attempts to divine Chinese thinking in this realm, 
there is a tendency to rely heavily on a determination of its military space capabilities and then draw a 
speculative line to its intentions. This is, in part, a result of the paucity of reliable and accurate information 
on China’s military space program, but regardless, it holds limited insight into where China is heading in 
space and why. China’s intentions in space and the security implications for the United States are also a 
product of the current security architecture of space and China’s changing strategic perception and interests 
in space. 
 
Capabilities: An analysis of China’s ASAT capabilities should be divided into two basic categories: what 
is known and what is speculated. We know China has the ability to use a medium range ballistic missile as 
a direct ascent, kinetic energy ASAT (also known as a kinetic kill vehicle, KKV). The extent of that 
program is not known, but mated with a larger booster, a KKV could reach satellites in higher orbits. With 
China’s civilian and military space programs closely intertwined, much of this real and potential ASAT-
enabling capability falls under existing dual-use technologies. 
 
Everything else regarding Chinese ASAT capabilities falls into the second category, what is speculated, 
including a number of dual-use programs that are under research and development, but which have no 
known dedicated weapons programs. Several of these technologies could conceivably lie within China’s 
technical capability including co-orbital interceptors, space mines, either conventional or nuclear. In 
addition, China has been researching and developing laser technology since the 1960s. Among those most 
relevant to ASAT capabilities are free-electron and chemical oxygen-iodine high energy lasers, which 
could provide the technology base that could dazzle or permanently blind optical sensors of space-based 
missile defense components, or at higher power could damage those satellites. High power microwave 
weapons for jamming have also been designed and tested. Other relevant R&D with dual-use potential 
includes China’s small and mini-satellites, which would allow China to launch swiftly using small, mobile 
launchers and which would have the potential to disrupt, degrade or destroy space assets. While a number 
of required support capabilities for an effective ASAT program are improving in connection with China’s 
manned and commercial space programs, tracking, surveillance, and launch-on-demand capabilities are 
probably still insufficient.  
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Institutions: An important measure of China’s preparation for conflict in space is the state of its 
organizational and institutional make-up. This is a diverse subject, and could include aspects from staff 
management to logistics and R&D support (e.g., ASAT-related research falls under China Aerospace and 
Technology Corporation [CASC] and its subsidiaries, China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, the 
Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology, and the China Academy of Space Technology, and 
numerous others). This is described in great detail elsewhere; however, two points are worth stressing in 
this respect. 
 
First, there has been movement on the status of the organizational leadership relevant to military space that 
is indicative of internal thinking on the subject. In fact, to date, there is no separate military space 
command; however, this may be changing as evidenced by calls within several key military organizations 
to create a dedicated military space command with a stated purpose of tackling the growing strategic and 
national security threats in space. The driving force behind this new command system appears to be the 
PLA General Armament Department (GAD). Presently, command over civilian space experiment activities 
is roughly divided between the State Council, the Central Military Commission (CMC) and functional 
sections of the GAD. Although the institutional hierarchy of China’s military space program is not fully 
understood, military space activities will be led by the CMC and the PLA General Chief Department, with 
significant personnel coming from the GAD. Under a new powerful supreme command department for 
space, an agency with the Chinese president as the supreme commander, military space would take on a 
new priority in terms of budgeting and military and political authority; similar to what occurred with the 
establishment of the Second Artillery, China’s strategic force. The PLA Air Force appears to be 
challenging the calls for an independent space command arguing that a service integrated with the Air 
Force would better serve the nation’s security interests. Reports in 2005 for a feasibility study on such a 
command have given additional credence to its impending creation. Despite the outcome of this debate, it 
demonstrates that attention to the relevant security issues in space are mounting. 
 
Calls for a separate space command have additional significance for this discussion on China’s preparations 
for conflict in space. With organizational and industry constituencies taking root in the system and vying 
for political and economic influence and authority, a degree of imperviousness to outside influence may 
grow in tandem. The closed and nontransparent nature of China’s military establishment, which largely 
runs the space program, only exacerbates this tendency. The sum of these realities suggests that once set in 
motion, national defense considerations planned over a long period to address security threats may be 
responsive to a degree by external factors, but cannot be altered at the whim of those factors. These 
tendencies may impact the degree to which China’s space program is malleable to fine tune its course of 
developing military capabilities.  
 
The second point regarding institutional status is the history of China’s priorities on spending in space. The 
vast majority of China’s space related program, whether manned space, satellites or military assets, largely 
falls under GAD and its subsidiary institutions. The official budget for China’s space program is 
approximately $2.5 billion and employs up to 200,000 workers. With 90 percent of space technology being 
dual-use, it is difficult to ascertain the degree of focus and spending that goes directly or indirectly to 
military programs. This does not negate the fact that a decision was clearly made in the early 1990s under 
Project 921, whether by choice or by necessity, to orientate China’s space efforts to a civilian program. 
Advancements in dual-use, ASAT-enabling technologies such as systems integration software, propulsion, 
orbital docking, systems diagnostics, miniaturization and navigation are real. But, while space technology 
may have dual-use applications, that is far less true for hardware development and testing. China’s decision 
to primarily develop civilian space over military, its known ASAT capability notwithstanding, makes 
funding and institutional interests for a larger, dedicated military space program ambiguous at best. 
 
Guiding Principles: Finally, the last element of China’s preparations relevant to space warfare is the 
development of doctrine, generally defined to include strategic, tactical and operational levels. Open source 
literature contains little definitive information on official war fighting doctrine for space. A number of 
recent scholars and reports have made attempts to discern China’s thinking in this realm either by inferring 
 doctrinal elements from other areas (land, air, sea) or by analyzing relevant but unofficial publications. 
However, their applicability to Chinese military thinking for space is debatable.  
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From what can be deciphered from open sources, China’s guiding principles in space warfare for the 
foreseeable future can best described as limited deterrence in space. The outline of this strategy has a 
number of salient characteristics. One is that it is defensive in nature and as such is circumscribed by 
China’s overall defensive military strategy. The concept of ‘comprehensive defensive actions’ is often 
divided into ‘passive defense’ and ‘active defense’, with China’s space force tasked with both passive and 
active strategies. However, the focus is on capabilities to enhance the survivability of China’s satellite 
networks, and to ensure its access to space, that is considered indispensable for future ‘informationalized 
warfare.’ ‘Passive defense’ emphasizes a preventative quality stressing protection against attack and 
includes measures for satellite assets including hardening, encryption, camouflage, stealth, and redundancy 
and duplication in satellite network systems and subsystems. ‘Active defense’, a central component of this 
strategy, includes countermeasures such as interference and jamming techniques, and in extreme situations 
using micro-satellites to actively guard other satellites, act as decoys or even counter-attack. In the long 
term, missile defense will also be part of the overall space force. 
 
A second characteristic of this limited deterrence in space is an emphasis to protect against an adversary’s 
capability to prevent or restrict China from accessing space to its economic and national security 
advantage. The PLA believes that U.S. intentions in space are not only to exercise its right to protect its 
satellites and other space assets, but also to deprive other countries of the same. China sees in space known 
(e.g. orbital slots) and unknown (planetary) resources and assets to which it has sovereign rights to utilize 
and explore. The ability to guarantee its access to space in light of threats to that goal can perhaps best be 
summed up as the ability to deny the denial. The line between offensive and defensive doctrine in a 
straightforward strategy and capability of denial in space is surely a blurry one. Without taking the point 
too far, denying others a capability to deny is subtly, and arguably, distinctive in placing a premium on 
defensive posture. While offensive measures have been discussed by some Chinese authors, they are 
largely dismissed as being strategically destabilizing and not within China’s reach for the foreseeable 
future.  
 
A wide reading of the open literature strongly suggests that China’s preparations for space warfare remain 
ambiguous or simply indeterminate. This state of affairs is certainly due in part to a lack of transparency or 
strategic and political expediency. However, while that may be true for certain aspects of China’s space 
warfare preparations, it is much harder to make that case across the board, from capabilities to 
organizational culture and doctrinal thinking, all of which are instrumental for the future of China’s 
military space program. Thus, the alternative cannot be dismissed: that a degree of the ambiguity reflects 
reality and that many elements of China’s preparations for conflict in space remain indefinite. That is not to 
be naïve about what China may be up to by overstating its ASAT and other weapons programs -- 
presuming worst-case scenarios is the greater risk because it can inadvertently spur on the Chinese military 
space program and lead to negative security consequences for American security in space.  
 
ASAT Test: Strategic Response 
 
While capabilities, institutions and doctrine help provide the broad strokes of where China’s program is 
currently, they have limited utility for the country’s longer term objectives and its intentions in space. 
Important political, diplomatic and strategic factors critically influence its direction, and in China’s case, 
may be determinative. On balance, while these issues add up to a strategic logic for China to build ASATs 
and other assets for conflict in space, there are powerful reasons for China to avert a military competition in 
space with the United States.  
 
In this light, China’s recent ASAT test is instructive. Why was it tested and what does that mean for space 
security and the United States? China’s ASAT test should not be interpreted as a direct threat to U.S. space 
power but a challenge to its ambitions for space control and dominance. With little information emanating 
 from Beijing regarding the test, discounting the possibility of internal struggle, miscommunication or 
clumsy miscalculation within China as a partial explanation for the test is obviously difficult. However, 
based on China’s past behavior, its interests in space and the huge stakes involved, it is also implausible 
that the test was executed without a careful consideration of the consequences. Rather, the balance of 
China’s perceived threats, economic development goals, techno-national and international image interests 
related to space point to the test primarily as a strategic response to the United States. 
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In the past decade, China has derived a number of key conclusions from its observations of U.S. military 
activities in space that have fundamentally shaped China’s own strategic posture. The first is the profound 
implications of space for information and high-tech wars. China witnessed with awe and alarm the power 
of the U.S. military using satellite communication, reconnaissance, geo-positioning and integration 
capabilities for an impressive show of force beginning first with the Gulf War in 1991, to the recent 
campaign in Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S. military’s almost complete dependence on space assets has not 
escaped the close examination of Chinese analysts. ASATs are seen by some analysts as weapons in line 
with China’s asymmetric military strategy to hit enemies’ vulnerable and hugely expensive assets in space 
with relatively cheap and easy countermeasures. 
 
Coupled with a number of key U.S. policy and military documents that call for control in space and the 
development of space weapons, as well as the U.S. refusal to enter into any restrictive space arms control 
treaty, China has concluded that America is determined to dominate and control space. This perceived U.S. 
intent leads Beijing to assume the inevitable weaponization of space, which mainly centers on the current 
administration’s goal of being able to shoot down missiles of all ranges, in all phases of their flight (boost, 
midcourse and terminal) and to do this from land, sea, air and space. 
 
These capabilities are extremely worrisome for China as they directly impact China’s core national 
interests and security. Components of this layered missile defense system (particularly boost-phase) will 
rely on space-based early warning systems, and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency plans to include space-
based interceptors having both defensive and offensive capabilities that could effectively negate China’s 
minimum nuclear deterrent arsenal. The ‘Shriever’ space war games conducted by the U.S. Air Force in 
2001, 2003 and 2005 strongly reinforced the conclusion that U.S. space control sets China as a target. An 
accelerated development of the U.S. ballistic missile system, especially as it is being developed in close 
cooperation with Japan, has been cited as threatening China’s homeland and nuclear deterrent and may 
deeply upset the region’s strategic balance or lead to regional proliferation. 
 
Most central to China’s concerns, however, is the direct affect U.S. space dominance will have on China’s 
ability to prevail in a conflict in the Taiwan Straits. Two scenarios are commonly cited as the most likely 
regarding space assets. One would involve China’s own reliance on force enhancement capabilities and 
specifically reconnaissance and targeting (of U.S. aircraft carriers for instance) with anti-ship missiles. The 
second scenario would entail disabling U.S. satellites in preparation for a conflict in the straits and would 
involve identification, tracking and ASAT capabilities. In both situations, China is vastly the weaker power 
in space and hence more vulnerable. 
 
Experts have noted the significant financial, political and technical barriers to most of the U.S. space 
weapons and even components of the multilayered missile defense programs. Yet, given the growing 
budgets for U.S. military space and missile defense activities, the current administration is set to continue 
pursuing these systems. Moreover, a significant portion of the U.S. military space program is classified, 
making a determination of the extent of U.S. military space program highly problematic. In fact, it can be 
reasonably argued that as a best case scenario, “the jury is still out” on whether the United States will 
ultimately pursue weapons in space. This is particularly problematic from a Chinese perspective that 
misreads these nuances in the United States and combines them with other U.S. actions and words in its 
conclusion regarding U.S. plans for space weaponization. 
 
However, in addition to the above strategic factors in space, China’s angst is compounded by its own 
 growing interests in space. China now stands at the cusp of becoming a heavily invested power in space. It 
has deep and growing interests in terms of the lucrative commercial satellite industry, its civilian, manned 
and exploratory space programs as well as military programs in space. China plans to launch up to 100 
satellites during the Eleventh Five Year Plan (2006-2010), an almost four-fold increase from the number 
launched in the preceding five-year plan. It’s manned and unmanned civilian exploratory programs are 
equally ambitious for the next 15 years with launches planned for manned docking in orbit, voyages to the 
moon and the beginning of a Mars program and a sun mission. Several new satellite and micro-satellite 
research and production facilities have significantly boosted China’s indigenous satellite production 
program. Also, a brand new launch center is under construction in Hainan Province, which will vastly 
increase China’s capacity to launch vehicles into geostationary orbit. China is cooperating with many 
countries on a broad range of projects. All told, China’s ambitions in space are impressive and the growth 
of its programs unprecedented. Moreover, space is far more than a monetary investment for China. It’s 
aspirations in space are also part of a larger and more comprehensive economic, social and scientific 
development plan. Presently, China remains less dependent and therefore less vulnerable in space than the 
United States, but that situation is changing. The ASAT test was a clear message that China also has deep 
and growing interests in space that require defending. 
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Thus, the confluence of China being at the threshold of becoming a space power along with China’s 
strategic vulnerabilities as a result of U.S. military developments in space have thus engendered a 
fundamental response: America’s pursuit of space control and dominance and its pursuit to develop space 
weapons pose an intolerable risk to China’s national security and interests. China’s own ASAT test 
embodied this message, redressing what it perceives as a critically imbalanced strategic environment that 
increasingly endangers China’s evolving interests. Yet, China has an overwhelming interest to avoid the 
weaponization of space, and such a test may have been a desperate measure to pull the United States back 
from the brink. Failing that however, the ASAT test also demonstrated China’s determination to defend its 
interests through deterrence. Its willingness to risk international opprobrium (and endangerment of its own 
space assets, let’s not forget) through such a test, and instigate the very U.S. reaction it seeks to avoid, 
conveys the importance of space to national security and China’s grim resolve to defend it.  
 
The timing of the test may also indicate China’s desire to avoid a costly arms race. China has repeatedly 
said it will not enter a space race with the United States, certainly not in terms of achieving strategic parity 
(which it cannot afford). The ASAT test could be a last ditch effort to gauge U.S. determination to pursue 
its goals for space control. If they prove unbending, China would demonstrate the resolve to deter these 
ambitions while the United States remains more invested and vulnerable in space and at the same time alter 
the degree and manner in which China itself invests in space (for instance, China would avoid building up 
expensive and vulnerable space assets).  
 
China has been calling for arms control in space for a long time, culminating in the draft resolution on 
Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space in 2002 at the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Yet, every call 
by China’s diplomatic effort at the CD has been effectively blocked by the United States. The latter’s 
rejection of a treaty to ban weapons in space, based on the rationale that it was not needed because there 
was no military space race, is widely rejected and is perceived as a U.S. preference to maintain its freedom 
to unilaterally act in space. With the ASAT test, the Chinese may have, inadvertently or not, put paid to the 
argument. While an open military competition in space may not yet exist, there is a clash of interests in 
space, along with an increase in threats, both perceived and real, between the United States and China.  
 
Many have pointed out the contradiction between China’s diplomatic offensive and its decision to conduct 
an ASAT test. However, the latter was more likely the product of a separate and perhaps independent 
hedging track rather than a deliberate intention to develop space weapons covertly. Although most aspects 
of China’s military program in space are largely unknown, the open source literature indicates that it 
proceeded in several stages as a response to developments in the United States. This process largely began 
in late 1980s with a realization that the U.S. missile defense, ASAT and space weapons program could 
endanger China’s national security interests. Yet, at that time, it seemed that China preferred to solve this 
 perceived threat through a diplomatic approach. With gridlock at the CD beginning in the mid-1990s, 
however, the military option – independent of a diplomatic one – took on greater urgency with the call for a 
development of relevant space technology. An awareness that effective defensive capabilities in space 
would take a long time to develop provided further impetus to these trends. The second phase was marked 
by the Shriever war game exercise in 2001, which vindicated China’s long-held fear of being a primary 
target of the U.S. military space program and triggered China’s determination to resolve this threat in space 
– either through military or diplomatic means. From China’s perspective, all U.S. actions since that time 
have served to diminish a diplomatic solution while underscoring the necessity of a military hedge in space.  
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To sum up, the ASAT test and China’s overall military preparations for conflict in space are closely linked 
to the perceived threats to its interests in space, both strategic and other, by the United States. But the 
balance of those interests strongly suggest that China’s intentions include, if not necessitate, avoiding the 
weaponization and an arms race in space. The challenge, as defined by recent events, is to the current 
imbalance of the strategic architecture in space (U.S. dominance), not U.S. power in space per se. 
 
Threats  
 
China’s ASAT test implies a clear but limited threat to the United States (and its allies) that should be 
considered in close connection with a potential conflict in the Taiwan Straits. However, considering the 
sum of China’s preparations for conflict in space as well as a careful consideration of its intentions as 
described above, the threat to international space security is arguably more benign than this spectacular test, 
and the orbital debris cloud it created, would suggest. 
 
The destruction of the defunct FY-1C at 850 kilometers above the earth using a medium-range rocket puts 
at risk critical and vulnerable space-based components in low earth orbit (LEO) such as the space-based 
tracking satellites (e.g., SBIR Low) as well as the giant keyhole optical and Lacrosse radar reconnaissance 
satellites in LEO. As they are big and few in number, they are not immediately replaceable if lost. If mated 
with a larger booster, a similar kinetic kill vehicle might be able to reach satellites in higher orbits. 
However, U.S. satellites monitoring the globe for missile launches -- Defense Support Program spacecraft -
- in geo-synchronous orbit at some 24,000 miles high, and GPS constellation in medium altitude at 12,000 
miles are both too high to be of threat to this kind of ASAT. A number of other capabilities as described in 
the first section could provide a far greater threat range, but the development level of these capabilities in 
China’s space program is largely indeterminate. 
 
The degree to which China’s ASAT test directly threatens Japan is roughly proportional to U.S.-Japanese 
cooperation in development of the missile defense system and how their alliance could play out in a Taiwan 
scenario. Systems including PAC-3, Aegis/SM-3 and THAAD and the overall interoperability with the 
United States might encourage Japanese involvement in a Taiwan conflict. In addition, the U.S. Navy and 
Air Force have bases in Japan, which may require the United States to seek support from the Japanese in a 
sustained conflict, including the conflict over Taiwan. Given the legacy of mistrust between China and 
Japan, this Chinese action may fuel Japan’s development of its own military space capabilities, especially 
as it came in the midst of the North Korean nuclear crisis. 
 
In India, the Air Force’s recent ‘China threat’ lobbying and its push to establish a military space command 
may have been given a significant boost by the ASAT test. With India rising as an Asian power, China 
certainly has concerns over U.S. cooperation with India on missile defense, a development that could 
deeply alter the region’s strategic balance. Certainly the ASAT test holds an inherent threat to any space 
faring nation and particularly a potential strategic competitor to China. However, Sino-Indian relations 
have recently made significant progress and without a closer connection to the Taiwan situation, the ASAT 
test should not be seen as an immediate threat to India.  
 
In terms of greater threat to the international community, the main threat from this ASAT test is the debris 
it created, stretching from approximately 425 to 3,000 kilometers, endangering over 100 satellites owned 
 by a variety of nations and commercial companies, particularly Earth-observation and weather satellites. 
However, China has shown a vigorous desire to cooperate in space with any willing nation. China is jointly 
engaged in developing a number of satellite programs, with eight other countries under the Asia-Pacific 
Space Cooperation Organization treaty, as well as with Nigeria, Venezuela, Brazil, Russia and a number of 
countries in the European Union. 
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More importantly, does the test and China’s ambitions in space pose a larger strategic threat to the United 
States? The nature of China’s intention by ASAT testing is paramount to answering this question. As 
analyzed previously, the test was fundamentally a deterrent response to the United States and therefore 
represents a hedging strategy. If correct, this would suggest that the inevitability of China’s pursuit of space 
weapons is connected to the inevitability of America’s space domination goals. This does not diminish U.S. 
vulnerability to the ASAT test, but it does have implications for a longer term strategic threat and solutions 
to addressing it as outlined in the following section. 
 
Cracking the Security Dilemma 
 
The paradigm the United States faces with regard to China in space, particularly in the aftermath of China’s 
ASAT test, is one of a classic security dilemma commonly defined as two states that are drawn into conflict 
because the actions of one state to increase its security are interpreted as threatening to the other state, 
leading to a cycle of provocation. Space is highly susceptible to this zero-sum dynamic because of the 
blurring between defensive and offensive capabilities in space as well as the dual-use nature of space 
technology. China has demonstrated that it has interests in space and will no longer accept the status quo of 
U.S. plans for space dominance. While this may have had a deterrent and defensive intent, it is perceived as 
inherently threatening to U.S. assets in space. The security dilemma in Sino-U.S. relations is particularly 
troublesome as the two countries develop a complex relationship that is economically close, politically 
ambiguous and potentially adversarial militarily. How can the vicious circle of the security dilemma in 
space be broken? It will require a highly creative mix of measures to give China greater strategic room and 
access to outer space that will not at the same time appear as U.S. weakness (which may encourage China), 
or as giving up substantial strategic ground (which is politically infeasible).  
 
Purely technological solutions to the security dilemma are limited. Passive protective measures such as 
hardening, encryption, camouflage, stealth, and redundancy of satellites would be relatively 
uncontroversial. The Chinese ASAT test has certainly underscored the vulnerability of U.S. assets in space 
and has spurred an already growing consensus around requirements for improving situational awareness. 
Passive protective measures would enhance the ability to see and understand what is going on in space 
through upgrading and expanding the Space Surveillance Network. Most of these measures would roughly 
fall into a non-offensive category as well, but even here, verification and inspection capabilities could be 
ambiguous in undercutting China’s security. 
 
Beyond passive defense technologies, most capabilities in space will drive the security conundrum if not 
accompanied by a clearer intent of purpose. This goes for many aspects of the currently envisioned 
multilayered ballistic missile defense system. The system is hardly offensive in concept, yet China 
considers many components of it as threatening. Upper tier, boost-phase and mid-course interceptors, and 
Aegis-based systems, could negate China’s nuclear deterrent and protect against China’s most potent 
coercive tool against Taiwan—short and medium range ballistic missiles.  
 
In fact, China’s worries over U.S. intentions in space are most closely connected to the strategic balance in 
the Taiwan straits. Taiwan is a core national interest to China, and is also virtually the only conceivable 
point of conflict between China and the United States for the foreseeable future. This greatly complicates 
any solutions as Taiwan is a particularly knotty challenge in its own right. But it also underscores the 
importance of a political solution over a technical one. Due to the security dilemma that defines Sino-U.S. 
relations in space, this is surely fiendishly difficult but it is not impossible. Recognizing the close linkage 
between strategic stability in the Taiwan Straits (foreign policy) and U.S. space weapons programs is 
 essential. This is rarely acknowledged in any systematic way, let alone factored into military decision-
making.  
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China’s evolving notions of sovereignty in space could increasingly become another point of tension in 
Sino-U.S. relations in space and one that China will likely seek to redress. China claims equal sovereign 
rights (under international law) to access space, which is impeded by U.S. national security objectives in 
space. At the same time, China is threatened by U.S. satellites -- particularly those with military utility -- 
passing over Chinese territory. Although outer space is viewed as the global commons, its exploitation, 
whether for commercial, military or other purposes, overwhelmingly favors the United States. This is in 
contrast to international waters, where U.S. fleets safeguard shipping lanes that serve a truly international 
trade. In space, the strategic advantage this bestows on the United States is not lost on China. It does not 
have the ability (or the motive) to challenge the United States on the high seas, but it is showing a growing 
willingness to exercise its rights in space.  
 
Other smaller steps may be more politically feasible, however, and could also go a long way to managing 
the competitive Sino-U.S. relationship in space. Clearly defining threats and parameters for acceptable 
norms of behavior in space has not been accomplished in any significant way. A ‘code of conduct’ and 
‘rules of the road’ for space, with measures such as mutual noninterference of satellites and space traffic 
management, and procedures for ‘incidents’ in space would help to build confidence for mutual security. A 
reconsideration of the U.S. position at the CD could go a long way to not only addressing core values and 
interests in space but the fundamental problem of the perception of an inevitability of space weaponization. 
The argument that there is no space race and therefore no need for further treaties beyond the Outer Space 
Treaty is increasingly untenable.  
  
Naturally, it takes two to talk. Despite the fact that blame also lies on the Chinese side in terms of its 
hedging behavior and its allergic reaction to transparency, it is precisely because we know so little about 
China’s intentions, whether regarding the ASAT test or its larger military ambitions in space, that the 
imperative to talk is all the more stark. Dialogue across a broad range of space issues, at many different 
levels and in a systematic way is obligatory, not an option. Space is rapidly becoming the node where 
crucial strategic, military and commercial ambitions intersect, of both nations, and so these discussions 
should become part of strategic talks. While high barriers to effective test bans or arms reductions in space 
will always be elusive, negotiations can also serve to open channels of communication for conflict 
management. China will likely maintain a secretive posture for some time to come but when carefully 
considered, China has more interest to avert a space race than join one. Moreover, the ASAT test and 
military space program are fundamentally a response to U.S. goals in space and China is therefore 
malleable to a strategic solution. That window will not stay open forever.  
 
Effective communication on such issues must be predicated on a well-considered analysis of the nature of 
the threat and an understanding of the other side’s interests. This entails a reading of a vast body of 
literature that is largely inaccessible to the majority of students of Sino-U.S. relations, on both sides of the 
ocean. The problem is magnified however in the United States where few specialists (let alone non-
specialists) have the language skills to read the material first-hand, a fact that is further compounded by the 
fact that material’s authoritativeness is extremely difficult to discern. This creates a ‘gatekeeper 
phenomenon’ where much analysis relies on selected translations, where conclusions about China’s 
military space ambitions are difficult to contend. A language task force to provide wider and more uniform 
access (civilian and government) to these materials could drastically minimize this problem.   
 
In conclusion, many of the above measures are palliative in nature, requiring high diplomacy, and may or 
may not come to fruition. To focus solely on them would be to miss the larger strategic undercurrent of the 
security dilemma in space. China did not challenge U.S. power in space; it was challenging the U.S. self-
described right to dominate it. China will unlikely accept U.S objectives in space if pursued at the exclusion 
of China’s own core national values and interests. A failure to heed this evolving reality will likely lead to 
more friction, and perhaps even further testing. The future course of action is not about pleasing or 
 appeasing Beijing: it is about reaching accommodation and common ground that is not only equitable but 
inevitable. The United States needs to come to grips with the reality that China will demand more ‘strategic 
room’ in space. While it is not the message Washington wants to hear, and may be difficult to achieve 
politically, it is increasingly the reality that the United States must confront. 
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Appendix 
During the past decade or more, there has been a vast proliferation of literature directly and indirectly 
related to ASATs and military space issues in China. Not only has the information increased in volume, but 
has diversified in viewpoint, ranging from the hawkish and dovish at the fringes, and everything in 
between. Understanding this body of information in China requires discerning analysis.  
 
First, who is writing? The authors and their institutional affiliation are essential to discriminating the 
publication’s relevance to military and policy/strategy decision-making regarding China’s military space 
program. There is no set formula for determining the authoritativeness of an article or book but an 
important indicator is the nature of the references used (popular science, newspapers and digests as 
opposed to academic publications or papers produced at high levels). Second, what is the writing about? Is 
it ‘lessons learned’ and descriptions of other countries’ capabilities (e.g., the United States or Russia), or 
proposals and depictions of China’s own program? The majority of publications fall into the former 
category but are often interpreted within the latter. Third, and most basic, is the fidelity of the translation. 
This task can be more art than science, but the mistranslation of a few key words can drastically alter the 
meaning and intent of an article. All of these are critical to reaching balanced and informed conclusions 
about China’s military space capabilities, doctrines and intentions. 
 
The paper submitted to this commission on Jan. 19, 2007, “The Assessment of China’s Anti-Satellite and 
Space Warfare Programs, Policies and Doctrines” commits all of the critical errors described above. First, 
the study claims to represent the majority of openly available sources, but only quotes from approximately 
30 articles and 3 books that are not representative of a far larger pool of sources (the World Security 
Institute’s China Program has a library of over 1,000 articles and 30 books on the subject dating back to the 
1980s). Based on a wide reading of the literature, the references used in this report appear to exploit the 
most strident and extreme voices. The degree to which these particular sources are not representative of 
China’s military space efforts should have been recognized and acknowledged. This report does neither, 
and therefore misleads the reader. One important instance in this regard, is the use of the book by Col. Li 
Daguang called Space War (2001), upon which eight of the 30 central findings are based. At the time of 
writing, Li was an associate professor at China’s National Defense University. His resume states he 
specializes in international strategy, national defense strategy, defense science and technology 
development, and Sun Tzu’s theory and its application in business competition. His role in China’s 
doctrinal thinking on space warfare and influence in shaping China’s military space capability build-up is 
unknown, but he is certainly not a prominent and authoritative voice and his book draws on popular science 
and digests. As for the other two authors, Jia Junming and Yuan Zelu, their books were only their PhD 
theses in the years 2000 and 2004 respectively.  Yet, the most authoritative references --for instance 
Military Astronautics (2005, 2nd ed.), a book by Maj. Gen. Chang Xianqi, former president of the PLA 
Armament Command and Technology Academy) -- are not used as sources in the report. Chang’s book 
represents the findings of a key task force on space forces and space war-fighting under the PLA’s 10th Five 
Year Plan. Its tone is far less strident than Space War.  (A brief review of Military Astronautics can be 
found in China Security Quarterly at www.wsichina.org).  
 
Second, the vast majority of the sources utilized in the study submitted are highly technical articles dealing 
mainly with theoretical aspects of space war fighting and its capabilities. There is indeed a large body of 
research papers discussing specific technologies and weapons platforms of other countries, but few of them 
speak directly about China’s “space warfare programs, policies and doctrines” as stated in the title of the 
report. Certainly, technology development is suggestive of larger doctrinal issues, but the line between 
them is far from clear. This nuance is almost entirely absent, confusing theory and technology assessment 
with China’s policy intentions. 
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In addition, a number of the extensively translated articles in the report are actually studies of other 
countries’ capabilities, notably the United States (and/or Russia). The report ‘reads into’ these studies a 
reflection of China’s own program. One example is the errors made in the use of Liu Huanyu’s article on 
“sea-based anti-satellite platforms” (pp. 24-29). Whole sections of the article are rearranged in such a way 
as to inappropriately fall under a heading of proposals for what “China needs” in terms of weapons 
platforms. For instance, all of Section 3 (pp. 26-28), dealing with “anti-satellite weapons” is clearly a 
descriptive analysis of U.S. (and Russian) capabilities, a kind of ‘lessons learned’ approach, yet it is 
relocated under this “proposals” section.  Another example is found on Page 46 (ref. #39), where the 
translation of the headline for a section and its reference omit the word “foreign”, distorting the fact that the 
article is clearly a study on the high power microwave weapons of foreign countries, not China’s. 
 
Translation errors, of commission and omission, frequently occur, many of which go beyond minor 
technical nitpicking. China has certainly spent a lot of effort to carefully study U.S. weapons systems, from 
those used in the Gulf War to the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as evidenced by the large body 
of literature. But the leap from that to what China will do with its own program is debatable and one that 
should not be insinuated through mistranslation. On Page 43 (Section 6) of the report, for instance, a crucial 
sentence is absent within the translated section. The missing sentence specifically states that “China has not 
conducted research in this area.” More critically, at the beginning of the report’s executive summary (pg. 
3),  it states that “…Chinese Colonels Li, Jia and Yuan all advocated covert deployment of a sophisticated 
antisatellite weapon system to be used against United States in a surprise manner without warning.”  
However, in Space War, penned by the first author mentioned (Li Daguang); the use of “covert 
deployment” is never used in this context. Rather, he proposed that “China needs to build a small but 
capable space warfare special experiment force...[and] considering certain restrictions of the international 
society, this force should be secretly built and kept under low profile.”  Interpretation of books’ themes is 
one thing, but mistranslation of quotes is another. Particularly, when a Chinese author is advocating such a 
provocative program, it is imperative to accurately translate the Chinese authors’ words. 
 
In sum, the purpose of this critique is not to discredit this report or dismiss its findings based on 
technicalities. But flaws go deeper than mere cosmetics. Neither is this intended to downplay the realities 
of China’s military space program. To be blind to the fact that China may be hedging its bets in space by 
engaging in ASAT and/or space weapons efforts would be naïve, or worse, dangerous. But the conclusions 
drawn about the exact nature of the threat, and the underlying motivation and intention, must be based on 
careful and objective analysis. Misinterpretation based on problematic analysis and translation could lead to 
a worsening of U.S. security in space through misjudgment and overreaction. The gravity of this subject 
dictates a careful, comprehensive and accurate study of China’s military space program. 
 
 
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thank you.   Mr.  Cheng.  
 
STATEMENT OF MR. DEAN CHENG, RESEARCH FELLOW, 
CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSIS CORPORATION, 
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 
 
 MR.  CHENG:  I 'd  a lso  l ike  to  express  my apprecia t ion  to  the 
Commiss ion for  being invi ted  to  appear  before  you today to  address  the  
quest ion of  the  PLA's  object ives  in  space .   
 My remarks  today wi l l  focus  on three  real i t ies  that  the  Chinese 
ant i -sa te l l i te  tes t  of  January 11 brought  to  the  forefront .   Fi rs t ,  tha t  
China  is  a  space  power  of  the  f i rst  t ie r .   Second,  China  ac ts  according 
to  Chinese  interests .   Third,  Chinese decis ion-making is  very  much 
 opaque and not  wel l  unders tood.  
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 F i rs t ,  the  Chinese  are  a  space  power .   That  i s  they are  a  nat ion 
that  possesses  the  pol i t ical  wi l l ,  the  f inancia l  and human resources  and 
the  physica l  inf ras t ructure  to  use  space  for  the i r  own ends  and on thei r  
own terms.  
 More to  the  point ,  they are  a  f i rs t  t ier  space power ,  arguably  
exceeding Europe and Japan.   Not  only  does  China have the  abi l i ty  to  
exploi t  space  for  i t s  own purposes ,  but  the  January  ASAT tes t  a lso  has  
demonst ra ted  a  Chinese  capaci ty  to  deny other  nat ions  that  same 
abi l i ty .   This  may be  an  ear ly ,  l imi ted  capabi l i ty ,  but  i t  i s  a lso  now 
actual  ra ther  than potent ia l .  
 This  makes  the Chinese  a  very d i f ferent  proposi t ion in  the  pos t-
Cold  War  environment .   By being a  space power ,  China has  an 
enhanced abi l i ty  to  moni tor  i t s  environment  and i t s  surroundings  and 
can do so  re ly ing on i t s  own assets .  
 As  impor tant ,  by  control l ing  i ts  own space  asse ts ,  China  can 
provide  access  to  such informat ion and capabi l i t ies  to  o ther  nat ions  of  
Bei j ing 's  choosing.  
 This  ra ises  a  second impor tant  aspect .   I t  i s  essent ia l  to  v iew the 
PRC on i t s  own terms.   That  i s ,  as  an agent  ac t ing towards  i t  own ends  
and not  s imply a  ref lec t ion of  o ther  nat ions ,  par t icular ly  American 
act ions  or  perceived non-act ions .   China  under took the  ASAT tes t  
because  i t  f i t  in to  the  Chinese  calculus  of  comprehensive  nat ional  
power  and se l f - in teres t .  
 An effect ive  American response  needs to  take  that  calculus  in to 
account .   In  th is  regard ,  i t  i s  impor tant  to  examine the  ro le  of  the  
People 's  Libera t ion Army.   The PLA is  a  profess ional  mi l i tary  and,  as  
wi th  any profess ional  mi l i tary ,  i t  i s  charged wi th  f ight ing and winning 
the  nat ion 's  wars .  
 To do so ,  ra ther  than re ly ing on mass ,  PLA doctr inal  wri t ings  
over  the  las t  decade suggest  that  fu ture  wars  wi l l  focus  on high 
technology,  especia l ly  informat ion technology.   According to  PLA 
wri t ings ,  the  focus  now is  on f ight ing and winning what  they term 
local  wars  under  informat ional ized condi t ions .    
 To accompl ish  this ,  Chinese  analyses  emphasize  the  need to  
under take  war t ime informat ion,  col lec t ion,  t ransmiss ion,  management  
and analys is ,  whi le  h inder ing to  the  greates t  extent  poss ible  an  
opponent 's  abi l i t ies  to  under take  those  same act iv i t ies .  
 This  entai l s  a  s t ruggle  for  what  the  Chinese  term “ informat ion 
dominance,”  which leads  in  turn  to  an  increased emphasis  on space  
sys tems and space  opera t ions .   Space i s  a  key arena  for  each of  the  
informat ion-re la ted  funct ions  I  jus t  ment ioned.  
 To ful ly  exploi t  the  informat ion technologies  and improve sensor  
sys tems to  make modern weapons  that  much more  des t ruct ive ,  in  the  
 Chinese  view,  i t  now requires  the  abi l i ty  to  control  space .  
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 Thus ,  many Chinese  mi l i tary  wri t ings  emphasize  tha t  there  are  
now f ive  bat t lespaces  in  which the  PLA must  be  able  to  operate  in  
fu ture  wars :  the  t radi t ional  land,  sea  and a i r ;  the  e lec t romagnet ic  
spect rum;  and outer  space .   Some Chinese  authors  even refer  to  the  
concept  as  space informat ion warfare  because of  the  int imate  
re la t ionship  between space warfare  and informat ion warfare .  
 To th is  end,  Chinese  mi l i tary  wri t ings  of ten  refer  to  space  as  a  
new s t ra tegic  h igh ground.   Chinese  authors  note  that  control  of  space 
i s  now crucial  for  mi l i tary  operat ions .   Because  so much of  the  
informat ion needed to  f ight  fu ture  wars  involves  space  systems and 
because  the  informat ion passes  through space sys tems,  the  abi l i ty  
therefore  to  successful ly  f ight  and win future  local  wars ,  under  
informat ional ized condi t ions ,  wi l l  require  the  es tabl ishment  of  
informat ion dominance  which,  in  turn,  wi l l  enta i l  operat ions  a imed a t  
es tabl ishing dominance of  space .  
 So as  a  professional  mi l i tary ,  i t  would therefore  be  dere l ic t  of  
the  PLA not  to  be  prepared to  under take  opera t ions  in  space .   What  we 
have seen,  therefore ,  i s  not  the  act ions ,  as  some have suggested,  of  a  
“rogue” PLA,  but  of  a  mi l i tary  that  i s  taking i t s  role  ser ious ly.   At  the  
same t ime,  i t  i s  essent ia l  to  recognize  that ,  as  a  par ty-mi l i tary ,  this  i s  a  
ro le  tha t  the  Par ty ,  ac t ing as  China 's  nat ional  leadership ,  has  ass igned 
and approved.  
 The PRC ASAT tes t ,  then,  was  ul t imate ly  under taken because  i t  
i s  consis tent  wi th what  the  Chinese  leadership perceives  the i r  nat ional  
in teres ts  to  require .   And formulat ing an  adequate  response  wi l l  
require ,  in  turn ,  address ing those  same in teres ts  on  Chinese  ra ther  than 
through an American lens ,  which br ings  us  to  the  th i rd  rea l i ty .    
 Despi te  a l l  of  our  in terac t ions ,  Chinese  decis ion-making remains  
ext remely opaque to  us .   I t  should  be  ext remely di s turbing to  a l l  of  us  
here  that  af ter  30 years  of  Chinese  reform and opening,  thousands  of  
s tudents ,  bus iness  ventures ,  and tour is ts ,  how such a  tes t  was  decided 
upon,  the  mechanisms and personal i t ies  involved,  and the  processes  by 
which the  decis ion was  made,  remain  i l l  unders tood.  
 This  i s  potent ia l ly  of  enormous consequences .    
 I t  a f fec ts  day- to-day diplomacy.   A key assumpt ion has  been that  
the  PRC is  interes ted  in  being,  quote,  "a  s takeholder"  in  sus ta in ing the  
in ternat ional  system.   But  who are  these  s takeholders?    
 I t  a f fects  cr is is  management .   In  the  event  of  another  Chinese  
miss i le  tes t ,  such as  we saw in  1996,  or  the  EP-3 cr is is  of  Apri l  2001,  
or  even in  the  wake of  a  non-secur i ty  cr is is  such as  another  t sunami ,  
who should  the  U.S.  seek to  contact  in  order  to  manage the  cr is i s?  
 F inal ly ,  i t  a f fec ts  mi l i ta ry  planning.   Perhaps  most  
problemat ica l ly  and a lso  most  immediate ly ,  the  opaci ty  of  Chinese  
 decis ion-making means  that  our  own mil i tary  and c ivi l ian  leaders  are  
now put  on not ice  that  in  the  event  of  a  conf l ic t  wi th  the  PRC,  space  is  
l ikely  to  be  a  potent ia l  bat t leground.  
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 Whi le  ef for ts  a t  increasing the  robustness  of  our  own mil i tary  
space  asse ts  inc luding greater  redundancy,  hardening,  and 
incorporat ion of  s tea l th  technologies  are  a l l  essent ia l ,  I 'd  l ike  to  
suggest  tha t  there  a lso  needs  to  be  ef for ts  a imed a t  improving our  
unders tanding of  Chinese  decis ion-making,  which has  impl ica t ions  for  
both  war t ime and peacet ime.   
 Once again ,  I  th ink very  much the  U.S. -China  Commiss ion for  
invi t ing me to  speak wi th  you today and look forward to  quest ions .  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thanks  to  a l l  three  of  you for  
cogent ,  very  helpful  presenta t ions .   Commiss ioner  Wortzel .  
[The s ta tement  fo l lows:] 9
 
PANEL VI:   Discuss ion,  Quest ions  and Answers  
 
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Gent lemen,  thank you very  
much.   Three  outs tanding pieces  of  tes t imony.   Some PLA off icers  
advocate  the  capabi l i ty  for  China  to ensure  that  fore ign survei l lance  
assets  cannot  observe China f rom space  and more  speci f ica l ly  cannot  
observe  China 's  s t ra tegic  nuclear  forces  f rom space .  
 You spoke about  the  dangers  of  potent ia l  miscalcula t ion,  and 
par t  of  the  goal  of  that  ASAT tes t  was  to  b l ind American observat ion 
or  have the  capabi l i ty  to  b l ind American observat ion of  China  f rom 
space .   I 'd  l ike  each of  you to  comment  on what  potent ia l  escala tory  
dangers  you see  i f  China  ac ts  to  deny the  U.S.  the  capaci ty  to  conduct  
sa te l l i te  survei l lance  of  China  f rom space  and deny launch detect ion 
f rom space  for  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  in  the  event  of  a  cr i s i s ,  in  any order ,  
the  order  you tes t i f ied ,  and i f  you don ' t  care  to  comment ,  i t ' s  up  to  
you.  
 DR.  PILLSBURY:  I  could  say,  Commiss ioner  Wortzel ,  two 
th ings  based on shor t - term issues  and then long- term issues .   Long-
term issues  are  addressed in  these  three  books  that  I  examined by the  
PLA space  exper ts ,  exper t  in  the  sense  that  they teach and wri te  about  
mi l i tary  space,  and I 've  seen those  author i t ies  in  China.  
 Al l  three  of  them say that  China should take  a  three-phase  
approach to  denia l  and decept ion of  fore ign sate l l i tes .   I 'm glad you 
say fore ign,  by the  way,  because  Japan and India  are  a lso  I  th ink 
included in  th is  impl ic i t ly .  
 F i rs t ,  they advocate  that  in  a  per iod roughly 2010 to  2020,  China 
by then should  have developed the  means  to  e i ther  hard ki l l ,  tha t  i s  
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 permanent ly  des t roy,  or  sof t  k i l l ,  temporar i ly  d isrupt ,  any and a l l  
fore ign sate l l i tes  over  Chinese  terr i tory.  
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 Everybody knows th is  i s  jus t  an  aspi ra t ion.   I t ' s  jus t  something in  
the  book,  but  ac tual ly  when you th ink about  i t ,  i f  you have a  lo t  to  
conceal ,  i t ' s  a  pre t ty  good idea .   I t ' s  a lso  hard  to  do.   I t  means  in  terms  
of  s i tuat ional  awareness ,  you have to  know a  lo t  about  several  fore ign 
countr ies '  sa te l l i tes ,  where  they are  and what  they do.   This  in  many 
ways  i s  the  hear t  of  the  secur i ty  di lemma,  to  borrow Eric  Hagt ' s  term,  
involving an arms  race  in  space .   I t ' s  very  di f f icul t  to  know what 's  
ca l led  the  mi l i tary space  archi tec ture  of  your  opponent .  
 People  very  casual ly  say,  the  U.S.  has  400 sa te l l i tes  or  i t  has  low 
and medium and so  for th ,  geosynchronous ,  but  ac tual ly  one of  our  
country 's  b iggest  secre ts  i s  which sa te l l i tes  do what  and whether  the  
sa te l l i tes  that  we say do one th ing might ,  in  fac t ,  do  another?   There  
are  severa l  books  on th is .   The bes t  one  is  ca l led  “Deep Black” and 
there  i s  a  great  effor t  by  journal is ts  when they are  told something is  
real ly ,  rea l ly  secret ,  they jus t  love  to  kind of  p ick a t  i t  and see  what  
they can.  
 But  I 'm re la t ively  conf ident  that  the  hear t  of  our  space 
archi tec ture  i s  s t i l l  a  pre t ty  b ig  secre t  f rom fore ign powers .   I  th ink 
there 's  some evidence  the  Russ ians  got  the  fur thes t  and whether  they 
t ransfer red  that ,  those  crown jewels ,  to  the  Chinese ,  which would only  
take  a  couple  days ,  I  don ' t  know.  
 But  as  long as  i t ' s  hard  to  do,  I 'm not  so  worr ied  about  the  long-
term plan  because  we have many ins t ruments  ourse lves  to  make our  
sa te l l i tes  maneuverable ,  to  make them smal ler ,  to  re ly  on networks  that  
are  harder  to  f ind,  and to  engage in  decept ion f rankly ourselves  about  
which sa te l l i tes  do what .  
 So the  long-term problem we have  t ime to  work on and i f  th is  
Commiss ion makes  recommendat ions  to  the  Congress  about  that ,  I  
personal ly  would be  very gra teful .   This  i s  not  something to  be 
complacent  about .   
 The shor t  te rm is  a  scar ier  s i tuat ion,  where  i t ' s  poss ib le  a l l  three  
of  your  panel is ts  agree  that  there  are  some Chinese  mispercept ions  
about  space .   In  your  las t  panel ,  I  l iked Mr.  Lewis '  point  tha t  the  
Chinese  may overemphasize  how a  s ingle  asymmetr ic  s t r ike ,  and of ten 
you see  th is  phrase  in  the  books  I  looked a t ,  can  br ing America  to  i t s  
knees .   They love  to  use  th is  phrase ,  "br ing our  opponent  to  h is  knees  
wi th  a  s ingle  s t r ike ."  
 This  i s  dangerous  th inking because  (a)  i t ' s  not  t rue;  and (b)  i t  
could  prompt  re ta l ia t ion.  I f  you read General  Car twright 's  tes t imony on 
Wednesday to  our  St ra tegic  Subcommit tee ,  you see  h im very  expl ic i t ly 
laying out  th is  i s  what  we 'd  have to  do.   I f  one sa te l l i te  i s  taken down 
a t  6  a .m. ,  we ' re  not  going to  wai t  a round t i l l  noon to  see  i f  20 more  are  
 going to  be  taken down,  when our  ent i re  in te l l igence  and frankly  
f inancia l  and communicat ion s t ructure  re ly  on i f  those  are  the  ones  that  
are  taken down.  
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 So,  sorry  for  the  long answer ,  but  you have a  shor t - term/long-
term problem and i t  cer ta in ly  meri ts  the  Commission making 
recommendat ions  to  the  Congress ,  i t  seems to  me.    
 Thank you.  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Let ' s  have the  o ther  two 
comment ,  and then we ' l l  come back in  another  round to  fo l low up i f  
necessary.  
 Mr.  Hagt .  
 MR.  HAGT:  I  don ' t  necessar i ly  want  to  take  i ssue  wi th  my 
copanel is t  here  on sources .   But  I  think tha t  the  readings  of  how the  
Chinese  are  thinking about  some of  these  issues  i s  extremely di f f icul t  
to  decipher .   I  know the  books  that  Dr .  Pi l l sbury  i s  ta lking about ,  and I  
a lso  know that  there  are  a  large  number  of  o ther  books  that  ta lk  about  
these  th ings  that  have been brought  up,  and the  quest ions  that  are  
covered in  d i f ferent  ways  and in  d i f ferent  th inking.   I  would  argue that  
indeed the  vast  major i ty  of  sor t  of  the  mains t ream th inking on this  i s  
more ,  I  would  say more  defens ive  in  na ture  than offens ive in  terms of  
in  par t icular  how that  p lays  out  in  space  in  terms of  dual  use  and then 
that  b lurry  dis t inct ion between defensive  and offensive  is  a  d i f f icul t  
one.   I  rea l ize  that .  
 But  in  my es t imat ion,  I  th ink that  a  l imi ted  deterrence  in  space  
wi th  an emphasis  on pass ive  protect ive  measures  to  me is  rea l ly  what  
i s  the  thrus t  for  the  foreseeable  fu ture  in  Chinese  th inking,  but  to  
address  the  quest ion of  what  Mr.  Wortzel  brought  up,  I  would say that  
the  Chinese  are  very  sensi t ive  to  sa te l l i tes ,  for  ins tance ,  pass ing over  
Chinese  ter r i tory ,  and as  we see  wi th  the  EP-3 incident ,  I  th ink there  i s  
a  growing feel ing of  sor t  of  nat ional  sovereignty  and how sor t  of  these  
k ind of  i ssues ,  and sa te l l i tes  i s  included here ,  inf r inge on that ,  and I  
th ink that  i s  sor t  of  changing in  China .  
 I  would  say that  I  th ink what  we wi l l  see  more  chal lenges  to 
these  k inds  of  th ings  and there  i s  a  repor t  on  the  paint ing of  a  sa te l l i te  
over  U.S.  te rr i tory  which has  been disputed and we 're  not  sure  exact ly  
what  happened.   But  whether  that ' s  t rue  or  not ,  I  th ink that  we wi l l  see  
more  chal lenges  to  that  as  China 's  sor t  of  not ions  of  nat ional  
sovere ignty  and how that  extends  in to  space .   I  th ink we wi l l  see  more  
chal lenges  to  U.S.  sor t  of  posi t ion of  control  and dominance  in  space .  
 So I ' l l  leave  i t  there .  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Mr.  Cheng.  
 MR.  CHENG:  I  th ink that  Dr .  Wortze l ' s  quest ion  goes to  two 
di lemmas,  h ighl ights  them.   Fi rs t ,  the  PRC's  ins is tence on 
s imul taneously  character iz ing i t se l f  as  s imply  the  most  advanced 
 developing nat ion ,  whi le  a t  the  same t ime represent ing  a  s igni f icant  
por t ion of  the  world 's  economy and having a  substant ia l ly  moderniz ing 
mi l i tary .  
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 Cer ta in ly ,  for  the  moment ,  one  can a t  least  t ry  to  square  tha t  
c i rc le ,  but  the  t rend suggests  that  the  Chinese  are  ac tual ly  t ry ing to  
take  advantage of  s t raddl ing the  fence .   Therefore ,  they presumably 
have the  "r ight ,"  quote-unquote ,  to  h ide  thei r  weaknesses  f rom the  
s t rong,  namely f rom us ,  whi le  not  necessar i ly  according that  same 
cour tesy  to  o thers ,  such as  Uni ted  Sta tes .  
 The second di lemma is  the  quest ion of  what  the  Chinese  
themselves  necessar i ly  unders tand about  the  importance and 
capabi l i t ies  of  miss i le  detect ion and nuclear  detonat ion detect ion,  a t  
leas t  based upon the  open source mater ia l ,  which I  would l ike  to 
emphasize ,  i s  a l l  my tes t imony 's  bas is .  
 The Chinese  have not  deployed miss i le  or  nuclear  detect ion 
warning sa te l l i tes .   Now,  that  means  several  th ings .   One,  they may not  
be  aware  of  the  capabi l i t ies  associa ted;  but ,  second,  i t  means  that  the  
Chinese  space  program and the  Chinese  th inking about  space  i s  very 
d i f ferent  f rom not  only  that  of  the  Uni ted Sta tes  but  a lso  that  of  the  
Sovie t  Union whose  space  sys tems very  much were a  mirror  of  our  
own.  
 Whether  or  not  tha t  was  intent ional  i s  a  separa te  i ssue ,  but  the  
point  i s  tha t  the  Sovie ts  could  unders tand what  you could  obta in  and 
why th is  might  be  impor tant .   Whether  or  not  the  Chinese  have done so  
i s  a  very  d i f ferent  i ssue ,  and on the  subject  of  the  secur i ty  d i lemma;  I  
would  jus t  l ike  to  point  out  tha t  the  assumpt ion,  a  fundamenta l  
assumpt ion,  has  a lways  been that  everybody unders tands  a l l  of  the  
par ts  of  the  matr ix  and ass igns  s imi lar  va lues  to  them.  
 So what  happens  is  tha t  when you have two countr ies  tha t  have 
very  di f ferent  v iews,  going,  for  example ,  to  the  psycho-cul tura l  and 
psycho-his tor ica l  aspects ,  perhaps  what  I  va lue  and what  I  assume you 
value ,  i s  very  di f ferent  f rom what ,  in  fac t ,  you do value .   
 F inal ly ,  th is  goes  to  one las t  point :   The issues  of  concealment ,  
camouflage  and decept ion are  in tegra l  to  PLA thinking and I  would 
suggest  i s  probably  in tegra l  a t  the  nat ional  level  to  s t ra tegic  th inking.   
So whether  or  not  the  Chinese  are  going to  be  par t icular ly  focusing on 
hiding thei r  s t ra tegic  nuclear  assets ,  I  suspect  i s  as  much a  funct ion of  
SOPs that  i t  i s  na tura l  for  them to  do.   That  i s ,  i t  i s  s tandard  opera t ing 
procedure  not  to  leave th ings  out  to  be  observed given thei r  druthers  
and given a  choice ,  and so  long as  no one has  ac tual ly  t r ied  to  
negot ia te  anything a long these  l ines ,  then that ' s  what  they ' re  going to  
do.  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thank you.   Commiss ioner  
Fiedler .  
  COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  I  would  l ike  to  address  wi th  Dr .  
Pi l l sbury ,  and you two i f  you care  to  address  the  quest ion of  opaci ty  
and miscalculat ion  that  we ' re  a l l  concerned about  and proffer  a  not ion 
and ask you to  comment  on i t .   I t ’ s  increasingly  c lear  to  me that  as  a  
conscious  mat ter  of  s t rategy,  the  Chinese  are  denying us  t ransparency 
and that  i t  i s ,  in  fac t ,  par t  of  the i r  s t ra tegy to  do that .  
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 In  o ther  words ,  i t  keeps  us  thinking,  keeps  us  wonder ing,  keeps 
us  confused,  and keeps  us  ac tual ly  even perhaps  spending more  money 
or  wast ing more  money doing th ings  that  we shouldn ' t  do .   This  i s  
evidenced somewhat  in  the  in i t ia l  response  in  the  ASAT tes t  to  th is  
b izarre  not ion,  which you seem to  d ismiss ,  and I  th ink I  immedia te ly  
d ismissed as  a  mat ter  of  common sense ,  tha t  the  Chinese  leadership 
didn ' t  know that  the  ASAT tes t  was  going to  occur .  
 So I  would  l ike  you to  comment  on that  ques t ion and the  
re la t ionship  of  tha t  percept ion tha t  they lef t  wi th  the  world  as  a  mat ter  
of  consciousness  or  a  mat ter  of  dysfunct ional  decis ion-making or  what ,  
and whether  or  not  the i r  lack of  t ransparency is  a  conscious  s t ra tegic  
decis ion? 
 DR.  PILLSBURY:  Commiss ioner  Fiedler ,  I  th ink you 've  
successful ly  pointed  to  one  of  the  fundamental  f i ssures  in  the  China 
watching communi ty  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  and in  Japan and in  India ,  
which is  the  specula t ion over  why China  i s  not  t ransparent?   And th is  
has  led  to  a  number  of  ad  hominem at tacks  by China  exper ts  against  
each other .   I t ' s  led  to  a  great  deal  of  heat ,  but  very  l i t t le  l ight ,  and 
f rankly  I  propose  that  th is  i s  an  area  for  some fa i r ly  d isc ipl ined 
research because  again  on the  i ssue of  a l ternat ive  scenar ios ,  by 
common sense ,  wi th  any country ,  don ' t  make i t  China ,  make i t  some 
other  country  that ' s  not  being t ransparent ,  there ' s  a  range of  
poss ibi l i t ies .  
 Number  one ,  they ' re  shy and embarrassed a t  how backward they 
are .   We get  this  v iew put  forward a  lo t  by the  so-ca l led  "panda-
hugger"  communi ty  tha t  i s  very  sympathet ic  wi th  China  and f rankly  the  
Chinese  say  th is  themselves:  the  reason we can ' t  be  t ransparent  wi th  
you Americans  i s  because  we would lose  face .   We are  so  backward,  
and you ' re  so  impress ive ,  we jus t  can ' t  le t  you in  that  fac i l i ty  or  
whatever  i t  might  be .  
 At  the  o ther  ext reme,  we have the  view that  they have  something 
to  h ide ,  something rea l ly  b ig  and rea l ly  important ,  and i t  would  change 
our  ca lcula t ions  or  those  of  India  and Japan i f  they knew what 's  be ing 
hidden,  and so  i t ' s  qui te  common sense  to  h ide  i t  because  they don ' t  
want  countermeasures  taken agains t  them.  
 Then there  i s  the  k ind of  in-between view that ,  wel l ,  some 
organizat ions  in  China  are  obviously  very  open-- the  tour ism indust ry .   
So i t  can ' t  be  to ta l ly  cul tura l ,  but  there 's  k ind of  a  cul tura l  argument  in  
 the  inter im that ,  wel l ,  in  this  mid-zone,  wel l ,  Chinese tend to  cont rol  
informat ion more  careful ly  than the  enl ightened Westerners  who come 
out  of  ancient  Greece  and Rome and the  Renaissance and so  for th .  
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 So i f  you jus t  push hard  enough,  they wi l l  reveal  what  they ' re  not  
be ing t ransparent  about ,  but  there  wi l l  jus t  be  th is  ini t ia l  cul tural  
res is tance .   So you have these  three  broad schools .  And every  now and 
then something happens  that  surpr i ses  everybody-- the  appearance of  a  
new submarine  c lass  a  couple  of  years  ago on the  In ternet  tha t  a  
number  of  U.S.  government  in te l l igence  analys ts  to ld  the  press  they 
were  surpr ised about .  
 I f  they were  surpr ised  and i t  was  hidden in  a  b ig  bas ical ly  hangar  
or  bui ld ing,  i t  means  that  something was  being hidden.   How 
s igni f icant  i s  a  new c lass  of  submarines?   Wel l ,  tha t  depends  a  lo t  on 
your  overa l l  context  of  analys is .   But  I  don ' t  see  any effor t  underway 
by the  China-watching communi ty  to  address  this  i ssue  of  what- -your  
exact  ques t ion--could  the  lack of  t ransparency,  which is  a  euphemism,  
by the  way,  i t ' s  real ly  the  maintaining a t  very  high cos t  of  secrecy to  
what  China  is  doing.  
 What  i s  the  s t ra tegy,  i f  any,  behind this?  I t ' s  not  been addressed 
in  my view so I  would  t ry  to  reveal  a  l i t t le  b i t  of  ins ide  d i r ty  laundry 
of  the  China  f ie ld ,  but  there  needs  to  be  an  examinat ion of  i s  there  a  
s t ra tegy here?   I f  so ,  what  are  they t rying to  conceal  and what  i s  in  our  
grea tes t  in terest  to  learn?  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  Dean.  
 MR.  CHENG:  I  th ink several  aspects  come to  mind?  The f i rs t  i s  
whether  or  not  i t  i s  a  conscious  mat ter  of  s t ra tegy.   I  would  suggest  
perhaps  that  in  the  middle  road that  Mike Pi l l sbury jus t  la id  out ,  that  
perhaps  i t  i s  an  unconscious  mat ter  of  s t ra tegy,  which is  to  say  that  i t  
i s  something that  you do natura l ly .  
 That  doesn ' t  necessar i ly  make me feel  any bet ter  that  you are  
doing th is ,  na tura l ly .   But  this  a lso  goes  to  the  i ssue  of  who the  target  
i s .   That  i s ,  tha t  as  a  mat ter  of  s t ra tegy,  recogniz ing that  China 's  
in ternal  pol i t ica l  sys tem remains  in  many ways ,  a lmost  a lways 
ac tual ly ,  author i tar ian  even as  they t r ied  to  br ing in  more  pol i t ica l  
p layers  into  the  system,  tha t  concealment ,  tha t  h id ing your  s t rength  is  
a t  t imes ,  not  necessar i ly  on speci f ic  things  l ike  submarines  
necessar i ly ,  but  a lso  fa i lure  to  d iscuss  SARS,  fa i lure  to  d iscuss  Avian 
f lu  domest ica l ly ,  fa i lure  to  d iscuss  thoroughly  what  your  own 
s t ra tegies  are ,  may be  as  much a imed a t  the  domest ic  pol i t ica l  
component ,  power  s t ruggles  and the  l ike ,  as  i t  i s  in  a  broad 
concealment  a imed a t  the  U.S. ,  Japan and India .  
 I 'm not  t ry ing to say that  the  second is  not  impor tant.   Jus t  tha t  i t  
may or  may not  be  a  par t icular  fac tor  in  any given i tem of  concealment  
and decept ion.  
  The other  aspect  was  whether  or  not  the  Chinese  leadership  was  
aware  of  the  ASAT tes t ,  and I  would  suggest ,  a t  leas t  my own working 
hypothes is ,  has  been that  the  Chinese  leadership  was  ful ly  aware  of  the  
ASAT program and had s igned off  probably  on many aspects  including 
tes t ing,  but  not  necessar i ly  on speci f ic  dates ,  and so  therefore  
unders tanding how thei r  bureaucracy works  becomes a  very  impor tant  
fac tor .  
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 I 'm not  sure  that  we unders tand how thei r  weapons  development  
process  proceeds,  what  the i r  concepts  of  mi les tones  are ,  and therefore  
where  things  occur  when,  and whether  or  not ,  therefore ,  having 
approved an overa l l  program to  develop ASATs,  whether  Hu J in tao 
himself  i s  then kept  appr ised of  each and every  programmatic  
mi les tone including the  tes t .   Which isn ' t  to  say  that  they ' re  not  aware,  
but  only  how far  down does  the  top leadership  become involved in  
those  sor ts  of  i ssues .  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:   Mr.  Hagt ,  do  you have 
anything or  should  we move on?  
 MR.  HAGT:  Jus t  br ie f ly ,  I  would  say that  looking a t  th is  a t  a  
l i t t le  more  sor t  of  a  b i rd 's -eye  view,  I  th ink the  space  program in  China  
i s  by  and large  a  mi l i tary  program,  so  i t  i s  non- t ransparent  by  nature .   
I  th ink that  i s  changing to  a  degree as  China  real izes  tha t  i t s  own 
program is  changing and the  percept ion of  o thers .   
 I  th ink fundamenta l ly  that  China  sees  i t se l f  as  a  much weaker  
power  in  space ,  and that  sor t  of  s t ra tegic  balance  I  th ink that  China 
focuses  much more  on in  terms of  t ransparency,  in  terms of  in tent ,  so  
the  Taiwan scenar io,  nuclear  deter rence  and these  sor t  of  ear ly  
warning,  a l l  these  things ,  what  i s  U.S.  in tent?   And before  i t  
unders tands  that ,  wi l l  i t  sor t  of  d ivulge  speci f ic  capabi l i t ies  which we 
would  a t t r ibute  to  rea l  t ransparency?  So I  th ink there 's  a  s igni f icant  
d i f ference in  how we ta lk  about  t ransparency.  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thank you.   Commiss ioner  
Wessel .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Thank you a l l  for  being here ,  and 
i t ' s  been a  grea t  interact ion  so  far .   I 'd  l ike  to  go back,  Dr .  Pi l l sbury,  
to  your  in i t ia l  comments  and educat ion here  on a  mat ter  which I  th ink 
is  ac tual ly  wel l -known:  the  Net  Assessment  process ,  Andy Marshal l  
and a l l  tha t  has  gone on for  so  many years .  
 I t  i s  not  a  secre t ,  and is  wel l  known by I 'm sure  the  Chinese  as  
wel l .   So the  quest ion  of  worst -case  scenar io and insurance programs 
agains t  those  wors t -case  scenar ios ,  how do you view Chinese  responses  
to  that ,  to  a l l  the  panel is ts?   Meaning that  i f  they know we have a  net  
assessment  process ,  which is  going to  provide  one scenar io of  worst -
case ,  and that  we ' re  going to  prepare  for  tha t ,  whatever  tha t  means 
wi th  some kind of  insurance program,  how does  that  fac tor  into their  
 th inking knowing that  we ' re  going to  be  doing that?  
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 Dr .  Pi l l sbury,  and the  other  panel is t s?  
 DR.  PILLSBURY:  I 'm not  sure  I  unders tand your  ques t ion.   
They have  thei r  own net  assessment  process  and off ice ,  and they have 
sought  out  Andy Marshal l  and the  Off ice  of  Net  Assessment  for  many 
years  in  an  ef for t  to  exchange views,  shal l  we say.  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   But  I  guess  the  opaci ty  of  the i r  
sys tem is  somewhat  i r re levant  i f  we are  going to  assume the  worst ,  
meaning that  we know what  capabi l i t ies  are  out  there  general ly  
because  we 're  prepar ing many of  them.   So I  assume as  par t  of  the  net  
assessment  process ,  that  they could  have those  capabi l i t ies ,  and we ' l l  
prepare  to  respond to  that .  
 So  the  opaci ty ,  i t  seems to  me,  whi le  re levant  in  terms of  how 
many resources  you expend,  we ' re  going to  assume the  wors t  and 
prepare  for  i t .  Do we know anything about  how the  Chinese  view our  
ne t  assessment  process?  
 DR.  PILLSBURY:  This  Commiss ion has  some excel lent  
quest ions  that  probe and tes t  the  wi tnesses ,  I  must  say .  
 You 're  not  an  easy commiss ion.   Net  assessment  does  not  focus  
only on the  wors t  scenar ios .   I t  never  does  that .   I  ment ioned the  term 
family  or  range of  scenarios .   Actual ly ,  one  of  the  most  impor tant  par ts  
of  net  assessment  i s  to  unders tand the  weaknesses  and vulnerabi l i t ies  
of  an  opponent .   This  puts  net  assessment  a t  odds  wi th  the  in te l l igence 
communi ty  which famously  once  was  asked many decades  ago by a  
Secre tary of  Defense ,  I  want  a  l i s t  of  a l l  the  Soviet  mi l i tary 
weaknesses .  
 The inte l l igence  communi ty  came back and sa id ,  s i r ,  there  are  
none,  and i f  there  are  some shor t - term ones ,  they ' l l  f ix  them soon.  
 So net  assessment  of ten  i s  looking a t  the  opponent 's '  
vulnerabi l i t ies  and weaknesses ,  how they can be  exploi ted  or  
increased,  especial ly  over  the  long-term compet i t ion of  20 or  30 years ,  
as  measured against  our  s t rengths  or  areas  we can s t rengthen.   This  i s  
the  essence  of  Chinese  ancient  s ta tecraft  as  wel l  f rankly .   I t ' s  not  
something invented by the  Pentagon.  
 The Chinese  process  of  assessment  of  us  i s  qui te  a  fasc inat ing 
topic .   They have debates  about  the  nature  and goals  of  the  Uni ted  
Sta tes .   We have some ins ight  in to  thei r  debates .   They have America  
exper ts .   They have  exper ts  on  the  American mi l i tary .   They have  some 
who come out  and want  to  meet  Commissioner  Wortze l  because  he  used 
to  be  Army Attaché,  Assis tant  Army Attaché,  and they read his  books .   
They want  to  know how influent ia l  he  i s  on the  American Pres ident  and 
the  White  House .  There  are  o thers  who don ' t  come out .   There  are  o ther  
Chinese  s t ra tegic  th inkers  and planners  and assessors  who we are  to ld  
when we ask  to  them by name,  this  person does  not  see  foreigners .  
 Ever .   So our  ins ights  shouldn ' t  be  exaggerated,  but  I  don ' t  th ink the  
Chinese  use  wors t -case  scenar ios  e i ther .  
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 I  th ink thei r  focus  i s  on  shaping thei r  potent ia l  secur i ty  par tner  
and that  shaping tha t  goes  on into  the  f i r s t  phase  of  the  bat t le  as  wel l .  
They a lso have a  concept  of  teaching lessons  to  head of  a  larger  war .   
They actual ly  thought ,  we now know,  and Tom Chris tensen 's  book on 
th is  i s  qui te  good,  we now know that  thei r  idea  of  sending 300,000 
t roops  into  nor thern  Korea to  a t tack us  was to  head off  something 
bigger ;  they were  going to  teach us  a  lesson.  
 They did  th is  wi th  India  in  '62 .   They expl ic i t ly  wanted to  teach 
India  a  lesson by ki l l ing qui te  a  few Indians  and then captur ing more ,  
and then wi thdrawing back to  the  l ine  before  they had previously  
control led .   This  i s  qui te  as tonishing in  the  h is tory  of  mi l i tary  confl ic t ,  
tha t  you a t tack somebody to  teach a  lesson and then you wi thdraw 
behind the  l ine  that  you had before .  
 They did  th is  again  wi th  Vietnam in  1979.  They went  qui te  deep 
in to  Vietnam,  a lmos t  300,000 t roops ,  to  teach a  lesson,  then wi thdrew,  
and cont inued to  have ski rmishes  for  the  next  20 years  on the  border .   
Now,  this  i s  not  the  American way.  To go back to  Dean Cheng 's ,  do  
they think d i f ferent ly  about  space?   I t ' s  hard  to  f ind examples  in  
American his tory-- there  are  some--where  we 've  sought  to  teach a  
lesson wi th  one- thi rd  of  our  t roops .  
 So i t  suggests  tha t  the  Chinese  use  of  force  and the  way they see 
scenar ios  and how they assess  th ings  may be  qui te  d i f ferent  than what  
the  U.S.  and the  Europeans  do.   I  obviously  don ' t  have t ime to  answer  
you a  long l i s t  of  th ings ,  but  i t ' s  a  major  topic  f rankly  because  i f  the  
Chinese  assess  th ings  d i f ferent ly  than we do,  we real ly  should  t ry  to  
unders tand that .  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thank you.   Commiss ioner  
Shea .  
 COMMISSIONER SHEA:  Thank you very  much.   This  has  been 
an absolute ly  fasc inat ing in teract ion.   I 've  enjoyed i t  a  lo t .   Back to  
th is  i ssue that  Commiss ioner  Fiedler  ra ised  about  whether  the  pol i t ical  
leadership  in  the  PRC was  in  the  loop wi th  respect  to  the ASAT tes t  in  
January,  and as  I  unders tand your  tes t imony,  Mr.  Cheng,  you are  
surmis ing that  th is  sor t  of  middle  ground approach,  the  pol i t ica l  
leadership  approved the  overa l l  program,  maybe the  key miles tones  in  
the  program,  but  a t  an  opera t ional  level  d idn ' t  s ign off  on key 
operat ional  mi les tones .   I s  tha t  fa i r  to  say?  
 MR.  CHENG:  Yes ,  s i r .  
 COMMISSIONER SHEA:  Okay.   There  are  two other  potent ia l  
scenar ios  here ,  tha t  the  pol i t ica l  leadership  was  complete ly  out  of  the  
loop and that  the  mi l i tary was  act ing independent ly ;  and a  th i rd  
scenar io  would  be that  the  pol i t ica l  leadership  was  s igning off  every 
 s tep  of  the  way and knew ful ly  what  was  going to  happen and when i t  
was  going to  happen,  and maybe had been br iefed on internat ional  
pol i t ica l  fa l lout  or  concerns .  
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 Could  you jus t  g ive  me under  each of  those  three  scenar ios  what  
inferences ,  conclus ions ,  and impl icat ions  for  our  own nat ional  secur i ty  
we can draw?  Take each of  the  three  scenar ios  and say does  one 
scenar io  par t icular ly  concern  you more,  assuming that  we rea l ly  don ' t - -
i s  i t  fa i r  to  say that  we real ly  don ' t  know how the  decis ion-making 
occurred  in  this  instance?  
 MR.  CHENG:  Let  me t ry  to  address  that .  
 COMMISSIONER SHEA:  Okay.  
 MR.  CHENG:  To begin  wi th  your  th i rd  scenar io ,  which is  that  
the  pol i t ica l  leadership  was  fu l ly  and in tegral ly  involved,  i s  cer ta inly  a  
poss ibi l i ty  which would  then suggest  that  the  fore ign minis t ry  e i ther  i s  
comprised of  superb  ac tors  which is  the  ro le  of  d ip lomats  the  wor ld  
over ,  or  a l ternat ively  was ,  a t  least  tha t  e lement  was ,  kept  out  of  tha t  
loop.   
 This  goes  back again  to  the  i ssue  of  decis ion-making and does ,  in  
fac t ,  the  fore ign minis t ry  s i t  in  on a  decis ion such as  this ,  and that  i s  a  
ques t ion which I  th ink,  a t  leas t  based upon our  unders tanding,  for  
example ,  the  Pol i tburo  Standing Commit tee ,  the  Foreign Minis ter  does  
not  s i t  on  that .  
 So i t  i s  cer ta in ly  poss ible  that  the  key leadership  was  involved,  
but  tha t  therefore  the  fore ign minis ter  i s  not  necessar i ly  par t  of  that .  
 The impl ica t ions  for  that  would  suggest  that  perhaps  we are  not  
a lways  ta lk ing to  the  r ight  people  when we are  t ry ing to  inf luence 
China 's  th inking.   Now,  to  your  f i rs t ,  to  your  second scenar io  where  
the  PLA acted on i t s  own,  tha t  rea l ly ,  tha t  may or  may not  be  di f ferent  
f rom the  surmise  tha t  I  had la id  out ,  which is  to  say  that  the  individual  
programmatic  ac t ion may wel l  have been under taken by the  PLA at  a  
lower  level  to  tes t  an  ASAT on January  11,  2007.  That  i s  not  
necessar i ly  contradic tory  wi th  the  idea  that  the  broader  leadership  i s  
fu l ly  aware  that  th is  program exis ts ,  tha t  tes t ing wi l l  occur .  
 I f  on  the  other  hand,  where  I  th ink you 're  heading,  which is  that  
the  PLA s imply acted  on i t s  own,  wi thout  reference  to--  
 COMMISSIONER SHEA:  I 'm jus t  t rying to  f igure  out  what  your  
assessment  of  the  s i tua t ion is .  
 MR.  CHENG:  I  would  say i f  tha t  were  t rue ,  then we would  be 
potent ia l ly  fac ing a  very ,  very  di f ferent  ca lculus  of  who decis ion-
makers  are ,  of  how the  PRC reaches  decis ion-making.   I  am personal ly;  
however ,  I  have to  say skept ical  of  tha t ,  in  no smal l  par t  because  i t  
impl ies  tha t  Hu J in tao  as  head of  the  Centra l  Mil i tary  Commission 
actual ly  i s  bas ica l ly  kept  out  of  a  s igni f icant  se t  of  loops .   I t  suggests  
that  the  PLA has  access  to  power  which is  not  ref lected  in  i t s  minimal  
 posi t ion on both  the  Pol i tburo  Standing Commit tee  and the  Centra l  
Commit tee  of  the  Par ty .  
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 I t  would  suggest  tha t  i t  has  the  abi l i ty  to  under take  key decis ions  
outs ide  of  i t s  own purview on a  range of  i ssues  which then begs  other  
quest ions ,  th ings  l ike  the  absence  of  nat ional  defense  mobi l iza t ion 
laws when they have repeatedly argued-- the  PLA has  argued that  i t  
needs  them and the  res t  of  the  government  bas ica l ly  says ,  “Umm, that ' s  
n ice ,  come back next  year .   Maybe we ' l l  put  i t  on  the  agenda.”  
 The reason I  surmise  the  way I  d id  i s  in  par t  because  of ,  
however ,  the  Foreign Minis t ry 's  bad handl ing.   What  f i t s  the  pat tern  of  
behavior?   How could  the  PRC have tes ted  an  ASAT and lef t  i t s  
Fore ign Minis t ry  fumbl ing for  an  answer ,  and that ' s  why I  la id  out  the  
surmise  and I  do emphasize  that  i t  i s  an  assumpt ion,  but  I  am cer ta in ly  
open to  being corrected.  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thank you.   Commiss ioner  
Bar tholomew.  
 MR.  HAGT:  May I  add something? I  was  jus t  going to  add 
something to  tha t  tha t  I 've  been s tudying myself ,  and that  i s  how the 
tes t  may have represented-- I  th ink I  have  i t  in  my s ta tement- -a  hedging 
s t ra tegy for  the  government .   I f  you go back over  the  l i tera ture ,  the  
documents  of  China 's  th inking about  the  U.S.  space  program,  s tar t ing 
f rom SDI through the  '90s ,  to  sor t  of  the  rea l  beginning of  us ing space  
in  warfare ,  the  Gulf  War ,  and then I  th ink another  phase  being wi th  the  
Schr iever  Wargaming in  2001,  I  be l ieve  was  the  f i rs t  one ,  and then 
Rumsfeld Commiss ion on Space ,  and so on,  you can see  a  pa t tern of  
Chinese  th inking about  these  th ings ,  and my own take  on i t ,  and again  
th is  i s  speculat ion ,  but  I  see  that  as  a  two-t racked response:  a  mi l i ta ry 
one and a  d iplomat ic  one wi th  the  mi l i tary  one as  a  hedge against  the  
d iplomat ic  one .  
 I  th ink tha t  China  has  a t  some point ,  whether  that  was  las t  year  
r ight  before  the  tes t ,  or  the  las t  couple  of  years ,  I 'm not  sure ,  but  that  
China  has  come to  the  decis ion that  weaponizat ion of  space  is  
inevi table  and that  China  needs  in  a  measure  real ly  to  t ry  and br ing the 
weaponizat ion of  space  back f rom the  br ink,  tha t  i t  decided to  take  th is  
hedge to  i t s  conclus ion.  
 How that  was  p layed out  in  the  mi l i ta ry  in  the  leadership i s  very  
di f f icul t ,  of  course ,  to  know.  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thank you.  
 DR.  PILLSBURY:  There 's  a  fourth  scenar io  I  th ink you might  
want  to  add to  your  f i rs t  three .  
 COMMISSIONER SHEA:  Okay.  
 DR.  PILLSBURY:  I  can ' t  resolve  i t  for  you,  but  the  four th  
scenar io  has  been put  forward in  a  number  of  ar t ic les ,  Michael  Swaine  
being the  longest  vers ion,  tha t  he  b lames America  because  the  f i rs t  
 tes ts  the  Chinese  d id  were  not  made publ ic ,  were  not  leaked by the  
Uni ted  Sta tes ,  so  there  i s  some reason to  bel ieve  the  Chinese  thought  
they could  go ahead wi th the thi rd  tes t  wi thout  any problem.  
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 Another  vers ion of  that  same four th  scenar io i s  that  the  Chinese 
d id  not  in tend for  th is  tes t  to  become publ ic .   You may recal l  i t  was 
the  Uni ted  Sta tes  Nat ional  Secur i ty  Counci l  spokesman,  which is  pre t ty  
h igh up in  our  government ,  who made i t  publ ic  about  the  same t ime 
wi thin  hours  of  four  governments  going in to  Bei j ing asking for  
explanat ions .  
 So this  scenar io  impl ies  tha t  the  U.S.  de l iberately  made th is  
publ ic  and combined i t  wi th  d iplomat ic  demarches  by three  other  
countr ies  who somehow seemed to  have learned about  th is  January 11 
event  a lso  in  advance of i t  being made publ ic ,  and you see  some of  th is  
in  the  Chinese  press  now,  a  sense  of  being ent rapped by a  very  craf ty  
hegemon who wanted th is  to  spin  out  th is  very  way to  embarrass  China 
and make i t  sound l ike  there 's  a  Chinese  threat  when we 're  a l l  supposed 
to  know that  there  i s  no  Chinese  threat ,  and anyone who says  there  i s ,  
i s  a  fabr ica tor .  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Commiss ioner  Bar tholomew.    
 COMMISSIONER SHEA:  Thank you.  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Thank you.   Al though I  have 
quest ions ,  I  fee l  l ike  I  have to  make a  comment .   Dr .  Pi l l sbury ,  i s  i t  
not  a lso  poss ib le  tha t  the  U.S.  and other  countr ies  had to  go publ ic  
wi th  this  one  because  the  tes t  had been successful ,  and they ' re  going to  
be  deal ing wi th  fa l l ing debr is  for  a  long t ime,  and perhaps  i t  made 
more  sense  to  actual ly  put  i t  out  there .   There  was  jus t  a  s tory the  
other  day about  a  Chi lean a i rplane  that  was  missed,  jus t  missed by a  
p iece  of  fa l l ing debr is .   I  have no idea  where  that  debr is  came from,  
but  you could  envis ion what  would  have happened i f  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  
government  had known that  th is  had happened and some plane gets  h i t  
and a  bunch of  passengers  d ie ,  and i t  looks  l ike  there  i s  a  cover-up.  
 Among the  scenar ios ,  there  are  a l l  sor ts  of  d i f ferent  a l ternat ives .   
That  was  not  what  I  intended to  ask  about .   Commiss ioner  Wortzel  and 
I  have been haggl ing up here  about  who 's  going to  fol low up on the  
nat ional  sovere ignty  issue .   I 'm going to  leave  i t  to  h im,  but  say  that  i t  
i s  in teres t ing.  
 I  want  to  thank a l l  of  you.   I  a lso  want  to  commend you because  I  
know that  there  are  some ra ther  d i f ferent  v iewpoints  that  are  being 
represented here  and there  can be  very  tes ty  and heated di f ferences .   I  
th ink that  you a l l  a re  handl ing those  di f ferences  qui te  graciously  and 
we real ly  appreciate  tha t .  
 I 'm s t ruck in  some ways  by the  approach even on the  weapons 
tes t  and what  i t  means  ref lec t ing a  b igger  under ly ing debate  in  U.S. -
China  pol icy  or  in  the  view towards  pol icy .   Mr.  Cheng,  I  apprecia te  
 the  fac t  tha t  you 've  sa id ,  look,  the  Chinese  are  going to  use  the  
Chinese  object ives ,  and we need to  unders tand what  the  Chinese  
object ives  are .   Mr.  Hagt ,  more  of  what  I  hear  f rom you is  tha t ,  we 
need to  be  careful  because  i f  we t rea t  them l ike an enemy,  they ' re  
going to  become an enemy.   I  don ' t  know how we reconci le  that ,  but  I  
th ink that ' s  one of  the  big  faul t  l ines  in  China  analys is ,  tha t  we a l l  
have got  to  e i ther  acknowledge or  f igure  out  how we come to  some sor t  
of  unif ied  analys is  or  maybe unif ied analys is  i sn ' t  necessary ,  but  we 
recognize  i t .  
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 On the  o ther  hand,  Mr.  Hagt ,  I  found myself  a  l i t t le  confused 
between what  your  wri t ten  s ta tement  sa id  and your  verbal  s ta tement .  
 Do you th ink that  the  U.S.  should  be  concerned about  China 's  
in tent ions  and capabi l i t ies  in  space?  
 MR.  HAGT:  Yes ,  def in i te ly .   I  don ' t  th ink there  i s  any ques t ion 
that  the  ASAT tes t  puts  a t  r i sk  U.S.  asse ts  in  space  and i t s  ambi t ions  in  
space  in  a  greater  sense .   But  I  th ink I 'm saying that ,  i t ' s  a  l imi ted ,  in  
my assessment ,  i t ' s  a  l imi ted  threat  because  i t  was  pr imar i ly ,  I  th ink,  a  
response  to  what  China  sees  as  sor t  of  a  re jec t ion of  the  U.S.  p lans  to  
dominate  space  because  that  inf r inges  on China 's  core  nat ional  
in terests  and i t s  nat ional  sovereignty .  
 So in  the  sense  that  i t ' s  a  response ,  I  th ink there  i s  a  window of  
oppor tuni ty  to  say,  okay,  then there  i s  the  poss ibi l i ty  for  the  
connect ion there .   I f  i t  was  jus t  China  doing th is  del ibera te ly  and 
cover t ly ,  wi th  col lus ion wi th  the  Foreign Minis t ry ,  i f  that  was  the  case ,  
then I  would  say the  weaponizat ion of  space  i s  inevi table  f rom both 
s ides  of  the  Paci f ic .   But  because  I  bel ieve that  fundamenta l ly  i t  was  a  
response ,  then there  is  the  U.S.  response  in  turn ,  I  think,  a l lows for  an  
oppor tuni ty  to  come to  terms wi th  the  s t ra tegic  i ssues  in  space .  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  I  don ' t  know i f  you 've  had an 
oppor tuni ty  to  l i s ten  to  any of  our  o ther  wi tnesses  yes terday or  today,  
but  when you take  a  look a t  analyses  of  Chinese  in teres ts  in  cyber  
warfare ,  for  example ,  we understand the  impor tance  of  communicat ions  
for  U.S.  war  conduct ing capaci ty .   I t  i s  very  di f f icul t  for  me to  see  the  
ASAT test  as  a  thing that  s tands  on i t s  own.  
 I f  you look a t  i t  as  jus t  something that  s tands  on i t s  own,  I  
unders tand how you get  to  tha t  analys is,  but  to  me i f  you look a t  i t  as  a  
b igger  par t  of  a  s t ra tegy of  what  they are  doing,  t ry ing to  f igure  out  
how to  counter  us ,  neutral ize  us ,  i t  leads  to  a  d i f ferent  conclus ion.   
Again ,  I 'm not  saying that  tha t ' s  necessar i ly  what 's  going to  happen.   I  
a lways  get  to  the  wors t  case  scenar io  planning.   I f  we have learned 
anything f rom this  I raq debacle ,  i t  i s  that  we need to  th ink through 
wors t -case  scenar ios .   But  I  don ' t  th ink that  the  ASAT tes t  can be  seen 
in  i sola t ion.  I  th ink i t  has  to  be  analyzed as  a  par t  of  a  b igger  s t ra tegy 
of  what 's  going on.  
  So i t ' s  not  so  much a  ques t ion to  you or ,  i f  I  need to  turn  i t  in to  a  
ques t ion,  i t  would  be  how do you view the  ASAT tes t  in  the  context  of  
these  bigger  quest ions  about  Chinese  warfare  capabi l i t ies  and 
in tent ions  f rankly?  
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 MR.  HAGT:  I  would  agree;  I  don ' t  th ink i t ' s  i sola ted.   But  I  
th ink that  how China  cal ibra ted  i t s  response  to  th is - - I 'm ta lk ing about  
grea ter  secur i ty  i ssues  here .   I  think that  because  the U.S.  i s  so  
vulnerable  in  space ,  i t  i s  the  one  area  that  China  would  have the  
oppor tuni ty  to  asser t  i t s  s t ra tegic  interes ts ,  i t s  na t ional  sovereignty  
in teres ts .  
 Can i t  do  that  in  informat ion warfare  wi thout  a  conf l ic t?   Can i t  
do  that  on the  high seas  wi thout  running into  the  Paci f ic  f lee t?   There  
is  a  much greater  poss ibi l i ty  for  rea l  conf l ic t ,  I  th ink,  and here  you 
have an  ASAT tes t  which hasn ' t  been rea l ly  admit ted  as  an  ASAT test  
by China  yet .   I t  was  a  tes t  of  i t s  capabi l i t ies  to  h i t  a  dying weather  
sa te l l i te  for  sc ient i f ic  purposes .  
 Also ,  and I 'm not  necessar i ly  espousing that .   I 'm jus t  saying that  
I  th ink i f  you look a t  how the  ASAT tes t  was  done,  when i t  was  done,  
and the  fact  that  i t  was  actual ly  a  medium-range rocket  to  h i t  one  of  
China 's  own weather  sate l l i tes ,  I  th ink that  was  with in  what  the  Uni ted  
States  i t se l f  has  a l ready done in  terms of  capabi l i t ies  and in  terms of  
the  pol i t ica l  consequences .  
 I f  i t  had tes ted  a  h igh-powered laser  weapon to  i r revers ibly  
damage a  U.S.  or  i t s  own sa te l l i te ,  des t royed the  sa te l l i te ,  that  would 
have shown that  i t  was  a  demonstra t ion of  a  capabi l i ty beyond what  the  
Uni ted Sta tes  has  a l ready tes ted .   I  th ink you get  in to  th is- - the  
demonstra t ion of  tha t  may spur  on U.S. ' s  own program to  a  greater  
degree  than i t  d id wi th  this  because i t ' s  wi thin  the  conf ines  of  what  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes  has  a l ready done and so  on and so  for th .  
 And i t ' s  in  space .   I t ' s  a  p lace  where  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  i s  
vulnerable  and I  th ink that  China can asser t  those .  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thank you.   Dr .  Pi l l sbury has  
a l ready commented on th is  in  h is  wri t ten  tes t imony so  I ' l l  ask  the  o ther  
two of  you to  comment  i f  you wi l l  on  the  proposal  by the  Chinese  or  by 
others  for  a  mul t i la tera l  t reaty  prohibi t ing weaponizat ion of  outer  
space ,  or  var ia t ions  thereof .  
 In  l ight  of  a l l  tha t  you 've  tes t i f ied  to  about  Chinese  advances  in  
th is  area ,  i s  th is  k ind  of  negot ia t ion something that  you th ink might  be  
in  our  in teres t  or  do you th ink i t  would  be  a  mis take  a t  th is  point?   Mr.  
Cheng f i rs t  and then Mr.  Hagt .  
 MR.  CHENG:  One of  my favor i te  movies  i s  “1776.”   There 's  a  
grea t  l ine  in  there  that  there 's  nothing that ' s  so  dangerous that  i t  can ' t  
be  ta lked about .  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Apparent ly  there  are  some 
 th ings .  
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 MR.  CHENG:  But  that  being sa id ,  ta lk  i s  one  th ing;  commit t ing  
the  ful l  fa i th  and credi t  of  the  Uni ted States  to  something,  now that ' s  a  
d i f ferent  proposi t ion.   I  would have no problem banning a l l  sor ts  of  
th ings  so  long as  we could  def ine ,  for  example ,  what  a  space  weapon 
is .  
 One of  the  recent  technologies ,  according to  my unders tanding,  
i s  the  development  of  a  robot  sa te l l i te  capable  of  refuel ing,  servic ing 
sa te l l i tes ,  because  the  Shut t le ,  of  course ,  i s  seeing the  end of  i t s  l i fe  
span.   So what  we are  ta lk ing about  i s  something that  wi l l  go  in to  
space ,  rendezvous ,  provide  addi t ional  fuel ,  and then come home.  
 Far  be  i t  f rom me to  ever  have skept ic ism about  our  wondrous  
technology,  but  i f  one  of  those  th ings  ever  went  off  course  or  i f  
somebody e lse--we heard  f rom the  ear l ier  panel  about  technology 
spreading and th ings  l ike  that .   I f  somebody e lse  developed that  
technology,  and i t  went  off  course ,  was  that  a  tes t  of  an  ASAT when i t  
s lammed in to  something,  or  was  that  an  accident?   How would we 
know?  I 'm sure  that  somebody out  there  could  give  us  an  opinion,  but  
you see  here  on an ASAT tes t  or  perhaps  an  a t tack agains t  a  weather  
sa te l l i te  of  one 's  own nat ion what  that  means .  
 I  hes i ta te ,  therefore ,  to  commit  the  fu l l  fa i th  and credi t  of  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes  to  a  t rea ty  l ike  that .   I 'd  a lso  point  out  the  fo l lowing:   
Chinese  wri t ings ,  mi l i tary wri t ings--and le t  me emphasize that  we ' re  
ta lk ing about  PLA wri t ings  about  space--emphasize  the  impor tance  of  
space  opera t ions ,  not  in  response  to  our  being for  or  agains t  space  
arms contro l ,  but  because  this  i s  how we f ight  our  wars ,  not  in  terms of  
ASATs,  but  s imply the  passage of  informat ion through space  sys tems.  
 So an  arms control  t rea ty that  essent ia l ly  locked down a l l  space 
weaponizat ion,  whatever  that  means ,  jamming,  ear th-based jamming,  
was  the  ASAT tes t  a  v iola t ion of  weaponizing space  s ince  i t  was f i red 
f rom ear th?   But ,  leaving that  as ide ,  a  space  arms control  t rea ty  would  
mean that  the  Chinese  would be  s igning on to  a  t reaty  that  permanent ly  
casts  themselves  in  an  infer ior  posi t ion in  terms  of  f ight ing wars  over  
potent ia l ly  say an is land 100 mi les  off  of  thei r  coast .  
 Now,  somehow,  be  i t  a  cul tura l  i ssue ,  be  i t  a  pol i t ica l  i ssue ,  I  
don ' t  th ink the  Chinese  bargain  that  way,  but  I  may wel l  be  mis taken.   
So I  defer  to  my bet ters  on that .  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Mr.  Hagt .  
 MR.  HAGT:  I  th ink the  U.S.  posi t ion a t  the  Conference on 
Disarmament  has  essent ia l ly  re jec ted any kind of  t rea ty ,  whether  i t ' s  
banning the  tes t ing of  ASATs or  space  weaponizat ion in  general .   I  
th ink that  th is  i s  in  agreement  wi th Dean-- that  i t ' s  very  di f f icul t  to  
come to  an  agreement  on ver i f ica t ion of these  t rea t ies .   But  ta lking,  of  
course ,  doesn ' t  necessar i ly  mean that  i t  has  to  commit  and I  th ink that  
 changing i t s  fundamental  posi t ion that  there  is  not  a  space  race  is ,  to  
me,  in  terms of  percept ion-- i t ' s  not  rea l i ty-- i s  very  det r imental  both,  
obviously  to  o ther  countr ies ,  but  a lso  to  the  Uni ted Sta tes  i t se l f .  
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 I t  seems to  me very reasonable  that  we would  at  leas t  ta lk  about  
the  poss ibi l i t ies ,  and I  th ink the  poss ibi l i t ies  are  some kind of  ban on a  
des t ruct ive  debr is -creat ing weapons ASAT tes t  a t  a  minimum,  and 
there  i s  even debate  on that  because  the  Uni ted Sta tes  may actual ly  be  
very  much in  favor  of  th is  k ind of  des t ruct ive  ASAT tes t .   What  about  
non-dest ruct ive  ASAT tes ts?  
 The Uni ted  Sta tes  would  have a  great  advantage to  have a  ban on 
the  former  and not  on the  la t ter  because  U.S.  technology is  so  much 
more  advanced in  terms of  co-orbi ta l  ASAT technology that ,  as  Dean 
ment ioned i t ,  you have these  guard sa te l l i tes  that  could  bas ical ly--
robot  sa te l l i tes  that  wi l l  sneak up on another  sa te l l i te  and make the  
determinat ion whether  i t ' s  good or  bad.   So I  th ink that  th is  i s  a  very  
compl icated subject ,  but  to  me a  bas ic  tes t  ban of  des t ruct ive  sa te l l i tes  
and a  “rules  of  the  road,”  which I  th ink is  again  coming to  terms wi th 
def ini t ions  of  space  weapons ,  but  a lso  how do we deal  wi th  non-
inter ference of  each other ' s  sa te l l i tes .   We def ine  our  space  and our  
ter r i tory  in  space .   These  are  a l l  very  impor tant  basic  measures .  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  One of  my favor i te  movies  i s  
Risky Business .   But  I  don ' t  th ink I 'm going to  extend the  metaphor .  
 DR.  PILLSBURY:  Tom Cruise 's  f i rs t  h i t .  
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  We have f ive  minutes  lef t  and 
Commiss ioner  Wortzel  and Commiss ioner  Fiedler  each have one 
addi t ional  quest ion to  which you wi l l  respond br ief ly .   
 Commiss ioner  Wortzel .  
 COMMISSIONER FIEDLER:  I  y ie ld  my t ime to  the  cochai r .  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:   Mr .  Hagt ,  I  have one quest ion 
for  you and that  i s :   in  your  tes t imony,  a  few t imes  you have referred  
to  sovere ignty  in  space  and ter r i tory  in  space .   Now,  my unders tanding 
of  American views of  in ternat ional  law such as  i t  exis ts  or  common 
pract ice  and Western  v iews is  tha t  above 100,000 meters ,  there  i s  no 
sovereign ter r i tory ,  analogous  to  the  high seas .  
 So what  i s  your  unders tanding of  Chinese  legal  v iews of  the  
concept  of  sovere ignty  in  space?  And you other  two gent lemen 
enumerate ,  i f  you could ,  the  escala tory  dangers  of  the  b l inding of  
American survei l lance  in  space?  
  
 MR.  HAGT:  The Uni ted  Sta tes  has  become pre t ty  much the  
protector  of  the  high seas .  That 's  wi thout  ques t ion,  but  I  th ink the  
d i f ference  wi th  space  is  what  purpose tha t  serves  and in  the  high seas  
i t  serves  the  purpose  of  t ruly  internat ional  t rading regime and i t  
benef i t s  everyone,  the  Chinese  just  as  much as  the  U.S.   Maybe in  the  
 fu ture  even more .  
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 But  in  space ,  there  i s  much more  of  an  imbalance  there ,  and who 
benef i ts  s t ra tegical ly  and commercia l ly ,  and that ' s  much more  in  favor  
of  the  Uni ted Sta tes  than i t  i s  of  China .   And so  I  think that ' s  by  vi r tue 
of  the  dual -use  aspect  of  space  technology.   So I  th ink i t ' s  a  very 
di f f icul t  d i lemma here  and I  think that  because  of  a l l  these  fac tors ,  I  
th ink that  China  sees  tha t  i t  needs  to  be  in  space  in  order  to  exerc ise  
i t s  sovere ignty .  
 I t  doesn ' t  need to  be  in  the  h igh seas ,  I  would  argue,  a t  leas t  for  
the  foreseeable  fu ture .   So that  would  be  my thoughts .  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  May I  ask for  a  c lar i f icat ion,  
because  my unders tanding of  what  you were  saying,  Mr.  Hagt ,  i s  the  
Chinese  are  concerned about  nat ional  sovereignty  essent ia l ly  over  thei r  
space  which ra ises  a l l  sor ts  of  ques t ions .   I t ' s  a  huge land mass  that  
we ' re  ta lk ing about ,  and i f  they decide  that  they cont rol  a l l  of  the  
space  above China ,  tha t  has  huge consequences  for  everybody e lse  in  
the  world .  
 MR.  HAGT:  Yes ,  I  don ' t  know i f  nat ional  sovereignty  i s  an  
extension f rom i ts  ter r i tory  up to  24,000 miles  in  the  a i r .   I  th ink i t ' s  
more  nat ional  sovere ignty  i s ,  yes ,  space  is  g lobal  commons and as  such 
i t  has  the  r ights  to  par t ic ipate  equal ly  in  those .   But  i t  a lso  I  think 
touches  on s t ra tegic  i ssues ,  and because  the  Uni ted Sta tes  i s  able  to  
pass  over  China wi th  spy sa te l l i tes ,  tha t  inf r inges  on i t s  ter r i tory ,  and 
so  there  i s  sor t  of  a  d i rect  sovereignty  ter r i tory  and space  i ssue .   There  
i s  a lso  a  greater  na t ional  sovereignty issue .  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  So you 're  ta lk ing about  nat ional  
sovere ignty  in  both  senses ,  which is  the  Chinese  government 's  r ight  to 
par t ic ipate  everywhere  in  space  as  wel l  as  thei r  concerns  about  what  
they might  th ink of  as  thei r  own space? 
 MR.  HAGT:  Yes ,  and I  th ink that ' s  not  necessar i ly  c lear ,  but  I  
th ink i t ' s  evolving because  before  i t  was  not  c lear ,  I  don ' t  th ink.   I t  
wasn ' t  c lear  to  anyone,  but  because  the  Uni ted Sta tes  rea l ly  dominated 
space ,  but  now they ' re  s tar t ing to  th ink about  these  i ssues  much more  
jus t  l ike  they ' re  s tar t ing to  th ink about  the i r  r ights  on the  h igh seas  and 
power  project ion and so  on and so  for th .   So I  th ink these  concepts  are  
developing.   
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Larry,  do you s t i l l  want  answers  
f rom the  other  panel is ts  or  have  them for  the  record?  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:   You can submit  them for  the  
record .     
 HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  Thank you very  much.   We 
apprecia te  the  in teract ion.   And thank you for  your  tes t imony.  
 HEARING COCHAIR WORTZEL:  Great  panel  and great  
tes t imony.  
  HEARING COCHAIR REINSCH:  The hear ing is  adjourned.  
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 [Whereupon,  a t  11:30 a .m. ,  the  hear ing was  adjourned. ]  
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Statement on “China’s Military Strategy for Space” 
China’s Military Modernization and its Impact on the United States and the Asia-Pacific 
Mary C. FitzGerald 
Research Fellow, Hudson Institute 
30 March 2007 
 
 
When China blinded a U.S. satellite in late 2006, the deputy head of Russia’s Federal Space Agency was 
forced to feign nonchalance at the PLA’s space-bound juggernaut.  “We don’t think China will outpace us 
in space research,” Yuriy Nosenko declared.  “We’ll most probably move along in step with each other, as 
partners.  And China will compete with us in space exploration.”  
 
Then -- caught like a deer in the PLA’s ASAT headlights -- other world powers scrambled to voice surprise 
at China’s January 2007 kinetic kill of an aging weather satellite.  But by 2002, the PLA had already 
warned that “The prelude of the race to win 21st-century space dominance has begun.”  
 
The PLA Challenge 
  
For more than a decade, Chinese military strategists and aerospace scientists have been quietly designing a 
blueprint for achieving space dominance.  As a result, equipping the “Space Theater of Global War” will 
dictate the military-technical priorities of China’s defense industry for the first quarter of the 21st century.   
From 1997-1999, a fundamental restructuring of the Chinese defense industry shifted control of defense 
enterprises from the military to the civilian government, and integrated their operations with commercial 
advanced technology enterprises.  This has resulted in an accelerated rate of military system modernization 
-- especially for defense electronics -- and portends China’s emergence as an advanced technology 
“superstate.”  Against this backdrop, the prospects for the PLA’s swift emergence as a challenger in space 
are said to be “bright.” 
According to Chinese military scientists, the PLA revamped its RDT&E program in the late 1990s. The 
Chinese decided to cancel weapons projects that had been active for 10 years or longer and to direct these 
funds to developing so-called “new-concept weapons”: laser, beam, electromagnetic, microwave, 
infrasonic , climatic, genetic, biotechnological, and nanotechnological.  The results demonstrate that -- 
besides solving the problem of modernizing its conventional forces -- China now has three military 
priorities: space, nuclear weapons, and “new-concept” weapons. 
Chinese aerospace scientists argue that “as we produce one generation, research and develop one 
generation, and pre-search one generation, we must move on to explore one generation.”  Indeed the 
“leaps-and-bounds” theory has become the linchpin of Chinese military development for 21st-century 
warfare.  
 
China aims to achieve at least two objectives in its advancement of military space capabilities and military-
technological development: 
• First, to develop strong-propulsion carrier rockets to carry digital reconnaissance satellites in a bid 
to form a "round-the-clock" spatial image reconnaissance system; and  
• Second, to develop a new generation of solid-fuel rockets to carry micro-satellites in an endeavor 
to establish a space network for precise positioning, communications, and electromagnetic 
jamming and reconnaissance.  These rockets use 120-ton liquid oxygen engines and 50-ton liquid 
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oxygen/liquid hydrogen engines, and their carrying capacity can reach 15 tons.  They are also 
capable of launching satellites into near-earth orbit. 
 
Space Technologies 
 
“The weaponization of space,” say the Chinese, “is an inevitable developmental trend.”  And the 
“commanding height” of  strategic competition in the 21st century “will not be on Earth, but in space.”   
 
According to the Chinese, the United States and Russia are engaged in a race to develop ground-, air-, and 
space-based weapons for achieving space dominance.  These are said to include ground-based kinetic and 
airborne ASAT systems, high-altitude anti-missile weapons, space weapons platforms, aerospace aircraft, 
and space combat aircraft designed to execute simultaneous space and ground strikes.  
 
The Chinese also charge that the United States is developing “some new-concept weapons” for its 21st-
century space force, including kinetic, directed-energy, and non-antipersonnel weapons. Kinetic-energy 
weapons use ultra-high-speed warheads with extremely high kinetic energy such as electromagnetic 
cannons and intelligent intercepting bombs to collide with and destroy targets directly. Directed-energy 
weapons (laser, microwave, particle-beam, etc.) can be used not only to destroy various ground targets and 
flying targets such as aircraft, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, satellites, and space stations, but also in 
both electronic warfare and photoelectronic warfare.  Non-antipersonnel weapons include chemical energy-
losing agents, low-energy-laser-blinding weapons, omnidirectional irradiation weapons, etc.  
 
The Chinese agenda for space weaponry includes the following “new-concept” weapons, which will make 
outer space the fifth-dimension operational space after land, sea, air, and electromagnetism:  laser weapons, 
ultra-high frequency weapons, ultrasonic wave weapons, stealth weapons, mirror-beam weapons, 
electromagnetic guns, plasma weapons, ecological weapons, logic weapons, and sonic weapons. 
 
In early 2006, Chinese military strategists announced that “space weapons systems composed of hypersonic 
weapons will be the crack space troops with uniform tri-service land, sea, and air coordination and a widely 
increased scope of joint operations capability.”  They will be united in informational completeness, and the 
enemy -- thus exposed to space weapons attack -- will be forced to protect friendly land, sea, and air forces 
against such attack.  Hypersonic weapons will become “the dominant combat ordnance” in future high-tech 
battlefields, and aerospace integration will be the primary mode of operations in future high-tech warfare. 
 
According to these experts, the interest of the major world nations in the development of hypersonic 
weapons will accelerate the development of this technology.  It will thus generate new focal points and new 
circumstances for aerospace countermeasures.  Whatever complications may arise in their technological 
development, “these types of weapons will be the nucleus of military competition in the early period of the 
21st century.” 
 
In addition, hypersonic aerospace aircraft represent “one of the key weapons to be employed for controlling 
space and vying for 21st-century space dominance.”  These aircraft can: 1) ensure inexpensive, high-speed 
access to space; 2) counter satellites; 3) reconnoiter, monitor, and issue early warnings; 4) be used as space 
platforms for weapon launching; 5) be used as high-speed transport airplanes; and 6) be used as reserve 
command nodes  in space during wartime.  
 
Space Warfare 
 
Published by the Chinese Academy of  Military Sciences, a recent book entitled Strategy defines the 
components of  “military space strategy” as 1) the policies and principles for building military space forces; 
2)  the fundamental principles for employing military space forces; 3) the significance and role of space 
dominance; and 4) the characteristics, forms, and tactics of space war.   
 
 Since 1996, Chinese military scientists have defined space warfare as combat operations whose major goal 
is to seize and maintain space dominance, whose major combat arena is outer space, and whose major 
combat strength is military space forces.  
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The features of space warfare are said to include: dogfights between the space-based combat systems of 
both belligerents; intercepts of strategic ballistic missiles by space-based combat platforms; strikes by space 
weapons on Earth targets and Earth-based counterspace or space  defense operations; and strikes from the 
land, sea, and air on enemy space launch platforms and command-and-control organs. 
 
Since 2005, Chinese military scientists have contended that space warfare will become the core of future 
non-contact combat.  The integrated space-based “metasystem” of combat platforms, weaponry, and C4ISR 
components will guide the various combat elements of  the three armed services to launch long-distance 
precision attacks on ground, sea, air, and space targets.  
 
Defensive campaigns will more often take offensive forms.  Offenses and defenses will permeate, 
stimulate, and rely on each other; and the two will have a synergistic and systems-intimate relationship.  
Sea, air, and electromagnetic dominance will gradually subside and become subordinate to space 
dominance. 
 
Because the space theater of war is in outer space and more than 120 km above the earth's surface, there are 
no restrictions concerning national boundaries and sovereign air space.  The side possessing space 
dominance, say the Chinese,  can therefore exercise complete freedom of action.  The use of space-based 
weapons systems to strike endoatmospheric air, land, and sea targets demonstrates a unique superiority. 
These unique, high-altitude advantages of space have strategic and decisive significance for the side 
exercising space dominance.  If strike weapons are deployed in space, it will be possible to execute such 
offensive operations as satellite attack, missile intercept, and ground firepower support.  It will be possible 
to guarantee the operational independence of friendly military space forces, and to translate these 
advantages into information, air, and sea dominance.  Without space dominance, say the Chinese, one is 
actually putting oneself in the disadvantageous position of  “being defeated first and then going to war.”   
Space Information Warfare 
Both China and Russia have long contended that the “space-information continuum” constitutes the nucleus 
of the current “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA).  The “Space Epoch” thus requires a colossal 
revision of military-strategic thought.  “As informationized war advances,” say the Chinese, “space will 
truly become the new theater of war and thereby establish a new milestone in mankind’s history of 
warfare.” 
 
Echoing their Russian counterparts, Chinese military scientists assert that information warfare (IW) 
missions are accomplished most effectively by using space-based assets.  The Chinese delineate at least 
three reasons for the critical importance of space warfare to IW missions.  First, space is the “commanding 
height” for future IW.  Second, seizure of space control constitutes “the first combat operation in future 
IW.”  With the continuing development of space weaponry and equipment, belligerents will conduct such 
new modes of space warfare as 1) space information warfare, 2)  space electronic warfare, 3) space anti-
satellite warfare, 4) space anti-missile warfare, and  5) space-to-Earth warfare.   
 
The “core of space warfare” is thus the struggle for information dominance, so IW in space constitutes its 
main mode.  The principal forms of space IW are: 1) conducting space electronic and space network 
warfare to inflict “soft” strikes on enemy space platforms, thereby disrupting and destroying their electronic 
equipment and computer systems; and 2) employing all types of anti-satellite weapons to inflict “hard” 
strikes on enemy platforms, thereby fundamentally destroying his space-information system. 
 Finally, the decisiveness of space dominance in future IW is clearly reflected in the ever-escalating 
preparations by world military powers to win future space wars.  The pace of competition for the 
militarization of space has increased dramatically since Desert Storm, to include 1) the vigorous 
development and deployment of offensive and defensive weapons for space operations, 2) accelerated 
development of the space theater of war,  3) creation and organization of  space combat troops, and 4) 
development of theories on space combat.  
 
 
 
 
  
209
 
Space Electronic Warfare 
Owing to its strategic significance, say Chinese aerospace experts, space electronic warfare (EW) -- aimed 
at jamming, sabotaging, and destroying satellites -- has become the most important way to gain information 
dominance in future wars.   
As the pivotal role of space-based synthetic aperture radar (SAR) becomes increasingly manifest, various 
countries are rushing to develop countermeasures.  Active jamming -- said to be the most effective 
technique among asymmetrical countermeasures -- is divided into active suppressive and active deception 
jamming.  Active suppressive jamming includes barrage, spot, and random pulse jamming.  Active 
deception jamming includes repeater, responsive, and scattered wave jamming.  Chinese algorithms 
demonstrate that, in order to achieve the ideal jamming effect against SAR, the jamming signal must be 
highly coherent with the radar echo -- a technique deemed feasible from a Chinese engineering perspective. 
 
Chinese experts in space EW note that the counter-jamming capabilities of radar systems have been 
continuously advancing.  The production of jamming signals with the same frequency and coverage as the 
radar signals has already been realized.  However, the jamming signal created by countermeasures 
equipment is often not in the same direction as that of the target echo.  Space adaptive jamming suppression 
technology can suppress the jamming signals in different directions compared to the direction of the signal 
echo.   
 
Furthermore, the jamming suppression system can correspondingly provide adaptive variations following 
changes in the jamming direction.  This technology has thus gained wide recognition, and has become an 
important technological measure in the development of radar counter-jamming capability. 
 
The air-space battlefield is said to be the quintessential battlefield for information counterattack.  EW 
satellites traveling in geostationary orbits or 300-1,000 kilometer orbits can conduct electronic 
reconnaissance and jamming in wide areas.  EW aircraft in flight can execute high-intensity electronic 
killing of enemy long-range radar stations, command centers, and communications centers to paralyze their 
command capabilities and disable their firing systems.  They can also directly launch anti-radiation missiles 
to totally destroy the enemy. 
According to Chinese military scientists, the high-powered microwave (HPM) weapon has triggered  “a 
new revolution in electronic warfare  systems and technology.”  Not only is it compatible for creating 
integrated systems with radar for low-power detection, target tracking, and target jamming, but its power 
can also be rapidly increased for hard damage/destruction of targets and for inflicting damage on the 
electronic equipment of enemy targets.  These weapons portend extremely wide applications extending to 
aeronautic, astronautic, warship, and battlefield weaponry. 
 
The Chinese charge that rapid advances are being made in U.S. HPM and high-powered radio-frequency 
weapons development, and that they have already entered the applications stages.  But designers of 
electronic systems can adopt many countermeasures for reducing HPM interference and damage, such as 
protective measures for the coupling and cable connections of systems and subsystems.  Transmitters and 
receivers can be designed to be very sensitive to HPM; their duty ratios can be reduced; and redundant 
circuitry can be designed to further reduce HPM interference and damage.   
 
 Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Warfare 
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Chinese military scientists assert that ASAT warfare is the most effective way to achieve space dominance.  
The principal forms are: 1) use aircraft, warplanes, and rockets to launch anti-satellite missiles to destroy 
enemy satellites; 2) install “space landmines” on the orbits of enemy satellites for destruction once they hit 
the landmines; and 3) use positioning weapons such as lasers, clusters of particles, and microwaves to 
attack enemy satellites.  According to the Chinese, the United States has conducted successful experiments 
using laser weapons to destroy targeted satellites.  Russia has also conducted tests using clusters of particles 
to disrupt and destroy the electronic equipment of satellites. 
Based on the capabilities of reconnaissance satellites, Chinese aerospace scientists have compiled the 
following list of  “space-information countermeasures”: 
• Aim for the satellite's effective payload by applying suppression interference to cause overload in 
the satellite's receiving system, data processing system, and memory; 
• Target the satellite's remote control system by 1) establishing a space target monitoring system to 
acquire the satellite's technical parameters and character information, and 2) effectively detecting 
and analyzing the satellite's operational system and down-link remote signal; 
• Attack the satellite's space-to-ground communication and command nodes to weaken the 
connection, link, mutual operation, and networking flexibility in order to degrade its operational 
effectiveness; and 
• Use high-energy and kinetic weapons to blind [2006] or destroy [2007] the reconnaissance 
satellite [dates added by author]. 
While Chinese military experts applaud the "brilliant" performance of the U.S. Global Positioning System 
(GPS) in recent high-tech military operations, they continue to clarify its inevitable "Achilles' Heel."  They 
have delineated three major weaknesses.  First, defeat GPS at its source by exploiting the weakness of the 
low orbits of navigation satellites.  This is accomplished by attacking with 1) anti-satellite satellites, 2) 
high-energy laser weapons, and 3) high-altitude weather-monitoring rockets.  Second, defeat GPS in the 
middle by exploiting the scattered and exposed ground stations.   
Finally, defeat GPS at the end by exploiting the fact that navigation signals are highly attenuated.   After 
attenuation by natural causes, the ground signal is very weak and easy to jam.  To prevent the enemy from 
locating and destroying the GPS jammers and to avoid personnel losses, the GPS jammer can be carried on 
a variety of platforms -- such as numerous aircraft and projectiles -- and thrown into a designated region for 
effective jamming.  
 
The Chinese also allege a U.S. counterspace scenario against the Galileo system, which is said to consist 
of:  1) attacks by ground-based laser weapons, 2)  attacks by airborne laser weapons, and   3)  attacks by 
orbital weapons.  (Orbital weapons capable of attacking enemy targets include laser and beam weapons.)  
  
These experts also propose three measures that China and other countries could employ to counter the 
above-mentioned three “U.S.” tactics: 
 
• Passive Defense:  Create a protective shield in space to disperse laser attacks 
• Active Defense:  Establish ground-based anti-satellite systems and orbital weapons platforms 
and deploy orbital weapons to attack and destroy hostile targets  
• Develop strategic weapons to counter space weapons 
 
 Chinese aerospace scientists describe the “new-concept” orbital ballistic missile (orbital missile) as a multi-
task, multi-role strike weapon capable of implementing random orbit transfer from Earth orbits. It can 
function as an intercontinental ballistic missile, an ASAT weapon, and an orbital bomber weapon.  The 
missile is a cross between a ballistic missile and a satellite; it is a ballistic missile in a satellite orbit or a 
satellite with weapons capability.  These missiles should be developed using the mutually interchangeable 
ground-based and space-based missiles, ground-ground missiles, and ASAT missiles.   
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To attack a target satellite, the orbital missile may ascend to the intercept point or it may enter a holding 
orbit around the Earth, and then encounter the target by changing the orbit.  The advantages of the direct-
ascent approach are that it is simple, its early-warning time is short, and its fuel-to-mass ratio is low.  But 
this approach means that each launch has only one chance to attack.   
 
In contrast, the approach of attacking from orbit has several chances in a single day.  The possible 
operations include:  1)  making the orbit of the missile coaxial with the orbit of the target satellite, and 
achieving interception by expanding the orbit with thrust impulse; 2)  placing the missile in an Earth orbit 
lower than that of the target satellite, so that its apogee is almost coincident with the perigee of the target 
satellite’s orbit, and achieving interception by faster orbital speed; and 3)  still placing the missile into an 
Earth orbit lower than that of the target, but intercepting it at a certain orbit position by a dynamic jump.  
But this method requires a more complex control technology and a higher fuel-to-mass ratio.  The target 
satellite will also have a longer early-warning period.  
 
Anti-Missile Warfare 
 
Anti-missile warfare refers primarily to the employment of an anti-missile system composed of space-, air-, 
and ground-based platforms to detect, identify, and track enemy ballistic missiles.  Anti-missile space 
warfare also refers to the employment of positioning, kinetic, and other anti-missile weapons to intercept 
and destroy enemy missiles.  The United States, say the Chinese,  is currently developing a national missile 
defense (NMD) system “which is actually an anti-missile system anchored primarily in space warfare.” 
Chinese aerospace scientists note that, compared with land-based, sea-based, and air-based antiballistic 
missile weapons, space-based antiballistic missile weapons have the following advantages:  1) they can 
intercept missiles on a global basis,  2)  they can carry out highly efficient boost-phase interception, and  3)  
the virtually vacuum space is advantageous for improving an interceptor’s capabilities, such as reducing the 
attenuation of laser energy in the atmosphere.  (Space-based antiballistic missile weapons, however, have 
the shortcoming that they need enormous amounts of resources to build.) 
 
In analyzing the capabilities of the air- and  space-based laser systems that underpin the ballistic missile 
boost-phase interception stage of the U.S. NMD system, Chinese scientists have also analyzed the 
feasibility of boost-phase evasive measures, to include the following four methods:  1)  employ fast-
burning rocket motor to shorten the duration of the boost-phase and hence the duration for a laser attack; 
2) perform active rolling of the missile body during the boost phase so that the energy of the laser spot at a 
given location remains lower than the damage threshold;  3)  apply high-reflectivity, low-conductivity, anti-
laser coating on the missile surface to reduce the thermal coupling coefficient of the laser and keep the 
temperature rise rate in the safe region;  and  4) other countermeasures such as smoke. 
 
Chinese military strategists stress that the creation of ballistic missile defense systems and corresponding 
“penetrating measures” again prove the “shield-spear” dialectic, each of which will always generate the 
other and advance competitively.  For today, the Chinese propose the following “penetrating measures”: 1)  
multiple warhead attack,  2)  decoy penetration,  3)  interruption and concealed penetrations, 4)  enclosing 
balls (huge metallic membrane balloons), 5)  trajectory change penetrations, 6)  mobile launch,  
and  7)  preemptive strike:  “attack and destroy a certain part” of the NMD system. 
 
Conducting a preemptive strike includes:  1)  use “suicide satellites” (an orbital type of cruise satellite) or 
 laser weapons to destroy the early-warning satellite system and space-based infrared systems of the NMD 
system to paralyze them, and  2)  launch preemptive attacks against each component of the NMD system.  
According to Russian scientists, say the Chinese
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, it is possible to use a mid-air nuclear explosion to destroy 
the “command, control, and communication management center” of the NMD system to both paralyze and 
attack its essential defensive capabilities. 
Chinese strategists assert that for the long term, “we must intensify new and high-tech pre-research in this 
field, focus on aerospace threats and missile-attack and defense confrontations, and establish an all-
dimensional and integrated missile defense system as soon as possible.” 
 
“Integrated Air-and-Space Operations” 
 
“This revolution,” say the Chinese, “is first of all a revolution in concepts.”   Like their Russian 
counterparts, Chinese military strategists have long been articulating a body of operational concepts for 
conducting integrated “air-and-space operations” (ASO).   
 
The boundaries dividing military aviation and aerospace will gradually disappear to create a unified 
aviation and aerospace entity whose range extends from the surface of the Earth to outer space.  The 
ground, air, and space already constitute an indivisible operational environment -- as demonstrated by the 
experience of recent wars.  Conducting integrated ASO is now only a matter of perfecting the relevant 
technologies, and no longer a matter of their feasibility.   
 
Owing to the technological breakthroughs in systems such as the Space Shuttle, aerospace aircraft, space 
weapons, and “new-concept” weapons, integrated ASO are becoming a new operational form of 
informationized warfare.  For example, the Space Shuttle will become a completely new space weapon that 
combines aviation and spaceflight strikes, transportation, and information operations.   
 
This kind of milestone weapon, say Chinese scientists, will create the conditions for multidimensional, 
stereoscopic operations conducted from space to Earth, from Earth to space, and from space to space -- 
thereby transforming integrated ASO from theoretical to actual.  An integrated air-space maneuver 
platform can transport troops to any location on Earth in a few hours, while the attack weapons -- such as 
laser and beam weapons -- can execute precision strikes at the speed of several hundred thousand 
kilometers per second.  This speed is hardly something that defensive weapons can withstand.  
 
The principles behind integrated ASO consist in “attacking systems” and “attacking the whole.”  
Implementing a whole system-to-system confrontation is completely consistent with the Chinese concept of 
“whole operations” in informationized warfare (i.e., “integrated network-electronic warfare”).  As space 
weapons continue to be developed, the speed at which targets can be acquired and attacked from outer 
space will undergo an Einsteinian change.  Targets can be obliterated in an instant from distances of up to 
10,000 kilometers, which makes the course of operations measurable in minutes or seconds.  The concept 
of time in operations will thus move from the “time of combat vehicles” and “time of missiles” to the “time 
of the speed of light.”   
 
Chinese military strategists predict that the emergence of integrated ASO will inevitably trigger a sea-
change in military strategy.  The expanding space battlefield will compel new theories such as space threat 
warfare, space mobility warfare, space blockade warfare, space attack warfare, and space defense warfare.   
 
As “new-concept” weapons continue to be developed, the expanding space arsenal will generate such 
operations as laser attacks, microwave attacks, meteorological attacks, genetic attacks, virus attacks, and 
non-lethal attacks.   
 
The first wave of war will develop from “firepower attack” and “electromagnetic attack” to “satellite 
paralysis.”  Space will become, say the Chinese, “the first true battlefield.” 
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Organizational Imperatives 
 
Chinese military scientists note that, in order to implement space warfare, all organizational elements of the 
PLA must undergo both quantitative and qualitative changes.  In general, the operational forces will now 
elevate technical elements, and operational systems will endure major adjustments. 
 
First, the PLA will transform the current large unit formations.  Operational units will become smaller, the 
number of combatants within the formations will be greatly reduced, and science and technology personnel 
within the PLA will increase dramatically. 
 
Second, significant changes will occur in the composition of the PLA services and branches.  In addition to 
eliminating some of the older military branches, a series of new technical and combat branches will be 
organized.  These will include a “space force,” an “aviation and aerospace corps,” and “drone operations 
units.” 
 
Third, operational command systems and logistics (and technical) support systems will also be substantially 
adjusted and transformed.  The command organization for space forces will be given prominence in the 
command system in order to constantly strengthen command-and-control capabilities for the operational air 
and space forces.   
 
Implications  for the United States 
 
During the Cold War, the Soviets used the arms control process to gain time to overcome a perceived lag in 
emerging military technologies.  And, like all good Marxist-Maoists, Chinese political leaders rarely say 
what they mean.  But their PLA helmsmen do.  Viewed as a military museum at the time of Desert Storm in 
1991, the PLA has engineered a quantum leap into the “space club,” even imposing its own terms in the 
process.  So the recent blinding and pulverizing of satellites can hardly be cryptic to anyone who reads their 
open exhortations to their own cadres. 
 
“Whoever loses space loses the future,” they say -- and mean.  Among other “new-concept” weapons 
openly earmarked for space dominance, laser technology appears to be the PLA’s current “holy of holies.”  
Based on their colossal progress to date, America should cease to be complacent about the sanctity of its 
orbital assets.  Citing the Nikita Khrushchev of forty years ago, one PLA writer has warned that a new 
“Sword of Damocles” now dangles over the whole planet. 
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Hearing on “China's Military Modernization and Its Impact on the United States and the Asia-
Pacific” 
A Congressional Perspective: 
Congressman Duncan Hunter (R-CA) 
March 29-30, 2007 
 
Madam Chairman Carolyn Bartholomew and Vice Chairman Daniel Blumenthal, thank you for 
the opportunity to offer my perspective and concerns regarding the People Republic of China’s (PRC) 
military modernization efforts and its impact on the United States, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world.   
 
Since 2000, this Commission has informed Members of Congress with its policy analysis and 
legislative recommendations, which are aimed at protecting and advancing U.S. economic and security 
interests given the uncertainty of China’s desire to increase its regional and global roles.  On behalf of my 
fellow Members of Congress and my fellow Americans, I commend you for your hard work and dedicated 
service.   
 
This hearing is timely.  Earlier this year, China conducted a direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) 
test—a provocative act signaling the communist country’s indisputable capability to challenge the United 
States in space.  As someone who has watched China’s military build-up closely for over a decade, the 
timing of this test was unexpected, but the act itself was not surprising.  In 2003 the Department of Defense 
predicted that “China is believed to be conducting research and development on a direct-ascent anti-
satellite (ASAT) system that could be fielded in the 2005-2010 timeframe” in its annual report to Congress 
on Chinese military modernization.  Four years later, the world witnessed a suspected intention evolve into 
a tested capability when the Chinese intercepted and destroyed one of its aging weather satellites.   
A few weeks after the ASAT test, China announced that its 2007 defense budget would be 
increased by 17.8 percent over the previous year—increasing its military spending from $35 billion in 2006 
to $45 billion in 2007. The Pentagon believes China’s military spending is two to three times greater than 
the public budget numbers.  China’s continued double-digit defense increases demonstrate its resolve to 
transform and evolve its military into one that can challenge its regional neighbors first and then into a 
force that can conduct offensive operations globally.  The October 2006 surfacing of a Chinese SONG-
class diesel submarine near the USS Kittyhawk coupled with its ASAT test point to the likelihood that we 
are on the brink of seeing China’s investments in modernizing its military pay off.      
I came to Washington with the strong belief that the primary responsibility of Congress is to 
protect the American people.  Today, my convictions are even stronger when considering 21st Century 
challenges to U.S. security.  As we prosecute the Global War on Terrorism, much of the public’s attention 
is focused on the Middle East and the on-going military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  But it is the 
responsibility of leaders—from our military commanders on the front lines to policy makers in 
Washington—not to lose sight of the vast range of potential security challenges that may threaten our way 
of life.   
 
The Pentagon’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) noted that China was at a 
strategic crossroads and it had the “greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States.”  In 
2006, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) conducted its first-ever bipartisan Committee 
Defense Review (CDR) to complement the Pentagon’s QDR.  Unlike the QDR, our analysis and findings 
were based primarily on threats.  However, the Committee’s efforts also recognized China as a potential 
strategic challenge to the United States.  Some of our key findings included:  
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 China’s military capabilities are developing in a direction that could challenge U.S. Armed 
Forces; 
 China’s defense spending is rapidly growing and the military is undergoing a general 
downsizing to free up resources to accelerate modernization; 
 The People’s Liberation Army is an increasingly professional force equipped with the latest 
generation of advanced military hardware; and 
 The PRC’s air and naval forces have dramatically improved their capabilities to extend the 
battle space beyond Chinese territorial waters and increasingly focused on anti-access and 
area-denial capabilities.  
 
   While it is remains uncertain if China will emerge as a responsible regional and global partner, 
China’s military modernization ambitions and its increasing global aspirations to become a political, 
economic, and military power are beyond doubt.  Therefore, the American people and our allies deserve the 
highest levels of diligence in understanding how China may evolve into a strategic challenge and threaten 
the security and economic prosperity of the United States, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world.  Our 
constituents also deserve informed leaders who make the necessary and difficult decisions about what 
America requires to maintain the strength necessary to deter and prepare for these potential Chinese 
challenges.   
  
As the former Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee, I offer 
my concerns regarding China’s military modernization efforts for your consideration: 
 
American dollars are paying for Chinese military modernization  
 
In the last ten years, I have watched China become the world’s third largest trading power by 
devaluing its currency to achieve an export advantage over its trading partners.  This action makes Chinese 
goods less expensive on the global market.  As a result, China’s trade surplus with the United States has 
grown to more than $200 billion in 2006, a 25 percent increase from 2004.  Despite a slight currency re-
valuation in 2005, the Chinese Yuan remains undervalued by approximately 40 percent.  By undervaluing it 
currency, China has given itself an unfair advantage to strengthen its manufacturing base at the expense of 
American manufacturers.  This unacceptable practice, coupled with other tariffs and trade penalties, creates 
an uneven playing field and a one-way street for trade.   
 
At the beginning of this Congress, I joined my collogue and good friend, U.S. Rep. Tim Ryan 
(OH) in reintroducing the Fair Currency Act, which would level the playing field for U.S. workers and 
reverse the one-way trade deals that are eroding the U.S. manufacturing base.  If enacted into law, our 
proposal would define “exchange-rate manipulation” and permit American workers and manufacturers to 
seek relief against imports from countries that regulate the value of their currency, including China.  
 
 In the context of this hearing, I believe our legislation would also directly impact China’s rapid 
economic growth, therefore indirectly reducing the pace and scope of China’s military modernization by 
making it more difficult for the Chinese to use American greenbacks to purchase its ships, planes, and 
missiles.  
 
China’s Preparations for War Over Taiwan 
 
China is likely to continue a regional campaign to achieve re-unification with Taiwan by shaping 
and influencing diplomatic, economic, and security initiatives.  While economic integration with Taiwan is 
far along and likely to continue, it is also likely that China will continue to prevent the independence of 
Taiwan through coercive means and continue to expand its regional influence.  This policy China’s  
sustained military threat is evident by the deployment of over 800 short-range ballistic missiles to garrisons 
facing Taiwan.  Additionally, China continues to modernize its offensive air capabilities, including modern 
tactical fighters and precision weaponry.   China continues to improve its surface-to-air-missile system, 
 including the Russian variant, S-300 PMU2/SAM, which if placed on the coast opposite Taiwan would 
give China the capability to intercept aircraft operating over the island within a range of 200 kilometers.   
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While it is not likely that China will seek a military confrontation with the United States, third 
party events or actions could initiate a regional conflict.  As such, the House Armed Services Committee’s 
CDR determined that China is also continuing to modernize its military capabilities to deter and defeat any 
American forces that may be sent to protect Taiwan.  It is safe to assume that China will continue to 
develop and modernize its cruise and intermediate-range ballistic missiles along with its integrated air 
defenses.  It is also likely that China will continue to expand its conventional submarine forces while 
reportedly arming them with novel missiles, such as the Russian SS-N-Sizzler.   
 
China’s Ambitions to Modernize Its Strategic Forces  
 
China’s ASAT test earlier this year shocked most of the world, getting the attention of all who 
have assets in space, including commercial entities.  From a security perspective, China’s ASAT test 
illustrated its progress in expanding its offensive capabilities beyond the traditional battlefield.  For the 
United States, it revealed the potential vulnerability of our military and commercial space assets and 
marked the commencement of a new era of military competition in space.  This is happening whether we 
like it or not unfortunately.   
 
Protecting our war fighting capabilities and our economic interests compels this nation to take the 
necessary steps to ensure our forces cannot be targeted through an adversarial space strike.  In a letter to the 
President, U.S. Rep. Terry Everett (AL) and I expressed these concerns and asked the Department of 
Defense to review its programs intended to preserve American space assets and to put in place new 
programs which “provide protection, redundancy, and reconstitution.”  We also recommended that the 
United States review all potential space cooperative activities with China in order to deny the Chinese any 
space technologies that could advance its military space ambitions.   
 
China’s modernization of its strategic forces is not limited to counter-space operations.  China’s 
strategic force ambitions also include building a robust arsenal of short-, medium- and long-range ballistic 
missiles and making large investments in submarine launched ballistic missiles, asymmetric capabilities 
such as cyber warfare, advanced submarines, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Significant strategic 
developments that have caught my attention include China’s successful development of solid-fueled and 
road-mobile DF-31 and DF-31A, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) which could target the United 
States, and the reported completion of five domestically-produced nuclear submarines.  There are also 
some independent military experts who believe the Chinese may be equipping their silo-based ICBM’s 
with multiple warheads.   
 
Over the years, I have spoken to U.S. military commanders and administration officials regarding 
the quality and quantity of China’s nuclear arsenal and nuclear ambitions.  Although there is some 
uncertainty, there is consensus that China is actively seeking to expand its strategic capabilities, including 
participating in counterintelligence activities to acquire advanced technologies.  From these accounts, it is 
also clear that China’s strategic posture should be calculated in the U.S. strategic equation.   
 
China’s Future Power Projection Capabilities 
 
In addition to seeking capabilities to dominate regionally, it is evident that China seeks capabilities 
to project military power into the Pacific and well beyond the South China Sea.  In our defense review, the 
Armed Services Committee concluded that the Chinese air force has an interest in acquiring an aerial 
fueling and airborne early warning (AEW) capabilities, turning some older bombers into tankers and 
modifying A-50/IL-76 transport aircraft to perform the AEW mission.  The resulting capabilities would 
provide greater reach and command and control functions for the Chinese military.  In terms of Chinese 
naval power, we found that the Chinese are transforming from a coastal navy to a deep-water fleet centered 
 on anti-access and area-denial vessels, such as the four Sovremmenny-class destroyers equipped with the 
advanced SS-N-22 Sunburn ship-to-ship missiles; modern submarines, including twelve modern KILO-
class diesel submarines from Russia and its five domestically produced nuclear submarines; and advanced 
weapons systems, such as long-range anti-ship cruise missiles and naval mines.  
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China’s competition for regional and global influence 
 
Lastly, China’s rapid economic growth and military modernization ambitions may reflect a nation 
seeking greater influence not only in the Asia-Pacific region but globally.   Although China’s global 
military influence is limited, focused primarily on participation in peacekeeping operations and arms sales, 
its diplomatic and economic roles are expanding.  If you look around the world, you will see a Chinese 
presence in different regions, including Africa and Latin America.  You will also find China increasing its 
demand for capital, technology, and natural resources beyond its regional neighbors.  Although not widely 
accepted today, I believe that it is probable that China’s expanded economic interests around the world may 
shift its justification for its military modernization from defending its sovereignty to building a military 
capable of defending its global interests.  This is a possibility I recommend that this Commission watch 
closely. 
 
Closing 
 
In closing, China’s rapid economic growth, double-digit defense spending, investments in military 
modernization with a focus on power projection and its strategic forces, and increasing presence around the 
world require a policy employed by one of America’s great leaders, Ronald Reagan – “Trust, but verify.”  
America and its allies cannot afford to wait one the sidelines as China continues its upward trajectory.  We 
must devise and implement a strategy to counter China’s ambitions now so we are not unprepared for the 
future.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
